In this Apex Court judgment, Right of Prisoner against Solitary Confinement was held to be part of Article 21 of Constitution
Citation: 1978 AIR 1675, 1979 SCR (1) 392
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In this judgment, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that, prisoners too have the right to be interviewed and journalist can seek permission to interview prisoners and adhere to Rules of Prison Manual while recording the interview.
BENCH:
MISRA RANGNATH
DUTT, M.M. (J)
citations: JT 1988 (3) 15, AIR 1983 SC 378
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In this landmark judgment bu Hon’ble Apex Court, it was held that even prisoners has right to free legal aid. It was a terrible act of a jail warder, who practiced torture and sustained serious anal injury because a rod was driven into that aperture to inflict inhuman torture and that as the bleeding had not stopped, he was removed to the jail hospital and later to the Irvin Hospital.
BENCH:
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
PATHAK, R.S.
REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)
citations: 1980 AIR 1579, 1980 SCR (2) 557
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In this landmark judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was held that “We have already extracted a passage from the judgment of Field, J. in Munn v. Illinois (1), where the learned judge pointed out that “life” in the 5th and 14th Amendments of the U. S. Constitution corresponding to Art. 21, means not merely the right to the continuance of a person’s animal existence, but a right to the possession of each of his organs-his arms and legs etc. We do not entertain any doubt that the word “’life” in Art. 21 bears the same signification.”
In our view cl. (b) of Regulation 236 is plainly violative of Art. 21’ and as there is no “law” on which the same could be justified it must be struck down as unconstitutional.
This petition raises a question of far-reaching importance. namely, a right of a citizen of India to lead a free life subject to social control imposed by valid law. The fact that the question has been raised at the instance of an alleged disreputable character shall not be allowed to deflect our perspective. If the police could do what they did to the petitioner, they could also do the same to an honest and law-abiding citizen.
Let us at the outset clear the ground. We are not concerned here with a law imposing restrictions on a bad character, for admittedly there is no such law. Therefore, the petitioner’s fundamental right, if any, has to be judged on the basis that there is no such law. To state it differently, what fundamental right of the petitioner has been infringed by the acts of the police? If he has any fundamental right which has been infringed by such acts, he would be entitled to a relief straight away, for the State could not justify it on the basis of any law made by the appropriate Legislature or the rules made thereunder.
Discussion around infringement of both Articles 19 and 21
At this stage it will be convenient to ascertain the scope of the said two provisions and their relation inter se in the context of the question raised. Both of them are distinct fundamental rights. No doubt the expression “personal liberty” is a comprehensive one and the right to move freely is an attribute of personal liberty. It is said that the freedom to move freely is carved out of personal liberty and, therefore, the expression “personal liberty” in Art. 21 excludes that attribute. In our view, this is not a correct approach. Both are independent fundamental rights, though there is overlapping. There is no question of one being carved out of another. The fundamen. tal right of life and personal liberty have many attributes and some of them are found in Art. 19. If a Person’s fundamental right under Art. 21 is infringed, the State can rely upon a law to sustain the action; but that cannot be a complete answer unless the said law satisfies the test laid down in Art. 19 (2) so far as the attributes covered by Art. 19 (1) are concerned. In other words, the State must satisfy that both the fundamental rights are not infringed by showing that there is a law and that it does amount -to a reasonable restriction. within the meaning of Art. 19 (2) of the Constitution. But in this case no such defence is available, as admittedly there is no such law. So the petitioner can legitimately plead that his fundamental rights both under Art. 19 (1) (d) and Art. 21 are infringed by the State.
Discussion around Article 21
We would, therefore, define the right of personal liberty in Art. 21 as a right of an individual to be free from restrictions or encroachments on his person, whether those restrictions or encroachments are directly imposed or indirectly brought about by calculated measures. If so understood, all the acts of surveillance under,Regulation 236 infringe the fundamental right of the petitioner under Art. 21 of the Constitution.
Citation: 1963 AIR 1295, 1964 SCR (1) 332
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The index page is here.
In this judgment, Hon’ble Apex Court held that “When there are two interpretations, one wide and unconstitutional, the other narrower but within constitutional bounds, this Court will read down the overflowing expressions to make them valid. So read, the two regulations are more restricted than counsel for the petitioner sought to impress upon us. Regulation 855, in our view, empowers surveillance only of persons against whom reasonable materials exist to induce the opinion that they show a determination, to lead it life of criminal in this context being confined to such as involve public peace or security only and if they are dangerous security risks. Mere Convictions in criminal cases where nothing gravely imperilling saftey of society cannot be regarded as warranting surveillance under this Regulation. Similarly, domiciliary visits and picketing by the police should be reduced to the clearest cases of danger to community security and not routine follow-up at the end of a conviction or release from prison or at the whim of a police officer. In truth, legality apart, these regulations ill-accord with the essence of personal freedoms and the State will do well to revise the- se old police regulations verging perilously near unconstitutionality.”
Citation: 1975 AIR 1378, 1975 SCR (3) 946
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This is another landmark judgment which held the right to travel.
The composition of Bench is
BENCH:
RAO, K. SUBBA (CJ)
HIDAYATULLAH, M.
BACHAWAT, R.S.
SHELAT, J.M.
VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.
Citation: AIR 1976 SC 1836, 1967 AIR 1836, 1967 SCR (2) 525
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In this landmark judgment by the full bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was held that fundamental rights provided by Articles of Constitution are not silos in nature but are connected with one another.
