Dolly Rani Vs Manish Kumar Chanchal on 19 Apr 2024

Posted on August 10, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that a Hindu marriage without conducting the marriage ceremonies is not a valid marriage.

We find that the registration of Hindu marriages under the said provision is only to facilitate the proof of a Hindu marriage but for that, there has to be a Hindu marriage in accordance with Section 7 of the Act inasmuch as there must be a marriage ceremony which has taken place between the parties in accordance with the said provision. Although the parties may have complied with the requisite conditions for a valid Hindu marriage as per
Section 5 of the Act in the absence of there being a “Hindu marriage” in accordance with Section 7 of the Act, i.e., solemnization of such a marriage, there would be no Hindu marriage in the eye of law. In the absence of there being a valid Hindu marriage, the Marriage Registration Officer cannot
register such a marriage under the provisions of Section 8 of the Act. Therefore, if a certificate is issued stating that the couple had undergone marriage and if the marriage ceremony had not been performed in accordance with Section 7 of the Act, then the registration of such marriage under Section 8 would not confer any legitimacy to such a marriage. The registration of a marriage under Section 8 of the Act is only to confirm that the
parties have undergone a valid marriage ceremony in accordance with Section 7 of the Act. In other words, a certificate of marriage is a proof of validity of Hindu marriage only when such a marriage has taken place and not in a case where there is no marriage ceremony performed at all.
We further observe that a Hindu marriage is a sacrament and has a sacred character. In the context of saptapadi in a Hindu marriage, according to Rig Veda, after completing the seventh step (saptapadi) the bridegroom says to his bride, “With seven steps we have become friends (sakha). May I attain to friendship with thee; may I not be separated from thy friendship”. A wife is considered to be half of oneself (ardhangini) but to be accepted with an identity of her own and to be a co-equal partner in the marriage. There is nothing like a “better-half” in a marriage but the spouses are equal halves in a marriage.

Also

No doubt, under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, a man and a woman can acquire the status of being a husband and a wife as per the provisions of the said Act. The Special Marriage Act, 1954 is not restricted to Hindus. Any man and woman irrespective of their race, caste or creed can acquire the status of being a husband and a wife under the provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 but under the provisions of the Act (Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955), there should not only be compliance of the conditions as prescribed under Section 5 of the said Act but also the couple must solemnise a marriage in accordance with Section 7 of the Act. In the absence of there being any such marriage in accordance with Section 7 of the Act, a certificate
issued in that regard by any entity is of no legal consequence. Further, any registration of a marriage which has not at all taken place under Section 8 of the Act and as per the rules made by the State Government would not be evidence of a Hindu marriage and also does not confer the status of a husband and a wife to a couple.
In recent years, we have come across several instances where for “practical purposes”, a man and a woman with the intention of solemnisation of their marriage at a future date seek to register their marriage under Section 8 of the Act on the basis of a document which may have been issued as proof of ‘solemnisation of their marriage’ such as in the instant case. As we have already noted, any such registration of a marriage before the Registrar of Marriages and a certificate being issued thereafter would not confirm that the parties have ‘solemnised’ a Hindu marriage. We note that parents of young couples agree for registration of a marriage in order to apply for Visa for emigration to foreign countries where either of the parties may be working “in order to save time” and pending formalising a marriage ceremony. Such practices have to be deprecated. What would be the consequence, if no such marriage is solemnised at all at a future date? What would be the status of the parties then? Are they husband and wife in law and do they acquire such status in society?

Dolly Rani Vs Manish Kumar Chanchal on 19 Apr 2024

State of Karnataka Vs T.Naseer @ Thadiantavida Naseer on 6 Nov 2023

Posted on August 10, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held that when the original electronic devices were already produced and marked MOs, there was no need to produce the certificate under Section 65-B of the Act.

