Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda Vs State of Maharashtra on 17 Jul 1984

Posted on March 10, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Landmark judgment by a 3-judge bench of Supreme Court around circumstantial evidence (Sec 106 of Evidence Act 1872) basis which the accused were acquitted. The 5 golden principles postulated in this decision are as below.

153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established :
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade and another Vs. State of Maharashtra 1973 2 SCC 793 where the observations were made :
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the
accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.
154. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.

Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda Vs State of Maharashtra on 17 Jul 1984 (SCR)

Citations : [1984 SCC 4 116], [1984 AIR SC 1622], [1984 CRI LJ 1738], [1984 CRIMES 2 235], [1984 CAR 263], [1984 CRLJ 90 1738], [1984 SCALE 2 445], [1985 SCR 1 88], [1984 CRLR 296], [1985 BOMCR SC 1 208], [1984 CRIMES SC 2 853], [1984 SCC CRI 1 487], [1984 SCC CRI 487], [1984 CRLJ SC 1738], [1984 AIR 1622], [1984 CRIMES SC 2 235]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1505859/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56b48ca6607dba348ffede2b

State of Karnataka Vs M. Devendrappa and Anr on 16 Jan 2002

Posted on February 25, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A 3 judge bench citing Bhajan lal judgment here, held as follows:

In dealing with the last case, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is function of the trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of private complainant as unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly.

Finally, it was held that, there were grounds to Quash the proceedings, by saying,

the involvement of excise officials cannot be ruled out and when they have been indicated to be witnesses, likelihood of prejudice cannot be ruled out. It was also noted that there was no “definite evidence” to show that accused nos. 1&2 were directly involved. Finally, it was observed that there was no material to hold that the accused persons had committed theft of “Letter Heads” from Karnataka Bank Ltd., and/or they had committed forgery for the purpose of cheating or have used genuine forged documents or had cheated the government. Finally, it was observed that there was no evidence to infer common intention to commit such offences.

State of Karnataka Vs M. Devendrappa and Anr on 16 Jan 2002

Citations : [2002 SCC 3 89], [2002 SCALE 1 176], [2002 AIR SC 671], [2002 SCR 1 275], [2002 CRLJ SC 998], [2002 SCC CRI 539], [2002 UJ SC 1 362], [2002 AIR SC 286], [2002 SUPREME 1 192], [2002 ACR SC 1 605], [2002 ALD CRI 1 412], [2002 SCSUPPL CHN 2 21], [2002 UC 1 294], [2002 AIR SCW 286], [2002 JT SC 1 213]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1014506/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adc4e4b0149711412362

M. Subramaniam Vs S. Janaki on 20 Mar 2020

Posted on January 31, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

3-Judge bench of Apex Court held that mere pendency of civil proceeding (divorce, maintenance, dvc etc) is not a good ground and justification to not register and investigate an FIR if a criminal offence has been committed.

M. Subramaniam Vs S. Janaki on 20 Mar 2020

Citations : [2020 SCC ONLINE SC 341], [2020 (2) Crimes 261 (SC)], [2020 (5) CTC 464]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/37685877/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5e78e5bf3321bc362da2b770

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/m-subramaniam-and-another-versus-s-janaki-and-another

Nandini Satpathy Vs PL Dani and Anr on 07 Apr 1978

Posted on January 16, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Nandini Satpathy Vs PL Dani and Anr on 07 Apr 1978

Citations :

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1938988/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609abcce4b014971140d5d5

Prahlad Vs State of Rajasthan on 14 Nov 2018

Posted on January 16, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court says,

9. No explanation is forthcoming from the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. as to when he parted the company of the victim. Also, no explanation is there as to what happened after getting the chocolates for the victim. The silence on the part of the accused, in such a matter wherein he is expected to come out with an explanation, leads to an adverse inference against the accused.

Circumstantial Evidence…

10. We find that there is ample material against the accused to convict him for the offence under Section 302 IPC. All the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution stand proved so as to complete the chain of circumstances in respect of the offence under Section 302 of the IPC. The Trial Court and the High Court are, on facts, justified in convicting the accused for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC. However, we are unable to find reliable material against the accused for the offences under Section 3 and 4 of the POCSO Act.

