A division bench of Gauhati HC passed practice directions, relying of a decision passed by Delhi HC.
A notification was also issued
Tag: 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision
Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) By LRs and Ors Vs Special Deputy Collector (LA) on 08 Apr 2024
A division bench of Apex Court passed these guidelines with respect to condoning the delay in filing appeals…
From Para 26,
26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.
Mainoddin Vs State of Karnataka on 02 Feb 2024
A division bench of Apex Court held that, ‘vague,general and omnibus allegations against the family members/relatives implicating them in matrimonial disputes are an abuse of process of
law.’
From Paras 4 and 5,
4. The present appellant is the younger brother of the husband of complainant-respondent no.2 and the only allegation made against him in the last
paragraph of the complaint is that all the family members of the husband joined together and used foul language against the complainant of not
getting dowry from her family.
5. It is already well settled by this Court in the case of Geeta Mehrotra & Anr. vs. State of U.P. and Anr. reported in (2012) 10 SCC 741 and also in the case of Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam & Ors. vs. State of Bihar & Ors. in Criminal Appeal No.195 of 2022 decided on 08.02.2022, that such vague, general and omnibus allegations against thefamily members/relatives implicating them in matrimonial disputes are an abuse of process of law.
Index of landmark quash judgements is here.
Bezawada Chandravadana Vs State of Telangana and Anr
A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,
On 15-Mar-2024,
3. Heard Mr. Abid Ali Beeran P, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. The counsel submits that the petitioner is the complainant and the respondent No. 2 who is her husband, is facing the proceeding in CC No. 249 of 2012 before the Magistrate’s Court at Hyderabad. In course of the said proceeding, the petitioner was examined as PW-1 and on the basis of her response in the cross-examination, the respondent No. 2 had filed the application under Section 91 of the Cr.P.C. for a direction on the petitioner to produce her passport for the purpose of further cross-examination. According to the counsel, the said prayer was rightly rejected by the learned Magistrate under her order dated 14.07.2023 (Annexure P/4). However, the High Court under the impugned order has erroneously ordered for production of the petitioner’s passport to substantiate her claim on the travel from USA to India.
4. The counsel would argue that this was an incorrect decision by the High Court as in the application filed by the respondent No. 2, the petitioner was not arrayed as a party. It will also have implication for the privacy of the petitioner.
Earlier order from Telangana High Court here.
Joseph Salvaraj A Vs State of Gujarat and Ors on 4 Jul 2011
A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,
From Para 11,
11.The Appellant, thereafter, was constrained to file the petition under Section 482 of the Code in the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, with a prayer for quashing of the FIR bearing C.R. No. I-371/2006 registered with Odhav Police Station and to stay further investigation in the case. The said
application came to be considered before the learned Single Judge on 11.1.2007. By that time, charge sheet was already filed before the Competent Criminal Court. Thus, learned Single Judge, was of the opinion that it was not a fit case to be entertained and refused to hear the petition on merits, even though the appellant was given liberty to file an application for his discharge before the Trial Court. It may be noted that even in its impugned order the learned Single Judge has emphasized that he had not considered the case on merits. Thus the Appellant’s petition was dismissed and interim order granted in his favour was vacated.
From Paras 15 and 16,
15. The allegations in the F.I.R. clearly discloses a civil dispute between the parties and the FIR seems to have been filed only with an intention to harass and humiliate the Appellant. This was a pre-emptive move by the Complainant.
16. A summary Civil Suit under Order 37 Rule II of Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter to be referred as ‘CPC’) has already been filed by Dharmendra P. Rami @ Laläbhai against the Appellant and the Respondent No.4, Complainant herein, before the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad claiming a sum of Rs. 10 lacs together with interest thereon. In the said suit an unconditional leave to defend has already been granted to the Appellant and the matter is still pending. In the light of the aforesaid submissions, it was contended that it is a fit case where the FIR deserves to be quashed otherwise the same would amount to abuse of the process of law.
From Paras 21-23,
21. Criminal breach of trust is defined under Section 405 of the IPC and 406 thereof deals with punishment to be awarded to the accused, if found guilty for commission of the said offence i.e. with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
22. Section 420 of the IPC deals with cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property. Cheating has been defined under Section 415 of the IPC to constitute an offence. Under the aforesaid section, it is inbuilt that there has to be a dishonest intention from the very beginning, which is sine qua non to hold the accused guilty for commission of the said offence. Categorical and microscopic examination of the FIR certainly does not reflect any such dishonest intention ab initio on the part of the appellant.
