Ivan Rathinam Vs Milan Joseph on 28 Jan 2025

Posted on January 30, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that,

From Para 45,

45. Despite concurrent findings of three courts as to the legitimacy of the Respondent, he and his mother maintain and proclaim to the world that the Appellant is his biological father. It must be underscored that theAppellant has maintained a consistent stance across all fora that he never had sexual relations with the Respondent’s mother. In fact, the dispute was assumed to have been put to rest in 2011, providing some relief to the Appellant, only to be reopened in 2015, once again making him face the brunt of the allegations. This constant pendulum-like state of affairs and unsubstantiated allegations must have, undoubtedly, had an adverse effect on the Appellant’s quality of life. In this backdrop, an order necessitating a DNA test based on mere allegations of adultery, would ultimately violate the Appellant’s right to dignity and privacy.

From Paras 69 and 70,

69. This convoluted case, spanning over two decades, has no doubt taken its toll on the parties involved and other relevant stakeholders. Given these
extenuating circumstances, at this stage, it must be closed for all intents and purposes.
70. Accordingly, we deem it appropriate to allow this appeal and set aside the Impugned Judgment of the High Court dated 21.05.2018 and of the
Family Court dated 09.11.2015, with the following directions and conclusions:
i. Legitimacy determines paternity under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, until the presumption is successfully rebutted by proving ‘non-access’;
ii. The Munsiff Court and the Sub-Judge Court possessed jurisdiction to entertain the Original Suit, which dealt with the question of the legitimacy of the Respondent;
iii. The Family Court, Alappuzha erred in reopening the Maintenance Petition when the self-imposed condition was not satisfied;
iv. The impugned proceedings, initiated by the Respondent, are barred by the principle of res judicata;
v. The proceedings in MC No. No. 224/2007 before the Family Court, Alappuzha stand quashed;
vi. Any claim by the Respondent based upon the perceived relationship of paternity qua the Appellant, stands negated; and
vii. The Respondent is presumed to be the legitimate son of Mr. Raju Kurian.

Ivan Rathinam Vs Milan Joseph on 28 Jan 2025

Impugned Judgment:

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5e977c0b4653d048ca2bb2dc

Srinivas Raghavendrarao Desai (Dead) By Lrs. Vs V.Kumar Vamanrao and Ors on 04 Mar 2024

Posted on December 23, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court reiterated that no evidence could be led beyond pleadings.

From Para 15,

15. There is no quarrel with the proposition of law that no evidence could be led beyond pleadings. It is not a case in which there was any error in the pleadings and the parties knowing their case fully well had led evidence to enable the Court to deal with that evidence. In the case in hand, specific amendment in the pleadings was sought by the plaintiffs with reference to 1965 partition but the same was rejected. In such a situation, the evidence with reference to 1965 partition cannot be considered.

Srinivas Raghavendrarao Desai (Dead) By Lrs. Vs V.Kumar Vamanrao and Ors on 04 Mar 2024

Pallavi Mohan Vs Raghu Menon on 12 Sep 2023

Posted on October 30, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Paras 32-33,

32. Clearly Section 28 of the HMA and Section 19 of the Family Courts Act operate in different spheres and apply to orders passed by different forums i.e. District Court and the Family Court respectively.
33. Thus the period of limitation for filing an appeal from an appealable order and decree of the District Court would be ninety days under section 28 of HMA and the period of limitation for filing an appeal from an appealable order and judgment of the Family Court, wherever it has been set up, would be thirty days under section 19 of the Family Courts Act.

Pallavi Mohan Vs Raghu Menon on 12 Sep 2023

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/132852916/

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/high-courts/limitation-period-for-filing-an-appeal-against-family-courts-order-is-thirty-days-and-delay-in-filing-can-be-condoned-if-sufficient-cause-is-shown-delhi-hc-1494654

The wife went to Supreme Court (Diary No. – 40374/2023; SLP(C) No. 024347 – / 2023)

The husband chose not to file a counter as on 22-03-2024 .

Index of All Divorce Judgments here.

Yashodeep Bisanrao Vadode Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 21 Oct 2024

Posted on October 26, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that it is a matter of common knowledge that exaggerated versions of the incident are reflected in a large number of complaints and the tendency of over implication is also reflected in a large number of cases.