Prahlad Vs State of Rajasthan on 14 Nov 2018

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/45763796/

https://www.legalauthority.in/judgement/prahlad-vs-the-state-of-rajasthan-40094

Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Zaixhu Xie and Ors on 11 Dec 2020

Posted on January 14, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A 3-judge bench of Supreme Court cited an recent decision passed wherein it was held as follows:

We appreciate that the learned Judge may have delivered a number of judgments and dealt with many cases and in the interregnum period may have even faced some personal difficulty as set out in the report but that does not take away from the fact that the process which was required to be
followed as set out in the judicial pronouncements has not been followed in the present case. If a judgment cannot be delivered on the same date or immediately thereafter, logically the judgment ought to have been at least reserved to facilitate the Judge to pen down the order. Result of not doing so is that the appellant being the aggrieved party, is unable to avail of the legal remedy.
We have to follow the same course of action as in the judgment referred to aforesaid and thus set aside the impugned order and remit the matter back for reconsideration of the High Court on merits, uninfluenced by the reasons which have been set out in the impugned order.
Needless to say the matter would be taken up by a Bench not consisting of the member who constituted the bench earlier.

Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Zaixhu Xie and Ors on 11 Dec 2020

Citations :

Other Sources :

Murali Vs State on 05 Jan 2021

Posted on January 13, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

This 3 judge bench of Supreme Court held that, if the parties compromise in a non-compoundable case, the sentence can be reduced. Here are the grounds taken by Court,

13. Given this position of law and the peculiar circumstances arising out of subsequent events, we are of the considered opinion that it is a fit case to
take a sympathetic view and reconsider the quantum of sentences awarded to the appellants. We say so because: first, the parties to the dispute have mutually buried their hatchet. The separate affidavit of the victim inspires confidence that the apology has voluntarily been accepted given the efflux of time and owing to the maturity brought about by age. There is no question of the settlement being as a result of any coercion or inducement. Considering that the parties are on friendly terms now and they inhabit the same society, this is a fit case for reduction of sentence.
14. Second, at the time of the incident, the victim was a college student, and both appellants too were no older than 2022 years. The attack was in
pursuance of a verbal altercation during a sports match, with there being no previous enmity between the parties. It does raise hope that parties would have grown up and have mended their ways. Indeed, in the present case, fifteen years have elapsed since the incident. The appellants are today in their mid-thirties and present little chance of committing the same crime.
15. Third, the appellants have no other criminal antecedents, no previous enmity, and today are married and have children. They are the sole bread
earners of their family and have significant social obligations to tend to. In such circumstances, it might not serve the interests of society to keep them
incarcerated any further.
16. Finally, both appellants have served a significant portion of their sentences. Murali has undergone more than half of his sentence and Rajavelu has been in jail for more than one year and eight months.

Murali Vs State on 05 Jan 2021

All India Judges’ Association and Ors Vs Union of India and Ors on 21 Mar 2002

Posted on December 31, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A 3-judge bench of Supreme Court held that, Law graduates can be eligible for practicing law without having any experience but recommended that the newly hired judges under training for a period not less than 1 year and preferably two years.

In the All India Judges’s case [1993] 4 SCC 288 at p. 314; this Court has observed that in order to enter the Judicial Service, an applicant must be an Advocate of at least three year’s standing. Rules were amended accordingly. With the passage of time, experience has shown that the best talent which is available is not attracted to the Judicial Service. A bright young law graduate after 3 year of practice finds the Judicial Service not attractive enough. It has been recommended by the Shetty Commission after taking into consideration the views expressed before it by various authorities, that the need for an applicant to have been an Advocate for at least 3 years should be done away with. After taking all the circumstances into consideration, we accept this recommendation of the Shetty Commission and the argument of the learned Amicus Curiae that it should be no longer mandatory for an applicant desirous of entering the Judicial Service to be an Advocate of at least three years’ standing we accordingly, in the light of experience gained after the judgment in All India Judges’ cases direct to the High Courts and to the State Governments to amend their rules so as to enable a fresh law graduate who may not even have put in even three years of practice, to be eligible to compete and enter the Judicial Service. We, however, recommend that a fresh recruit into the Judicial Service should be imparted with training of not less than one years, preferably two years. The Shetty Commission has recommended Assured Career Progessive Scheme and Functional Scales. We have accepted the said recommendation and a suggestion was mooted to the effect that in order that a Judicial Officer does not feel that he is stagnated there should be a change in the nomenclature with the change of the pay scale.

