Anju and Anr Vs Rinku Dahiya on 11 Oct 2023

Posted on October 8, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court help that, HMA 24 is not to equalize the parties. Also highlighted the importance of PPPI (Purchase Power Parity Index) published by World Bank, while computing foreign salary obtained outside India.

From Para 8,

8. The respondent/ husband has explained that as per the PPP (Purchase Power Parity) Index published by World Bank, the dollar cannot be converted into Rupees at the prevailing exchange rate. The dollar has to be multiplied with PPP conversion factor which is Rs.23.22 for India. The salary of the respondent i.e. USD 7134 when multiplied by 23.22 comes to Rs.1,65,651/- per month, which is much less than the income of the wife which is Rs.2.5 lakhs per month. It is asserted that the interim maintenance granted to the child is liable to be reduced.

From Paras 10 and 11,

10. Admittedly, the appellant/ wife as well as the husband are highly qualified and the wife is getting Rs.2.5 lakhs per month while the husband is getting USD 7134 per month which if converted to Indian rupee by applying PPP (Purchase Power Parity) Index, comes to Rs.1,65,651/- per month or if simple exchange rate is applied; it is otherwise equivalent to Rs.5,60,000/-. Though the husband may be earning in dollars, but it cannot be overlooked that his expenditure is also in dollars. He has explained that he has a monthly expense of about USD 7000 and is left with little money for saving. His calculations are duly supported by the documents.
11. We observe that in the present case, where both the spouses are equally qualified and are earning equally, interim maintenance cannot be granted to the wife under Section 24 of the Act. The object of Section 24 of the Act is to ensure that during the matrimonial proceedings under HMA either party should not be handicapped and suffer any financial disability to litigate only because of paucity of source of income. The provision for interim/ pendent lite maintenance has been made only to help either spouse to sail through the litigation expenses and also to ensure that they are able to live comfortably. The proceedings under Section 24 of the Act are not intended to equalize the income of both the spouses or to give an interim maintenance which is commensurate to maintain a similar life style as the other spouse as has been observed by this Court in the case of K.N. vs. R.G MAT. APP.(FC) 93/2018 decided on 12.02.2019.

Finally, from Para 14, (Joint Parental Maintenance…?)

14. Considering the income of the wife and the husband and also appreciating that the responsibility of maintaining the child has to be shared jointly by both the husband and the wife, we find that the interim maintenance in the sum of Rs.40,000/- for the child is liable to be reduced to Rs.25,000/- per month.

Anju and Anr Vs Rinku Dahiya on 11 Oct 2023

Index of Section 24 HMA judgments is here.

Dr. Pankaj Kumar Vs Prerna on 16 Dec 2020

Posted on September 27, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Jharkhand High Court granted divorce to the husband, not on the ground of cruelty by wife, but on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

