Kuldeep Kumar Vs U.T. Chandigarh and Ors on 20 Feb 2024

Posted on March 14, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Apex Court passed order to initiate perjury proceedings against a Presiding Officer of conducting the election to the Post of Mayor of the Chandigarh Municipal Corporation, as follows,

From Paras 40-42,

40. Further, we are of the considered view that a fit and proper case is made out for invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 in respect of the conduct of Shri Anil Masih, the Presiding Officer. In paragraph 2 of the order dated 19 February 2024, we have recorded the statement which was made by the Presiding Officer when he appeared personally before this Court. As Presiding Officer, Shri Anil Masih could not have been unmindful of the consequences of making a statement which, prima facie, appears to be false to his knowledge in the course of judicial proceedings.
41. The Registrar (Judicial) is accordingly directed to issue a notice to show cause to Shri Anil Masih of the Chandigarh Municipal Corporation who was the Presiding Officer at the election which took place on 30 January 2024, as to why steps should not be initiated against him under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. The notice shall be made returnable on 15 March 2024.
42. Shri Anil Masih shall have an opportunity to file his response to the notice to be issued in pursuance of the above directions in the meantime.

Kuldeep Kumar Vs U.T. Chandigarh and Ors on 20 Feb 2024

Previous Order where false statement was made in paragraph 2.

2. During the course of the hearing, the Returning Officer Mr Anil Masih is present before this Court. Responding to a query of the Court, Mr Masih stated that he had, besides signing the ballot papers, put his mark at eight ballot papers during the course of the counting of the votes. He states that he did so as he found that the ballot papers were defaced.

Kuldeep Kumar Vs U.T. Chandigarh and Ors on 19 Feb 2024

Index of Perjury judgments is here.

Grasim Industries Ltd Vs Collector of Customs Bombay on 04 Apr 2002

Posted on February 12, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

Sitting on the full bench of Apex Court, Justice Arijit Pasayat, held as follows, while interpreting the statutes passed by the Legislature.

From Para 9,

No words or expressions used in any statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. In matters of interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one word and pay too little attention to other words. No provision in the statute and no word in any section can be construed in isolation. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used. It is said that every statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting any word while considering a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the Court to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating the statutory provisions. Wherever the language is clear the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. While doing so what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided. As stated by the Privy Council in Crawford v. Spooner [(1846) 6 Moore PC 1] “we cannot aid the Legislature’s defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend and, by construction make up deficiencies which are left there”. In case of an ordinary word there should be no attempt to substitute or paraphrase of general application. Attention should be confined to what is necessary for deciding the particular case. This principle is too well settled and reference to few decisions of this Court would suffice. [See: Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests, Palghat and Anr. (AIR 1990 SC 1747), Union of India and Anr. v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal (AIR 1992 SC 96), Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse and Anr. (1997 (6) SCC 312) and Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India and Ors. (JT 2002 (3) SC 21)]

Grasim Industries Ltd Vs Collector of Customs Bombay on 04 Apr 2002

Court Kutchehry Version:

Grasim Industries Ltd Vs Collector of Customs Bombay on 04 Apr 2002 (CK)

Nahar Singh Yadav and Anr Vs Union of India and Ors on 19 Nov 2010

Posted on November 13, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A Full Bench of the Apex Court passed these broad factors while considering transfer petitions u/s 406 Cr.P.C.

From Para 24,

24.Thus, although no rigid and inflexible rule or test could be laid down to decide whether or not power under Section 406 of the Cr.P.C. should be
exercised, it is manifest from a bare reading of sub-sections (2) and (3) of the said Section and on an analysis of the decisions of this Court that an order of transfer of trial is not to be passed as a matter of routine or merely because an interested party has expressed some apprehension about the proper conduct of a trial. This power has to be exercised cautiously and in exceptional situations, where it becomes necessary to do so to provide credibility to the trial. Some of the broad factors which could be kept in mind while considering an application for transfer of the trial are:-
(i) when it appears that the State machinery or prosecution is acting hand in glove with the accused, and there is likelihood of miscarriage of justice due to the lackadaisical attitude of the prosecution;
(ii) when there is material to show that the accused may influence the prosecution witnesses or cause physical harm to the complainant;
(iii) comparative inconvenience and hardships likely to be caused to the accused, the complainant/the prosecution and the witnesses, besides the burden to be borne by the State Exchequer in making payment of travelling and other expenses of the official and non-official witnesses;
(iv) a communally surcharged atmosphere, indicating some proof of inability of holding fair and impartial trial because of the accusations made and the nature of the crime committed by the accused; and
(v) existence of some material from which it can be inferred that the some persons are so hostile that they are interfering or are likely to interfere either directly or indirectly with the course of justice.

