Nitya Dharmananda @ K. Lenin Vs Sri Gopal Sheelum Reddy on 7 December, 2017

Posted on August 24, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Another gem of Order (not judgment) from my favorite judges Shri Adarsh Kumar Goel J and Shri Uday Umesh Lalit J, where in it was held that,

From Para 9,

Thus, it is clear that while ordinarily the Court has to proceed on the basis of material produced with the charge sheet for dealing with the issue of charge but if the court is satisfied that there is material of sterling quality which has been withheld by the investigator/prosecutor, the court is not debarred from summoning or relying upon the same even if such document is not a part of the charge sheet. It does not mean that the defence has a right to invoke Section 91 Cr.P.C. de hors the satisfaction of the court, at the stage of charge.

Nitya Dharmananda @ K. Lenin Vs Sri Gopal Sheelum Reddy on 7 December, 2017

Citations : [CDJ 2017 SC 1384], [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 1430], [(2018) 2 SCC 93], [(2018) 1 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 458], [(2018) 2 SCC 6]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/178580003/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5a3408f5ce686e2b4ddaf270

K. Subba Rao Vs The State Of Telangana on 21 August, 2018

Posted on August 23, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

A recent 2018 quash judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case of 498A based on the allegations made on maternal uncles, prima facie, not making out any case as alleged.

From Paras 4 and 5,

4. A perusal of the charge sheet and the supplementary charge sheet discloses the fact that the Appellants are not the immediate family members of the third Respondent/husband. They are the maternal uncles of the third Respondent. Except the bald statement that they supported the third Respondent who was harassing the second Respondent for dowry and that they conspired with the third Respondent for taking away his child to the U.S.A., nothing else indicating their involvement in the crime was mentioned. The Appellants approached the High Court when the investigation was pending. The charge sheet and the supplementary charge sheet were filed after disposal of the case by the High Court.

5. Criminal proceedings are not normally interdicted by us at the interlocutory stage unless there is an abuse of process of a Court. This Court, at the same time, does not hesitate to interfere to secure the ends of justice. See State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335. The Courts should be careful in proceeding against the distant relatives in crimes pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths. The relatives of the husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations unless specific instances of their involvement in the crime are made out. See Kans Raj v. State of Punjab & Ors. (2000) 5 SCC 207 and Kailash Chandra Agrawal and Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2014) 16 SCC 551.

K. Subba Rao Vs The State Of Telangana on 21 August, 2018

Citations: [2018 SCC 14 452], [2018 SCC ONLINE SC 1080], [2018 AIR SC 4009]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/85067403/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5b7c448e9eff436a94f01d47

Relatives of husband acquitted of charge under Section 498-A IPC on finding allegations to be omnibus and unspecific: SC

Sri Rameshwar Yadav Vs The State Of Bihar on 16 March, 2018

Posted on August 20, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

This judgment from Hon’ble Apex Court allowed Exemption from Personal Appearance under CrPC 205 to parents and family of Arnesh Kumar.

Sri Rameshwar Yadav Vs The State Of Bihar on 16 March, 2018

Mahila Vinod Kumari Vs State Of M.P on 11 July, 2008

Posted on August 10, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Supreme Court held that perjury proceedings initiated by Trial Court and High Court does not suffer from any infirmity and as such the petitions were dismissed,

As she resiled from the statement made during investigation, she was permitted to be cross-examined by the prosecution. She even denied to have lodged the first information report (Exh.P-1) and to have given any statement 1 to the police (Exh.P-2). In view of the statement of the petitioner, the two accused persons were acquitted by judgment dated 28.11.2001.

Another gem of the mindset of some women and her family members

Learned counsel for the petitioner stated that being a girl of tender age, she was pressurized by her mother and uncle to give a false report. This is at variance with the statement made in court during trial to the effect that she had not reported anything to the police.

Purpose of Section 344, Cr.P.C.

