Citing various caselaws, Division bench of Kerala High Court held that a General Power of Attorney Holder can ask as an agent of the witness in a Court and depose on his behalf.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/143432928/
Tag: Catena of Landmark Judgments Referred/Cited to
Dhariwal Tobaco Products Ltd and Ors Vs State of Maharastra and Anr on 17 Dec 2008
A wonderful decision by Supreme Court of India around High Court’s inherent power under section 482 CrPC against the Revisional Powers u/s 401 CrPC.
From Para 8,
8. Indisputably issuance of summons is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397 of the Code. This Court in a large number of decisions beginning from R .P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 to Som Mittal v. Govt. of Karnataka , [ (2008) 3 SCC 574 ] has laid down the criterion for entertaining an application under Section 482. Only because a revision petition is maintainable, the same by itself, in our considered opinion, would not constitute a bar for entertaining an application under Section 482 of the Code.
Even where a revision application is barred, as for example the remedy by way of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 this Court has held that the remedies under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India would be available. (See Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others, [ (2003) 6 SCC 675 ] ).
Even in cases where a second revision before the High Court after dismissal of the first one by the Court of Sessions is barred under Section 397 (2) of the Code, the inherent power of the Court has been held to be available.
Citations : [2009 SCC 2 370], [2009 CRLJ SC 974], [2008 SCALE 16 240], [2009 SCC CRI 1 806], [2009 BOMCR CRI SC 1 802], [2008 AIOL 1468], [2008 SCR 17 844], [2009 AIR SC 1032], [2009 AIC SC 75 265], [2009 ECRN SC 2 284]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1891955/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae9ee4b0149711414586
Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs West Bengal Vs Mohan Singh and Ors on 08 Oct 1974
A division bench consisting the legendary Justice P.N. Bhagvati, held that a subsequent petition under 482 CrPC is maintainable if the facts and circumstances are different from earlier application. Here Section 561-A is current Section 482 CrPC.
Section 561-A preserves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as it deems fit to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice and the High Court must, therefore, exercise its inherent powers having regard to the situation prevailing at the particular point of time when its inherent jurisdiction is sought to be invoked. The High Court was in the circumstances entitled to entertain the subsequent application of Respondents 1 and 2 and consider whether on the facts and circumstances then obtaining the continuance of the proceeding against the respondents constituted an abuse of the process of the Court or its quashing was necessary to secure the ends of justice.
Indiankanoon version:
Casemine version:
Citations : [1975 AIR SC 1002], [1975 PLR 77 147], [1975 SCC 3 706], [1974 CRLR 0 691], [1975 AIR SC 100], [1975 SCJ 11 478], [1976 MLJ CRL 1 1], [1975 SCC CRI 156], [1975 CRLJ SC 812]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1993916/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aba3e4b014971140cf5f
Index of Quash judgments is here.
Satprakash Meena Vs Alka Meena on 07 Jul 2021
The single-judge bench of Prathiba M. Singh held out a passionate appeal to Union Government to implement long pending Article 44 of the Constitution of India, Uniform Civil Code for all.
From Para 50,
50. Courts have been repeatedly confronted with the conflicts that arise in personal laws. Persons belonging to various communities, castes and religions, who forge marital bonds, struggle with such conflicts. It is with the hope of bringing uniformity and to eliminate these struggles and conflicts, that the Supreme Court way back in 1985, in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum and Ors, (1985) 2 SCC 556 observed:
“32. It is also a matter of regret that Article 44 of our Constitution has remained a dead letter. It provides that “The State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India”. There is no evidence of any official activity for framing a common civil code for the country. A belief seems to have gained ground that it is for the Muslim community to take a lead in the matter of reforms of their personal law. A common Civil Code will help the cause of national integration by removing disparate loyalties to laws which have conflicting ideologies. No community is likely to bell the cat by making gratuitous concessions on this issue. It is the State which is charged with the duty of securing a uniform civil code for the citizens of the country and, unquestionably, it has the legislative competence to do so. A counsel in the case whispered, somewhat audibly, that legislative competence is one thing, the political courage to use that competence is quite another. We understand the difficulties involved in bringing persons of different faiths and persuasions on a common platform. But, a beginning has to be made if the Constitution is to have any meaning. Inevitably, the role of the reformer has to be assumed by the courts because, it is beyond the endurance of sensitive minds to allow injustice to be suffered when it is so palpable. But piecemeal attempts of courts to bridge the gap between personal laws cannot take the place of a common Civil Code. Justice to all is a far more satisfactory way of dispensing justice than justice from case to case.”
