Renuka Vs Sangappa on 11 Dec 2019

Posted on November 13, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Karnataka HC held as follow with regards to Cruelty and Desertion grounds as found under Hindu Marriage Act 1955.

From Para 9,

9. The Trial Court examined PWs-1 to 3 and RW-1 and perused Ex.P1 and Exs.R1 to R8. The appellants attitude towards the respondent and staying away from him for years together and so also filing a petition for maintenance in Criminal miscellaneous No.95/2007 and partition suit in O.S.No.73/2005, she has not made any efforts to join her husband. On the other hand, the respondent had filed petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act and petition was not continued on account of appellants readiness and willingness to join the respondent due to which the respondent had withdrawn the petition filed under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Even thereafter the appellant had not joined the respondent. The appellant has not apprised the Trial Court as well as before this Court by producing any material evidence and so also what efforts she has made all these years to join the respondent. The contention of the appellant that she is ready to join her husband is only an afterthought for the reasons that she had ample opportunity of joining the respondent during the pendency of M.C.No.4/2010. Now we are in the year 2019. Even during the period from 30.11.2013, the date on which M.C.No.4/2010 was disposed off, till date she has not shown her willingness to join her husband. If her intention was really to join her husband, both Trial and this Court would have made necessary efforts to refer the matter to the Mediation & Conciliation Centre. Therefore, the attitude of the appellant towards respondent for these many years resulted in failure of marriage among the appellant and the respondent. Once the appellant failed to return to her marital home and remained in her parental house for more than one and half decade amounts to both desertion and cruelty.

From Para 16,

16. The principle is, thus, settled that whether in the facts and circumstances of a given case, the plaintiff has been able to make out a case of grant of divorce on the ground of cruelty would depend upon the nature of pleadings and evidence in that case and there can be no straitjacket formula nor an exhaustive list of instances can be prepared, where cruelty is said to have been committed by one or other party to the marriage. Cruelty can also not be inferred by applying any formula because the said question is to be determined keeping in view the social status of the parties, their financial and other conditions, the atmosphere and the kind of employment or vocation which they carry out would all be important to interfere whether on the given set of allegations it has become difficult for the plaintiff to live with the other side and the behaviour of such degree which amounts to the cruelty.

Renuka Vs Sangappa on 11 Dec 2019

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://www.legitquest.com/case/renuka-v-sangappa/1a2cde

https://www.lawyerservices.in/Renuka-Versus-Sangappa-2019-12-11

Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 13 Apr 2021

Posted on November 10, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

This is a landmark judgment from the 3-judge full-bench of Supreme Court of India.

From Para 23,

23. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be adopted”, during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during the investigation or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under:
i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence;
ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences;
iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on;
iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty).
v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;
vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;
vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule;
viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere;
ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping;
x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;
xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice;
xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;
xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court;
xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint;
xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR;
xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order.
xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.

Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 13 Apr 2021

Citations : [2021 SCC ONLINE SC 315]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/199473647/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/607d22efba0bb01cbed0c0a7

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/m-s-neeharika-infrastructure-pvt-ltd-versus-state-of-maharashtra-and-others

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Balraj Khanna and Ors Vs Moti Ram on 22 Apr 1971

Posted on October 16, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court passed this Judgment regd

After a consideration of the various decisions referred to above, we are of the opinion that the propositions laid down in English decisions dealing with libel that the actual words alleged to be used must be stated in the indictment cannot be applied on all fours when dealing with the cases of defamation by spoken words under Section 499 I. P. C. it will be highly desirable no doubt if the actual words stated to have been used by an accused and which are alleged to be defamatory are reproduced by the complainant. The actual words used or the statements made may be reproduced verbatim by the complainant if the words are few and the statement is very brief. But in cases where the words spoken are too many or the statements made are too long, in our opinion, it will be the height of technicality to insist that the actual words and the entire statements should be reproduced verbatim. The object of having, if possible, the actual words or the statements before the court is to enable it to consider whether those words or the statements are defamatory in nature. That purpose or object will be served if the complainant is able to reproduce in his complaint or evidence in a substantial measure the words of imputation alleged to have been uttered. If the statements or the words placed before the court by the complainant are held to be not defamatory, it will mean that the complainant will have to lose. Therefore it is to his interest to get a proper adjudication from, the court that as far as possible the words spoken or the statements actually made and which he alleges to be defamatory are before the court. But a complaint cannot be thrown out on the mere ground that the actual words spoken or the statements made have not been stated in the complaint. From the point of view of accused also it is necessary that the matters alleged to be defamatory in the complaint must be so stated as to enable them to know the nature of the allegations that they have to meet.

