Index of Perjury judgments is here.
Tag: 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision
Shaileshbhai Ranchhodbhai Patel and Anr Vs State of Gujarat and Ors on 28 Aug 2024
A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,
From Paras 7 and 8,
7. The question of law involved in these two appeals as to whether quashing of the FIR should have been refused for no other reason than that the investigating officer has filed the charge-sheet is no longer res integra. Decisions of this Court to such effect are legion. We may profitably refer to the decisions of this Court in Ruchi Majoo v. Sanjeev Majoo3, Anand Kumar Mohatta vs State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) Home Department4 and Abhishek vs. State of Madhya Pradesh5.
8. On the authority of the aforesaid decisions, law seems to be well-settled that the High Court under Section 482, Cr. PC. retains the power to quash an FIR, even after charge-sheet under Section 173(2) thereof is filed, provided a satisfaction is reached, inter alia, that either the FIR and the charge-sheet read together, even accepted as true and correct without rebuttal, does not disclose commission of any offence or that continuation of proceedings arising out of such an FIR would in fact be an abuse of the process of law as well as of the Court given the peculiar circumstances of each particular case.
Index of Quash judgments is here.
Nikhil Wadhawan Vs Priti Wadhawan on 05 Feb 2024
A division bench of Delhi High Court held as follows,
From Para 37 and 38,
37. From the evidence of the parties, it is evident that there was an unwarranted interference of the parents and the family members of the respondent in the matrimonial life of the appellant, as has been asserted by him. Such parental interference reached an extent of causing immense harassment to the appellant, who was even made to face multiple complaints before the different agencies. The parties are residing separately since 2001 i.e. for about 13 years, during which the appellant has been deprived of his conjugal relationship for no fault of his. It needs no reiteration that the bedrock of any matrimonial relationship is cohabitation and conjugal relationships. For a spouse to be deprived of his wife’s company proves that the marriage cannot survive, and such deprivation of conjugal relationships is an act of extreme cruelty. Such long separation with no effort by the wife to resume matrimonial relationship, is an act of cruelty as is held in the case of Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511.
38. We thus, conclude that the evidence on record proved that there is no chance of reconciliation between the parties and such long separation peppered which false allegations, Police reports and criminal trial can only be termed as mental cruelty. The marital discord between the parties has pinnacled to complete loss of faith, trust, understanding, love and affection between the parties. This dead relationship has become infested with acrimony, irreconcilable differences and protracted litigations; any insistence to continue this relationship would only be perpetuating further cruelty upon both the parties.
Index of Divorce judgments is here.
Samad Habib Mithani and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 25 Jul 2024
A division (women!) bench of Bombay High Court at Bombay quashed a fake case on in-laws.
From Para 10,
10…
Hence, from the above mentioned statements of the relatives of the Respondent No.2, it is obvious that there are no serious allegations as such against the present Applicants. These are merely omnibus allegations which are not supported by any evidence, as regards the ill-treatment and cruelty meted to the Respondent No.2. The allegations in the complaint are general and vague without specific examples of cruelty and harassment. The record and the statements do not support the allegations made against the present Applicants. The complaint against the present Applicants is not supported by any documents, letter, e-mails, message to support the allegation of cruelty and harassment.
From Para 16,
16. In our opinion, the case of the present Applicants would fall under the category (ii) from the above referred three categories, where the allegations in the FIR or the complaint taken to its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged. Merely, remarks in the complaint about the supporting the accused No.1 while narrating some of the incidents would not perse amount to committing the offences which they have been alleged of. It would be unfair to continue the prosecution against the present Applicants for the conduct of the accused No.1, in which they have been unfortunately dragged. From the various incidents which have been narrated by the Respondent No.2 as well as the witnesses, who are her near relatives, there does not appear to be complicity of the present Applicants. The continuation of present proceedings against the Applicants would cause injustice and hardship to the Applicants. Even otherwise, the material collected during the investigation does not support the charges levelled against the present Applicants. The malafide proceedings initiated against the present Applicants needs to be curbed at this stage itself, in order to prevent abuse or process of law and miscarriage of justice, since it is obvious that the allegations are not supported by any other cogent material and have been made with a view to wreak vengeance against the present Applicants.