From Para 51,
51. Again in Ms Jordon Diengdeh v. S.S. Chopra, (1985) 3 SCC 62, the Supreme Court observed in the context of dissolution of marriage between a couple wherein the wife belong to the Naga Tribe and the husband was a Sikh by religion that Article 44 of the Constitution needs to be implemented in its letter and spirit. The Supreme Court notices the various provisions under the personal laws applicable to marriages under the Hindu Marriage Act, Special Marriage Act, Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, Muslim Law etc. The Court then concluded and observed as under:-
“7. It is thus seen that the law relating to judicial separation, divorce and nullity of marriage is far, far from uniform. Surely the time has now come for a complete reform of the law of marriage and make a uniform law applicable to all people irrespective of religion or caste. It appears to be necessary to introduce irretrievable breakdown of marriage and mutual consent as grounds of divorce in all cases. The case before us is an illustration of a case where the parties are bound together by a marital tie which is better untied. There is no point or purpose to be served by the continuance of a marriage which has so completely and signally broken down. We suggest that the time has come for the intervention of the legislature in these matters to provide for a uniform code of marriage and divorce and to provide by law for a way out of the unhappy situations in which couples like the present have found themselves in. We direct that a copy of this order may be forwarded to the Ministry of Law and Justice for such action as they may deem fit to take. In the meanwhile, let notice go to the respondents.”
From Para 52,
52. The decisions in Shah Bano (supra) and Ms Jordon Diengdeh (supra) were rendered way back in 1985 and more than 35 years have been passed. The Supreme Court had expressed hope and observed that the time has come for enacting a uniform code of marriage and divorce and urged for a ‘complete reform’. These very sentiments have been again reiterated in Sarla Mudgal Vs. UOI AIR 1995 SC 1531 and Lily Thomas (2000) 6 SCC 224.
From Para 53,
53. In John Vallamattom and Another v. Union of India, (2003) 6 SCC 611, the Supreme Court considered Sarla Mudgal (supra) and further observed:
“44. Before I part with the case, I would like to state that Article 44 provides that the State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India. The aforesaid provision is based on the premise that there is no necessary connection between religious and personal law in a civilized society. Article 25 of the Constitution confers freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion. The aforesaid two provisions viz. Articles 25 and 44 show that the former guarantees religious freedom whereas the latter divests religion from social relations and personal law. It is no matter of doubt that marriage, succession and the like matters of a secular character cannot be brought within the guarantee enshrined under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. Any legislation which brings succession and the like matters of secular character within the ambit of Articles 25 and 26 is a suspect legislation, although it is doubtful whether the American doctrine of suspect legislation is followed in this country. In Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India [(1995) 3 SCC 635: 1995 SCC (Cri) 569] it was held that marriage, succession and like matters of secular character cannot be brought within the guarantee enshrined under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. It is a matter of regret that Article 44 of the Constitution has not been given effect to. Parliament is still to step in for framing a common civil code in the country. A common civil code will help the cause of national integration by removing the contradictions based on ideologies.”
From Para 54,
54. The need for a Uniform Code has been again echoed by the Supreme Court in ABC v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2015) 10 SCC 1, wherein it was held:
“20. It is imperative that the rights of the mother must also be given due consideration. As Ms Malhotra, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, has eloquently argued, the appellant’s fundamental right of privacy would be violated if she is forced to disclose the name and particulars of the father of her child. Any responsible man would keep track of his offspring and be concerned for the welfare of the child he has brought into the world; this does not appear to be so in the present case, on a perusal of the pleading as they presently portray. Furthermore, Christian unwed mothers in India are disadvantaged when compared to their Hindu counterparts, who are the natural guardians of their illegitimate children by virtue of their maternity alone, without the requirement of any notice to the putative fathers. It would be apposite for us to underscore that our directive principles envision the existence of a Uniform Civil Code, but this remains an unaddressed constitutional expectation.”