From Para 21,

21. We, therefore, proceed to answer this question as this issue has not yet been decided by this Court. We may not have to labour hard in this regard since the Full Bench of Bombay High Court has squarely dealt with the same issue concerning applicability of section 19(3) of the Family Courts’ Act, 1984 and section 28(4) of the Hindu Marriage Ac, 1955 on the period of limitation governing the filing of an appeal before the High Court from the suit s instituted under Hindu Marriage Act concerning the rights of the parties such as, dissolution of marriage, restitution of conjugal right, declaration of a marriage as null and void, judicial separation, etc.
This view has been further followed by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Smt. Gunjan v. Praveen ( Supra), Rajasthan High Court in the case of Kuldeep Yadav v. Anita Yadav ( and Delhi High Court in the cases of R.R.D. (Supra) and DC (Supra) cited by the learned counsel for the appellant. The
rationale behind taking such a view is that the Act of 1984 provides for a special forum relating to matrimonial dispute and for that, special procedure was devised for expeditious adjudication of the case. Provisions of section 20 thereof containing the obstante clause has to be construed in that context, whereas Parliament being conscious of the period of limitation of 30 days prescribed under section 19(3) of Family Courts’ Act, 1984 chose to make suitable amendment in section 39(4) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 and section 28(4) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 by enlarging the period of limitation from 30 days to 90 days keeping into account the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Savitri Pandey (supra) and
the rationale behind it. It is true that in a country like us where millions of people face financial hardship for litigating a matter and considerable time, money and energy have to be spent in pursuing the appeal given the difficult geographical condition, access to justice may become illusory in approaching the Court of Appeal within a small period of 30 day and amendment to section 28(4) introduced in 2003 to the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 being the later enactment in point of time compared to the provisions of section 19(3) under the Family Courts’ Act, 1984, the intention of the Legislature to provide a larger time period for preferring an appeal needs to be furthered in order to resolve this inconsistency by adopting the principles of harmonious construction. We are, therefore, inclined to follow the principles laid down by the Full Bench decision of Bombay High Court in this regard. The Hindu Marriage Act being a special legislation, the provisions governing the period of limitation for preferring an appeal arising out of the decisions of the Family Court under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 should be governed by larger period of limitation of 90 days prescribed under section 28(4) thereof. The second question posed for determination at the outset is also answered in the aforesaid manner in the affirmative. Having held so, the instant appeal does not suffer from any delay since the original petition was filed within a period of 90 days from the date of the impugned order i.e. 05.08.2015. As such, there is no delay in preferring the instant appeal. I.A. No. 539/2020 is disposed of.

Dr. Pankaj Kumar Vs Prerna on 16 Dec 2020

2023-Mar-31: The parties settled.
Learned counsel for the parties submit that since the parties have settled the matrimonial dispute in all respects and the disposal / withdrawal of two pending cases against each other is only a matter of time where both the parties are taking steps and joint compromise petition has been filed in one of them whereas in the other they would be filing the joint compromise petition, the appeal itself can be disposed of in terms of the settlement by dissolution of the marriage as they are living separately also.
Having regard to the aforesaid state of facts and that the parties have settled the matter amicably amongst themselves during course of mediation at JHALSA and have decided to live separately without any condition of permanent alimony, there is no point in keeping this appeal pending as no lis survives to be adjudicated upon. As such, the appeal is disposed of in terms of the settlement jointly signed by the parties on 7th November 2021 part of the mediation report dated 16th November 2021 bearing letter no.2513. As such, marriage between the parties is dissolved. Parties are at idem that the two pending cases shall be withdrawn or disposed of parties on the basis of the joint settlement between the parties. They have also agreed not to institute any future cases against each other. Parties should abide by the terms and conditions of the settlement. The settlement should form part of the decree. Decree accordingly.

Dr. Pankaj Kumar Vs Prerna on 31 Mar 2023

Index of judgements on Divorce Appeals is here.

N.Rajendran Vs S.Valli on 03 Feb 2022

Posted on September 26, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court granted divorce to the husband, not on the ground of cruelty by wife, but on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

From Para 29,

29. Article 142 of the Constitution undoubtedly clothes this Court with a reservoir of power to pass orders as would reach complete justice to the parties. What comes to mind is the concept of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. Undoubtedly, though there have been reports of the Law Commission in this regard recommending changes in the law, as of today the statute does not provide for irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground. However, this Court has on a number of occasions exercised its power and granted dissolution of marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage based on Article 142. In this regard, learned counsel for respondent pointed out that this is not a case for exercising power under Article 142. He addressed this submission, reminding us of the conduct of the appellant throughout. He would submit that the respondent is completely without blame. She was always ready and willing. The findings as found by the High Court being confirmed, no occasion arises for this Court to exercise power under Article 142. We record this submission for as a prefatory remark to indicate that this is not a case where both parties are agreeable for a dissolution by way of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. But that then leads us to the question as to whether the consent of the parties is necessary to order dissolution of marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown. This again, is not res integra. We may notice that this Court has in a catena of decisions discussed this very aspect.