Balraj Khanna and Ors Vs Moti Ram on 22 Apr 1971

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1946272/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ab73e4b014971140c842

Citations:

Sivasankaran Vs Santhimeenal on 13 Sep 2021

Posted on September 16, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court granted divorce to a husband, on the grounds of Cruelty apart from irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

From Paras 4 and 5,

4. Insofar as irretrievable breakdown of marriage is concerned, no doubt, it does not exist as a ground of divorce under the Act. The issue has been debated by the Law Commission in its various reports. Breakdown of marriage was incidentally considered by the Law Commission in its 59th report (1974), but the Commission made no specific recommendations in this regard. Thereafter in its 71st report (1978), the Law Commission departed from the fault theory of divorce to recognise situations where a marriage has completely broken down and there is no possibility of reconciliation. Neither party need individually be at fault for such a breakdown of the marriage – it may be the result of prolonged separation, clash of personalities, or incompatibility of the couple. As the Law Commission pithily noted, such marriages are ‘merely a shell out of which the substance is gone’. For such situations, the Commission recommended that the law be amended to provide for ‘irretrievable breakdown of marriage’ as an additional ground of divorce. This recommendation was reiterated by the Law Commission in its 217th Report in 2010, after undertaking a suo moto study of the legal issues involved. So far, the Law Commission’s recommendations have not been implemented. In 2010, the government introduced the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2010, which inter alia proposed to add irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a new ground for divorce in both the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the Special Marriage Act, 1954. After receiving suggestions from relevant stakeholders, the bill was amended and re- introduced as the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2013. This bill was never passed.
5. The result is that, in appropriate cases, this court has granted decrees of divorce exercising its unique jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, to do complete justice between the parties. Such a course is being followed in varied kinds of cases, for instance where there are inter se allegations between the parties, in order to put a quietus to the matter, the parties withdraw these allegations and by mutual consent, this court itself grants divorce. There are also cases where the parties accept that there is an irretrievable breakdown of marriage and themselves request for a decree of divorce. One of the more difficult situations is where, in the opinion of the court, there is irretrievable breakdown of marriage but only one of the parties is willing to acknowledge the same and accept divorce on that account, while the other side seeks to oppose it even if it means carrying on with the marriage.

From Para 7,

7. A marriage is more than a seemingly simple union between two individuals. As a social institution, all marriages have legal, economic, cultural, and religious ramifications. The norms of a marriage and the varying degrees of legitimacy it may acquire are dictated by factors such as marriage and divorce laws, prevailing social norms, and religious dictates. Functionally, marriages are seen as a site for the propagation of social and cultural capital as they help in identifying kinship ties, regulating sexual behaviour, and consolidating property and social prestige. Families are arranged on the idea of a mutual expectation of support and amity which is meant to be experienced and acknowledged amongst its members. Once this amity breaks apart, the results can be highly devastating and stigmatizing. The primary effects of such breakdown are felt especially by women, who may find it hard to guarantee the same degree of social adjustment and support that they enjoyed while they were married.

From Para 14,

14. We are conscious that the Constitution Bench is examining the larger issue but that reference has been pending for the last five years. Living together is not a compulsory exercise. But marriage is a tie between two parties. If this tie is not working under any circumstances, we see no purpose in postponing the inevitability of the situation merely because of the pendency of the reference.