From Para 55,
55. Recently, in Jose Paulo Coutinho v. Maria Luiza Valentina Pereira and Another, (2019) 20 SCC 85, the Supreme Court observed:
“..24. It is interesting to note that whereas the Founders of the Constitution in Article 44 in Part IV dealing with the Directive Principles of State Policy had hoped and expected that the State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a Uniform Civil Code throughout the territories of India, till date no action has been taken in this regard. Though Hindu laws were codified in the year 1956, there has been no attempt to frame a Uniform Civil Code applicable to all citizens of the country despite exhortations of this Court in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum [Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 2 SCC 556 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 245] and Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India [Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 569] .”
From Para 56, a slipper shot to all opponents of UCC
56. The backdrop of all the above decisions and the crux of Art. 44 of the Constitution is well captured in the Constituent Assembly Debates. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar while debating on Article 35 (now Article 44 of the Constitution of India) [Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 7, 23rd November 1948] said:
“My friend, Mr. Hussain Imam, in rising to support the amendments, asked whether it was possible and desirable to have a uniform Code of laws for a country so vast as this is. Now I must confess that I was very much surprised at that statement, for the simple reason that we have in this country a uniform code of laws covering almost every aspect of human relationship. We have a uniform and complete Criminal Code operating throughout the country, which is contained in the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code. We have the Law of Transfer of Property, which deals with property relations and which is operative throughout the country. Then there are the Negotiable Instruments Acts: and I can cite innumerable enactments which would prove that this country has practically a Civil Code, uniform in its content and applicable to the whole of the country. The only province the Civil Law has not been able to invade so far is Marriage and Succession. It is this little corner which we have not been able to invade so far and it is the intention of those who desire to have article 35 as part of the Constitution to bring about that change. Therefore, the argument whether we should attempt such a thing seems to me somewhat misplaced for the simple reason that we have, as a matter of fact, covered the whole lot of the field which is covered by a uniform Civil Code in this country. It is therefore too late now to ask the question whether we could do it. As I say, we have already done it.”
And finally from Para 57,
57. The need for a Uniform Civil Code as envisioned under Article 44, has been reiterated from time to time by the Supreme Court. Cases like the present one repeatedly highlight the need for such a Code – ‘common to all’, which would enable uniform principles being applied in respect of aspects such as marriage, divorce, succession etc., so that settled principles, safeguards and procedures can be laid down and citizens are not made to struggle due to the conflicts and contradictions in various personal laws. In modern Indian society which is gradually becoming homogenous, the traditional barriers of religion, community and caste are slowly dissipating. The youth of India belonging to various communities, tribes, castes or religions who solemnise their marriages ought not to be forced to struggle with issues arising due to conflicts in various personal laws, especially in relation to marriage and divorce. The hope expressed in Article 44 of the Constitution that the State shall secure for its citizens Uniform Civil Code ought not to remain a mere hope. The Supreme Court had, in 1985 directed that the judgment in Ms. Jordon Diengdeh (supra) to be placed before the Ministry of Law to take appropriate steps. However, more than three decades have passed since then and it is unclear as to what steps have been taken in this regard till date. Accordingly, let the copy of the present judgment be communicated to the Secretary, Ministry of Law & Justice, Government of India, for necessary action as deemed appropriate.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/106393931/
Udai Shankar Awasthi Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 09 Jan 2013
A Division Bench of the Apex Court quash the complaint case filed against the appellants and while doing to enunciated and reiterated lot of legal principles supported by case laws.
From Para 6,
LIMITATION IN CRIMINAL CASES- Section 468 Cr.P.C.:
6. Section 468 Cr.P.C. places an embargo upon court from taking cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the limitation period provided therein. Section 469 prescribes when the period of limitation begins. Section 473 enables the court to condone delay, provided that the court is satisfied with the explanation furnished by the prosecution/complainant, and where, in the interests of justice, extension of the period of limitation is called for. The principle of condonation of delay is based on the general rule of the criminal justice system which states that a crime never dies, as has been
explained by way of the legal maxim, nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi (lapse of time is no bar to the Crown for the purpose of it initiating proceeding against offenders). A criminal offence is considered as a wrong against the State and also the society as a whole, even though the same has been committed against an individual.
From Para 7, regd delay in registering a complaint
7. The question of delay in launching a criminal prosecution may be a circumstance to be taken into consideration while arriving at a final decision, however, the same may not itself be a ground for dismissing the complaint at the threshold. Moreover, the issue of limitation must be examined in light of the gravity of the charge in question.