The purpose of enacting Section 344, Cr.P.C. corresponding to Section 479-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Old Code’) appears to be further arm the Court with a weapon to deal with more flagrant cases and not to take away the weapon already in its possession. The object of the legislature underlying enactment of the provision is that the evil of perjury and fabrication of evidence has to be eradicated and can be better achieved now as it is open to the courts to take recourse to Section 340(1) (corresponding to Section 476 of the Old Code) in cases in which they are failed to take action under Section 344 Cr.P.C.

Conditions to initiate CrPC 344 proceedings

For exercising the powers under the section the Court at the time of delivery of judgment or final order must at the first instance express an opinion to the effect that the witness before it has either intentionally given false evidence or fabricated such evidence. The second condition is that the Court must come to the conclusion that in the interests of justice the witness concerned should be punished summarily by it for the offence which appears to have been committed by the witness. And the third condition is that before commencing the summary trial for punishment the witness must be given reasonable opportunity of showing cause why he should not be so punished. All these conditions arc mandatory. [See Narayanswamy v. State of Muharashtra, (1971) 2 SCC 182].

Mahila Vinod Kumari Vs State Of M.P on 11 July, 2008

Citations : [2008 SCC 8 34], [2008 KERLT 3 509], [2009 SCJ 1 89], [2009 SCJ 1 396], [2008 AIR SC 2965], [2008 SCR 10 869], [2008 SCALE 10 97], [2008 SLT 6 419], [2008 AIR SC 4989], [2009 MPJR 1 7], [2008 CALCRILR 2 490], [2009 ILR MP 332], [2008 KLD 2 513], [2008 RAJLW 3 2379], [2008 AIOL 814], [2009 BOMCR CRI SC 2 494], [2008 SCC CRI 3 414], [2008 AIC SC 69 189], [2008 AIR SCW 4989], [2008 CRLJ SC 3867]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/46073/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae92e4b01497114142e2

https://www.legalauthority.in/judgement/mahila-vinod-kumari-vs-state-of-m-p-13468

Prashant Bharti Vs State of Nct Of Delhi on 23 January, 2013

Posted on August 3, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

The Hon’ble Apex Court has shown her right place for this liar who tried to frame an innocent in a false rape case. The liar was royally concluded to have falsified more than one instance as listed below.

High Court’s observations

“This Court cannot quash the FIR on the ground that FIR was false FIR. In case of a false FIR, it must be brought to its logical conclusion and Investigating Officer must give a report to that effect. In this case, if it is found that the petitioner has been falsely implicated and the complaint was false, it would be obligatory on the part of the Investigating Officer to register a case and book the prosecuterix for falsely implicating the person in an offence under Section 376 IPC. It is a very serious matter that a prosecuterix just by making a false statement can book somebody in offence under Section 376 IPC, which is serious in nature and invites a minimum punishment of 07 years. I consider that Investigating Officer shall submit a detailed report and in case, it is that the petitioner was falsely implicated, he would take steps for booking the complainant for falsely implicating the petitioner.”