Index of Quash judgments is here.
Harsh Bhuwalka and Ors Vs Sanjay Kumar Bajoria on 05 Aug 2024
A division bench of the Apex Court passed this Practice directions as follows,
From Paras 7-9,
7. It is clear on the face of the records and it is also not disputed by Mr. Siddharth Bhatnagar, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, in his usual fairness, that the petitioners made an absolutely incorrect, nay false, statement in paragraph 3 of I.A. No.158707 of 2024 that the High Court had not furnished the certified copy of the impugned order despite they having applied for the same.
8. We would have been entirely justified in directing the Registry to take suitable steps for initiation of proceedings before the criminal court against the petitioners but having regard to the fervent prayer made by Mr. Bhatnagar that the petitioners may not entirely be at fault, we refrain from so directing.
9. However, having regard to the skullduggery that was sought to be adopted, we see no reason to condone the grave lapse on the part of the petitioners and hear them on the merits of the special leave petition. The special leave petition, along with I.A. No.158707 of 2024, I.A. No.158709 of
2024 and I.A. No. 169588 of 2024, stands dismissed.
From Paras 16-18,
16. We are pained to note that despite there being specific provisions in the 2013 Rules requiring a special leave petition to be accompanied by the certified copy of the impugned judgment and order, such provisions are observed more in the breach. Such a situation should not to be allowed to persist; so long the rules exist, there has to be substantial compliance. Even if the certified copy is not available on the date of presentation of a special leave petition, proof of application for such copy has to be adduced for the court to consider the prayer for exemption.
17. With this in view, we propose to issue a practice direction to the following effect:
“If any special leave petition, arising out of civil proceedings as well as criminal proceedings, is accompanied by an application for exemption from filing certified copy of the judgment and/or order under challenge, such application must have, as an annexure, the receipt that has been generated/provided by the concerned Section/Department of the high court as acknowledgment of receipt of an application from the applicant for certified copy of the impugned judgment and/or order and the reason for seeking exemption; further, it must have an averment that the application for certified copy has not lapsed owing to non-filing of requisites or otherwise; also, the application must contain an undertaking of the applicant to place the certified copy of the impugned judgment and/or order on record as soon as possible after the same is furnished to him by the concerned Section/Department of the high court.”
Ordered accordingly.
18. This practice direction has to be observed by all litigants who propose to file special leave petitions both on the civil side as well as on the criminal side with effect from 20th August, 2024.
Dolly Rani Vs Manish Kumar Chanchal on 19 Apr 2024
A division bench of Apex Court held that a Hindu marriage without conducting the marriage ceremonies is not a valid marriage.
We find that the registration of Hindu marriages under the said provision is only to facilitate the proof of a Hindu marriage but for that, there has to be a Hindu marriage in accordance with Section 7 of the Act inasmuch as there must be a marriage ceremony which has taken place between the parties in accordance with the said provision. Although the parties may have complied with the requisite conditions for a valid Hindu marriage as per
Section 5 of the Act in the absence of there being a “Hindu marriage” in accordance with Section 7 of the Act, i.e., solemnization of such a marriage, there would be no Hindu marriage in the eye of law. In the absence of there being a valid Hindu marriage, the Marriage Registration Officer cannot
register such a marriage under the provisions of Section 8 of the Act. Therefore, if a certificate is issued stating that the couple had undergone marriage and if the marriage ceremony had not been performed in accordance with Section 7 of the Act, then the registration of such marriage under Section 8 would not confer any legitimacy to such a marriage. The registration of a marriage under Section 8 of the Act is only to confirm that the
parties have undergone a valid marriage ceremony in accordance with Section 7 of the Act. In other words, a certificate of marriage is a proof of validity of Hindu marriage only when such a marriage has taken place and not in a case where there is no marriage ceremony performed at all.
We further observe that a Hindu marriage is a sacrament and has a sacred character. In the context of saptapadi in a Hindu marriage, according to Rig Veda, after completing the seventh step (saptapadi) the bridegroom says to his bride, “With seven steps we have become friends (sakha). May I attain to friendship with thee; may I not be separated from thy friendship”. A wife is considered to be half of oneself (ardhangini) but to be accepted with an identity of her own and to be a co-equal partner in the marriage. There is nothing like a “better-half” in a marriage but the spouses are equal halves in a marriage.