From Para 8, regd while condoning delay has to record the reasons
8. The court, while condoning delay has to record the reasons for its satisfaction, and the same must be manifest in the order of the court itself. The court is further required to state in its conclusion, while condoning such delay, that such condonation is required in the interest of justice.
From Para 10,
CONTINUING OFFENCE:
10. Section 472 Cr.P.C. provides that in case of a continuing offence, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time period during which the offence continues. The expression, ‘continuing offence’ has not been defined in the Cr.P.C. because it is one of those expressions which does not have a fixed connotation, and therefore, the formula of universal application cannot be formulated in this respect.
From Para 16,
16. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that, in the case of a continuing offence, the ingredients of the offence continue, i.e., endure even after the period of consummation, whereas in an instantaneous offence, the offence takes place once and for all i.e. when the same actually takes place. In such cases, there is no continuing offence, even though the damage resulting from the injury may itself continue.
From Para
SECOND COMPLAINT ON SAME FACTS-MAINTAINABILITY:
17. While considering the issue at hand in Shiv Shankar Singh v. State of Bihar & Anr., (2012) 1 SCC 130, this Court, after considering its earlier judgments in Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar AIR 1962 SC 876; Jatinder Singh & Ors. v. Ranjit Kaur AIR 2001 SC 784; Mahesh Chand v. B. Janardhan Reddy & Anr., AIR 2003 SC 702; Poonam Chand Jain & Anr. v. Fazru AIR 2005 SC 38 held:
“It is evident that the law does not prohibit filing or entertaining of the second complaint even on the same facts provided the earlier complaint has been decided on the basis of insufficient material or the order has been passed without understanding the nature of the complaint or the complete facts could not be placed before the court or where the complainant came to know certain facts after disposal of the first complaint which could have tilted the balance in his favour. However, second complaint would not be maintainable wherein the earlier complaint has been disposed of on full consideration of the case of the complainant on merit.”
From Para 28,
28. Approaching the court at a belated stage for a rightful cause, or even for the violation of the fundamental rights, has always been considered as a good ground for its rejection at the threshold. The ground taken by the learned counsel for respondent No. 2 that the cause of action arose on 20.10.2009 and 5.11.2009, as the appellants refused to return money and other materials, articles and record, does not have substance worth consideration. In case a representation is made by the person aggrieved and the same is rejected by the competent statutory authority, and such an order is communicated to the person aggrieved, making repeated representations will not enable the party to explain the delay.
Citations : [2013 SCALE 1 212], [2013 JT 1 539], [2013 JCC SC 1 711], [2013 SCC 2 435], [2013 SUPREME 1 590], [2013 AIOL 18], [2013 SLT 1 249], [2013 CRIMES SC 1 231], [2013 SCC CIV 1 1121], [2013 SCC CRI 2 708], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 41], [2013 AIC 123 137], [2013 UC 1 449], [2013 ACR 1 689], [2013 BLJ 3 28], [2013 NCC 1 549], [2013 AD SC 1 537], [2013 JLJR 1 235], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL 2 503], [2013 SCR 3 935], [2013 MLJ CRI 1 462], [2013 JCC 1 711], [2013 MLJ CRL 1 462], [2013 JT SC 1 539]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/39425468/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af3fe4b0149711415eef
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/udai-shankar-awasthi-vs-state-of-u-p-anr
The High Court judgment is here.
Nasruddin Mian Vs State of Bihar on 21 Jun 2021
A division bench of Patna High Court held that this is not how a judgment is to be written, while acquitting a husband from a conviction given for the alleged offence of murdering his wife.
78. The judgment under consideration is an example of how not to write a judgment. It has repeatedly been emphasized by the Supreme Court that the Courts and Judges must make a dispassionate assessment of evidence and that the Courts and Judges should not be swayed by the horror of crime and the character of the person. The judgment should be made by a Judge uninfluenced by his own imagined norms of the functioning of the society.
79. The Trial Court ought to have avoided the sweeping and disparaging remarks made in para 42 of its judgment regarding the conduct of the appellants.
80. I fail to see as to how the Trial Court held in para 44 of its judgment that the charge was framed against the appellants under Section 498-A of the IPC after the informant filed an application for addition to the original charge. The order dated 08.05.2017 passed by the Trial Court, which has been extracted hereinabove, would clearly show that the original charge under Sections 498-A, 306 and 201/34 of the IPC was altered to Sections 304-B, 302 and 201/34 of the IPC. The trial court did not allow the prayer of the informant regarding addition of Sections 304-B and 302 of the IPC to the original charge already framed against them meaning thereby that due to alteration of the original charge vide order dated 08.05.2017, the charge under Sections 498-A and 306 became non-existent.
