Based on Sharad Birdhichand here and many other judgments, Allahabad High Court has set-aside the conviction and sentence of the appellants.
Tag: Catena of Landmark Judgments Referred/Cited to
Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda Vs State of Maharashtra on 17 Jul 1984
Landmark judgment by a 3-judge bench of Supreme Court around circumstantial evidence (Sec 106 of Evidence Act 1872) basis which the accused were acquitted. The 5 golden principles postulated in this decision are as below.
153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established :
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade and another Vs. State of Maharashtra 1973 2 SCC 793 where the observations were made :
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the
accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.
154. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.
Citations : [1984 SCC 4 116], [1984 AIR SC 1622], [1984 CRI LJ 1738], [1984 CRIMES 2 235], [1984 CAR 263], [1984 CRLJ 90 1738], [1984 SCALE 2 445], [1985 SCR 1 88], [1984 CRLR 296], [1985 BOMCR SC 1 208], [1984 CRIMES SC 2 853], [1984 SCC CRI 1 487], [1984 SCC CRI 487], [1984 CRLJ SC 1738], [1984 AIR 1622], [1984 CRIMES SC 2 235]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1505859/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56b48ca6607dba348ffede2b
Kapil Agarwal and Ors Vs Sanjay Sharma and Ors 01 Mar 2021
Apex Court quashed the FIR in this case, and u/s 210 CrPC, held as follows
From Paras 5 and 6,
Thus, as per Section 210 Cr.P.C., when in a case instituted otherwise than on a police report, i.e., in a complaint case, during the course of the inquiry or trial held by the Magistrate, it appears to the Magistrate that an investigation by the police is in progress in relation to the offence which is the subject matter of the inquiry or trial held by him, the Magistrate shall stay the proceedings of such inquiry or trial and call for a report on the matter from the police officer conducting the investigation. It also provides that if a report is made by the investigating police officer under Section 173 Cr.P.C. and on such report cognizance of any offence is taken by the Magistrate against any person who is an accused in the complaint case, the Magistrate shall inquire into or try together the complaint case and the case arising out of the police report as if both the cases were instituted on a police report. It also further provides that if the police report does not relate to any accused in the complaint case or if the Magistrate does not take cognizance of any offence on the police report, he shall proceed with the inquiry or trial, which was stayed by him, in accordance with the provisions of Cr.P.C.
Thus, merely because on the same set of facts with the same allegations and averments earlier the complaint is filed, there is no bar to lodge the FIR with the police station with the same allegations and averments.
6. However, at the same time, if it is found that the subsequent FIR is an abuse of process of law and/or the same has been lodged only to harass the accused, the same can be quashed in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution or in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. In that case, the complaint case will proceed further in accordance with the provisions of the Cr.P.C.
Citations : [2021 SCC OnLine SC 154]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/97191348/
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/kapil-agarwal-and-others-versus-sanjay-sharma-and-others
https://www.legitquest.com/case/kapil-agarwal-and-others-v-sanjay-sharma-and-others/1DA1F3
https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/tag/inherent-powers-of-high-courts/
U.Surekha Vs State of AP on 04 Mar 2021
Relying on landmark judgment of Apex Court here, a Division bench of AP High Court comprising the Chief Justice held that the rule [Rule 5(2)(a)(i) of Andhra Pradesh State Judicial Service Rules, 2007] which mandates 3 years of practice as requirement from Junior Civil Judge positions in State of AP was unconstitutional and the Notification issued on 03 Dec 2020 was set aside.
Another case got filed at Supreme Court here which was later withdrawn.
Preeti Vs Sandeep Asthana on 6 Sep 2017
After discussion the law around converting one petition into one with different pleadings/prayers under Rule 17 of Order VI of the C.P.C., the division bench of Allahabad High Court held that under this rule, Court has power to allow amendment petitions to avoid multiplicity of suits, to do the substantial justice to parties.
Citations : [2017 ADJ 10 232], [2017 ALLWC 5 4646], [2017 ALR 125 133], [2017 ALR 125 397], [2017 ARC 3 853]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/66510547/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5e96b4964653d0536457f983
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/smt-preeti-vs-sandeep-asthana
https://www.legitquest.com/case/preeti-v-sandeep-asthana/1A8067
Santokh Singh Vs Izhar Hussain and Anr on 25 Apr 1973
A 2-judge bench of Apex Court held that, in this particular case, the Police officer can not be saddled with IPC 211 and prosecuted u/s 340 CrPC read with 195 CrPC. But the necessary ingredients are clearly articulated and hence this case law has to be relied upon as landmark judgment to file perjury against the person who made the false complaint (FIR need not be registered).
From Para 8,
8. In this Court, Shri Gupta has very forcefully contended that on the material on the record this direction is wholly unjustified, if not positively illegal, being based on misreading of evidence and on erroneous view of law. According to the submission, the appellant had neither lodged the FIR nor otherwise instituted any criminal proceeding or falsely charged Izhar Hussain within the contemplation of Section 211 IPC. Besides, there is absolutely no material on the record on which the High Court could have formed an opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that a complaint under Section 211 IPC should be filed against the appellant.
