A division bench of the Apex Court held that ‘Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (popularly called as Restitution of Conjugal Rights case) is not violative of Articles 14 and 21 (right to privacy)‘.
Tag: 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision
Kunal Choudhary Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 05 Dec 2023
A division of the Apex Court set aside a weird condition in an Anticipatory Bail petition in a Sec 498A IPC case.
From Para 5,
5. The High Court vide the impugned order has dismissed the Cr.M.P. No.2419 of 2021 filed by the appellant observing that in view of the adamant attitude of the appellant in not resuming the conjugal life with the opposite party No.2 in the house of the appellant, where the opposite party No.2 was staying, his petition could not be considered. In our opinion, neither such condition should have been imposed by the High Court while granting an anticipatory bail, nor such could be a ground for rejection of the petition filed by the appellant.
Modification on the following order was dismissed.
Anticipatory Bail was granted with this condition…
Considering the submissions of learned counsels and the facts and circumstances stated above, I am inclined to grant privileges of anticipatory bail to the petitioner. Accordingly, the petitioner is directed to surrender in the Court within six weeks from today and in the event of his arrest or surrendering, he will be enlarged on bail on satisfying the trial court that the petitioner has taken the opposite party no.2 to his house at Pandra locality of Ranchi and keeping and maintaining her with full dignity and honour as his lawful wife and on furnishing bail bond of Rs.25,000/- (Twenty five thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned CJM, Ranchi in connection with Complain Case No. 3004 of 2018 with the condition that he will co-operate with the trial of the case with condition that he will take the opposite party no.2 to his house at Pandra in the locality of Ranchi and keeping and maintaining her with full dignity and honour as his lawful wife and subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Index of Anticipatory Bail Judgments is here.
Achin Gupta Vs State of Haryana and Anr on 03 May 2024
A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,
From Para 31-32,
31. We are of the view that the category 7 referred to above should be taken into consideration and applied in a case like the one on hand a bit liberally. If the Court is convinced by the fact that the involvement by the complainant of her husband and his close relatives is with an oblique motive then even if the FIR and the chargesheet disclose the commission of a cognizable offence the Court with a view to doing substantial justice should read in between the lines the oblique motive of the complainant and take a pragmatic view of the matter. If the submission canvassed by the counsel appearing for the Respondent No. 2 and the State is to be accepted mechanically then in our opinion the very conferment of the inherent power by the Cr.P.C. upon the High Court would be rendered otiose. We are saying so for the simple reason that if the wife on account of matrimonial disputes decides to harass her husband and his family members then the first thing, she would ensure is to see that proper allegations are levelled in the First Information Report. Many times the services of professionals are availed for the same and once the complaint is drafted by a legal mind, it would be very difficult thereafter to weed out any loopholes or other deficiencies in the same. However, that does not mean that the Court should shut its eyes and raise its hands in helplessness, saying that whether true or false, there are allegations in the First Information Report and the chargesheet papers disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. If the allegations alone as levelled, more particularly in the case like the one on hand, are to be looked into or considered then why the investigating agency thought fit to file a closure report against the other co-accused? There is no answer to this at the end of the learned counsel appearing for the State. We say so, because allegations have been levelled not only against the Appellant herein but even against his parents, brother & sister. If that be so, then why the police did not deem fit to file chargesheet against the other co-accused? It appears that even the investigating agency was convinced that the FIR was nothing but an outburst arising from a matrimonial dispute.