From Paras 11-13,

11. In the contextual situation, it is only appropriate to keep reminded of the observations of this Court in the decision in Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand1. This Court observed that it is a matter of common knowledge that exaggerated versions of the incident are reflected in a large number of complaints and the tendency of over implication is also reflected in a large number of cases.
12. We are of the view that in view of such circumstances, the courts have to be careful to identify instances of over implication and to avert the suffering of ignominy and inexpiable consequences, by such persons.
13. The upshot of the discussion is that the finding of guilt against the appellant by the courts below for the offence under Section 498-A, IPC, with the aid of Section 34, IPC, is absolutely perverse in view of the absolute absence of any evidence against him to connect him with the said offence in any manner.

Yashodeep Bisanrao Vadode Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 21 Oct 2024

Anju and Anr Vs Rinku Dahiya on 11 Oct 2023

Posted on October 8, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court help that, HMA 24 is not to equalize the parties. Also highlighted the importance of PPPI (Purchase Power Parity Index) published by World Bank, while computing foreign salary obtained outside India.

From Para 8,

8. The respondent/ husband has explained that as per the PPP (Purchase Power Parity) Index published by World Bank, the dollar cannot be converted into Rupees at the prevailing exchange rate. The dollar has to be multiplied with PPP conversion factor which is Rs.23.22 for India. The salary of the respondent i.e. USD 7134 when multiplied by 23.22 comes to Rs.1,65,651/- per month, which is much less than the income of the wife which is Rs.2.5 lakhs per month. It is asserted that the interim maintenance granted to the child is liable to be reduced.

From Paras 10 and 11,

10. Admittedly, the appellant/ wife as well as the husband are highly qualified and the wife is getting Rs.2.5 lakhs per month while the husband is getting USD 7134 per month which if converted to Indian rupee by applying PPP (Purchase Power Parity) Index, comes to Rs.1,65,651/- per month or if simple exchange rate is applied; it is otherwise equivalent to Rs.5,60,000/-. Though the husband may be earning in dollars, but it cannot be overlooked that his expenditure is also in dollars. He has explained that he has a monthly expense of about USD 7000 and is left with little money for saving. His calculations are duly supported by the documents.
11. We observe that in the present case, where both the spouses are equally qualified and are earning equally, interim maintenance cannot be granted to the wife under Section 24 of the Act. The object of Section 24 of the Act is to ensure that during the matrimonial proceedings under HMA either party should not be handicapped and suffer any financial disability to litigate only because of paucity of source of income. The provision for interim/ pendent lite maintenance has been made only to help either spouse to sail through the litigation expenses and also to ensure that they are able to live comfortably. The proceedings under Section 24 of the Act are not intended to equalize the income of both the spouses or to give an interim maintenance which is commensurate to maintain a similar life style as the other spouse as has been observed by this Court in the case of K.N. vs. R.G MAT. APP.(FC) 93/2018 decided on 12.02.2019.

Finally, from Para 14, (Joint Parental Maintenance…?)

14. Considering the income of the wife and the husband and also appreciating that the responsibility of maintaining the child has to be shared jointly by both the husband and the wife, we find that the interim maintenance in the sum of Rs.40,000/- for the child is liable to be reduced to Rs.25,000/- per month.

Anju and Anr Vs Rinku Dahiya on 11 Oct 2023

Index of Section 24 HMA judgments is here.

Dr. Pankaj Kumar Vs Prerna on 16 Dec 2020

Posted on September 27, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Jharkhand High Court granted divorce to the husband, not on the ground of cruelty by wife, but on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