From Para 15,

15. Fair trial in a criminal case does not mean that it should be fair to one of the parties. Rather, the object is that no guilty should go scot-free and no innocent should be punished. A certificate under Section 65-B of the Act, which is sought to be produced by the prosecution is not an evidence which has been created now. It is meeting the requirement of law to prove a report on record. By permitting the prosecution to produce the certificate under Section 65B of the Act at this stage will not result in any irreversible prejudice to the accused. The accused will have full opportunity to rebut the evidence led by the prosecution. This is the purpose for which Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. is there. The object of the Code is to arrive at truth. However, the power under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. can be exercised to subserve the cause of justice and public interest. In the case in hand, this exercise of power is required to uphold the truth, as no prejudice as such is going to be caused to the accused.

State of Karnataka Vs T.Naseer @ Thadiantavida Naseer on 6 Nov 2023

Shivi Bansal Vs Gaurav Bansal on 16 Jul 2024

Posted on August 3, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Paras 11 and 12,

11. In our view, even though the conclusion reached by the Family Court Judge on this score is correct, i.e., that the divorce petition cannot be rejected in part, arraying a third party to a divorce petition is neither proper nor necessary. A necessary party is one in whose absence no effective decree can be passed, whereas, a proper party enables complete and final adjudication of issues involved in a given lis.
11.1 The alleged adulterer is, to our minds, not a necessary party as a decree can be passed in his/her absence. Likewise, the adulterer is not a proper party since the issue concerning adultery can be adjudicated without making the adulterer a party to the cause. Proof of adultery need not be conflated with who should be arrayed as a party to a divorce action.
11.2 A divorce action is a lis centered around the couple who have entered into matrimony. A third party [who does not claim the status of a spouse]
has no locus to intervene or seek impleadment in such a cause. [Also see Manjul Joshi v. Bhavna Khurana, 2024: DHC:4170-DB].
12. The alleged adulterer (third party) can either be summoned as a witness or other evidence can be placed before the Family Court to prove adultery. Therefore, on this count, we are not in agreement with the counsel for the appellant/wife.

Shivi Bansal Vs Gaurav Bansal on 16 Jul 2024

Index of Divorce judgment is here.

Baba Natarajan Prasad Vs M. Revathi on 15 Jul 2024

Posted on July 16, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,

From Paras 10 and 11,

10. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant herein would submit that a scanning of the judgment of the trial Court would reveal that the Court had appropriately appreciated the evidence on record and convicted accused Nos.1 and 2 upon satisfying itself that the ingredients to attract the offence punishable under Section 494 I.P.C., have been made out by the appellant. Furthermore, it is submitted that a bare perusal of the impugned judgment would reveal that the High Court had rightly considered the contentions of the appellant herein against the reversal of their conviction by the First Appellate Court that it was founded on surmises and conjectures. We are of the considered view that no more narrative on the correctness of the reversal of the judgment of the First Appellate Court by the High Court under the impugned judgment is required as the indisputable and undisputed position is that its reversal was accepted by accused Nos.1 and 2 and they had undergone the sentence imposed by the High Court consequent to the reversal of the First Appellate Court’s judgment. We may note here that the learned senior counsel for the appellant would submit that the appellant had not accepted any compensation and in the same breath, would further submit that the appellant did not want any such compensation.
11. In the aforesaid circumstances, the sole question surviving for consideration is whether the High Court was right in not restoring the sentence imposed for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., by the trial Court when it accepted the contentions of the appellant and reversed the acquittal of accused Nos.1 and 2 and restored the conviction entered on them by the trial Court. In other words, the question is whether the High Court had shown undeserving leniency and sympathy to accused Nos.1 and 2 even after finding that they have committed the serious offence of bigamy punishable under Section 494 I.P.C., and whether they were let off with a flea-bite sentence and whether an enhancement of sentence is invited?