81. As a matter of fact, for all practical purposes, after alteration of the charge, the appellants were being tried only for the offences punishable under Sections 304-B, 302 and 201/34 of the IPC.
82. Surprisingly, in para 43 of the judgment, the Trial Court held that the case under Section 306 of the IPC is not made out. After alteration of charge, since there was no charge under Section 306 of the IPC, there was no occasion for the Trial Court to have recorded such finding in respect of Section 306 of the IPC.
83. Evidently, while passing the impugned judgment, the Trial Court had misconceived that the appellants were also being tried for the original charge framed under Sections 498-A and 306 of the IPC.
84. While saying so, I am mindful of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shanti Vs. State of Haryana, since reported in (1991) 1 SCC 371, wherein it has been held that Sections 304-B and 498-A of the IPC are not mutually exclusive. They deal with two distinct offences. A person charged and acquitted under Section 304-B of the IPC can be convicted under Section 498-A of the IPC without charge being framed, if such a case is made out. But from the point of view of practice and procedure and to avoid technical defects, it is necessary in such cases to frame charges under both
the sections and if the case is established against the accused, they can be convicted under both the Sections but no separate sentence need be awarded under Section 498-A in view of the substantive sentence being awarded for the major offence under Section 304-B.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/193472418/
Asar Mohammad and Ors Vs State of UP on 24 Oct 2018
Replying on a catena of landmark judgments, a division bench of the Apex Court that the Appellant No.1 is guilty of committing the murder and the Appellant No.2 and 3 are liable to punishment u/s 201 IPC.
Citations : [2018 SCC ONLINE SC 2179], [2019 SCC 12 253], [2019 SCC CRI 4 321], [2018 AIR SC 5264], [2018 CRIMES 4 387], [2019 ALL LJ 1 382], [2018 AIC 192 50], [2019 ECRN 1 148]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/28788694/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5bd343729eff430a1b47f1d9
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/asar-mohammad-and-ors-versus-the-state-of-u-p
https://crlreview.in/asar-mohammad-v-state-of-up/
Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya and Ors Vs State of Gujarat and Anr on 16 Oct 2019
A landmark judgment by a Full Bench of Supreme Court of India around the question,
From Para 9,
whether, after a charge-sheet is filed by the police, the Magistrate has the power to order further investigation, and if so, up to what stage of a criminal proceeding.
From Para 25,
25. Whereas it is true that Section 156(3) remains unchanged even after the 1973 Code has been brought into force, yet the 1973 Code has one very important addition, namely, Section 173(8), which did not exist under the 1898 Code. As we have noticed earlier in this judgment, Section 2(h) of the 1973 Criminal Procedure Code defines “investigation” in the same terms as the earlier definition contained in Section 2(l) of the 1898 Criminal Procedure Code with this difference – that “investigation” after the 1973 Code has come into force will now include all the proceedings under the CrPC for collection of evidence conducted by a police officer. “All” would clearly include proceedings under Section 173(8) as well. Thus, when Section 156(3) states that a Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order “such an investigation”, such Magistrate may also order further investigation under Section 173(8), regard being had to the definition of “investigation” contained in Section 2(h).
From Para 36,
36. Despite the aforesaid judgments, some discordant notes were sounded in three recent judgments. In Amrutbhai Shambubhai Patel v. Sumanbhai Kantibai Patel (2017) 4 SCC 177, on the facts in that case, the Appellant/Informant therein sought a direction under Section 173(8) from the Trial Court for further investigation by the police long after charges were framed against the Respondents at the culminating stages of the trial. The Court in its ultimate conclusion was correct, in that, once the trial begins with the framing of charges, the stage of investigation or inquiry into the offence is over, as a result of which no further investigation into the offence should be ordered. But instead of resting its judgment on this simple fact, this Court from paragraphs 29 to 34 resuscitated some of the earlier judgments of this Court, in which a view was taken that no further investigation could be ordered by the Magistrate in cases where, after cognizance is taken, the accused had appeared in pursuance of process being issued. In particular, Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy (supra) was strongly relied upon by the Court. We have already seen how this judgment was rendered without adverting to the definition of “investigation” in Section 2(h) of the CrPC, and cannot therefore be relied upon as laying down the law on this aspect correctly.