From Paras 17-19,

17. There are episodes of further harassment by the respondent even at the place of work of the appellant including insulting the appellant in front of students and professors, as is apparent from the judgment of the Trial Court. She is stated to have threatened the appellant of physical harm in front of his colleagues as per the testimony of PW.3 and complained to the appellant’s employer threatening to file a criminal complaint against him (PW.3). The first appellate court somehow brushed aside these incidents as having not been fully established on a perception of wear and tear of marriage. The moot point is that the marriage has not taken of from its inception. There can hardly be any ‘wear and tear of marriage’ where parties have not been living together for a long period of time. The parties, undisputedly, never lived together even for a day.
18. We are, thus, faced with a marriage which never took of from the first day. The marriage was never consummated and the parties have been living separately from the date of marriage for almost 20 years. The appellant remarried after 6 years of the marriage, 5 years of which were spent in Trial Court proceedings. The marriage took place soon after the decree of divorce was granted. All mediation efforts have failed.
19. In view of the legal position which we have referred to aforesaid, these continuing acts of the respondent would amount to cruelty even if the same had not arisen as a cause prior to the institution of the petition, as was found by the Trial Court. This conduct shows disintegration of marital unity and thus disintegration of the marriage.10 In fact, there was no initial integration itself which would allow disintegration afterwards. The fact that there have been continued allegations and litigative proceedings and that can amount to cruelty is an aspect taken note of by this court. 11 The marriage having not taken of from its inception and 5 years having been spent in the Trial Court, it is difficult to accept that the marriage soon after the decree of divorce, within 6 days, albeit 6 years after the initial inception of marriage, amounts to conduct which can be held against the appellant.

Sivasankaran Vs Santhimeenal on 13 Sep 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/48424234/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/613f760f9e99febca989f9ba

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/sivasankaran-versus-santhimeenal

Rakesh and Anr Vs State of UP and Anr on 13 Aug 2014

Posted on August 30, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows

From Para 2, Issue was fixed.

2. Whether a Magistrate after accepting a negative final report submitted by the Police can take action on the basis of the protest petition filed by the complainant/first informant? The above question having been answered in the affirmative by the Allahabad High Court, this appeal has been filed by the accused.

From Para 7, issue was answered.

7. If we are to go back to trace the genesis of the views expressed by this Court in Gopal Vijay Verma (supra), notice must be had of the decision of this Court in H.S. Bains vs. State (Union Territory of Chandigarh) 3 wherein it was held that after receipt of the police report under Section 173, the Magistrate has three options –
“(1) he may decide that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further and drop action;
(2) he may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1)(b) on the basis of the police report and issue process; this he may do without being bound in any manner by the conclusion arrived at by the police in their report;
(3) he may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a) on the basis of the original complaint and proceed to examine upon oath the complainant and his witnesses under Section 200. If he adopts the third alternative, he may hold or direct an inquiry under Section 202 if he thinks fit. Thereafter he may dismiss the complaint or issue process, as the case may be.”
8. The second and third options available to the Magistrate as laid down in H.S. Bains (supra) has been referred to and relied upon in subsequent decisions of this Court to approve the action of the Magistrate in accepting the final report and at the same time in proceeding to treat either the police report or the initial complaint as the basis for further action/enquiry in the matter of the allegations levelled therein.

Rakesh and Anr Vs State of UP and Anr on 13 Aug 2014

Citations : [2014 RCR CRIMINAL SC 4 52], [2014 MPWN SC 3 73], [2014 AIR SC 3509], [2014 SCALE 9 347], [2014 AIOL 490], [2014 CRIMES SC 4 183], [2014 CRLJ SC 4195], [2014 JLJR SC 4 16], [2014 BOMCR CRI SC 4 643], [2014 SUPREME 7 286], [2014 SLT 7 183], [2014 SCC 13 133], [2014 SCC CRI 5 611], [2014 SCC ONLINE SC 619], [2014 AIC 142 75], [2014 ACR SC 3 3091], [2014 UC 3 1651], [2014 ALLCC 87 299], [2014 SCJ 9 159], [2014 ALT CRL AP 3 531], [2014 ALLMR CRI SC 3782], [2014 AJR 4 387], [2015 LW CRL 1 229], [2014 CCR SC 3 577], [2014 PLJR 4 176], [2014 MLJ CRL SC 4 113], [2014 ALL LJ 6 82]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/118305084/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af4be4b0149711416134