Nahar Singh Yadav and Anr Vs Union of India and Ors on 19 Nov 2010

Citations : [2011 AIR SC 1549], [2011 RCR CRIMINAL SC 1 120], [2011 SCC CRI 1 39], [2011 AIR SC 325], [2011 SCC 1 307], [2010 AIOL 798], [2010 SLT 9 322], [2010 JT 12 641], [2011 CRLJ SC 997], [2010 SCALE 12 199], [2010 SUPREME 7 729], [2010 AIC 96 1], [2011 ECRN 1 717], [2011 KCCR 2 845], [2011 AIR SCW 325], [201 OJ 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 851]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/668282/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aedde4b0149711414eec

https://vlex.in/vid/nahar-singh-yadav-and-572148534

https://www.latestlaws.com/latest-caselaw/2010/november/2010-latest-caselaw-867-sc/

Index of Transfer Judgments is here.

Abbayolla M. Subba Reddy Vs Padmamma on 27 Jul 1998

Posted on October 5, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

Abbayolla M. Subba Reddy Vs Padmamma on 27 Jul 1998 (CK)

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/19292/

In Re Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail (Guidelines Issued) on 31 Jan 2023

Posted on April 4, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A 3-judge bench passed these directions, in relation to release of undertrial prisoners/convicts who were granted bail.

With a view to ameliorate the problems a number of directions are sought. We have examined the directions which we reproduce hereinafter with
certain modifications:
“1) The Court which grants bail to an undertrial prisoner/convict would be required to send a soft copy of the bail order by e-mail to the prisoner through the Jail Superintendent on the same day or the next day. The Jail Superintendent would be required to enter the date of grant of bail in the e-prisons software [or any other software which is being used by the Prison Department].
2) If the accused is not released within a period of 7 days from the date of grant of bail, it would be the duty of the Superintendent of Jail to inform the
Secretary, DLSA who may depute para legal volunteer or jail visiting advocate to interact with the prisoner and assist the prisoner in all ways possible for his release.
3) NIC would make attempts to create necessary fields in the e-prison software so that the date of grant of bail and date of release are entered by the Prison Department and in case the prisoner is not released within 7 days, then an automatic email can be sent to the Secretary, DLSA.
4) The Secretary, DLSA with a view to find out the economic condition of the accused, may take help of the Probation Officers or the Para Legal Volunteers to prepare a report on the socio-economic conditions of the inmate which may be placed before the concerned Court with a request to relax the condition (s) of bail/surety.
5) In cases where the undertrial or convict requests that he can furnish bail bond or sureties once released, then in an appropriate case, the Court may consider granting temporary bail for a specified period to the accused so that he can furnish bail bond or sureties.
6) If the bail bonds are not furnished within one month from the date of grant bail, the concerned Court may suo moto take up the case and consider whether the conditions of bail require modification/ relaxation.
7) One of the reasons which delays the release of the accused/ convict is the insistence upon local surety. It is suggested that in such cases, the courts
may not impose the condition of local surety.”
We order that the aforesaid directions shall be complied with.

In Re Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail (Guidelines Issued) on 31 Jan 2023

Pravasi Legal Cell Vs Union of India and Ors on 20 Mar 2023

Posted on March 28, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Apex Court passed directions to all High Courts and States to setup online RTI portals in their respective territories…

From Paras 8-11,

8 We are of the view that such an exercise should be carried out by all the High Courts in the country no later than within a period of three months from the date of this order.
9 A certified copy of this order shall be remitted by the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court to all the Registrars General, who shall in turn, seek administrative directions from the learned Chief Justices for implementation.
10 The High Courts shall make adequate provisions to facilitate the supply of information through online web portals and for all incidental purposes connected with the implementation of the Right to Information Act 2005.
11 As regards the district judiciary, which is under the administrative control of the High Courts, we request all the Registrars General to take administrative directions from the Chief Justices. The High Courts may utilize the support of the National Informatics Centre for the purpose. NIC shall provide all logistical and technical assistance in that regard to the High Courts.

From Para 1 on Page 4,

1 In view of the orders which have been passed in Writ Petition (Civil) No 1325 of 2020, there shall be a direction to all the State governments/Union Territories to set up and operationalize online web portals so that information sought under the Right to Information Act 2005 is made available in respect of all public authorities falling within their jurisdiction. This exercise shall be completed within a period of three months from the date of this order.