From Paras 14 and 15,

14. A reading of Sections 494 and 495 I.P.C., would reveal that the legislature viewed the offence of bigamy as a serious offence. Though no minimum sentence is prescribed under Section 494 I.P.C., the maximum sentence of imprisonment prescribed thereunder for a conviction thereunder is seven years of imprisonment of either description. It is also to be noted that the said offence is compoundable only by the husband or wife of the person so marrying with the permission of the Court. The same offence under Section 494 I.P.C., with concealment of former marriage from person with whom subsequent marriage is contracted would visit the offender with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and with fine. This offence, which is an aggravated form of bigamy, is non-compoundable. The decision in Gopal Lal’s case (supra), and the prescription of maximum corporeal sentence imposable under Sections 494 and 495 I.P.C.,would undoubtedly suggest that the offence under Section 494 I.P.C., has to be treated as a serious offence.
15. When once it is found that an offence under Section494 I.P.C., is a serious offence, the circumstances obtaining in this case would constrain us to hold that the imposition of ‘imprisonment till the rising of the court’ is not a proper sentence falling in tune with the rule of proportionality in providing punishment as mentioned hereinbefore.

From Para 20, (Alteration of the imprisonment and fine)

20. Certain circumstances revealed from the evidence on record cannot go unnoticed while deciding the question of proper sentence. Earlier, the appellant herein filed HMOP 515/2012 before the Family Court, Coimbatore, seeking divorce. In the judgment of the trial Court, taking note of the evidence adduced, it was noted that the first accused had filed a petition seeking interim maintenance in the above HMOP and based on a petition in that regard the Court had ordered the appellant to pay Rs. 5,000/- per month to the first accused and she had received the maintenance till 13.07.2017. The evidence would further show that a child was born to the first and second accused in their wedlock in November, 2017. The evidence on record would reveal that on 22.01.2019, the first accused herself filed HMOP No.84 of 2019 seeking dissolution of her marriage with the appellant. In such circumstances, it is evident that the first accused married the second accused while the marriage between the appellant and the first accused was subsisting and not only that, during its subsistence, she had also begotten a child through the second accused. Taking into account all the circumstances, it can be said that undeserving leniency was shown in the case on hand. But then, taking into account the fact that the child born to the first and second accused was aged less than two years when the trial Court passed the sentence and that no minimum term of imprisonment is prescribed for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., and that the maximum sentence imposable for conviction thereunder is seven years, we are of the considered view that the trial Court had virtually struck a balance in fixing the term of one year as the corporeal sentence. But then, taking note of the fact that the said child is now aged only about six years and the sentence for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., can be of both descriptions. We think it appropriate to use our judicial discretion to modify the sentence imposed under the impugned judgment. Accordingly, we modify the term of the sentence awarded to accused Nos.1 and 2 for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., to six months each, making the nature of the sentence as simple imprisonment for the said period. We further modify the fine imposed by reducing the same from Rs. 20,000/- each to Rs. 2,000/- each, as originally awarded by the trial Court. Needless to say, that the default sentence therefor, awarded by the trial Court i.e., to undergo simple imprisonment for three months is also restored. If in terms of the impugned judgment, accused Nos.1 and 2 had already deposited Rs. 20,000/-, after making deduction in terms of the sentence of fine mentioned hereinbefore, the balance amount shall be refunded to them in accordance with the law. In the said circumstances, accused Nos.1 and 2 shall surrender before the trial Court so as to serve out the unserved period of sentence imposed on them by this judgment. Taking note of the fact that the child of accused Nos.1 and 2 is now aged only about 6 years, we further order that firstly the second accused shall surrender before the trial Court, within a period of 3 weeks from today to serve out the rest of the sentence. Upon his release from the jail, on suffering the sentence, the first accused shall surrender before the Court to serve her remaining period of sentence and such surrender shall be made by the first accused within a period of 2 weeks from the release of the second accused from the jail. This arrangement shall not be treated as a precedent as it was ordered in these special circumstances. In case the accused Nos.1 and 2 do not surrender in terms of this judgment on their own, the trial Court shall resort to appropriate steps in accordance with law to place them in custody and make them suffer the sentence as mentioned hereinbefore. The appeals are allowed as above.