All India Judges’ Association and Ors Vs Union of India and Ors on 21 Mar 2002

Citations : [2002 CGLJ 3 361], [2002 SCALE 3 291], [2002 AIR SC 1752], [2002 ALD SC 3 39], [2002 ALT SC 4 41], [2002 AWC SC 2 395], [2002 BLJR 2 1144], [2002 FLR 93 628], [2002 GLR 3 2017], [2002 JCR SC 2 248], [2002 JT SC 3 503], [2001 SCALE 2 327], [2002 SCC 4 247], [2002 SCR 2 712], [2002 SCT SC 2 735], [2002 SLJ SC 2 480], [2002 UPLBEC 2 1246], [2001 LIC 34 2398], [2001 AIR SC 2543], [2002 SLR 3 271], [2002 KANTLJ 3 26], [2002 AIR SC 1706], [2002 SUPREME 3 180], [2002 SLT 3 4], [2002 SCJ 2 598], [2002 SRJ 5 246], [2002 LIC 1473], [2002 LLN 2 781], [2002 UPLBEC 2 480], [2003 ILR KAR 1 321], [2002 BLJ 2 586], [2002 PAT LJR 2 210], [2001 AIR SCW 2543], [2002 BOMCR SC 5 242], [2002 SCC LS 508], [2002 AIR SCW 1706]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/125557979/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adb5e4b01497114120ad

Paramvir Singh Saini Vs Baljit Singh and Ors on 02 Dec 2020

Posted on December 16, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court passed this Order in furtherance to earlier Orders as follows:

From Paras 2 and 3,

2. This Court, vide Order dated 03.04.2018 in SLP (Crl) No. 2302 of 2017, reported as Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2018) 5 SCC 311, directed that a Central Oversight Body (hereinafter referred to as the “COB”) be set up by the Ministry of Home Affairs to implement the plan of action with respect to the use of videography in the crime scene during the investigation. This Court, while considering the directions issued in D.K. Basu Vs. State of West Bengal & Others (2015) 8 SCC 744, held that there was a need for further directions that in every State an oversight mechanism be created whereby an independent committee can study the CCTV camera footages and periodically publish a report of its observations thereon. The COB was further directed to issue appropriate instructions in this regard at the earliest.

From Paras 5, 6 and 7,

5. This Court, vide Order dated 16.07.2020, issued notice in the instant Special Leave Petition to the Ministry of Home Affairs on the question of audio-video recordings of Section 161 CrPC statements as is provided by Section 161 (3) proviso, as well as the larger question as to installation of CCTV cameras in police stations generally. While issuing notice this Court also took note of the directions in Shafhi Mohammad (supra).

6. This Court, vide Order dated 16.09.2020, impleaded all the States and Union Territories to find out the exact position of CCTV cameras qua each Police Station as well as the constitution of Oversight Committees in accordance with the Order dated 03.04.2018 of this Court in Shafhi Mohammad (supra).

7. Pursuant to the said directions of this Court, Compliance Affidavits and Action Taken Reports were filed by 14 States (till 24.11.2020), namely, West Bengal, Chhattisgarh, Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Nagaland, Karnataka, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, Assam, Sikkim, Mizoram, Madhya Pradesh, Meghalaya, Manipur; and 2 Union Territories, namely, Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry.

Duties of SLOC and DLOC are as follows:

12. It shall be the duty of the SLOC to see that the directions passed by this Court are carried out. Amongst others, the duties shall consist of:
a) Purchase, distribution and installation of CCTVs and its equipment; b) Obtaining the budgetary allocation for the same;
c) Continuous monitoring of maintenance and upkeep of CCTVs and its equipment;
d) Carrying out inspections and addressing the grievances received from the DLOC; and
e) To call for monthly reports from the DLOC and immediately address any concerns like faulty equipment.
Likewise, the DLOC shall have the following obligations:
a) Supervision, maintenance and upkeep of CCTVs and its equipment;
b) Continuous monitoring of maintenance and upkeep of CCTVs and its equipment;
c) To interact with the Station House Officer (hereinafter referred to as the “SHO”) as to the functioning and maintenance of CCTVs and its equipment; and
d) To send monthly reports to the SLOC about the functioning of CCTVs and allied equipment.
e) To review footage stored from CCTVs in the various Police Stations to check for any human rights violation that may have occurred but are not reported.

13. It is obvious that none of this can be done without allocation of adequate funds for the same, which must be done by the States’/Union Territories’ Finance Departments at the very earliest.

One of the most important aspect is settled here… Awesome…

14. The duty and responsibility for the working, maintenance and recording of CCTVs shall be that of the SHO of the police station concerned. It shall be the duty and obligation of the SHO to immediately report to the DLOC any fault with the equipment or malfunctioning of CCTVs. If the CCTVs are not functioning in a particular police station, the concerned SHO shall inform the DLOC of the arrest / interrogations carried out in that police station during the said period and forward the said record to the DLOC. If the concerned SHO has reported malfunctioning or non-functioning of CCTVs of a particular Police Station, the DLOC shall immediately request the SLOC for repair and purchase of the equipment, which shall be done immediately.