Pravasi Legal Cell Vs Union of India and Ors on 20 Mar 2023

Supreme Court launched it’s own RTI Portal in November 2022.

News here and here.

This was one of my PIL ideas here.

Jai Prakash Tiwari Vs State of Madhya Pradesh on 04 Aug 2022

Posted on March 8, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A Full bench of the Apex Court held as follows regarding the important of fundamental right available to accused u/s 313 Cr.P.C.

From Paras 18 and 19,

18. Another important issue that merits consideration in the present appeal is that the accused-appellant, in his Section 313 statement, stated that he and the complainant belonged to opposing student parties. The accused-appellant claimed that owing to the animosity pertaining to the elections, the accused-appellant was falsely implicated in the matter. He also produced two witnesses to prove his alibi. DW1 and DW2 have stated that the accused appellant was in his village as his mother was unwell. Moreover, the accused-appellant also pointed out to the Court that the father, sister and brother of the complainant were all a part of the police department. The accused-appellant also brought to the notice of the Court the fact that the complainant had also registered another criminal case against the accused-appellant in which he already stands acquitted.

19. In the case at hand, the alternate version put forth by the appellant-accused could not be ignored. Section 313 CrPC confers a valuable right upon an accused to establish his innocence and can well be considered beyond a statutory right, as a constitutional right to a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.[See Reena Hazarika v. State of Assam, (2019) 13 SCC 289]

From Paras 25-28,

25. In the present case, the courts below failed to scrutinize the defence version put forward by the appellant-accusedin his Section 313 statement. The object of Section 313 of the Codeis to establish a direct dialogue between the court and the accused. (See Asraf Ali v. State of Assam, (2008) 16 SCC 328)
26. The purpose of Section 313 CrPC is to provide the accused a reasonable opportunity to explain the adverse circumstances which have emerged against him during the course of trial.A reasonable opportunity entails putting all the adverse evidences in the form of questions so as to give an opportunity to the accused to articulate his defence and givehis explanation.
27. If all the circumstances are bundled together and a singleopportunity is provided to the accused to explain himself, he may not able to put forth a rational and intelligibleexplanation. Such, exercises which defeats fair opportunity are nothing but empty formality. Non-fulfilment of the true spirit of Section 313 may ultimately cause grave prejudice tothe accused and the Court may not have the benefit of all the necessary facts and circumstances to arrive at a fair conclusion.
28. Such an omission does not ipso facto vitiate the trial, unless the accused fails to prove that grave prejudice has been caused to him. Although the counsel on behalf the accused has not proved any serious prejudice caused to him due to failure of the Court in framing individual circumstances; however, considering the long pendency of the matter and the right of the accused to have a fair and expeditious trial, we propose to proceed and decide the matter on its own merit.

From Para 29,

29. It is an established principle of criminal law that the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt is upon the prosecution. Where an accused sets up a defence or offers an explanation, it is well-settled that he is not required to prove his defence beyond a reasonable doubt but only by preponderance of probabilities. [See M. Abbas v. State of Kerala, (2001) 10 SCC 103]. Further, it has been held by this Court in Parminder Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2020) 8 SCC 811 that “once a plausible version has been put forth in defence at the Section 313 CrPC examination stage, then it is for the prosecution to negate such defence plea”.

Jai Prakash Tiwari Vs State of Madhya Pradesh on 04 Aug 2022

Father Thomas Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 22 Dec 2010

Posted on March 4, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

Following the landmark decision of Apex Court here, the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court held as follows,

From Para 14,

14.In Union of India v. W.N. Chaddha, 1993 Cri.L.J 859 (SC) it has been held in paragraph 93: “…….More so, the accused has no right to have any say as regards the manner and method of investigation. Save under certain exceptions under the entire scheme of the Code, the accused has no participation as a matter of right during the course of the investigation of a case instituted on a police report till the investigation culminates in filing of a final report under S. 173(2) of the Code or in a proceeding instituted otherwise than on a police report till the process is issued under S. 204 of the Code, as the case may be. Even in cases where cognizance of an offence is taken on a complaint notwithstanding the said offence is triable by a Magistrate or triable exclusively by the Court of Session, the accused has no right to have participation till the process is issued. In case the issue of process is postponed as contemplated under S. 202 of the Code, the accused may attend the subsequent inquiry but cannot participate. There are various judicial pronouncements to this effect but we feel that it is not necessary to recapitulate those decisions. At the same time, we would like to point out that there are certain provisions under the Code empowering the Magistrate to give an opportunity of being heard under certain specified circumstances.”