From Para 32,

32. Having found that consent of the parties is not necessary to declare a marriage dissolved, we cannot be unmindful of the facts as they exist in reality. There has been a marriage which took place on 31.10.2004. There is a child born in the said marriage. No doubt being in contravention of Section 15, it becomes a fait accompli but at the same time we do not reasonably perceive any possibility of the appellant and the respondent cohabiting as husband and wife. Whatever life was there in the marriage has been snuffed out by the passage of time, the appearance of new parties and vanishing of any bond between the parties. Not even the slightest possibility of rapprochement between the appellant and the respondent exists for reasons though which are entirely due to the actions of the appellant and for which the respondent cannot be blamed. The marriage between the appellant and the respondent has become dead. It can be described as a point of no return. There is no possibility of the appellant and the respondent stitching together any kind of a reasonable relationship as the tie between the parties has broken beyond repair and having regard to the facts of this case, we would think that it would be in the interest of justice and to do complete justice to the parties that we should pass an order dissolving the marriage between the appellant and the respondent.

From Para 34,

34. Accordingly, while we affirm the judgment of the High Court and refuse to grant a decree of dissolution on the ground of cruelty by the respondent, we in exercise of our power under Article 142 of the Constitution declare the marriage between the appellant and the respondent as dissolved. This will be on condition that the appellant will pay a sum of Rs.20,000,00/- (Rupees twenty lakhs) to the respondent by way of a demand draft within a period of eight weeks from today. We further make it clear that this will be without prejudice to all the rights available to the son who was born in the marriage between the appellant and the respondent under law in regard to property rights. Till the amount is paid as aforesaid, the appellant will continue to be liable to pay Rs.7000/- per month to the respondent.

N.Rajendran Vs S.Valli on 03 Feb 2022

Index of Divorce judgements is here.

Arti Tiwari Vs Sanjay Kumar Tiwari on 04 Sep 2024

Posted on September 14, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench at Allahabad High Court held that,

From Para 3,

3. In brief, it may be noted that the marriage between the parties was solemnized on 2.3.2000. At that time, the appellant was working as Class-III employee at the Rajkiya Bachat Karyalaya, at Bareilly. His father and siblings were residing at their house at Unnao. The family of the appellant belongs to Kanpur Nagar. According to the respondent/husband, the appellant resided at her matrimonial home for a few days, but raised complaint of not feeling safe in the company of only male family members of the respondent, his mother having died almost 20 years earlier.Occasioned by that, the respondent took the appellant to the city of his work, at Bareilly. Even there, the appellant, did not stay for long. She now cited reasons to stay at Kanpur Nagar as she was a practising advocate. Thus, the appellant is described to have left for Kanpur Nagar. However, intermittent cohabitation of the parties at Bareilly, Kanpur Nagar and Unnao, during that period, is not disputed. Then, according to the respondent, he applied for and consequently, was transferred to Kannauj. This transfer, respondent had sought only to make it possible for the respondent to stay at Kanpur Nagar with him. Upon being thus transferred, the respondent took up a rented accommodation at Kanpur Nagar and he used to commute to Kannauj from there every day. However, the appellant still did not stay with him for long. Though intermittently, the appellant did stay with the respondent at his rented premises, she preferred to stay at her parental house. In that context, it is the further case of the respondent that the appellant wanted the respondent to stay with her at her parental home at Kanpur Nagar. When the appellant did not agree to live with the respondent at the rented accommodation taken by him at Kanpur Nagar, he vacated that premises and started staying at Unnao, at his parental home from where too he could easily commute to Kannauj, in connection with his work.