15. The Director General/Inspector General of Police of each State and Union Territory should issue directions to the person in charge of a Police Station to entrust the SHO of the concerned Police Station with the responsibility of assessing the working condition of the CCTV cameras installed in the police station and also to take corrective action to restore the functioning of all non-functional CCTV cameras. The SHO should also be made responsible for CCTV data maintenance, backup of data, fault rectification etc.

Regarding placement of CCTV cameras:

16. The State and Union Territory Governments should ensure that CCTV cameras are installed in each and every Police Station functioning in the respective State and/or Union Territory. Further, in order to ensure that no part of a Police Station is left uncovered, it is imperative to ensure that CCTV cameras are installed at all entry and exit points; main gate of the police station; all lock-ups; all corridors; lobby/the reception area; all verandas/outhouses, Inspector’s room; Sub-Inspector’s room; areas outside the lock-up room; station hall; in front of the police station compound; outside (not inside) washrooms/toilets; Duty Officer’s room; back part of the police station etc.

17. CCTV systems that have to be installed must be equipped with night vision and must necessarily consist of audio as well as video footage. In areas in which there is either no electricity and/or internet, it shall be the duty of the States/Union Territories to provide the same as expeditiously as possible using any mode of providing electricity, including solar/wind power. The internet systems that are provided must also be systems which provide clear image resolutions and audio. Most important of all is the storage of CCTV camera footage which can be done in digital video recorders and/or network video recorders. CCTV cameras must then be installed with such recording systems so that the data that is stored thereon shall be preserved for a period of 18 months. If the recording equipment, available in the market today, does not have the capacity to keep the recording for 18 months but for a lesser period of time, it shall be mandatory for all States, Union Territories and the Central Government to purchase one which allows storage for the maximum period possible, and, in any case, not below 1 year. It is also made clear that this will be reviewed by all the States so as to purchase equipment which is able to store the data for 18 months as soon as it is commercially available in the market. The affidavit of compliance to be filed by all States and Union Territories and Central Government shall clearly indicate that the best equipment available as of date has been purchased.
18. Whenever there is information of force being used at police stations resulting in serious injury and/or custodial deaths, it is necessary that persons be free to complain for a redressal of the same. Such complaints may not only be made to the State Human Rights Commission, which is then to utilise its powers, more particularly under Sections 17 and 18 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, for redressal of such complaints, but also to Human Rights Courts, which must then be set up in each District of every State/Union Territory under Section 30 of the aforesaid Act. The Commission/Court can then immediately summon CCTV camera footage in relation to the incident for its safe keeping, which may then be made available to an investigation agency in order to further process the complaint made to it.

And, finally explicitly publicising that the said premises is under CCTV monitoring in vernacular and English languages.

20. The SLOC and the COB (where applicable) shall give directions to all Police Stations, investigative/enforcement agencies to prominently display at the entrance and inside the police stations/offices of investigative/enforcement agencies about the coverage of the concerned premises by CCTV. This shall be done by large posters in English, Hindi and vernacular language. In addition to the above, it shall be clearly mentioned therein that a person has a right to complain about human rights violations to the National/State Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Court or the Superintendent of Police or any other authority empowered to take cognizance of an offence. It shall further mention that CCTV footage is preserved for a certain minimum time period, which shall not be less than six months, and the victim has a right to have the same secured in the event of violation of his human rights.

Paramvir Singh Saini Vs Baljit Singh and Ors on 02 Dec 2020

Girish Kumar Suneja Vs CBI on 13 Jul 2017

Posted on December 13, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that all those Order of a Trial Court which terminate the proceedings are not interlocutory Order but are intermediate orders in nature so such Orders are not prohibited in Revision at Session or High Courts.