From Para 21,

21. We, therefore, proceed to answer this question as this issue has not yet been decided by this Court. We may not have to labour hard in this regard since the Full Bench of Bombay High Court has squarely dealt with the same issue concerning applicability of section 19(3) of the Family Courts’ Act, 1984 and section 28(4) of the Hindu Marriage Ac, 1955 on the period of limitation governing the filing of an appeal before the High Court from the suit s instituted under Hindu Marriage Act concerning the rights of the parties such as, dissolution of marriage, restitution of conjugal right, declaration of a marriage as null and void, judicial separation, etc.
This view has been further followed by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Smt. Gunjan v. Praveen ( Supra), Rajasthan High Court in the case of Kuldeep Yadav v. Anita Yadav ( and Delhi High Court in the cases of R.R.D. (Supra) and DC (Supra) cited by the learned counsel for the appellant. The
rationale behind taking such a view is that the Act of 1984 provides for a special forum relating to matrimonial dispute and for that, special procedure was devised for expeditious adjudication of the case. Provisions of section 20 thereof containing the obstante clause has to be construed in that context, whereas Parliament being conscious of the period of limitation of 30 days prescribed under section 19(3) of Family Courts’ Act, 1984 chose to make suitable amendment in section 39(4) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 and section 28(4) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 by enlarging the period of limitation from 30 days to 90 days keeping into account the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Savitri Pandey (supra) and
the rationale behind it. It is true that in a country like us where millions of people face financial hardship for litigating a matter and considerable time, money and energy have to be spent in pursuing the appeal given the difficult geographical condition, access to justice may become illusory in approaching the Court of Appeal within a small period of 30 day and amendment to section 28(4) introduced in 2003 to the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 being the later enactment in point of time compared to the provisions of section 19(3) under the Family Courts’ Act, 1984, the intention of the Legislature to provide a larger time period for preferring an appeal needs to be furthered in order to resolve this inconsistency by adopting the principles of harmonious construction. We are, therefore, inclined to follow the principles laid down by the Full Bench decision of Bombay High Court in this regard. The Hindu Marriage Act being a special legislation, the provisions governing the period of limitation for preferring an appeal arising out of the decisions of the Family Court under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 should be governed by larger period of limitation of 90 days prescribed under section 28(4) thereof. The second question posed for determination at the outset is also answered in the aforesaid manner in the affirmative. Having held so, the instant appeal does not suffer from any delay since the original petition was filed within a period of 90 days from the date of the impugned order i.e. 05.08.2015. As such, there is no delay in preferring the instant appeal. I.A. No. 539/2020 is disposed of.

Dr. Pankaj Kumar Vs Prerna on 16 Dec 2020

2023-Mar-31: The parties settled.
Learned counsel for the parties submit that since the parties have settled the matrimonial dispute in all respects and the disposal / withdrawal of two pending cases against each other is only a matter of time where both the parties are taking steps and joint compromise petition has been filed in one of them whereas in the other they would be filing the joint compromise petition, the appeal itself can be disposed of in terms of the settlement by dissolution of the marriage as they are living separately also.
Having regard to the aforesaid state of facts and that the parties have settled the matter amicably amongst themselves during course of mediation at JHALSA and have decided to live separately without any condition of permanent alimony, there is no point in keeping this appeal pending as no lis survives to be adjudicated upon. As such, the appeal is disposed of in terms of the settlement jointly signed by the parties on 7th November 2021 part of the mediation report dated 16th November 2021 bearing letter no.2513. As such, marriage between the parties is dissolved. Parties are at idem that the two pending cases shall be withdrawn or disposed of parties on the basis of the joint settlement between the parties. They have also agreed not to institute any future cases against each other. Parties should abide by the terms and conditions of the settlement. The settlement should form part of the decree. Decree accordingly.

Dr. Pankaj Kumar Vs Prerna on 31 Mar 2023

Index of judgements on Divorce Appeals is here.

N.Rajendran Vs S.Valli on 03 Feb 2022

Posted on September 26, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court granted divorce to the husband, not on the ground of cruelty by wife, but on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

From Para 29,

29. Article 142 of the Constitution undoubtedly clothes this Court with a reservoir of power to pass orders as would reach complete justice to the parties. What comes to mind is the concept of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. Undoubtedly, though there have been reports of the Law Commission in this regard recommending changes in the law, as of today the statute does not provide for irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground. However, this Court has on a number of occasions exercised its power and granted dissolution of marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage based on Article 142. In this regard, learned counsel for respondent pointed out that this is not a case for exercising power under Article 142. He addressed this submission, reminding us of the conduct of the appellant throughout. He would submit that the respondent is completely without blame. She was always ready and willing. The findings as found by the High Court being confirmed, no occasion arises for this Court to exercise power under Article 142. We record this submission for as a prefatory remark to indicate that this is not a case where both parties are agreeable for a dissolution by way of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. But that then leads us to the question as to whether the consent of the parties is necessary to order dissolution of marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown. This again, is not res integra. We may notice that this Court has in a catena of decisions discussed this very aspect.