From Para 7,

7. It is also the case of the respondent that the appellant offered cruel behaviour towards all family members of the respondent, from very beginning. Not only she would use harsh words andabusive language in normal household affairs, it was specifically stated by the respondent that the appellant wanted the respondentto abide absolutely, by her wishes. Failing that she threatened to level false allegations against the respondent and his father, including allegation of illicit relationship between the respondentand his real sister. While no such case was ever lodged by the appellant and no such complaint appears to have been made by the appellant to any authority, at the same time, it is on record that after the institution of the divorce suit on 01.08.2006, the appellant instituted Criminal Case No. 687 of 2006 on 14.11.2006 i.e. after three months of the institution of the divorce case. Remarkably,though allegations of demand of dowry and cruelty were made in the First Information Report, there is no prior complaint or First Information Report of such allegation ever made by the appellant,over six years of marriage between the parties.

From Para 11, (Desertion is established)

11. During his extensive cross-examination, the above noted aspects proven by the respondent during his examination-in-chief were not controverted or doubted. We have made reference to those facts to bring out the extent to which the efforts had been made by the respondent to prove desertion offered by the appellant. In absence of any doubt being raised during the extensive cross-examination of the respondent, we do not find any error in the finding of the learned Court below to believe the testimony of the respondent. Sitting in first appeal, we are ourselves inclined to draw firm conclusion that the appellant had no will or desire to live in matrimony with the respondent either at his parental home or at his place of work, or even otherwise at Kanpur Nagar. She only desired to stay at her parental home.

From Para 17,

17. In face of Criminal Revision proceeding pending, against the order of conviction passed in the appeal proceedings, we are not recording any firm conclusion with respect to falsity or otherwise the allegations made in the criminal case, at the same time, in the context of facts and circumstances proven in this case, the critical element of cruelty is found in existence. Desertion suffered over long years in a young marriage, accompanied with harsh words spoken and complete lack of desire and effort on part of the deserting spouse to cohabit as also lodging of criminal case alleging demand of dowry only after institution of divorce case proceeding by the other spouse and pursuing it in appeal to secure conviction (after initial acquittal) does indicate in any case, the marriage between the parties is irretrievably broken down.

From Para 19,

19. In view of the facts noted above we do not find it a fit case to provide for permanent alimony. The daughter born to the parties has attained the age of majority.

Arti Tiwari Vs Sanjay Kumar Tiwari on 04 Sep 2024

Basudha Chakraborty Vs Neeta Chakraborty on 20 May 2024

Posted on September 13, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows,

We have failed to comprehend the necessity of the direction of the High Court insisting for personal presence of the petitioner no.2 in Court in-person, despite being apprised that the petitioner no.2 has been suffering from severe medical conditions. From the materials placed on record we find that not only did the petitioner no.2 undergo an organ transplant in the recent past, he is afflicted by other ailments too calling for a surgery thus making it inadvisable for him to travel to Kolkata for attending court proceedings physically. That apart, the petitioner no.1 had physically appeared before the Court on 8th April, 2024 in deference to the order dated 31st January, 2024, yet, she too has been ordered to be produced in court by the police without apparent justification.
We are also at loss to comprehend as to why despite the advancement of science and technology and with the introduction of facilities for virtual hearing in the High Courts, the Court did not consider it desirable to grant liberty to the two petitioners to appear before it through the virtual mode.
The dispute that the High Court is seized of arises out of a marital discord between the spouses and the situation, prima facie, was not such so as to call for the Court’s insistence for personal presence of both the petitioners including the ailing petitioner no.2 by taking an arduous journey from a distant place like Mumbai despite his medical conditions. If the Court thought it fit to interact and bring about a settlement between the parties, an attempt to achieve it by allowing the petitioners to attend proceedings through the virtual mode ought to have been made.
The impugned order is bound to operate harshly against the petitioners. We expect the Court to exercise restraint unless any party repeatedly acts in breach of its order to undermine its dignity, prestige and majesty, thereby attracting the contempt jurisdiction. Exercise of discretion judiciously could have prevented the proceedings from reaching this Court.

Basudha Chakraborty Vs Neeta Chakraborty on 20 May 2024

Sunil Nayak @ Fundi Vs State of NCT of Delhi on 09 Sep 2024

Posted on September 9, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

Index of Perjury judgments is here.