From Para 10,
… The short question posed, therefore, is, if by giving false evidence as a witness against Izhar Hussain the appellant can be said to have charged him within the contemplation of Section 211 IPC. If this question is answered in the affirmative, then it will have to be determined whether there is in fact a false accusation and finally whether it is expedient in the interest of justice on the facts and circumstances of the present case to direct a complaint to be filed under Section 211 IPC. This section as its marginal note indicates renders punishable false charge of offence with intent to injure. The essential ingredient of an offence under Section 211 IPC is to institute or cause to be instituted any criminal proceeding against a person with intent to cause him injury or with similar intent to falsely charge any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge. Instituting or causing to institute false criminal proceedings assume false charge but false charge may be preferred even when no criminal proceedings result. It is frankly conceded by Shri Kohli that the appellant cannot be said to have instituted any criminal proceeding against any person. So that part of Section 211 IPC is eliminated. Now, the expression “falsely charges” in this section, in our opinion, cannot mean giving false evidence as a prosecution witness against an accused person during the course of a criminal trial. To “falsely charge” must refer to the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation and not when speaking to prove the false charge by making deposition in support of the charge framed in that trial. The words “falsely charges” have to be read along with the expression “institution of criminal proceeding”. Both these expressions, being susceptible of analogous meaning should be understood to have been used in their cognate sense. They get as it were their colour and content from each other. They seem to have been used in a technical sense as commonly understood in our criminal law. The false charge must, therefore, be made initially to a person in authority or to someone who is in a position to get the offender punished by appropriate proceedings. In other words, it must be embodied either in a complaint or in a report of a cognizable offence to the police officer or an officer having authority over the person against whom the allegations are made. The statement in order to constitute the “charge” should be made with the intention and object of setting criminal law in motion. Statement on oath falsely supporting the prosecution case against an accused person more appropriately amounts to an offence under Sections 193 and 195 IPC and not under Section 211 IPC. We do not think that the offences contemplated by Sections 193/195 IPC on the one hand and Section 211 IPC on the other were intended by the legislature in this context, to overlap so as to make it optional whether to proceed under one or the other. ..…
From Para 11,
Every incorrect or false statement does not make it incumbent on the court to order prosecution. The Court has to exercise judicial discretion in the light of all the relevant circumstances when it determines the question of expediency. The court orders prosecution in the larger interest of the administration of justice and not to gratify feelings of personal revenge or vindictiveness or to serve the ends of a private party. Too frequent prosecutions for such offences tend to defeat its very object. It is only in glaring cases of deliberate falsehood where conviction is highly likely that the court should direct prosecution.
Original:
Casemine Version.
Citations : [1973 AIR SC 2190], [1974 BLJR 22 877], [1973 SCC 2 406], [1974 SCR 1 78], [1973 CAR 316], [1973 CRLR SC 473], [1973 SCC CR 828], [1973 SCC CRI 828], [1973 CRLJ SC 1176]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/56524/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ab94e4b014971140cd11
Index of Perjury judgments here.
MS Eicher Tractors Ltd and Ors Vs Harihar Singh and Anr on 7 Nov 2008
A 2-judge bench of Supreme Court held that Counterblast cases/proceedings must be quash as per Category 7 of Bhajan Lal judgment here. It held as follows in Para 10.
10. The case at hand squarely falls within the parameters indicated in category (7) of Bhajan Lal’s case (supra). The factual scenario as noted above clearly shows that the proceedings were initiated as a counterblast to the proceedings initiated by the appellants. Continuance of such proceedings will be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. Proceedings are accordingly quashed.
Citations : [2009 JCC 1 260], [2009 LW CRL 1 284], [2008 SCALE 15 60], [2008 SCALE 14 1], [2008 SCC 16 763], [2009 BC 1 193], [2009 SLT 1 576], [2009 OCR 42 139], [2008 AIOL 1268], [2009 CRIMES SC 1 144], [2008 JT 12 661], [2008 SCR 16 7], [2008 SUPREME 8 559], [2010 SCC CRI 4 425], [2009 ECRN SC 1 422], [2009 AIC SC 73 198]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/312043/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae6de4b0149711413d41
State of Karnataka Vs M. Devendrappa and Anr on 16 Jan 2002
A 3 judge bench citing Bhajan lal judgment here, held as follows:
In dealing with the last case, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is function of the trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of private complainant as unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly.
Finally, it was held that, there were grounds to Quash the proceedings, by saying,
the involvement of excise officials cannot be ruled out and when they have been indicated to be witnesses, likelihood of prejudice cannot be ruled out. It was also noted that there was no “definite evidence” to show that accused nos. 1&2 were directly involved. Finally, it was observed that there was no material to hold that the accused persons had committed theft of “Letter Heads” from Karnataka Bank Ltd., and/or they had committed forgery for the purpose of cheating or have used genuine forged documents or had cheated the government. Finally, it was observed that there was no evidence to infer common intention to commit such offences.