From Para 32,

32. Having found that consent of the parties is not necessary to declare a marriage dissolved, we cannot be unmindful of the facts as they exist in reality. There has been a marriage which took place on 31.10.2004. There is a child born in the said marriage. No doubt being in contravention of Section 15, it becomes a fait accompli but at the same time we do not reasonably perceive any possibility of the appellant and the respondent cohabiting as husband and wife. Whatever life was there in the marriage has been snuffed out by the passage of time, the appearance of new parties and vanishing of any bond between the parties. Not even the slightest possibility of rapprochement between the appellant and the respondent exists for reasons though which are entirely due to the actions of the appellant and for which the respondent cannot be blamed. The marriage between the appellant and the respondent has become dead. It can be described as a point of no return. There is no possibility of the appellant and the respondent stitching together any kind of a reasonable relationship as the tie between the parties has broken beyond repair and having regard to the facts of this case, we would think that it would be in the interest of justice and to do complete justice to the parties that we should pass an order dissolving the marriage between the appellant and the respondent.

From Para 34,

34. Accordingly, while we affirm the judgment of the High Court and refuse to grant a decree of dissolution on the ground of cruelty by the respondent, we in exercise of our power under Article 142 of the Constitution declare the marriage between the appellant and the respondent as dissolved. This will be on condition that the appellant will pay a sum of Rs.20,000,00/- (Rupees twenty lakhs) to the respondent by way of a demand draft within a period of eight weeks from today. We further make it clear that this will be without prejudice to all the rights available to the son who was born in the marriage between the appellant and the respondent under law in regard to property rights. Till the amount is paid as aforesaid, the appellant will continue to be liable to pay Rs.7000/- per month to the respondent.

N.Rajendran Vs S.Valli on 03 Feb 2022

Index of Divorce judgements is here.

Arti Tiwari Vs Sanjay Kumar Tiwari on 04 Sep 2024

Posted on September 14, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench at Allahabad High Court held that,

From Para 3,

3. In brief, it may be noted that the marriage between the parties was solemnized on 2.3.2000. At that time, the appellant was working as Class-III employee at the Rajkiya Bachat Karyalaya, at Bareilly. His father and siblings were residing at their house at Unnao. The family of the appellant belongs to Kanpur Nagar. According to the respondent/husband, the appellant resided at her matrimonial home for a few days, but raised complaint of not feeling safe in the company of only male family members of the respondent, his mother having died almost 20 years earlier.Occasioned by that, the respondent took the appellant to the city of his work, at Bareilly. Even there, the appellant, did not stay for long. She now cited reasons to stay at Kanpur Nagar as she was a practising advocate. Thus, the appellant is described to have left for Kanpur Nagar. However, intermittent cohabitation of the parties at Bareilly, Kanpur Nagar and Unnao, during that period, is not disputed. Then, according to the respondent, he applied for and consequently, was transferred to Kannauj. This transfer, respondent had sought only to make it possible for the respondent to stay at Kanpur Nagar with him. Upon being thus transferred, the respondent took up a rented accommodation at Kanpur Nagar and he used to commute to Kannauj from there every day. However, the appellant still did not stay with him for long. Though intermittently, the appellant did stay with the respondent at his rented premises, she preferred to stay at her parental house. In that context, it is the further case of the respondent that the appellant wanted the respondent to stay with her at her parental home at Kanpur Nagar. When the appellant did not agree to live with the respondent at the rented accommodation taken by him at Kanpur Nagar, he vacated that premises and started staying at Unnao, at his parental home from where too he could easily commute to Kannauj, in connection with his work.

From Para 7,

7. It is also the case of the respondent that the appellant offered cruel behaviour towards all family members of the respondent, from very beginning. Not only she would use harsh words andabusive language in normal household affairs, it was specifically stated by the respondent that the appellant wanted the respondentto abide absolutely, by her wishes. Failing that she threatened to level false allegations against the respondent and his father, including allegation of illicit relationship between the respondentand his real sister. While no such case was ever lodged by the appellant and no such complaint appears to have been made by the appellant to any authority, at the same time, it is on record that after the institution of the divorce suit on 01.08.2006, the appellant instituted Criminal Case No. 687 of 2006 on 14.11.2006 i.e. after three months of the institution of the divorce case. Remarkably,though allegations of demand of dowry and cruelty were made in the First Information Report, there is no prior complaint or First Information Report of such allegation ever made by the appellant,over six years of marriage between the parties.