Shaileshbhai Ranchhodbhai Patel and Anr Vs State of Gujarat and Ors on 28 Aug 2024

Posted on September 3, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,

From Paras 7 and 8,

7. The question of law involved in these two appeals as to whether quashing of the FIR should have been refused for no other reason than that the investigating officer has filed the charge-sheet is no longer res integra. Decisions of this Court to such effect are legion. We may profitably refer to the decisions of this Court in Ruchi Majoo v. Sanjeev Majoo3, Anand Kumar Mohatta vs State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) Home Department4 and Abhishek vs. State of Madhya Pradesh5.
8. On the authority of the aforesaid decisions, law seems to be well-settled that the High Court under Section 482, Cr. PC. retains the power to quash an FIR, even after charge-sheet under Section 173(2) thereof is filed, provided a satisfaction is reached, inter alia, that either the FIR and the charge-sheet read together, even accepted as true and correct without rebuttal, does not disclose commission of any offence or that continuation of proceedings arising out of such an FIR would in fact be an abuse of the process of law as well as of the Court given the peculiar circumstances of each particular case.

Shaileshbhai Ranchhodbhai Patel and Anr Vs State of Gujarat and Ors on 28 Aug 2024

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Nikhil Wadhawan Vs Priti Wadhawan on 05 Feb 2024

Posted on August 30, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Para 37 and 38,

37. From the evidence of the parties, it is evident that there was an unwarranted interference of the parents and the family members of the respondent in the matrimonial life of the appellant, as has been asserted by him. Such parental interference reached an extent of causing immense harassment to the appellant, who was even made to face multiple complaints before the different agencies. The parties are residing separately since 2001 i.e. for about 13 years, during which the appellant has been deprived of his conjugal relationship for no fault of his. It needs no reiteration that the bedrock of any matrimonial relationship is cohabitation and conjugal relationships. For a spouse to be deprived of his wife’s company proves that the marriage cannot survive, and such deprivation of conjugal relationships is an act of extreme cruelty. Such long separation with no effort by the wife to resume matrimonial relationship, is an act of cruelty as is held in the case of Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511.
38. We thus, conclude that the evidence on record proved that there is no chance of reconciliation between the parties and such long separation peppered which false allegations, Police reports and criminal trial can only be termed as mental cruelty. The marital discord between the parties has pinnacled to complete loss of faith, trust, understanding, love and affection between the parties. This dead relationship has become infested with acrimony, irreconcilable differences and protracted litigations; any insistence to continue this relationship would only be perpetuating further cruelty upon both the parties.

Nikhil Wadhawan Vs Priti Wadhawan on 05 Feb 2024

Index of Divorce judgments is here.

Samad Habib Mithani and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 25 Jul 2024

Posted on August 13, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division (women!) bench of Bombay High Court at Bombay quashed a fake case on in-laws.

From Para 10,

10…
Hence, from the above mentioned statements of the relatives of the Respondent No.2, it is obvious that there are no serious allegations as such against the present Applicants. These are merely omnibus allegations which are not supported by any evidence, as regards the ill-treatment and cruelty meted to the Respondent No.2. The allegations in the complaint are general and vague without specific examples of cruelty and harassment. The record and the statements do not support the allegations made against the present Applicants. The complaint against the present Applicants is not supported by any documents, letter, e-mails, message to support the allegation of cruelty and harassment.