Also
No doubt, under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, a man and a woman can acquire the status of being a husband and a wife as per the provisions of the said Act. The Special Marriage Act, 1954 is not restricted to Hindus. Any man and woman irrespective of their race, caste or creed can acquire the status of being a husband and a wife under the provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 but under the provisions of the Act (Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955), there should not only be compliance of the conditions as prescribed under Section 5 of the said Act but also the couple must solemnise a marriage in accordance with Section 7 of the Act. In the absence of there being any such marriage in accordance with Section 7 of the Act, a certificate
issued in that regard by any entity is of no legal consequence. Further, any registration of a marriage which has not at all taken place under Section 8 of the Act and as per the rules made by the State Government would not be evidence of a Hindu marriage and also does not confer the status of a husband and a wife to a couple.
In recent years, we have come across several instances where for “practical purposes”, a man and a woman with the intention of solemnisation of their marriage at a future date seek to register their marriage under Section 8 of the Act on the basis of a document which may have been issued as proof of ‘solemnisation of their marriage’ such as in the instant case. As we have already noted, any such registration of a marriage before the Registrar of Marriages and a certificate being issued thereafter would not confirm that the parties have ‘solemnised’ a Hindu marriage. We note that parents of young couples agree for registration of a marriage in order to apply for Visa for emigration to foreign countries where either of the parties may be working “in order to save time” and pending formalising a marriage ceremony. Such practices have to be deprecated. What would be the consequence, if no such marriage is solemnised at all at a future date? What would be the status of the parties then? Are they husband and wife in law and do they acquire such status in society?
State of Karnataka Vs T.Naseer @ Thadiantavida Naseer on 6 Nov 2023
A division bench of the Apex Court held that when the original electronic devices were already produced and marked MOs, there was no need to produce the certificate under Section 65-B of the Act.
From Para 15,
15. Fair trial in a criminal case does not mean that it should be fair to one of the parties. Rather, the object is that no guilty should go scot-free and no innocent should be punished. A certificate under Section 65-B of the Act, which is sought to be produced by the prosecution is not an evidence which has been created now. It is meeting the requirement of law to prove a report on record. By permitting the prosecution to produce the certificate under Section 65B of the Act at this stage will not result in any irreversible prejudice to the accused. The accused will have full opportunity to rebut the evidence led by the prosecution. This is the purpose for which Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. is there. The object of the Code is to arrive at truth. However, the power under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. can be exercised to subserve the cause of justice and public interest. In the case in hand, this exercise of power is required to uphold the truth, as no prejudice as such is going to be caused to the accused.
Shivi Bansal Vs Gaurav Bansal on 16 Jul 2024
A division bench of Delhi High Court held as follows,
From Paras 11 and 12,
11. In our view, even though the conclusion reached by the Family Court Judge on this score is correct, i.e., that the divorce petition cannot be rejected in part, arraying a third party to a divorce petition is neither proper nor necessary. A necessary party is one in whose absence no effective decree can be passed, whereas, a proper party enables complete and final adjudication of issues involved in a given lis.
11.1 The alleged adulterer is, to our minds, not a necessary party as a decree can be passed in his/her absence. Likewise, the adulterer is not a proper party since the issue concerning adultery can be adjudicated without making the adulterer a party to the cause. Proof of adultery need not be conflated with who should be arrayed as a party to a divorce action.
11.2 A divorce action is a lis centered around the couple who have entered into matrimony. A third party [who does not claim the status of a spouse]
has no locus to intervene or seek impleadment in such a cause. [Also see Manjul Joshi v. Bhavna Khurana, 2024: DHC:4170-DB].
12. The alleged adulterer (third party) can either be summoned as a witness or other evidence can be placed before the Family Court to prove adultery. Therefore, on this count, we are not in agreement with the counsel for the appellant/wife.
Index of Divorce judgment is here.