Falsifications by liar caught by Hon’ble Court

It is apparent from irrefutable evidence, that during the dates under reference and for a period of more than one year and eight months thereafter, she had remained married to Lalji Porwal. In such a fact situation, the assertion made by the complainant/ prosecuterix, that the appellant-accused had physical relations with her, on the assurance that he would marry her, is per se false and as such, unacceptable. She, more than anybody else, was clearly aware of the fact that she had a subsisting valid marriage with Lalji Porwal. Accordingly, there was no question of anyone being in a position to induce her into a physical relationship under an assurance of marriage. it would clearly emerge, that the complainant/prosecuterix was in a relationship of adultery on 23.12.2006, 25.12.2006 and 1.1.2007 with the appellant-accused, while she was validly married to her previous husband Lalji Porwal.
In her aforesaid complaint, Priya, the complainant/prosecuterix had alleged, that the appellant-accused had called her on her phone at 8.45 pm and asked her to meet him at Lodhi Colony, New Delhi. When she reached there, he drove her around in his car. He also offered her a cold drink (Pepsi) containing a poisonous/intoxicating substance. Having consumed the cold drink, she is stated to have felt inebriated, whereupon, he took advantage of her and started misbehaving with her, and also touched her breasts. Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, the presence of the complainant/prosecuterix, as well as the appellant-accused, at the alleged place of occurrence (Lodhi Colony, New Delhi), on the night of 15.2.2007 after 8.45 pm, has been established to be false on the basis of mobile phone call details of the parties concerned. Once it is concluded, that the complainant/prosecuterix and the appellant-accused were at different places, far away from one another, and certainly not in Lodhi Colony, New Delhi on the night of 15.2.2007, it is obvious that the allegation made by Priya, the complainant/ prosecuterix against Prashant Bharti, the appellant-accused of having outraged her modesty, was false.
Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, medical evidence discussed above reveals, that the complaint made by the complainant/prosecuterix alleging a sexual relationship with her by Prashant Bharti, the appellant-accused, was made more than one month after the alleged occurrences. It was, therefore, that during the course of her medical examination at the AIIMS, a vaginal smear was not taken. Her clothes were also not sent for forensic examination by the AIIMS, because she had allegedly changed the clothes which she had worn at the time of occurrence. In the absence of any such scientific evidence, the proof of sexual intercourse between the complainant/prosecuterix and the appellant-accused would be based on an assertion made by the complainant/prosecuterix. And an unequivocal denial thereof, by the appellant-accused. One’s word against the other. Based on the falsity of the statement made by the complainant/prosecuterix noticed above (and other such like falsities, to be narrated hereafter), it is unlikely, that a factual assertion made by the complainant/prosecuterix, would be acceptable over that of the appellant-accused.

Gem of the entire judgment

Even in the charge sheet dated 28.6.2007, (extracted above) the investigating officer has acknowledged, that he could not find any proof to substantiate the charges. The charge-sheet had been filed only on the basis of the statement of the complainant/prosecutrix under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C.

Prashant Bharti Vs State Of Nct Of Delhi on 23 January, 2013

Citations: [2013 ACR 2 1461], [2013 AIC 123 44], [2013 SCALE 1 652], [2013 CRIMES SC 1 195], [2013 RLW SC 4 3155], [2013 ALLCC 81 414], [2013 AJR 4 469], [2013 SCR 1 504], [2013 AD SC 2 89], [2013 ALLMR CRI 1123], [2013 JT SC 2 240], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 85], [2013 AIR SC 2753], [2013 DRJ 135 26], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL 3 399], [2013 SCC CRI 3 920], [2013 CRILJ 3839], [2013 SCC 9 293]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/89372902/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af39e4b0149711415df1

Savitri Vs Shri Govind Singh Rawat on 9 October, 1985

Posted on August 2, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Read for yourself. This is the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court which held that interim maintenance can be given in a Sec 125 CrPC case.