From Para 16,

16. In our opinion, the case of the present Applicants would fall under the category (ii) from the above referred three categories, where the allegations in the FIR or the complaint taken to its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged. Merely, remarks in the complaint about the supporting the accused No.1 while narrating some of the incidents would not perse amount to committing the offences which they have been alleged of. It would be unfair to continue the prosecution against the present Applicants for the conduct of the accused No.1, in which they have been unfortunately dragged. From the various incidents which have been narrated by the Respondent No.2 as well as the witnesses, who are her near relatives, there does not appear to be complicity of the present Applicants. The continuation of present proceedings against the Applicants would cause injustice and hardship to the Applicants. Even otherwise, the material collected during the investigation does not support the charges levelled against the present Applicants. The malafide proceedings initiated against the present Applicants needs to be curbed at this stage itself, in order to prevent abuse or process of law and miscarriage of justice, since it is obvious that the allegations are not supported by any other cogent material and have been made with a view to wreak vengeance against the present Applicants.

Samad Habib Mithani and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 25 Jul 2024

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Harsh Bhuwalka and Ors Vs Sanjay Kumar Bajoria on 05 Aug 2024

Posted on August 11, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court passed this Practice directions as follows,

From Paras 7-9,

7. It is clear on the face of the records and it is also not disputed by Mr. Siddharth Bhatnagar, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, in his usual fairness, that the petitioners made an absolutely incorrect, nay false, statement in paragraph 3 of I.A. No.158707 of 2024 that the High Court had not furnished the certified copy of the impugned order despite they having applied for the same.
8. We would have been entirely justified in directing the Registry to take suitable steps for initiation of proceedings before the criminal court against the petitioners but having regard to the fervent prayer made by Mr. Bhatnagar that the petitioners may not entirely be at fault, we refrain from so directing.
9. However, having regard to the skullduggery that was sought to be adopted, we see no reason to condone the grave lapse on the part of the petitioners and hear them on the merits of the special leave petition. The special leave petition, along with I.A. No.158707 of 2024, I.A. No.158709 of
2024 and I.A. No. 169588 of 2024, stands dismissed.

From Paras 16-18,

16. We are pained to note that despite there being specific provisions in the 2013 Rules requiring a special leave petition to be accompanied by the certified copy of the impugned judgment and order, such provisions are observed more in the breach. Such a situation should not to be allowed to persist; so long the rules exist, there has to be substantial compliance. Even if the certified copy is not available on the date of presentation of a special leave petition, proof of application for such copy has to be adduced for the court to consider the prayer for exemption.
17. With this in view, we propose to issue a practice direction to the following effect:
“If any special leave petition, arising out of civil proceedings as well as criminal proceedings, is accompanied by an application for exemption from filing certified copy of the judgment and/or order under challenge, such application must have, as an annexure, the receipt that has been generated/provided by the concerned Section/Department of the high court as acknowledgment of receipt of an application from the applicant for certified copy of the impugned judgment and/or order and the reason for seeking exemption; further, it must have an averment that the application for certified copy has not lapsed owing to non-filing of requisites or otherwise; also, the application must contain an undertaking of the applicant to place the certified copy of the impugned judgment and/or order on record as soon as possible after the same is furnished to him by the concerned Section/Department of the high court.”
Ordered accordingly.
18. This practice direction has to be observed by all litigants who propose to file special leave petitions both on the civil side as well as on the criminal side with effect from 20th August, 2024.

Harsh Bhuwalka and Ors Vs Sanjay Kumar Bajoria on 05 Aug 2024

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision

Anju and Anr Vs Rinku Dahiya on 11 Oct 2023

Dr. Pankaj Kumar Vs Prerna on 16 Dec 2020

N.Rajendran Vs S.Valli on 03 Feb 2022

Arti Tiwari Vs Sanjay Kumar Tiwari on 04 Sep 2024

Basudha Chakraborty Vs Neeta Chakraborty on 20 May 2024

Sunil Nayak @ Fundi Vs State of NCT of Delhi on 09 Sep 2024

Shaileshbhai Ranchhodbhai Patel and Anr Vs State of Gujarat and Ors on 28 Aug 2024

Nikhil Wadhawan Vs Priti Wadhawan on 05 Feb 2024

Samad Habib Mithani and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 25 Jul 2024

Harsh Bhuwalka and Ors Vs Sanjay Kumar Bajoria on 05 Aug 2024