Baba Natarajan Prasad Vs M. Revathi on 15 Jul 2024

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/punishment-must-be-in-proportion-to-gravity-of-offence-supreme-court-enhances-sentence-bigamous-marriage-263490

https://www.legiteye.com/supreme-court-modifies-sentence-in-bigamy-case-orders-staggered-jail-terms-for-couple-justices-ct-ravikumar-sanjay-kumar-15-07-2024/

https://www.latestlaws.com/latest-caselaw/2024/july/2024-latest-caselaw-433-sc/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6696638231ed747732bfccdc

https://citecase.in/baba-natarajan-prasad-vs-m-revathi-2024-insc-523-s-494-ipc-bigamy-sentencing/

https://www.advocatekhoj.com/library/judgments/announcement.php?WID=17724

https://x.com/SCJudgments/status/1813118439701057835

https://lawyerenews.com/supreme-court-enhances-sentence-in-bigamy-case/

https://www.freelaw.in/legalnews/Punishment-of-imprisonment-till-the-rising-of-the-court-is-a-flea-bite-sentence-for-those-convicted-for-an-offence-of-bigamy-Supreme-Court-

https://www.the-laws.com/encyclopedia/browse/case?caseId=004202345000&title=baba-natarajan-prasad-vs-m-revathi

Flea-Bite

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/baba-natarajan-prasad-v-m-revathi-2024-insc-523-bigamy-494-ipc-serious-offence-1544100

The decision of the District Court is here.

Baba Natarajan Prasad Vs M. Revathi on 21 Apr 2019

Index of Bigamy Judgments is here.

Mohammad Miyan and Ors Vs State of UP on 21 Aug 2018

Posted on July 14, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,

Mr. R. K. Das, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants-accused, submits that the prosecution under section 498A of IPC was clearly not tenable in view of the case of the complainant herself that there had been a divorce almost four years before filing of the FIR.
We find much substance in the submission made by Mr. Das, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants-accused. Even in the FIR dated 18.8.2015, the complainant-wife has stated that her divorce had taken place about four years back. It is not possible to accept the contention made by learned counsel appearing on behalf of complainant-wife that she made the statement in ignorance of Sharia law. She is a Headmistress and must be credited with due knowledge of her meritorious status.
In view of her own averment that she was divorced four years ago, we are of the view that the prosecution is not sustainable under section 498A of the IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
Section 498A of the IPC opens with the words “Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman….” Therefore, where the complainant approaches with a case that there has been a divorce long back i.e. four years ago before filing of the FIR, section 498A of IPC in terms would not be attracted. We accordingly consider it appropriate to quash the prosecution against all the accused persons under section 498A of IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

Mohammad Miyan Vs State of UP on 21 Aug 2018

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/150839791/

Index of Quash Judgments is here.

State (CBI) Vs Hemendhra Reddy and Anr on 28 Apr 2023

Posted on July 3, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows,

From Paras 76 and 77,

76. Thus, a conspectus of the aforesaid decisions of this Court rendered in cases where final reports (closure reports) had already been submitted and
accepted makes the position of law very clear that even after the final report is laid before the Magistrate and is accepted, it is permissible for the investigating agency to carry out further investigation in the case. In other words, there is no bar against conducting further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC after the final report submitted under Section 173(2) of the CrPC has been accepted. It is also evident, that prior to carrying out a further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC, it is not necessary for the Magistrate to review or recall the order accepting the final report.
77. We may summarise our final conclusion as under:
(i) Even after the final report is laid before the Magistrate and is accepted, it is permissible for the investigating agency to carry out further investigation in the case. In other words, there is no bar against conducting further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC after the final report submitted under Section 173(2) of the CrPC has been accepted.
(ii) Prior to carrying out further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC it is not necessary that the order accepting the final report should be reviewed, recalled or quashed.
(iv) Further investigation is merely a continuation of the earlier investigation, hence it cannot be said that the accused are being subjected to investigation twice over. Moreover, investigation cannot be put at par with prosecution and punishment so as to fall within the ambit of Clause (2) of Article 20 of the Constitution. The principle of double jeopardy would, therefore, not be applicable to further investigation.
(v) There is nothing in the CrPC to suggest that the court is obliged to hear the accused while considering an application for further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC.