From Para 16, 17 and 18,

16. While the text of sub-section (1) of Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. appears to confer very wide powers on the court in the exercise of its revision jurisdiction, this power is equally severely curtailed by sub-section (2) thereof. There is a complete prohibition in a court exercising its revision jurisdiction in respect of interlocutory orders. Therefore, what is the nature of orders in respect of which a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction?
17. There are three categories of orders that a court can pass – final, intermediate and interlocutory. There is no doubt that in respect of a final order, a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction – that is in respect of a final order of acquittal or conviction. There is equally no doubt that in respect of an interlocutory order, the court cannot exercise its revision jurisdiction. As far as an intermediate order is concerned, the court can exercise its revision jurisdiction since it is not an interlocutory order.
18. The concept of an intermediate order first found mention in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana7 in which case the interpretation and impact of Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. came up for consideration. This decision is important for two reasons. Firstly it gives the historical reason for the enactment of Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. and secondly considering that historical background, it gives a justification for a restrictive meaning to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

From Para 21,

21. The concept of an intermediate order was further elucidated in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra8 by contradistinguishing a final order and an interlocutory order. This decision lays down the principle that an intermediate order is one which is interlocutory in nature but when reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in a final order. Two such intermediate orders immediately come to mind – an order taking cognizance of an offence and summoning an accused and an order for framing charges. Prima facie these orders are interlocutory in nature, but when an order taking cognizance and summoning an accused is reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings against that person resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Similarly, an order for framing of charges if reversed has the effect of discharging the accused person and resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Therefore, an intermediate order is one which if passed in a certain way, the proceedings would terminate but if passed in another way, the proceedings would continue.

From Paras 23 and 24,

23. We may note that in different cases, different expressions are used for the same category of orders – sometimes it is called an intermediate order, sometimes a quasi-final order and sometimes it is called an order that is a matter of moment. Our preference is for the expression ‘intermediate order’ since that brings out the nature of the order more explicitly.
24. The second reason why Amar Nath is important is that it invokes the principle, in the context of criminal law, that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Therefore, when Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. prohibits interference in respect of interlocutory orders, Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be availed of to achieve the same objective. In other words, since Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. prohibits interference with interlocutory orders, it would not be permissible to resort to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to set aside an interlocutory order.

Finally,

27. Our conclusion on this subject is that while the appellants might have an entitlement (not a right) to file a revision petition in the High Court but that entitlement can be taken away and in any event, the High Court is under no obligation to entertain a revision petition – such a petition can be rejected at the threshold. If the High Court is inclined to accept the revision petition it can do so only against a final order or an intermediate order, namely, an order which if set aside would result in the culmination of the proceedings. As we see it, there appear to be only two such eventualities of a revisable order and in any case only one such eventuality is before us. Consequently the result of paragraph 10 of the order passed by this Court is that the entitlement of the appellants to file a revision petition in the High Court is taken away and thereby the High Court is deprived of exercising its extraordinary discretionary power available under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C.
28. However, this does not mean that the appellants have no remedy available to them – paragraph 10 of the order does not prohibit the appellants from approaching this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Therefore all that has happened is that the forum for ventilating the grievance of the appellants has shifted from the High Court to this Court. It was submitted by one of the learned counsel that this is not good enough for the appellants since this Court is not obliged to give reasons while dismissing such a petition unlike the High Court which would necessarily have to give reasons if it rejected a revision petition. In our opinion, the mere fact that this Court could dismiss the petition filed by the appellants under Article 136 of the Constitution without giving reasons does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that reasons will not be given or that some equitable order will not be passed. The submission of learned counsel has no basis and is only a presumption of what this Court might do. We cannot accept a submission that has its foundation on a hypothesis.

Girish Kumar Suneja Vs CBI on 13 Jul 2017

Citations : [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 766], [2017 AIR SC 3620], [2017 CRIMES SC 3 96], [2017 CCR SC 3 409], [2017 MLJ CRL 3 616], [2017 RCR CRIMINAL 3 665], [2017 SCALE 7 661], [2017 SCC 14 809], [2018 SCC CRI 1 202], [2017 CRI LJ 4980], [2017 AIC 180 100]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/174336697/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/59786fa94a9326202d8a7817

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: 3-Judge (Full) Bench Decision

Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda Vs State of Maharashtra on 17 Jul 1984

State of Karnataka Vs M. Devendrappa and Anr on 16 Jan 2002

M. Subramaniam Vs S. Janaki on 20 Mar 2020

Nandini Satpathy Vs PL Dani and Anr on 07 Apr 1978

Prahlad Vs State of Rajasthan on 14 Nov 2018

Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Zaixhu Xie and Ors on 11 Dec 2020

Murali Vs State on 05 Jan 2021

All India Judges’ Association and Ors Vs Union of India and Ors on 21 Mar 2002

Paramvir Singh Saini Vs Baljit Singh and Ors on 02 Dec 2020

Girish Kumar Suneja Vs CBI on 13 Jul 2017