From Para 29,

29.From a consideration of the aforesaid authorities, it is apparent that even when a complaint is filed under section 190(1) (a) and the Court decides to take cognizance and to adopt the procedure provided for inquiry under section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C, the accused is only permitted to remain present during the proceedings, but not to intervene or to raise his defence, until the order issuing summons is passed. The right of hearing of a prospective accused at the pre-cognizance stage, when only a direction for investigation by the police is issued by the Magistrate under section 156(3) Cr.P.C., can only be placed at a lower pedestal. It is only during the course of trial that the accused has been conferred rights at different stages to raise his defence. As the authorities show, that in the absence of any statutory right of hearing to the prospective accused at the pre-cognizance stage, when the direction to investigate has only been issued by the Magistrate under section 156(3), the accused cannot be conferred with any right of hearing even under any principle of audi alteram partem.

From Para 41,

41.An order under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. passed by the Magistrate directing the police officer to investigate a cognizable case on the other hand is no such order of moment, which impinges on anyvaluable rights of the party. Were any objection to the issuance of such a direction to be accepted (though it is difficult to visualize anyobjection which could result in the quashing of a simple direction for investigation), the proceedings would still not come to an end, as itwould be open to the complainant informant to move an application under section 154(3) before the Superintendent of Police (S.P.) or a superior officer under section 36 of the Code. He could also file a complaint under section 190 read with section 200 of the Code. This is the basic difference from the situations mentioned in Madhu Limaye and in Amar Nath’s cases, where acceptance of the objections could result in the said accused being discharged or the summons set aside, and the proceedings terminated. Also the direction for investigation by the Magistrate is but an incidental step in aid of investigation and trial. It is thus similar to orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, orders granting bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of pending proceedings which have been described as purely interlocutory in nature in Amar Nath (supra).

From Para 58,

58.However it is made clear that the initial order for investigation under section 156(3) is also not open to challenge in a writ petition, as it is now beyond the pale of controversy that the province of investigationby the police and the judiciary are not overlapping but complementary. As observed by the Privy Council in paragraph 37 in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR 1945 PC 18 when considering the scope of the statutory powers of the police to investigate a cognizable case under sections 154 and 156 of the Code, that it would be an unfortunate result if the Courts in exercise of their inherent powers could interfere in this function of the police. The roles of the Court and police are “complementary not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function.”

Finally, from Paras 64 and 65,

64.In this view of the matter, the Opinion of the Full bench on the three questions posed is:
65.A. The order of the Magistrate made in exercise of powers under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C directing the police to register and investigate is not open to revision at the instance of a person against whom neither cognizance has been taken nor any process issued.
B. An order made under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C is an interlocutory order and remedy of revision against such order is barred under subsection (2) of Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
C. The view expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ajay Malviya Vs. State of U.P and others reported in 2000(41) ACC 435 that as an order made under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is amenable to revision, and no writ petition for quashing an F.I.R registered on the basis of the order will be maintainable, is not correct.

Father Thomas Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 22 Dec 2010

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/77085610/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5767b120e691cb22da6d4314

Shivcharan Lal Verma and Anr Vs State of Madhya Pradesh on 19 Feb 2002

Posted on March 2, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Supreme Court held as follows regarding validity of 498A IPC proceedings when the marriage is null and void,

From Para 2,

2. This matter had not been taken up for hearing for this length of time as the judgment of this Court holding Section 306 of the IPC to be unconstitutional, was under re-consideration by the constitution bench. The constitution bench finally disposed of the matter in criminal case No. 274 of 1984 and batch and set aside the earlier judgment of this Court and held that Section 306 is constitutionally valid. In view of the aforesaid constitution bench decision, two questions arise for consideration in this appeal. One, whether the prosecution under Section 498A can at all be attracted since the marriage with Mohini itself was null and void, the same having been performed during the lifetime of Kalindi. Second, whether the conviction under Section 306 could at all be sustained in the absence of any positive material to hold that Mohini committed suicide because of any positive act on the part of either Shiv Charan or Kalindi.

Finally,

There may be considerable force in the argument of Mr. Khanduja, learned counsel for the appellant so far as conviction under Section 498A is concerned, inasmuch as the alleged marriage with Mohini during the subsistence of valid marriage with Kalindi is null and void. We, therefore, set aside the conviction and sentence under Section 498A of the IPC.

Citations : [2002 ACR SC 1 946], [2007 DMC SC 1 120], [2002 JT SC 2 641], [2007 SCC 15 369], [2010 SCC CRI 3 729], [2002 CRIMES SC 2 177], [2002 SUPREME 3 168], [2006 SLT 9 493], [2007 CCR 1 115]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/145448/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adbae4b01497114121aa

Delhi High Court followed this here as precedent and is binding and but not the Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam And Others.