32. Many times, the parents including the close relatives of the wife make a mountain out of a mole. Instead of salvaging the situation and making all possible endeavours to save the marriage, their action either due to ignorance or on account of sheer hatred towards the husband and his family members, brings about complete destruction of marriage on trivial issues. The first thing that comes in the mind of the wife, her parents and her relatives is the Police, as if the Police is the panacea of all evil. No sooner the matter reaches up to the Police, then even if there are fair chances of reconciliation between the spouses, they would get destroyed. The foundation of a sound marriage is tolerance, adjustment and respecting one another. Tolerance to each other’s fault to a certain bearable extent has to be inherent in every marriage. Petty quibbles, trifling differences are mundane matters and should not be exaggerated and blown out of proportion to destroy what is said to have been made in the heaven. The Court must appreciate that all quarrels must be weighed from that point of view in determining what constitutes cruelty in each particular case, always keeping in view the physical and mental conditions of the parties, their character and social status. A very technical and hyper sensitive approach would prove to be disastrous for the very institution of the marriage. In matrimonial disputes the main sufferers are the children. The spouses fight with such venom in their heart that they do not think even for a second that if the marriage would come to an end, then what will be the effect on their children. Divorce plays a very dubious role so far as the upbringing of the children is concerned. The only reason why we are saying so is that instead of handling the whole issue delicately, the initiation of criminal proceedings would bring about nothing but hatred for each other. There may be cases of genuine ill-treatment and harassment by the husband and his family members towards the wife. The degree of such ill-treatment or harassment may vary. However, the Police machinery should be resorted to as a measure of last resort and that too in a very genuine case of cruelty and harassment. The Police machinery cannot be utilised for the purpose of holding the husband at ransom so that he could be squeezed by the wife at the instigation of her parents or relatives or friends. In all cases, where wife complains of harassment or ill-treatment, Section 498A of the IPC cannot be applied mechanically. No FIR is complete without Sections 506(2) and 323 of the IPC. Every matrimonial conduct, which may cause annoyance to the other, may not amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations, quarrels between spouses, which happen in day-to-day married life, may also not amount to cruelty.
From Para 35,
35. In one of the recent pronouncements of this Court in Mahmood Ali & Ors. v. State of U.P & Ors., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950, authored by one of us (J.B. Pardiwala, J.), the legal principle applicable apropos Section 482 of the CrPC was examined. Therein, it was observed that when an accused comes before the High Court, invoking either the inherent power under Section 482 CrPC or the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed, essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances, the High Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. It was further observed that it will not be enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not as, in frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection, to try and read between the lines.
Index of Quash judgments is here.
Vishnudas H. and Anr Vs Nil on 27 Jul 2020
A division bench of Kerala High Court held that, a divorce petition is maintainable within 1 year from date of marriage, if there are Pleadings about Exceptional Hardship.
From Paras 8, 9 and 10
8. A reading of Section 14(1) of The Act, will show that, though the substantial provision provides a restriction in entertaining an application for dissolution of a marriage before the lapse of one year from the date of marriage, the proviso permits the court to grant leave to present the petition before the lapse of one year from the date of marriage, if the case is one of exceptional hardship to the petitioner or of exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent. The proviso to the section creates two instances where the court can grant leave to excuse time limit i.e., exceptional hardship to the petitioner or exceptional depravity to the respondent.
9. It is common knowledge that none enters into a marriage for the purpose of dissolving it. Certainly, at the time when the marriage vow is taken or the knot is tied, the intention is to create a permanent bond. However, human nature being a complex one, the error in judgment could be realized instantly or belatedly. When that error in judgment is realized, instantly, as it has happened in the present case, a window is provided by law, through the proviso, against the bar under Section 14(1) of The Act, for persons like the petitioners, to shorten their mental trauma by seeking permission to waive the one year period, of course, on satisfying the conditions stipulated.