Baba Natarajan Prasad Vs M. Revathi on 15 Jul 2024
A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,
From Paras 10 and 11,
10. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant herein would submit that a scanning of the judgment of the trial Court would reveal that the Court had appropriately appreciated the evidence on record and convicted accused Nos.1 and 2 upon satisfying itself that the ingredients to attract the offence punishable under Section 494 I.P.C., have been made out by the appellant. Furthermore, it is submitted that a bare perusal of the impugned judgment would reveal that the High Court had rightly considered the contentions of the appellant herein against the reversal of their conviction by the First Appellate Court that it was founded on surmises and conjectures. We are of the considered view that no more narrative on the correctness of the reversal of the judgment of the First Appellate Court by the High Court under the impugned judgment is required as the indisputable and undisputed position is that its reversal was accepted by accused Nos.1 and 2 and they had undergone the sentence imposed by the High Court consequent to the reversal of the First Appellate Court’s judgment. We may note here that the learned senior counsel for the appellant would submit that the appellant had not accepted any compensation and in the same breath, would further submit that the appellant did not want any such compensation.
11. In the aforesaid circumstances, the sole question surviving for consideration is whether the High Court was right in not restoring the sentence imposed for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., by the trial Court when it accepted the contentions of the appellant and reversed the acquittal of accused Nos.1 and 2 and restored the conviction entered on them by the trial Court. In other words, the question is whether the High Court had shown undeserving leniency and sympathy to accused Nos.1 and 2 even after finding that they have committed the serious offence of bigamy punishable under Section 494 I.P.C., and whether they were let off with a flea-bite sentence and whether an enhancement of sentence is invited?
From Paras 14 and 15,
14. A reading of Sections 494 and 495 I.P.C., would reveal that the legislature viewed the offence of bigamy as a serious offence. Though no minimum sentence is prescribed under Section 494 I.P.C., the maximum sentence of imprisonment prescribed thereunder for a conviction thereunder is seven years of imprisonment of either description. It is also to be noted that the said offence is compoundable only by the husband or wife of the person so marrying with the permission of the Court. The same offence under Section 494 I.P.C., with concealment of former marriage from person with whom subsequent marriage is contracted would visit the offender with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and with fine. This offence, which is an aggravated form of bigamy, is non-compoundable. The decision in Gopal Lal’s case (supra), and the prescription of maximum corporeal sentence imposable under Sections 494 and 495 I.P.C.,would undoubtedly suggest that the offence under Section 494 I.P.C., has to be treated as a serious offence.
15. When once it is found that an offence under Section494 I.P.C., is a serious offence, the circumstances obtaining in this case would constrain us to hold that the imposition of ‘imprisonment till the rising of the court’ is not a proper sentence falling in tune with the rule of proportionality in providing punishment as mentioned hereinbefore.
From Para 20, (Alteration of the imprisonment and fine)
20. Certain circumstances revealed from the evidence on record cannot go unnoticed while deciding the question of proper sentence. Earlier, the appellant herein filed HMOP 515/2012 before the Family Court, Coimbatore, seeking divorce. In the judgment of the trial Court, taking note of the evidence adduced, it was noted that the first accused had filed a petition seeking interim maintenance in the above HMOP and based on a petition in that regard the Court had ordered the appellant to pay Rs. 5,000/- per month to the first accused and she had received the maintenance till 13.07.2017. The evidence would further show that a child was born to the first and second accused in their wedlock in November, 2017. The evidence on record would reveal that on 22.01.2019, the first accused herself filed HMOP No.84 of 2019 seeking dissolution of her marriage with the appellant. In such circumstances, it is evident that the first accused married the second accused while the marriage between the appellant and the first accused was subsisting and not only that, during its subsistence, she had also begotten a child through the second accused. Taking into account all the circumstances, it can be said that undeserving leniency was shown in the case on hand. But then, taking into account the fact that the child born to the first and second accused was aged less than two years when the trial Court passed the sentence and that no minimum term of imprisonment is prescribed for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., and that the maximum sentence imposable for conviction