From Para 6,

6. In view of the foregoing it is the duty of the court to interpret the provisions in Chapter IX of the Code in such a way that the construction placed on them would not defeat the very object of the legislation. In the absence of any express prohibition, it is appropriate to construe the provisions in Chapter IX as conferring an implied power on the Magistrate to direct the person against whom an application is made under section 125 of the code to pay some reasonable sum by way of maintenance to the applicant pending final disposal of the application. It is quite common that applications made under section 125 of the code also take several months for being disposed of finally. In order to enjoy the fruits of the proceedings under Section 125, the applicant should be alive till the date of the final order and that the applicant can do in a large number of cases only if an order for payment of interim maintenance is passed by the court. Every court must be deemed to possess by necessary intendment all such powers as are necessary to make its orders effective. This principle is embodied in the maxim “ubi aliquid conceditur, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest” (Where anything is conceded, there is conceded also anything without which the thing itself cannot exist). [Vide Earl Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law, 1959 Edn., p. 1797.] Whenever anything is required to be done by law and it is found impossible to do that thing unless something not authorised in express terms be also done then that something else will be supplied by necessary intendment. Such a construction though it may not always be admissible in the present case however would advance the object of the legislation under consideration. A contrary view is likely to result in grave hardship to the applicant, who may have no means to subsist until the final order is passed. There is no room for the apprehension that the recognition of such implied power would lead to the passing of interim orders in a large number of cases where the liability to pay maintenance may not exist. It is quite possible that such contingency may arise in a few cases but the prejudice caused thereby to the person against whom it is made is minimal as it can be set right quickly after hearing both the parties. The Magistrate may, however, insist upon an affidavit being filed by or on behalf of the applicant concerned stating the grounds in support of the claim for interim maintenance to satisfy himself that there is a prima facie case for making such an order. Such an order may also be made in an appropriate case ex parte pending service of notice of the application subject to any modification or even an order of cancellation that may be passed after the respondent is heard. If a civil court can pass such interim orders on affidavits, there is no reason why a Magistrate should not rely on them for the purpose of issuing directions regarding payment of interim maintenance. The affidavit may be treated as supplying prima facie proof of the case of the applicant. If the allegations in the application or the affidavit are not true, it is always open to the person against whom such an order is made to show that the order is unsustainable. Having regard to the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by a Magistrate under section 125 of the code, we feel that the said provision should be interpreted as conferring power by necessary implication on the Magistrate to pass an order directing a person against whom an application is made under it to pay a reasonable sum by way of interim maintenance subject to the other conditions referred to therein pending final disposal of the application. In taking this view we have also taken note of the provisions of Section 7(2)(a) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (Act 66 of 1984) passed recently by Parliament proposing to transfer the jurisdiction exercisable by Magistrates under section 125 of the code to the Family Courts constituted under the said Act.

Note: By way on an amendment to Cr.P.C. 1973 in 2001, the Parliament brought the following two Provisos.

Provided further that the Magistrate may, during the pendency of the proceeding regarding monthly allowance for the maintenance under this sub-section, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the interim maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, and the expenses of such proceeding which the Magistrate considers reasonable, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct:
Provided also that an application for the monthly allowance for the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding under the second proviso shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within sixty days from the date of the service of notice of the application to such person.

Savitri Vs Shri Govind Singh Rawat on 9 October, 1985

Citations: [1986 AIR SC 984], [1985 AWC SC 11 906], [1986 BOMLR 88 223], [1985 GLH 1184], [1985 MHLJ 976], [1986 PLJR 6], [1985 SCALE 2 697], [1985 SCC 4 337], [1985 SUPP SCR 3 615], [1985 SCC CRI 556], [1985 CRIMES SC 2 872], [1986 CRIMES SC 1 148], [1986 CRLJ SC 41], [1986 CAR 1], [1986 CRLR 1], [1985 BBCJ 160], [1986 MLJ CRI 1 12], [1985 DLT 28 437], [1985 MPLJ SC 662]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1194071/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac1fe4b014971140e17e

https://vlex.in/vid/special-leave-petition-civil-852326810

Chaturbhuj Vs Sita Bai on 27 November, 2007

Posted on August 1, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court explained who is eligible to claim maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. and under what conditions.

From Para 7,

7. Under the law the burden is placed in the first place upon the wife to show that the means of her husband are sufficient. In the instant case there is no dispute that the appellant has the requisite means. But there is an inseparable condition which has also to be satisfied that the wife was unable to maintain herself. These two conditions are in addition to the requirement that the husband must have neglected or refused to maintain his wife. It has to be established that the wife was unable to maintain herself. The appellant has placed material to show that the respondent wife was earning some income. That is not sufficient to rule out application of Section 125 CrPC. It has to be established that with the amount she earned the respondent wife was able to maintain herself.