From Para 11, (Desertion is established)

11. During his extensive cross-examination, the above noted aspects proven by the respondent during his examination-in-chief were not controverted or doubted. We have made reference to those facts to bring out the extent to which the efforts had been made by the respondent to prove desertion offered by the appellant. In absence of any doubt being raised during the extensive cross-examination of the respondent, we do not find any error in the finding of the learned Court below to believe the testimony of the respondent. Sitting in first appeal, we are ourselves inclined to draw firm conclusion that the appellant had no will or desire to live in matrimony with the respondent either at his parental home or at his place of work, or even otherwise at Kanpur Nagar. She only desired to stay at her parental home.

From Para 17,

17. In face of Criminal Revision proceeding pending, against the order of conviction passed in the appeal proceedings, we are not recording any firm conclusion with respect to falsity or otherwise the allegations made in the criminal case, at the same time, in the context of facts and circumstances proven in this case, the critical element of cruelty is found in existence. Desertion suffered over long years in a young marriage, accompanied with harsh words spoken and complete lack of desire and effort on part of the deserting spouse to cohabit as also lodging of criminal case alleging demand of dowry only after institution of divorce case proceeding by the other spouse and pursuing it in appeal to secure conviction (after initial acquittal) does indicate in any case, the marriage between the parties is irretrievably broken down.

From Para 19,

19. In view of the facts noted above we do not find it a fit case to provide for permanent alimony. The daughter born to the parties has attained the age of majority.

Arti Tiwari Vs Sanjay Kumar Tiwari on 04 Sep 2024

Basudha Chakraborty Vs Neeta Chakraborty on 20 May 2024

Posted on September 13, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows,

We have failed to comprehend the necessity of the direction of the High Court insisting for personal presence of the petitioner no.2 in Court in-person, despite being apprised that the petitioner no.2 has been suffering from severe medical conditions. From the materials placed on record we find that not only did the petitioner no.2 undergo an organ transplant in the recent past, he is afflicted by other ailments too calling for a surgery thus making it inadvisable for him to travel to Kolkata for attending court proceedings physically. That apart, the petitioner no.1 had physically appeared before the Court on 8th April, 2024 in deference to the order dated 31st January, 2024, yet, she too has been ordered to be produced in court by the police without apparent justification.
We are also at loss to comprehend as to why despite the advancement of science and technology and with the introduction of facilities for virtual hearing in the High Courts, the Court did not consider it desirable to grant liberty to the two petitioners to appear before it through the virtual mode.
The dispute that the High Court is seized of arises out of a marital discord between the spouses and the situation, prima facie, was not such so as to call for the Court’s insistence for personal presence of both the petitioners including the ailing petitioner no.2 by taking an arduous journey from a distant place like Mumbai despite his medical conditions. If the Court thought it fit to interact and bring about a settlement between the parties, an attempt to achieve it by allowing the petitioners to attend proceedings through the virtual mode ought to have been made.
The impugned order is bound to operate harshly against the petitioners. We expect the Court to exercise restraint unless any party repeatedly acts in breach of its order to undermine its dignity, prestige and majesty, thereby attracting the contempt jurisdiction. Exercise of discretion judiciously could have prevented the proceedings from reaching this Court.

Basudha Chakraborty Vs Neeta Chakraborty on 20 May 2024

Sunil Nayak @ Fundi Vs State of NCT of Delhi on 09 Sep 2024

Posted on September 9, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

Index of Perjury judgments is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision

Ivan Rathinam Vs Milan Joseph on 28 Jan 2025

Srinivas Raghavendrarao Desai (Dead) By Lrs. Vs V.Kumar Vamanrao and Ors on 04 Mar 2024

Pallavi Mohan Vs Raghu Menon on 12 Sep 2023

Yashodeep Bisanrao Vadode Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 21 Oct 2024

Anju and Anr Vs Rinku Dahiya on 11 Oct 2023

Dr. Pankaj Kumar Vs Prerna on 16 Dec 2020

N.Rajendran Vs S.Valli on 03 Feb 2022

Arti Tiwari Vs Sanjay Kumar Tiwari on 04 Sep 2024

Basudha Chakraborty Vs Neeta Chakraborty on 20 May 2024

Sunil Nayak @ Fundi Vs State of NCT of Delhi on 09 Sep 2024