Puttaraju Vs Shivakumari on 01 Apr 2021

Posted on August 23, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Karnataka High Court held that, an offence under the PWDV Act alone is subject to limitation under CrPC but not the application filed belatedly u/s 12 of the Act.

From Paras 16-17,

16. To attract Section 468 of Cr.P.C, essentially the Act alleged must be an offence. Under the DV Act, the offence is not defined, as defined in Section 40 of IPC. Therefore, we have to revert to the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 3(38) of the General Clauses Act defines the offences as follows:
“3(38). “Offence” shall mean any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force.

17. Perusal of the above provision makes it clear that to call an act as offence, act or omission must be made punishable under law. As already pointed out, under Sections 12, 20 and 21 of the DV Act have not made the domestic violence alleged thereunder punishable or defined them as offence. Section 12 of the DV Act is only an enabling provision to initiate enquiry to find out whether such act or omission is committed.

From Para 19-20, Conclusions

19. Perusal of Section 31 of the DV Act makes it clear that only breach of the protection order or interim protection order etc. passed under Section 12 of the DV Act constitutes an offence and made punishable. As held by Punjab High Court in Vikas’s case referred to supra, Section 12 of the DV Act is only enabling provision. Therefore it is clear that the act or omission contemplated under Section 31 of the DV Act is an offence and the application under Section 12 of the DV Act itself is not an offence.
20. When the application under Section 12 of the DV Act is not covered under the term ‘offence’, Section 468 of Cr.P.C. is inapplicable. Therefore the application of Section 468 of Cr.P.C. to an application under Section 12 of the DV Act is clearly a misconception.

From Paras 24-26,

24. Distinguishing judgment in Inderjit Singh Grewal’s case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in subsequent judgment in Krishna Bhattacharjee’s case referred to supra held that the observation regarding domestic relationship in Inderjit Singh Grewal’s case were based on the facts and circumstances of the said case and they are not of general application.
25. Further in para 32 of the judgment in Krishna Bhattacharjee’s case referred to supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the definition of the aggrieved person and domestic relationship remains and the act of domestic violence attracts the term ‘continuing offence’, therefore does not get time barred.
26. In the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to above, the interplay of Section 3(38) of the General Clauses Act, Section 31 of the DV Act and Section 468 of Cr.P.C. had not fallen for consideration. In view of the later judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishna Bhattacharjee’s case referred to supra the judgments of this Court in Srinivas’s case and Gurudev’s case cannot be followed. Therefore this Court does not find any merit in the contention that the petition was time barred. Under the circumstances the respondent is entitled for withdrawal of the amount. The application is allowed.

Puttaraju Vs Shivakumari on 01 Apr 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://primelegal.in/2021/05/20/an-application-under-section-12-of-the-domestic-violence-act-is-not-barred-by-the-limitations-set-out-in-section-468-of-the-criminal-procedure-code-karnataka-high-court/

https://www.indiclegal.com/post/application-of-section-468-to-section-12-of-the-domestic-violence-act-is-clearly-a-misconception-hc

https://www.lawyersclubindia.com/judiciary/sri-puttaraju-vs-smt-shivakumari-5216.asp

Jangam Srinivasa Rao Vs Jaagam Rajeshwari and Anr on 13 Mar 1989

Posted on August 9, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Single Judge bench of AP HC held as follows:

From Para 6,

6. The points for determination in these proceedings are
(1) whether the order of maintenance passed in M.C. No. 18/84 stood cancelled ?
(2) Whether under Section 125(3), Cr.P.C. the wife can seek imprisonment of the husband for non-payment of maintenance accumulated beyond a period of 12 months ?
(3) Whether the payment of Rs. 3,250/- paid as per the directions of this court can be appropriated to the maintenance due for the first 25 months as claimed by the wife ?