Heart and soul of this judgment from Hon’ble Apex Court is in Para 8.

In an illustrative case where wife was surviving by begging, would not amount to her ability to maintain herself. It can also be not said that the wife has been capable of earning but she was not making an effort to earn. Whether the deserted wife was unable to maintain herself, has to be decided on the basis of the material placed on record. Where the personal income of the wife is insufficient she can claim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The test is whether the wife is in a position to maintain herself in the way she was used to in the place of her husband. In Bhagwan v. Kamla Devi (AIR 1975 SC 83) it was observed that the wife should be in a position to maintain standard of living which is neither luxurious nor penurious but what is consistent with status of a family. The expression “unable to maintain herself” does not mean that the wife must be absolutely destitute before she can apply for maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C.

Chaturbhuj Vs Sita Bai on 27 November, 2007

Citations: [AIR 2008 SUPREME COURT 530], [2007 AIR SCW 7416], [2008 CRI LJ (NOC) 186], [2008 CRI LJ (NOC) 2], [2008 (1) AIR JHAR R 664], [2008 (1) SRJ 29], [(2008) 1 MH LJ (CRI) 644], [(2008) 1 JCC 486 (SC)], [2008 (1) CALCRILR 416], [2008 (1) SCC(CRI) 356], [2008 (2) CRI RJ 401], [2008 ALL MR(CRI) 860], [2008 (2) SCC 316], [2007 (13) SCALE 402], [2007 (8) SUPREME 525], [(2008) 1 MPHT 13], [(2008) 64 ALLINDCAS 735 (CHH)], [(2008) 1 CGLJ 228], [(2008) 1 CHANDCRIC 27], [(2008) 1 DMC 22], [(2008) 1 CIVILCOURTC 233], [(2008) 2 GUJ LR 1159], [(2008) 1 HINDULR 130], [(2008) 2 JAB LJ 70], [(2008) 1 MADLW(CRI) 615], [(2008) 2 MAD LJ 481], [(2008) 1 MAD LJ(CRI) 1400], [(2008) 2 MARRILJ 605], [(2008) MATLR 775], [(2008) MATLR 165], [(2008) 39 OCR 383], [(2008) 1 PUN LR 263], [(2008) 1 RAJ LW 142], [(2008) 1 RECCRIR 163], [(2007) 4 CURCRIR 408], [(2008) 1 RECCIVR 136], [(2008) 2 ALLCRIR 1409], [(2008) 3 CGLJ 473], [(2008) 1 CAL LJ 166], [(2008) 1 ALLCRILR 342], [(2008) 105 CUT LT 729], [(2007) 3 JCC 2446 (DEL)], [(2008) 1 KER LT 41], [(2008) 1 RAJ CRI C 35], [2008 CRILR(SC&MP) 1], [(2008) 1 CRILR(RAJ) 1], [2008 CRILR(SC MAH GUJ) 1], [2008 (1) ALD(CRL) 97], [2008 (1) ANDHLT(CRI) 131 SC], [2007 INSC 1190]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1720873/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae55e4b01497114137ad

https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/browse/Case?caseId=007002893100&title=chaturbhuj-vs-sita-bai

[Landmark Judgement] Chaturbhuj v/s Sita Bai (2008)

Index Maintenance Judgments under Section 125 Cr.P.C. is here.

U.Suvetha Vs State By Insp.Of Police & Anr on 6 May, 2009

Posted on July 23, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that, a concubine is not a relative to the husband of the knife, with regards to IPC 498A.

The word ‘cruelty” having been defined in terms of the aforesaid explanation, no other meaning can be attributed thereto. Living with another woman may be an act of cruelty on the part of the husband for the purpose of judicial separation or dissolution of marriage but the same, in our opinion, would not attract the wrath of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.