The bench consisted of below judges, including the Hon’ble CJI.
As such it was held that it is declared that the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act 22 of 1969 is invalid and the action taken or deemed to be taken in exercise of the powers under the Act is declared unauthorised.
Citation: 1970 AIR 564, 1970 SCR (3) 530
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Improperly framed affidavits are held to be not acceptable by Supreme court per CPC and relevant Supreme Court Rules.
From Para 51, 52 and 53,
Apart from the aforesaid, in the writ petition which was filed on 21st January, 2006, there is no mention of the fact that the petitioner gave a statement under section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure in connection with the investigation arising out of FIR lodged on 30th December, 2005. From the records of the case it appears the petitioner gave 161 statement on 13th January, 2006. In the writ petition there is a complete suppression of the aforesaid fact. A statement under Section 161 is certainly a material fact in a police investigation in connection with an FIR. The investigation is to find out the genuineness of those very documents on the basis of which the writ petition was moved. In that factual context, total suppression in the writ petition of the fact that the petitioner gave a 161 statement in that investigation is, in our judgment, suppression of a very material fact.
It is, therefore, clear that writ petition is frivolous and is speculative in character. This Court is of the opinion that the so called legal questions on tapping of telephone cannot be gone into on the basis of a petition which is so weak in its foundation.
Courts have, over the centuries, frowned upon litigants who, with intent to deceive and mislead the courts, initiated proceedings without full disclosure of facts. Courts held that such litigants have come with “unclean hands” and are not entitled to be heard on the merits of their case.
From Para 58,
It is one of the fundamental principles of jurisprudence that litigants must observe total clarity and candour in their pleadings and especially when it contains a prayer for injunction. A prayer for injunction, which is an equitable remedy, must be governed by principles of ‘uberrima fide’.
From Para 62,
Following these principles, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the instant writ petition is an attempt by the petitioner to mislead the Court on the basis of frivolous allegations and by suppression of material facts as pointed out and discussed above.
From Para 65,
This court wants to make one thing clear i.e. perfunctory and slipshod affidavits which are not consistent either with Order XIX Rule 3 of the CPC or with Order XI Rules 5 and 13 of the Supreme Court Rules should not be entertained by this Court.
Citation: AIR 1982 SC 1473, 1983 SCR (1) 456
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In this judgment, Hon’ble Apex Court has held that, delay in executing a death sentence is violation of Article 21 of Constitution of India.
Case background:
A prisoner condemned to death over eight years ago claims that it is not lawful to hang him now. Let us put the worst against him first. He was the principal accused in the case and, so to say, the archvillian of a villainous piece. He was the brain behind a cruel conspiracy to impersonate Customs officers’ pretend to question unsuspecting visitors to the city of Madras, abduct them on the pretext of interrogating them, administer sleeping pills to the unsuspecting victims steal their cash and jewels and finally murder them. The plan was ingeniously fiendish and the appellant was the architect. There is no question that the learned Sessions Judge very rightly sentenced him to death But that was in January 1975. Since then he has been kept in solitary confinement, quite contrary to our ruling in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration(1). Before that he was a ’prisoner under remand’ for two years. So, the prisoner claims that to take away his life after keeping him in jail for ten years, eight of which in illegal solitary confinement, is a gross violation o the Fundamental Right guaranteed by Art. 21 af the Constitution.
Hon’ble Court rules:
So, what do we have now? Arts. 14, 19 and 21 are not mutually exclusive. They sustain, strengthen and nourish each other. They are available to prisoners as well as free men. Prison walls do not keep out Fundamental Rights. A person under sentence of death may also claim Fundamental Rights. The fiat of Art. 21, as explained, is that any procedure which deprives a person of his life or liberty must be just, fair and reasonable. Just, fair and reasonable procedure implies a right to free legal services where he cannot avail them. It implies a right to a speedy trial. It implies humane conditions of detection, preventive or punitive. ’Procedure established by law’ does not end with the pronouncement of sentence; it includes tho carrying out of sentence. That is as far as we have gone so far. It seems to us but a short step, but a step in the right direction, to hold that prolonged detention to await the execution of a sentence of death is an unjust, unfair and unreasonable procedure and the only way to undo the wrong is to quash the sentence of death.
Final Words:
What may be considered prolonged delay so as to attract the constitutional protection of Art. 21 against the execution of a sentence of death is a ticklish question. In Ediga Annamma’s case, two years was considered sufficient to justify interference with the sentence of death. In Bhagwan Baux’s case, two and a half years and in Sadhu Singh’s case, three and a half years were taken as sufficient to justify altering the sentence of death into one of imprisonment for life. The Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a sentence of death imposed by a court of Session must be confirmed by the High Court. The practice, to our knowledge, has always been to give top priority to the hearing of such cases by the High Courts. So, also in this Court. There are provisions in the Constitution (Arts. 72 and 161) which invest the President and the Governor with power to suspend, remit or commute a sentence of death. Making all reasonable allowance for the time necessary for appeal and considered of reprieve, we think that delay exceeding two years in the execution of a sentence of death should be considered sufficient to entitle the person under sentence of death to invoke Art. 21 and demand the quashing of the sentence of death. We therefore accept the special leave petition, allow the appeal as also the Writ Petition and quash the sentence of death. In the place of the sentence of death, we substitute the sentence of imprisonment for life.
Citation: AIR 1983 SC 361, 1983 AIR 361, 1983 SCR (2) 348, 1983 SCC (2) 68, 1983 SCALE (1)115
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