From Para 11, Point (2) was answered.

11. Considering the different views expressed by the various High Courts I prefer to follow the Division Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Moddari Bin v. Sukdeo Bin, (1967 Cri LJ 335). The other decisions are judgments or single Judges. In my humble opinion the contraction put forward by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court is harmonesus construction and interpretation of the proviso making the proviso applicable to both the limbs of procedure contemplated under sub-section 3 of Section 125, Cr.P.C. I hold on point No. 2 that the wife the maintenance-holder cannot accumulate the maintenance for a period beyond 12 months. No application for execution of the maintenance order can be entertained for a period exceeding 12 months immediately preceding the date of application. I hold this point in favour of the petitioner. In this context I make it clear that they remedy provided under S. 125(3), Cr.P.C. is a speedy and expeditious remedy. By virtue of the order of maintains granted in M.C. 18/84 the right vested in the wife to receive maintenance from the date of the application i.e. 7-12-83. She may not be able to recover the earlier arrears by resorting to an application under Section 126(3), Cr.P.C., but still she would certainly be entitled to claim those arrear by filing a civil suit on the basis that the amount is die to her by virtue of the court order. But at the same time it should be remembered that under civil laws also her claim should be within the period of limitation. For instance, for the maintenance payable for the period 7-12-83 to 7-1-84 she should file a suit on or before 7-1-87. At the most she can recover arrears of maintenance for 3 years by resorting to a civil suit. Unfortunately in this case the right to file a civil suit for the earlier arrears is also barred by time.

Indiankanoon Version:

Jangam Srinivasa Rao Vs Jaagam Rajeshwari and Anr on 13 Mar 1989 (IK Ver)

Casemine Version:

Jangam Srinivasa Rao Vs Jaagam Rajeshwari and Anr on 13 Mar 1989 (CM Ver)

Citations : [1990 CRILJ 2506], [1989 ALT 2 295], [1989 SCC ONLINE AP 66], [1989 AP LJ 2 41], [1989 ALT NRC 2 8]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/471311/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5608f701e4b014971113ef2e

Index to Maintenance judgments is here.

Rev. Samuel D. Stephens and Ors Vs Pastor A. Samuel Ramasamy on 27 Feb 2009

Posted on August 8, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Relying on earlier decision here, single judge bench of Madras High Court held as follows:

From Para 12,

12. Mr. V. Karthik has also brought to the notice of the Court the following decisions in Jagatbhai Punjabhai Palkhiwala and others v. Vikrambhai Punjabhai Palkhiwala and others, AIR 1985 Gujarat 112; K. Nagarajan v. K.S Ramasamy, 2003 (3) M.L.J 211; and K.R. Sengottuvelu v. Karuppa Naicker, 2005 (5) CTC 91. The above decisions are relating to Civil cases, wherein it has been held that since the documents are in the custody of the Court, the parties cannot take xerox copies of the same without the permission of the Court, but that does not mean that the Court can refuse such permission only on the ground that they have not become part of the record of the Suit.

From Para 16,

16. The main objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondent is that since the documents filed along with the Complaint have not been marked, the accused, at this stage, are not entitled to get certified copies of the same. In support of the said contention, the learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1970 SC 962, cited supra. It has to be pointed out that in the said decision, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the High Court was not justified, in indirectly applying to cases instituted on Private Complaints the requirements of Section 173(4), Cr.P.C In the said decision what the Hon’ble Court has held is that it was impermissible for the High Court to read into Section 94, Cr.P.C, the requirements of Section 173(4), Cr.P.C on the ground that Section 173(4), Cr.P.C is not applicable to Private Complaints. On the said reasoning, the direction issued by the High Court directing the prosecution to furnish copies of the documents to the accused was set aside. But it has to be pointed out that in that decision, the question as to whether the accused is entitled to get certified copies of the documents filed along with the Private Complaint did not come up for consideration and hence, the said decision is not of any help to the respondent.