Citations : [2002 SCC 3 89], [2002 SCALE 1 176], [2002 AIR SC 671], [2002 SCR 1 275], [2002 CRLJ SC 998], [2002 SCC CRI 539], [2002 UJ SC 1 362], [2002 AIR SC 286], [2002 SUPREME 1 192], [2002 ACR SC 1 605], [2002 ALD CRI 1 412], [2002 SCSUPPL CHN 2 21], [2002 UC 1 294], [2002 AIR SCW 286], [2002 JT SC 1 213]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1014506/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adc4e4b0149711412362
Pankaj Kumar Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 11 Jul 2008
In this landmark judgment, Apex Court held that Right to speedy trial is implicit to Article 21 of Constitution of India and also passed guidelines to ensure that this right is not violated, and it violated, Constitutional Courts have a duty to fix such violation appropriately.
From Para 14,
14. Time and again this Court has emphasized the need for speedy investigations and trial as both are mandated by the letter and spirit of the provisions of the CrPC. (In particular, Sections 197, 173, 309, 437 (6) and 468 etc.) and the constitutional protection enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. Inspired by the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by a seven-Judge Bench of this Court in Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India & Anr., in Hussainara Khatoon & Ors. Vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, this Court had said that Article 21 confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except according to procedure established by law; that such procedure is not some semblance of a procedure but the procedure should be ‘reasonable, fair and just’; and therefrom flows, without doubt, the right to speedy trial. It was also observed that no procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as ‘reasonable, fair or just’ and it would fall foul of Article 21. The Court clarified that speedy trial means reasonably expeditious trial which is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21.
From Para 15,
15. The exposition of Article 21 in Hussainara Khatoon’s case (supra) was exhaustively considered afresh by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors. Vs. R.S. Nayak & Anr.11. Referring to a number of decisions of this Court and the American precedents on the Sixth Amendment of their Constitution, making the right to a speedy and public trial a constitutional guarantee, the Court formulated as many as eleven propositions with a note of caution that these were not exhaustive and were meant only to serve as guidelines. For the sake of brevity, we do not propose to reproduce all the said propositions and it would suffice to note the gist thereof. These are:
(i) fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily;
(ii) right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial;
(iii) in every case where the speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is —
who is responsible for the delay?;
(iv) while determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of right to speedy trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the work-load of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on— what is called, the systemic delays;
(v) each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case;
(vi) ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh several relevant factors—’balancing test’ or ‘balancing process’—and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied;
(vii) Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open and having regard to the nature of offence and other circumstances when the court feels that quashing of proceedings cannot be in the interest of justice, it is open to the court to make appropriate orders, including fixing the period for completion of trial;
(viii) it is neither advisable nor feasible to prescribe any outer time-limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. In every case of complaint of denial of right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint;
(ix) an objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in High Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis.
From Para 17,
17. It is, therefore, well settled that the right to speedy trial in all criminal persecutions is an inalienable right under Article 21 of the Constitution. This right is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in court but also includes within its sweep the preceding police investigations as well. The right to speedy trial extends equally to all criminal persecutions and is not confined to any particular category of cases. In every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the court has to perform the balancing act upon taking into consideration all the attendant circumstances, enumerated above, and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. Where the court comes to the conclusion that the right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, may be quashed unless the court feels that having regard to the nature of offence and other relevant circumstances, quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a situation, it is open to the court to make an appropriate order as it may deem just and equitable including fixation of time for conclusion of trial.
Citations : [2008 RCR CRI 4 890], [2008 AIR SC 0 5165], [2008 JT 8 109], [2008 AIR SC 3077], [2008 RAJ 6 293], [2008 SCC 16 117], [2008 WLC 2 677], [2008 MLJ CRI 2 1649], [2009 SCJ 1 998], [2008 SCALE 9 760], [2008 CCR 3 176], [2008 DLT CRI 3 533], [2008 SLT 6 233], [2008 AIOL 2116], [2008 ANJ SC 2 173], [2008 BOMCR CRI SC 2 590], [2010 SCC CRI 4 217], [2008 AIC SC 68 93], [2009 LLN 2 798], [2009 FLR 122 790], [2008 CRLJ SC 3944], [2008 AIR SCW 5165]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1223002/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae6ae4b0149711413c8f
M. Subramaniam Vs S. Janaki on 20 Mar 2020
3-Judge bench of Apex Court held that mere pendency of civil proceeding (divorce, maintenance, dvc etc) is not a good ground and justification to not register and investigate an FIR if a criminal offence has been committed.
Citations : [2020 SCC ONLINE SC 341], [2020 (2) Crimes 261 (SC)], [2020 (5) CTC 464]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/37685877/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5e78e5bf3321bc362da2b770
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/m-subramaniam-and-another-versus-s-janaki-and-another