23. Section 506 of the IPC deals with punishment for criminal intimidation. Criminal intimidation, insult and annoyance have been defined in Section 503 of the IPC but the FIR lodged by complainant does not show or reflect that any such threat to cause injury to person or of property was ever given by the Appellant to the Complainant.
24. Thus, from the general conspectus of the various sections under which the Appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same are not made out even prima facie from the Complainant’s FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge could have still examinedwhether the offences alleged to have been committed by the Appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant’s FIR, charge sheet, documents etc. ornot.
25. In our opinion, the matter appears to be purely civil in nature. There appears to be no cheating or a dishonest inducement for the delivery of propertyor breach of trust by the Appellant. The present FIR is an abuse of process of law. The purely civil dispute, is sought to be given a colour of a criminal offence to wreak vengeance against theAppellant. It does not meet the strict standard of proof required to sustain a criminal accusation.
From Para 27,
27. In fact, all these questions have been elaborately discussed by this Court in the most oft quoted judgment reported in 1992 (Suppl) 1 SCC 335 State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal, where seven cardinal principles have been carved out before cognizance of offences, said to have been committed, by the accused is taken. The case in hand unfortunately does not fall in that category where cognizance of the offence could have been taken by the court, at least after having gone through the F.I.R., which discloses only a civil dispute.
Index of Quash judgments is here.
Mamta Shailesh Chandra Vs State of Uttarakhand and Ors on 29 Jan 2024
A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,
We do not agree with the reasoning of the High Court for dismissing the writ petition of the appellant, having regard to the ratio of the judgment of this Court delivered on 04.07.2011 in the case of Joseph Salvaraj A. vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. reported in 2011 (7) SCC 59. That was a case arising from the quashing plea of an F.I.R., where chargesheet was submitted after institution of the petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. A Coordinate Bench of this Court opined that even if the charge sheet had been filed, the Court could still examine if offences alleged to have been committed were prima facie made out or not on the basis of the F.I.R., chargesheet and other documents.
Index of Quash judgments is here.
Bipin Chander Jaisinghbhai Shah Vs Prabhawati on 19 Oct 1956
A division bench of Apex Court held as follows, (with respect to ‘desertion’)
Thus the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which differentiates desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned : (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid.
Citations: [1957 AIR 176], [1956 SCR 838]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1131783/
Index of Divorce judgments is here.
Savitri Pandey Vs Prem Chandra Pandey on 8 Jan 2002
A division bench of Apex Court held as follows, (with regards to Cruelty)
From Para 6,
6. Cruelty has not been defined under the Act but in relation to matrimonial matters it is contemplated as a conduct of such type which endangers the living of the petitioner with the respondent. Cruelty consists of acts which are dangerous to life, limb or health. Cruelty for the purpose of the Act means where one spouse has so treated the other and manifested such feelings towards her or him as to have inflicted bodily injury, or to have caused reasonable apprehension of bodily injury, suffering or to have injured health. Cruelty may be physical or mental. Mental cruelty is the conduct of other spouse which causes mental suffering or fear to the matrimonial life of the other. “Cruelty”, therefore, postulates a treatment of the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in his or her mind that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the other party. Cruelty, however, has to be distinguished from the ordinary wear and tear of family life. It cannot be decided on the basis of the sensitivity of the petitioner and has to be adjudged on the basis of the course of conduct which would, in general, be dangerous for a spouse to live with the other.
From Para 19, (with regards to the time limit to file an appeal against an Order of Family Court)
At this stage we would like to observe that the period of limitation prescribed for filing the appeal under Section 28(4) is apparently inadequate which facilitates the frustration of the marriages by the unscrupulous litigant spouses. In a vast country like ours, the powers under the Act are generally exercisable by the District Court and the first appeal has to be filed in the High Court. The distance, the geographical conditions, the financial position of the parties and the time required for filing a regular appeal, if kept in mind, would certainly show that the period of 30 days prescribed for filing the appeal is insufficient and inadequate. In the absence of appeal, the other party can solemnise the marriage and attempt to frustrate the appeal right of the other side as appears to have been done in the instant case. We are of the opinion that a minimum period of 90 days may be prescribed for filing the appeal against any judgment and decree under the Act and any marriage solemnised during the aforesaid period be deemed to be void. Appropriate legislation is required to be made in this regard. We direct the Registry that the copy of this judgment may be forwarded to the Ministry of Law & Justice for such action as it may deem fit to take in this behalf.