10. What is an exceptional hardship to the petitioner and what would be the exceptional depravity for the respondent, are matters which the court will have to identify, based on the factual situation that arise in each individual case. These two terms cannot be defined or explained in a straight-jacket formula, but will depend upon the circumstances of each case. Allegations that may be sufficient to grant a decree of divorce may not, in all cases, constitute the ‘exceptional hardship’ contemplated under the section. The factors that shall be weighed by the court while deciding a petition for grant of leave to present a petition for divorce are inter alia, reasonable probability of a reconciliation between the parties, interests of children in the marriage, as is indicated in Section 14(2) of The Act. With the above factors in mind, the terms exceptional hardship and exceptional depravity ought to be appreciated by the court by stepping into the shoes of the petitioner or the respondent, as the case may be. In our system of adversarial jurisprudence, when, parties who are discrepant in all aspects, are in accord that continuance of the relationship causes more hardship to them, in the absence of materials to the contrary, Court need not and cannot disbelieve their affirmations, especially at the initial stage of granting permission to present a petition for divorce. The power conferred under the latter part of the proviso to Section 14 of The Act is sufficient safeguard against misrepresentations or concealment in obtaining the above referred permissions.
From Paras 16 and 17,
16. A reading of the petition seeking permission in the instant case, as has been narrated earlier, shows that within few hours of the marriage, the petitioners separated from their companionship. It is jointly stated that neither had they lived together as husband and wife nor did they have any physical relationship. All attempts for mediation failed and their relationship has irretrievably broken down. The very fact that they have jointly stated that continuance of their relationship would cause more stress and trauma and that there is absolutely no trace of any stress or trauma in dissolving the marriage, speaks volumes about the exceptional hardship that will be caused to the parties to the marriage, if they are statutorily compelled to wait for a further period of time so as to merely satisfy the legal prescription of expiry of one year from the date of marriage. Both of them have also stated, together, that further delaying the dissolution of marriage has a propensity to cause damage to their career as well as their future prospects of marriage. They have also affirmed that their views are irreconcilable. When, in unison they state that continuance of marriage is more traumatic than dissolution of marriage, and that they lived together as husband and wife only for few hours, it satisfies the test of exceptional hardship contemplated under the proviso to Section 14(1) of The Act, to be granted the benefit of waiver of the period of one year.
17. A reading of the impugned order of the Family Court indicates that the court was moved more by general principles of morality rather than the specific case of the parties to the marriage. We cannot agree to the reasons stated in the impugned order.
Index of Divorce Matters here.
Dipak Nayak Vs State of Assam and Ors on 23 Jun 2023
A division bench of Gauhati HC passed practice directions, relying of a decision passed by Delhi HC.
A notification was also issued
Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) By LRs and Ors Vs Special Deputy Collector (LA) on 08 Apr 2024
A division bench of Apex Court passed these guidelines with respect to condoning the delay in filing appeals…
From Para 26,
26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.
Mainoddin Vs State of Karnataka on 02 Feb 2024
A division bench of Apex Court held that, ‘vague,general and omnibus allegations against the family members/relatives implicating them in matrimonial disputes are an abuse of process of
law.’
From Paras 4 and 5,
4. The present appellant is the younger brother of the husband of complainant-respondent no.2 and the only allegation made against him in the last
paragraph of the complaint is that all the family members of the husband joined together and used foul language against the complainant of not
getting dowry from her family.
5. It is already well settled by this Court in the case of Geeta Mehrotra & Anr. vs. State of U.P. and Anr. reported in (2012) 10 SCC 741 and also in the case of Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam & Ors. vs. State of Bihar & Ors. in Criminal Appeal No.195 of 2022 decided on 08.02.2022, that such vague, general and omnibus allegations against thefamily members/relatives implicating them in matrimonial disputes are an abuse of process of law.
Index of landmark quash judgements is here.
Bezawada Chandravadana Vs State of Telangana and Anr
A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,
On 15-Mar-2024,
3. Heard Mr. Abid Ali Beeran P, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. The counsel submits that the petitioner is the complainant and the respondent No. 2 who is her husband, is facing the proceeding in CC No. 249 of 2012 before the Magistrate’s Court at Hyderabad. In course of the said proceeding, the petitioner was examined as PW-1 and on the basis of her response in the cross-examination, the respondent No. 2 had filed the application under Section 91 of the Cr.P.C. for a direction on the petitioner to produce her passport for the purpose of further cross-examination. According to the counsel, the said prayer was rightly rejected by the learned Magistrate under her order dated 14.07.2023 (Annexure P/4). However, the High Court under the impugned order has erroneously ordered for production of the petitioner’s passport to substantiate her claim on the travel from USA to India.