From Para 38,
38. There is no good reason given by the Court in these decisions as to why a Magistrate’s powers to order further investigation would suddenly cease upon process being issued, and an accused appearing before the Magistrate, while concomitantly, the power of the police to further investigate the offence continues right till the stage the trial commences. Such a view would not accord with the earlier judgments of this Court, in particular, Sakiri (supra), Samaj Parivartan Samudaya (supra), Vinay Tyagi (supra), and Hardeep Singh (supra); Hardeep Singh (supra) having clearly held that a criminal trial does not begin after cognizance is taken, but only after charges are framed. What is not given any importance at all in the recent judgments of this Court is Article 21 of the Constitution and the fact that the Article demands no less than a fair and just investigation. To say that a fair and just investigation would lead to the conclusion that the police retain the power, subject, of course, to the Magistrate’s nod under Section 173(8) to further investigate an offence till charges are framed, but that the supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate suddenly ceases mid-way through the pre-trial proceedings, would amount to a travesty of justice, as certain cases may cry out for further investigation so that an innocent person is not wrongly arraigned as an accused or that a prima facie guilty person is not so left out. There is no warrant for such a narrow and restrictive view of the powers of the Magistrate, particularly when such powers are traceable to Section 156(3) read with Section 156(1), Section 2(h), and Section 173(8) of the CrPC, as has been noticed hereinabove, and would be available at all stages of the progress of a criminal case before the trial actually commences. It would also be in the interest of justice that this power be exercised suo motu by the Magistrate himself, depending on the facts of each case. Whether further investigation should or should not be ordered is within the discretion of the learned Magistrate who will exercise such discretion on the facts of each case and in accordance with law. If, for example, fresh facts come to light which would lead to inculpating or exculpating certain persons, arriving at the truth and doing substantial justice in a criminal case are more important than avoiding further delay being caused in concluding the criminal proceeding, as was held in Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi (supra). Therefore, to the extent that the judgments in Amrutbhai Shambubhai Patel (supra), Athul Rao (supra) and Bikash Ranjan Rout (supra) have held to the contrary, they stand overruled. Needless to add, Randhir Singh Rana v. State (Delhi Administration) (1997) 1 SCC 361 and Reeta Nag v. State of West Bengal and Ors. (2009) 9 SCC 129 also stand overruled.
From Para 43,
43. We, therefore, set aside the impugned High Court judgment insofar as it states that post-cognizance the Magistrate is denuded of power to order further investigation.
Citations : [2019 SCC ONLINE SC 1346], [(2019) 17 SCC 1], [AIR 2019 SC 5233], [2020(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 1], [(2019) 14 SCALE 1]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/131202146/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5da99d013321bc410549721e
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/vinubhai-haribhai-malaviya-and-ors-versus-the-state-of-gujarat-and-anr
S.Gopal Reddy Vs State of Andhra Pradesh on 11 Jul 1996
This a landmark judgment from a Division bench of the Supreme Court around section 2, 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act 1961.
Definition of Dowry and the offence of Demanding Dowry
The definition of the term ’dowry’ under Section 2 of the Act shows that any property or valuable security given or “agreed to be given” either directly or indirectly by one party to the marriage to the other party to the marriage “at or before or after the marriage” as a “consideration for the marriage of the said parties” would become ’dowry’ punishable under the Act. Property or valuable security so as to constitute ’dowry’ within the meaning of the Act must therefore be given or demanded “as consideration for the marriage”.
Section 4 of the Act aims at discouraging the very “demand” of “dowry” as a ’Consideration for the marriage’ between the parties thereto and lays down that if any person after the commencement of the Act, “demands”, directly or indirectly, from the parents or guardians of a ’bride’ or ’bridegroom’, as the case may be, any ’dowry’, he shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to Rs.5,000/- or with both.
Thus, it would be seen that section 4 makes punishable the very demand of property or valuable security as a consideration for marriage, which demand, if satisfied, would constitute the graver offence under section 3 of the Act punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years and with fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value of such dowry whichever is more.