State (CBI) Vs Hemendhra Reddy and Anr on 28 Apr 2023

D. Narsimha @Narsimlu Vs D.Anita @Vaishnavi on 21 Jun 2024

Posted on June 30, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Telangana High Court granted divorce to husband, by holding that,

From Para 16,

16. The obliteration of marital ties is entirely for the persons in the marriage and upon them to assess and resolve in the best way they think fit. The Court has a limited role in the whole affair and should not act as an executioner (in the sense of a hangman) or a counsellor to compel the parties to continue living as wife and husband, particularly where the meeting of minds between them has irrevocably ended. It is certainly not the Court’s work to ferret out faultlines in the evidence in negation of cruelty in an altruistic zeal for preserving the marriage. This kind of exercise is unwarranted and pointless.

From Paras 17 and 18,

17. It is relevant to state that the Trial Court also held that the brief “reunion” of the parties in May, 2015 precluded the appellant from re-agitating events prior to the respondent coming to live with the appellant as it indicated forgiveness on the part of the appellant. We are unable to agree with the reasoning and the presumption.
18. Condonation and forgiveness means restoration of the offending spouse to the same position as he/she was before the offence was committed. The evidence must also point to this direction: Dr.N.G. Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane13. Forgiveness would be a misnomer in a case where the wife stays with the husband for 2 months and then leaves the matrimonial home and lodges an F.I.R. against the husband and his family members for offences punishable under Section 498-A of the I.P.C. and the Dowry Prohibition Act: Malathi Ravi, M.D v. B.V. Ravi, M.D.14. The Supreme Court in that case held that the husband had been treated with mental cruelty and affirmed the decree of divorce granted by the High Court.

D. Narsimha @Narsimlu Vs D.Anita @Vaishnavi on 21 Jun 2024

Trial Court Order dismissing the Divorce petition:

D. Narsimha @Narsimlu Vs D.Anita @Vaishnavi on 02 Nov 2021

Vishal Noble Singh Vs State of Uttar Pradesh on 24 Jan 2024

Posted on June 29, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows

From Para 14,

14. The contents of the FIR as well as the chargesheet would have to be read in light of the ingredients mentioned in the aforesaid Sections and in light of the facts and circumstances of these cases. The FIR as well as the charge-sheet have invoked Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and Section 120B of the IPC. The aforesaid Sections are reproduced above. We fail to understand as to how the allegations against the appellants herein could be brought within the scope and ambit of the aforesaid sections.

From Para 17,

17. On a reading of the FIR as well as the charge-sheet, we do not find that the offences aforestated is made out at all. We do not find any criminal breach of trust nor any cheating by impersonation. There is also no cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property, nor has any documents referred to any forgery or security or any forgery for the purpose of cheating. There is no reference to any document which has been forged so as to be used as a genuine document and much less is as there any criminal conspiracy which can be imputed to the appellants herein in the absence of any offence being made out vis-a-vis the aforesaid Sections.

From Para 19,

19. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned judicial dicta, we find that none of the offences alleged against the Accused-Appellants herein is made out. In fact, we find that the allegations of criminal intent and other allegations against the Accused-Appellants herein have been made with a malafide intent and therefore, the judgment of this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal and particularly sub-paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and 7 of paragraph 102, extracted above, squarely apply to the facts of these cases. It is neither expedient nor in the interest of justice to permit the present prosecution to continue.

From Paras 21-23,

21. We find that in recent years the machinery of criminal justice is being misused by certain persons for their vested interests and for achieving their oblique motives and agenda. Courts have therefore to be vigilant against such tendencies and ensure that acts of omission and commission having an adverse impact on the fabric of our society must be nipped in the bud.
22. We say so for the reason that while the second respondent-complainant has made grave allegations against the appellants herein and on whose behalf a charge-sheet has also been filed against such allegations has failed to appear before this Court to justify the same. Such acts would not only cause deep fissures and mistrust between people and also unnecessarily burden the law courts and the criminal justice system.
23. We are constrained to make the aforesaid observations particularly having regard to the fact that the second Respondent complainant having made the allegations against the appellants and others has failed to appear before this Court to justify the same. The non-appearance of the second respondent before this Court is indicative of his prejudicial attitude and temperament and his inability to justify any of the allegations against the appellants herein and therefore his absence in this proceeding.