Index of Quash judgements is here and HMA Judgments is here.

Sanjay Kumar Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 28 Jan 2014

Posted on December 24, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Full bench of Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 4,

4. Earlier, this Court had issued notice to the petitioner himself to show cause that in case it was a fake institution, what was the reason or rationale for the petitioner to join the same and to continue to serve there for one year. In reply to the said show cause notice, the petitioner submitted that such pleadings be ignored and may not be taken into account for the purpose of disposal of the instant petition. We do not see any reason to allow a party to make a pleading in the petition and then make a submission to the court to ignore it as such an issue has no bearing on the merits of the case being totally irrelevant. Pleadings have to be true to the knowledge of the parties and in case a person takes such misleading pleadings, he can be refused not only any kind of indulgence by the court but can also be tried for perjury. In case, the pleading taken by the petitioner is true, he cannot ask for ignoring the same. In case, it is false and as such statement had been made on oath, he is liable to be tried for perjury. More so, whether such a pleading is relevant or not is a matter to be decided by the court and under Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, court has a right to ask the party even relevant or irrelevant questions and the parties or their counsel cannot raise any objection to any such question.

From Para 5,

Be that as it may, this Court had insisted at the time of first round of hearing of this case that AOR, Shri Manu Shanker Mishra should remain present in the Court at the time of arguments and also passed over the matter for his appearance. In the second round, it was informed to us that the AOR refused to come to the court. We take a very serious note of the conduct of this AOR, particularly, in view of the judgment of this Court In Re: Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, (2014) 1 SCC 572, wherein this Court has categorically held that in case the AOR does not appear in the court, his conduct may tantamount to criminal contempt of the court. In fact, a very few AsOR have spoiled the working system of the institution of AsOR who simply lend their signatures for petty amount. The AOR involved herein is living in a fool’s paradise if he thinks that he can play hide and seek with any court of law.
In such a chaotic situation, any “Arzi”, “Farzi”, half- baked lawyer under the label of “proxy counsel”, a phrase not traceable under the Advocates Act, 1961 or under the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 etc., cannot be allowed to abuse and misuse the process of the court under a false impression that he has a right to waste public time without any authority to appear in the court, either from the litigant or from the AOR, as in the instant case. The AOR, with impunity was disdainful towards the order of this Court directing him to appear in the court. He had also not filed any appearance for the counsel who had appeared, nor the said counsel disclosed his name. The Court takes serious note of the conduct of the AOR, Shri Manu Shanker Mishra and warns him to behave in an appropriate manner befitting the conduct of an advocate and an AOR otherwise this Court will not hesitate to take action against him. His conduct will be under close watch of this Court.

Sanjay Kumar Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 28 Jan 2014

Citations : [2014 ALLCC 84 1002], [2014 ALT CRL AP 2 242], [2014 CCR SC 2 37], [2014 COMPLJ SC 3 197], [2014 RCR CIVIL 2 285], [2014 SCALE 1 751], [2014 SCC 9 230], [2014 SCJ 4 412], [2014 SCR 1 848], [2014 UC 1 516], [2014 SCC CRI 5 21], [2014 SCC ONLINE SC 67], [2014 AIOL 52], [2014 SCV 1 397], [2014 SLT 3 298], [2014 RAJ 2 401], [2014 AICLR 1 991], [2014 ALLINDCAS 135 270], [2014 RCR CRIMINAL SC 2 711]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/199130163/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af4ce4b0149711416146

https://www.legalauthority.in/judgement/sanjay-kumar-vs-state-of-bihar-anr-5665

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: 3-Judge (Full) Bench Decision

Kuldeep Kumar Vs U.T. Chandigarh and Ors on 20 Feb 2024

Grasim Industries Ltd Vs Collector of Customs Bombay on 04 Apr 2002

Nahar Singh Yadav and Anr Vs Union of India and Ors on 19 Nov 2010

Abbayolla M. Subba Reddy Vs Padmamma on 27 Jul 1998

In Re Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail (Guidelines Issued) on 31 Jan 2023

Pravasi Legal Cell Vs Union of India and Ors on 20 Mar 2023

Jai Prakash Tiwari Vs State of Madhya Pradesh on 04 Aug 2022

Father Thomas Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 22 Dec 2010

Shivcharan Lal Verma and Anr Vs State of Madhya Pradesh on 19 Feb 2002

Sanjay Kumar Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 28 Jan 2014