4. The counsel would argue that this was an incorrect decision by the High Court as in the application filed by the respondent No. 2, the petitioner was not arrayed as a party. It will also have implication for the privacy of the petitioner.
Earlier order from Telangana High Court here.
Joseph Salvaraj A Vs State of Gujarat and Ors on 4 Jul 2011
A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,
From Para 11,
11.The Appellant, thereafter, was constrained to file the petition under Section 482 of the Code in the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, with a prayer for quashing of the FIR bearing C.R. No. I-371/2006 registered with Odhav Police Station and to stay further investigation in the case. The said
application came to be considered before the learned Single Judge on 11.1.2007. By that time, charge sheet was already filed before the Competent Criminal Court. Thus, learned Single Judge, was of the opinion that it was not a fit case to be entertained and refused to hear the petition on merits, even though the appellant was given liberty to file an application for his discharge before the Trial Court. It may be noted that even in its impugned order the learned Single Judge has emphasized that he had not considered the case on merits. Thus the Appellant’s petition was dismissed and interim order granted in his favour was vacated.
From Paras 15 and 16,
15. The allegations in the F.I.R. clearly discloses a civil dispute between the parties and the FIR seems to have been filed only with an intention to harass and humiliate the Appellant. This was a pre-emptive move by the Complainant.
16. A summary Civil Suit under Order 37 Rule II of Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter to be referred as ‘CPC’) has already been filed by Dharmendra P. Rami @ Laläbhai against the Appellant and the Respondent No.4, Complainant herein, before the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad claiming a sum of Rs. 10 lacs together with interest thereon. In the said suit an unconditional leave to defend has already been granted to the Appellant and the matter is still pending. In the light of the aforesaid submissions, it was contended that it is a fit case where the FIR deserves to be quashed otherwise the same would amount to abuse of the process of law.
From Paras 21-23,
21. Criminal breach of trust is defined under Section 405 of the IPC and 406 thereof deals with punishment to be awarded to the accused, if found guilty for commission of the said offence i.e. with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
22. Section 420 of the IPC deals with cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property. Cheating has been defined under Section 415 of the IPC to constitute an offence. Under the aforesaid section, it is inbuilt that there has to be a dishonest intention from the very beginning, which is sine qua non to hold the accused guilty for commission of the said offence. Categorical and microscopic examination of the FIR certainly does not reflect any such dishonest intention ab initio on the part of the appellant.
23. Section 506 of the IPC deals with punishment for criminal intimidation. Criminal intimidation, insult and annoyance have been defined in Section 503 of the IPC but the FIR lodged by complainant does not show or reflect that any such threat to cause injury to person or of property was ever given by the Appellant to the Complainant.
24. Thus, from the general conspectus of the various sections under which the Appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same are not made out even prima facie from the Complainant’s FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge could have still examinedwhether the offences alleged to have been committed by the Appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant’s FIR, charge sheet, documents etc. ornot.
25. In our opinion, the matter appears to be purely civil in nature. There appears to be no cheating or a dishonest inducement for the delivery of propertyor breach of trust by the Appellant. The present FIR is an abuse of process of law. The purely civil dispute, is sought to be given a colour of a criminal offence to wreak vengeance against theAppellant. It does not meet the strict standard of proof required to sustain a criminal accusation.
From Para 27,
27. In fact, all these questions have been elaborately discussed by this Court in the most oft quoted judgment reported in 1992 (Suppl) 1 SCC 335 State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal, where seven cardinal principles have been carved out before cognizance of offences, said to have been committed, by the accused is taken. The case in hand unfortunately does not fall in that category where cognizance of the offence could have been taken by the court, at least after having gone through the F.I.R., which discloses only a civil dispute.
Index of Quash judgments is here.