This judgment led to the passing of amendment here.
Citations: [AIR 2002 SUPREME COURT 591], [2002 (2) SCC 73], [2002 AIR SCW 182], [2002 ALL. L. J. 355], [2002 ALL CJ 1 122], [2002 (2) SRJ 553], [2002 (1) SLT 103], [(2002) 1 ALL WC 472], [(2002) 1 JCR 377 (SC)], [2002 (1) LRI 28], [(2002) 1 JT 25 (SC)], [2002 (1) UJ (SC) 273], [(2002) 1 MARRILJ 277], [2002 (1) ALL CJ 22], [2002 UJ(SC) 1 273], [2002 (1) BLJR 378], [(2002) 3 CIVILCOURTC 318], [(2002) 1 RECCIVR 719], [(2002) 6 BOM CR 511], [(2002) 1 HINDULR 338], [(2002) 2 MAHLR 263], [(2002) 2 PAT LJR 256], [(2002) 2 JLJR 135], [(2002) 2 GUJ LR 1369], [(2002) 1 KER LJ 193], [(2002) WLC(SC)CVL 116], [(2002) 1 SCALE 33], [(2002) 1 RAJ LW 183], [(2002) 3 GUJ LH 470], [(2002) 1 DMC 177], [(2002) 1 ANDH LT 55], [(2002) 1 CURCC 7], [(2002) 22 OCR 280], [(2002) 1 UC 299], [(2002) 1 SCJ 6], [(2002) 46 ALL LR 465], [(2002) 2 CAL HN 50], [(2002) 2 BLJ 177], [(2002) 1 SUPREME 90], [(2002) MATLR 224], [2002 (1) MARR LJ 277], [(2002) 4 CURCRIR 254], [(2002) 1 CAL HN 124], [(2002) 1 ALLCRILR 658], [(2002) 1 CALLT 32]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/325522/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56e0f1ad607dba38965f8bcd
https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/browse/Case?caseId=002002900000&title=savitri-pandey-vs-prem-chandra-pandey
Savitri Pandey vs Prem Chandra Pandey on 8 January, 2002 – Case Summary
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/savitri-pandey-vs-prem-chandra-pandey
http://roundup.manupatra.in/trans/viewdoc.aspx?i=ptiDy4oUEz7W4RhahAaT6h93RFUeTV40hI1vo81W7g5uCfRP5tL0pktJVchar(43)F5g3qk&id=zwKDa4S8QbBCBSkXPhUPwY5CqQmaAQ/9fT/TmfIpDN9bjNPkWKzs5n8Hchar(43)U/Dqe21io8GIp7cHk/RGFLXdXEB6A==
Index of Divorce judgments is here.
Gaurav Nighawan Vs Shweta on 05 Jan 2024
A division bench of Delhi High Court held as follows,
From Paras 19 and 20,
19. With regard to Section 13(1) (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the pertinent observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bipin Chandra Jaisinghbhai Shah Vs. Prabhavati 1956 SCC OnLine SC 15 are as under:-
“Thus the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which differentiates desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned : (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid.”
20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bipinchandra Jaisinghbhai Shah(Supra) has further observed that once it is found that one of the spouses has been in desertion, the presumption is that the desertion has continued and that is not necessary for the deserted spouse actually to take steps to bring the deserting spouse back to the matrimonial home.
Finally in Paras 23 and 24,
23. Applying the provisions of Section 13(ib) of the Act, we find that merely within two months of marriage between the parties, the respondent-wife left the matrimonial home. Neither she made any complaint against the appellant nor did she file petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 seeking Restitution of Conjugal Rights. No doubt, even appellant has not been able to show before the learned Family Court and even in this Court that he had made any concrete efforts to bring back his wife to the matrimonial home. However, when he approached the court seeking divorce, despite service through publication, the respondent did not appear before the learned Family Court to contest the allegations made by the appellant. The respondent has even abstained herself from appearing before this Court despite service through the SHO concerned. Relevantly, since the marriage in the year 2015 till the year 2023, the respondent has not made any effort to join company of appellant-husband. There is no doubt that respondent has quietly chosen to stay apart from appellant and broken the bond of marriage, though not legally but otherwise.
24. In the light of afore-noted facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court is of the considered opinion that respondent has wilfully deserted the appellant and so, appellant is entitled to get benefit of provision of Section 13(1) (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The marriage between the parties is thus, dissolved and a decree of divorce is granted. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly.
Index of Divorce judgments is here.