From Para 18,

18. In this context, it is pertinent to point out that the learned counsel for the respondent has not referred to any provision in the Criminal Procedure Code containing any prohibition to furnish certified copies of the documents filed along with the Private Complaint. The prohibition like the one contained under Section 173(4), Cr.P.C is not there as far as the documents filed along with the Private Complaint are concerned. Therefore, unless there is a statutory prohibition, it cannot be said that the accused is not entitled to get certified copies of the documents filed along with the Private Complaint.

From Para 20,

20. Similarly, in a Criminal case taken cognizance on the basis of the Private Complaint also if the allegations contained in the Complaint and the documents accompanied with the Complaint do not prima facie reveal the commission of any offence and the ingredients of the offence are not made out, it is always open to the accused to approach the High Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C seeking for quashing of the proceedings. For taking recourse under Section 482, Cr.P.C, it is necessary for the accused to produce before the Court a copy of the Complaint as well as the documents filed along with the Complaint. Since before taking cognizance, the learned Judicial Magistrate is bound to apply his judicial mind not only to the allegations contained in the Complaint but also to the documents accompanying the same and an order taking cognizance is a judicial order and as such the accused is entitled to challenge the cognizance taken in the case. As per Section 363(5), Cr.P.C, Save as otherwise provided in subsection (2), any person affected by an order passed by the Court on an Application made in this behalf and on payment of the prescribed charges be given a copy of such order or of any deposition or other part of the record. If the question is considered in the light of Section 363(5), Cr.P.C, it could be held that since, as pointed out above, an order taking cognizance is a judicial order, Section 363(5) is attracted and on that ground also the accused is entitled to get a copy of the part of the record of a Criminal case to enable him to seek appropriate remedy before the higher forum. In my considered view, Rule 339 of the Criminal Rules of Practice is in consonance with the provisions contained in Section 363(5), Cr.P.C It is also to be pointed out that by furnishing of certified copies of the documents filed along with the Private Complaint, no prejudice whatsoever is going to be caused to the complainant, whereas, if the request of the accused is rejected, it will definitely prejudice the right of the accused in seeking appropriate legal remedy before the higher Courts.

From Para 22,

22. A reading of the aforesaid provision shows that in a case instituted otherwise than on a police report, if it appears to the Magistrate issuing process under Section 204, Cr.P.C, that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall furnish to the accused a copy of each of the documents filed along with the Complaint. That Sections casts duty on the Court to furnish the said documents free of cost. But similar duty is not cast on the Magistrate to furnish copies of the documents free of cost if the case is not triable exclusively by the Court of Session. It would mean that it is not incumbent on the part of the learned Judicial Magistrate to furnish copies of the documents free of cost either at the time of sending the process or on the appearance of the accused. There is no other provision which prohibits the accused from applying for certified copies of those documents filed along with the Complaint. As pointed out above, in the absence of any specific prohibition in the Cr.P.C either expressly or impliedly, in the considered view of this Court, the accused cannot be deprived of his right to get certified copies of the documents filed along with the Complaint so as to defend himself in the case as long as such furnishing of certified copies would not prejudice the case of the respondent.

Casemine Version:

Rev. Samuel D. Stephens and Ors Vs Pastor A. Samuel Ramasamy on 27 Feb 2009 (CM Ver)

Court Kutchehry Version:

Rev. Samuel D. Stephens and Ors Vs Pastor A. Samuel Ramasamy on 27 Feb 2009 (CK Ver)

Citations : [2009 LW CRL 1 386], [2009 SCC ONLINE MAD 576], [2009 MWN CRI 1 298], [2009 MLJ CRL 2 436]

Other Sources :

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56ea7cf8607dba36cc747754

The Index is here.

Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P, Hyd Vs Nese Jilakara Sreeramulu on 29 Aug 2003

Posted on August 1, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A Full Bench gave this decision upon a reference from a Division bench of AP High Court on the question as to whether the law laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in Ayyala Rambabu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1993 (1) Andh LT (Cri) 73 and by a learned single Judge of this Court in Nunna Venkateswarlu v. State of A. P., 1996 Cri LJ 108 is good law.

The answer was a NO.

From Paras 17-19,

17. The definition of “dowry”, the object of the Act and the above decisions of the Apex Court clearly show that any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given comes within the purview of “dowry” on three occasions in which any property or valuable security comes within its purview. They are — (i) before the marriage, (ii) at the time of marriage, and (iii) “at any time” after the marriage. The third occasion may appear to be an unending period, but the crucial words are “in connection with the marriage of the parties”. This means, giving or agreeing to give any property or valuable security on any of the above three stages should have been in connection with the marriage of the parties.
18. The Legislature in its wisdom while providing for the definition of “dowry” has emphasized that any money, property or valuable security given as consideration for marriage “before, at or any time after” the marriage would be covered by the expression “dowry”, and this definition as contained in Section 2 of the Act has to be read whenever the expression “dowry” occurs in the Act, The meaning of expression “dowry” as commonly used and understood is different from the peculiar definition thereof under the Act.
19. Under Section 3 of the Act, if a person gives or takes are abets the giving or taking dowry shall be punished. Under Section 4 of the Act mere demand of dowry is sufficient to bring home the offence to an accused. Thus, any demand of money, property or valuable security, made from the bride or her parents or other relatives, or the bridegroom or his parents or other relatives, or vice versa, would fall within the mischief of “dowry” under the Act, where such demand is not properly referable to legally recognized claim and relatable only to the consideration of the marriage.

Indiankanoon version:

Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P, Hyd Vs Nese Jilakara Sreeramulu on 29 Aug 2003 (IK Ver)

Casemine version:

Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P, Hyd Vs Nese Jilakara Sreeramulu on 29 Aug 2003 (CM Ver)

Citations : [2004 EASTCRIC 3 48], [2004 ALT 2 504], [2004 ALD CRI 1 519], [2003 SCC ONLINE AP 830], [2003 SUPP ACC 875], [2004 CRI LJ 1629], [2004 HLR 2 144]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1945624/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5608f835e4b0149711141c0f

Virsa Singh Vs State of Punjab on 11 Mar 1958

Posted on July 21, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A Full bench of Apex Court held in a murder case as follow…

To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following before it can bring a case under s. 300 Indian Penal Code third clause.
(1) It must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present.
(2) The nature of the injury must be proved; these are purely objective investigations.
(3) It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended.
(4) It must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under s. 300, 3rdly. It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was Do intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only
escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional.

Virsa Singh Vs State of Punjab on 11 Mar 1958

Citations : [1958 AWR 28 572], [1958 MYSLJ SC 36 723], [1958 SCR 1 1495], [1958 SCR 0 1495], [1958 SCJ 0 772], [1958 AIR SC 458], [1958 AIR SC 463], [1958 SCR 0 1945], [1958 AIR SC 365], [1958 SCR 0 1450], [1958 CRLJ SC 818], [1958 AIR SC 465]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1296255/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aafee4b014971140b6ea

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Catena of Landmark Judgments Referred/Cited to

Renuka Vs Sangappa on 11 Dec 2019

Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 13 Apr 2021

Balraj Khanna and Ors Vs Moti Ram on 22 Apr 1971

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Rakesh and Anr Vs State of UP and Anr on 13 Aug 2014

Puttaraju Vs Shivakumari on 01 Apr 2021

Jangam Srinivasa Rao Vs Jaagam Rajeshwari and Anr on 13 Mar 1989

Rev. Samuel D. Stephens and Ors Vs Pastor A. Samuel Ramasamy on 27 Feb 2009

Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P, Hyd Vs Nese Jilakara Sreeramulu on 29 Aug 2003

Virsa Singh Vs State of Punjab on 11 Mar 1958