The definition of the expression ’dowry’ contained in Section 2 of the Act cannot be confined merely to the ’demand’ of money, property or valuable security ’made at or after the performance of marriage’ as is urged by Mr. Rao. The legislature has in its wisdom while providing for the definition of ’dowry’ emphasised that any money, property or valuable security given, as a consideration for marriage, ’before, at or after the marriage would be covered by the expression ’dowry’ and this definition as contained in Section 2 has to be read wherever the expression ’dowry’ occurs in the Act. Meaning of the expression ’dowry’ as commonly used and understood is different than the peculiar definition thereof under the Act. Under Section 4 of the Act, mere demand of ’dowry’ is sufficient to bring home the offence to an accused. Thus, any “demand” of money, property or valuable security made from the bride or her parents or other relatives by the bridegroom or his parents or other relatives or vice-versa would fall within the mischief of ’dowry’ under the Act where such demand is not properly referable to any legally recognised claim and is consideration of marriage. Marriage in this context would include a proposed marriage also more particularly where the non-fulfilment of the “demand of dowry” leads to the ugly consequence of the marriage not taking place at all. The expression ’dowry’ under the Act must be interpreted in the sense which the Statute wishes to attribute to it. Mr. P.P.Rao, learned senior counsel referred to various dictionaries for the meaning of ’dowry’, ’bride’ and ’bridegroom’ and on the basis of those meanings submitted that ’dowry’ must be construed only as such property, goods or valuable security which is given to a husband by and on behalf of the wife at marriage and any demand made prior to marriage would not amount to dowry. We cannot agree. Where definition has been given in a statute itself, it is neither proper nor desirable to look to the dictionaries etc. to find out the meaning of the expression. The definition given in the statute is the determinative- factor. The Act is a piece of social legislation which aims to check the growing menace of the social evil of dowry and it makes punishable not only the actual receiving of dowry but also the very demand of dowry made before or at the time or after the marriage where such demand is referable to the consideration of marriage. Dowry as a quid pro for marriage is prohibited and not the giving of traditional presents to the bride or the bride groom by friends and relatives. Thus, voluntary presents given at or before or after the marriage to the bride or the bridegroom, as the case may be, of a traditional nature, which are given not as a consideration for marriage but out of love, affection on regard, would not fall within the mischief of the expression ’dowry’ mare punishable under the Act.
On the point of Interpretation of Statutes
It is a well known rule of interpretation of statutes that the text and the context of the entire Act must be looked into while interpreting any of the expressions used in a statute. The courts must look to the object which the statute seeks to achieve while interpreting any of the provisions of the Act. A purposive approach for interpreting the Act is necessary. We are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with Mr. Rao that it is only the property or valuable security given at the time of marriage which would bring the same within the definition of ’dowry’ punishable under the Act, as such an interpretation would be defeating the very object for which the Act was enacted. Keeping in view the object of the Act, “demand of dowry” as a consideration for a proposed marriage would also come within the meaning of the expression dowry under the Act. If we were to agree with Mr. Rao that it is only the demand made at or after marriage which is punishable under Section 4 of the Act, Some serious consequences, which the legislature wanted to avoid, are bound to follow. Take for example a case where the bridegroom or his parents or other relatives make a ’demand’ of dowry during marriage negotiations and later on after bringing the bridal party to the bride’s house find that the bride or her parents or relative have not met the earlier ’demand’ and call off the marriage and leave the bride house should they escape the punishment under the Act. The answer has to be an emphatic ’no’. It would be adding insult to injury if we were to countenance that their action would not attract the provisions of Section 4 of the Act. Such an interpretation would frustrate the very object of the Act and would also run contrary to the accepted principles relating to the interpretation of statutes.
Citations : [1996 AD SC 5 229], [1996 AIR SC 2184], [1996 ALD CRI 2 926], [1996 ALT CRI 2 418], [1996 BLJR 2 1329], [1996 CRILJ 3237], [1996 CRIMES SC 3 35], [1997 DMC SC 2 100], [1996 JT SC 6 268], [1996 RCR CRIMINAL 3 153], [1996 SCALE 5 78], [1996 SCC 4 596], [1996 SUPP SCR 3 439], [1996 SCC CRI 792], [1996 OLR SC 2 229]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1213429/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ace1e4b014971140fef2
Gurmeet Singh Vs State of Punjab on 28 May 2021
Based on Satbir Singh case here, a 3-judge bench comprising the CJI N.V. Ramana, the appellant was held liable for the offence of 304B IPC>
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