Vishal Noble Singh Vs State of Uttar Pradesh on 24 Jan 2024

MS SAS Infratech Pvt Ltd Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 14 May 2024

Posted on June 1, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,

From Paras 8-11,

8. In view of the above, it is clear that when the Magistrate in exercise of his judicial discretion directs investigation under Section 156(3) of Cr. P.C., he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence. It is only when the Magistrate after applying his mind prefers to follow the procedure under Chapter XV of Cr.P.C. by resorting to Sections 200, he can be said to have taken cognizance of the offence.
9. The learned counsel for Respondent No.2 has placed reliance of the decision of this Court in “Priyanka Srivastava And Another Versus State of Uttar Pradesh And Others” (2015) 6 SCC 287 to submit that the complaint filed by the appellant – complainant was not supported by an affidavit. In our opinion, the said observation has been made in the said case by way of abundant caution to see that frivolous complaints are avoided.
10. In the instant case, as transpiring from the order passed by the Trial Court, the said Court had perused the complaint and the documents in support thereof, and also the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant – complainant and after having been prima facie satisfied, it had exercised its judicial discretion directing investigation under Section 156(3) of Cr. P.C. Such order being just, legal and proper, the High Court should not have interfered with the same, more particularly while exercising limited powers under Section 482 of Cr. P.C.
11. In that view of the matter, the impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside and the order dated 30-6-2023 passed by the Trial Court is restored.

MS SAS Infratech Pvt Ltd Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 14 May 2024

Citations:

Other Sources:

The decision of the Telangana High Court is here.

From Paras 4 and 5 [Consequences to the Lack of understanding of the procedures between Sec 156(3) CrPC and Sec 200 read with Sec 190 of CrPC)]

3. The docket order dated 30.06.2023 passed in S.R.No.3297 of 2023 by the Principal Junior Civil Judge-cum-XI Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Medchal-Malkajgiri District, Kukatpally, reads as follows:
“Complainant called present. The learned counsel for the complainant is present. Heard the learned counsel for the complainant. Perused the complaint and on scrutiny of the complaint, documents and also the submission made by the learned counsel for the complaint, this Court found prima-face case, hence this complaint is referred to SHO, PS Bachupally U/Sec. 156 (3) of Cr.P.C for investigation and report.”
4. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner/accused No.3 that the learned Magistrate has not applied judicial mind for forwarding the complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C and further no reasons have been assigned by the trial Court while disposing of the matter and therefore, seeks to set aside the said docket order.
5. As per the procedure laid down under Section 200 of Cr.P.C, a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate. If, after considering the statements on oath (if any) of the complainant and of the witnesses and the result of the inquiry or investigation (if any) under Section 202 of Cr.P.C, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding, he shall dismiss the complaint, and in every such case he shall briefly record his reasons for so doing.

Manne Mahesh Yadav Vs State of Telangana on 14 Sep 2023

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision

Dolly Rani Vs Manish Kumar Chanchal on 19 Apr 2024

State of Karnataka Vs T.Naseer @ Thadiantavida Naseer on 6 Nov 2023

Shivi Bansal Vs Gaurav Bansal on 16 Jul 2024

Baba Natarajan Prasad Vs M. Revathi on 15 Jul 2024

Mohammad Miyan and Ors Vs State of UP on 21 Aug 2018

State (CBI) Vs Hemendhra Reddy and Anr on 28 Apr 2023

D. Narsimha @Narsimlu Vs D.Anita @Vaishnavi on 21 Jun 2024

Vishal Noble Singh Vs State of Uttar Pradesh on 24 Jan 2024

MS SAS Infratech Pvt Ltd Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 14 May 2024