thereunder is seven years, we are of the considered view that the trial Court had virtually struck a balance in fixing the term of one year as the corporeal sentence. But then, taking note of the fact that the said child is now aged only about six years and the sentence for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., can be of both descriptions. We think it appropriate to use our judicial discretion to modify the sentence imposed under the impugned judgment. Accordingly, we modify the term of the sentence awarded to accused Nos.1 and 2 for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., to six months each, making the nature of the sentence as simple imprisonment for the said period. We further modify the fine imposed by reducing the same from Rs. 20,000/- each to Rs. 2,000/- each, as originally awarded by the trial Court. Needless to say, that the default sentence therefor, awarded by the trial Court i.e., to undergo simple imprisonment for three months is also restored. If in terms of the impugned judgment, accused Nos.1 and 2 had already deposited Rs. 20,000/-, after making deduction in terms of the sentence of fine mentioned hereinbefore, the balance amount shall be refunded to them in accordance with the law. In the said circumstances, accused Nos.1 and 2 shall surrender before the trial Court so as to serve out the unserved period of sentence imposed on them by this judgment. Taking note of the fact that the child of accused Nos.1 and 2 is now aged only about 6 years, we further order that firstly the second accused shall surrender before the trial Court, within a period of 3 weeks from today to serve out the rest of the sentence. Upon his release from the jail, on suffering the sentence, the first accused shall surrender before the Court to serve her remaining period of sentence and such surrender shall be made by the first accused within a period of 2 weeks from the release of the second accused from the jail. This arrangement shall not be treated as a precedent as it was ordered in these special circumstances. In case the accused Nos.1 and 2 do not surrender in terms of this judgment on their own, the trial Court shall resort to appropriate steps in accordance with law to place them in custody and make them suffer the sentence as mentioned hereinbefore. The appeals are allowed as above.
Other Sources:
https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/punishment-must-be-in-proportion-to-gravity-of-offence-supreme-court-enhances-sentence-bigamous-marriage-263490
https://www.legiteye.com/supreme-court-modifies-sentence-in-bigamy-case-orders-staggered-jail-terms-for-couple-justices-ct-ravikumar-sanjay-kumar-15-07-2024/
https://www.latestlaws.com/latest-caselaw/2024/july/2024-latest-caselaw-433-sc/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6696638231ed747732bfccdc
Baba Natarajan Prasad vs M. Revathi 2024 INSC 523 – S 494 IPC – Bigamy – Sentencing
https://www.advocatekhoj.com/library/judgments/announcement.php?WID=17724
https://x.com/SCJudgments/status/1813118439701057835
https://lawyerenews.com/supreme-court-enhances-sentence-in-bigamy-case/
https://www.freelaw.in/legalnews/Punishment-of-imprisonment-till-the-rising-of-the-court-is-a-flea-bite-sentence-for-those-convicted-for-an-offence-of-bigamy-Supreme-Court-
https://www.the-laws.com/encyclopedia/browse/case?caseId=004202345000&title=baba-natarajan-prasad-vs-m-revathi
https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/baba-natarajan-prasad-v-m-revathi-2024-insc-523-bigamy-494-ipc-serious-offence-1544100
The decision of the District Court is here.
Index of Bigamy Judgments is here.
Mohammad Miyan and Ors Vs State of UP on 21 Aug 2018
A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,
Mr. R. K. Das, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants-accused, submits that the prosecution under section 498A of IPC was clearly not tenable in view of the case of the complainant herself that there had been a divorce almost four years before filing of the FIR.
We find much substance in the submission made by Mr. Das, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants-accused. Even in the FIR dated 18.8.2015, the complainant-wife has stated that her divorce had taken place about four years back. It is not possible to accept the contention made by learned counsel appearing on behalf of complainant-wife that she made the statement in ignorance of Sharia law. She is a Headmistress and must be credited with due knowledge of her meritorious status.
In view of her own averment that she was divorced four years ago, we are of the view that the prosecution is not sustainable under section 498A of the IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
Section 498A of the IPC opens with the words “Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman….” Therefore, where the complainant approaches with a case that there has been a divorce long back i.e. four years ago before filing of the FIR, section 498A of IPC in terms would not be attracted. We accordingly consider it appropriate to quash the prosecution against all the accused persons under section 498A of IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/150839791/
Index of Quash Judgments is here.