Meaning or definition of “relative”:

In the absence of any statutory definition, the term ‘relative’ must be assigned a meaning as is commonly understood. Ordinarily it would include father, mother, husband or wife, son, daughter, brother, sister, nephew or niece, grandson or grand-daughter of an individual or the spouse of any person. The meaning of the word ‘relative’ would depend upon the nature of the statute. It principally includes a person related by blood, marriage or
adoption.

The word ‘relative’ has been defined in P. Ramanatha Aiyar Advanced Law Lexicon – Volume 4, 3rd Edition as under :-
“Relative, “RELATIVE” includes any person related by blood, marriage or adoption. [Lunacy Act ].
The expression “RELATIVE” means a husband wife, ancestor, lineal descendant, brother or sister. [Estate Duty Act].

“RELATIVE” means in relation to the deceased,
a) the wife or husband of the deceased;
b) the father, mother, children, uncles and aunts of the deceased, and
c) any issue of any person falling, within either of the preceding sub-clauses and the other party to a marriage with any such person or issue [Estate Duty Act].
A person shall be deemed to be a relative of another if, and only if, –
a) they are the members of a Hindu undivided family, or
b) they are husband and wife; or
c) the one is related to the other in the manner indicated in Schedule I-A [Companies Act, 1956].

“RELATIVE” in relation to an individual means –
a) The mother, father, husband or wife of the individual, or
b) a son, daughter, brother, sister, nephew or niece of the individual, or
c) a grandson or grand-daughter of the individual, or
d) the spouse of any person referred to in subclause (b) [Income tax Act].

“RELATIVE” means –
1) spouse of the person ;
2) brother or sister of the person ;
3) brother or sister of the spouse of the person;
4) any lineal ascendant or descendant of the person;
5) any lineal ascendant or descendant of the spouse of the person; [Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act].”

From Para 18,

By no stretch of imagination a girl friend or even a concubine in an etymological sense would be a ‘relative’. The word ‘relative’ brings within its purview a status. Such a status must be conferred either by blood or marriage or adoption. If no marriage has taken place, the question of one being relative of another would not arise.

U.Suvetha Vs State By Insp.Of Police & Anr on 6 May, 2009

Citations: [2009 ACC 67 903], [2009 SCC 6 787], [2009 SCC CRI 3 36], [2009 AIR SC 0 3491], [2009 SUPREME 3 797], [2009 RCR CRI 2 923], [2009 SCC 6 757], [2009 KERLT 2 686], [2009 MLJ CRI 2 1079], [2009 DMC 1 887], [2009 SLT 4 462], [2009 CUTLT SUPPL 1126], [2009 AIOL 675], [2009 AIR SC 1451], [2009 ANJ SC 2 16], [2009 BOMCR CRI SC 3 845], [2009 CRIMES SC 2 357], [2009 JT 7 222], [2009 SCALE 7 149], [2009 SCR 7 902], [2009 AIR SCW 3491], [2009 CRLJ SC 2974]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/953117/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aec9e4b0149711414c47

Suresh Nanda vs C.B.I. on 24 January, 2008

Posted on July 22, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this landmark judgment, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that, no one, except Passport Authority, can impound a passport; nor police nor Courts. Period.

The Apex Court held that

there is a difference between seizing a document and impounding a document. A seizure is made at a particular moment when a person or authority takes into his possession some property which was earlier not in his possession. Thus, the seizure is done at a particular moment of time. However, if after seizing of a property or document, said property or document is retained for some period of time, then such retention amounts impounding of property/or document.

And also

Maintaining that, the Passport Act, 1967 is a special act and thereby prevails over the Cr.P.C. which is a general law, vide G.P. Singh’s Principles of Statutory Interpretation (9th Edition pg. 133). This principle is expressed in the maxim \023Generalia specialibus non derogant\024. Hence, impounding of a passport cannot be done by the Court under Section 104 Cr.P.C. though it can impound any other document or thing.

This judgment has lead to lot of other judgments wherein the various High Courts in India had ordered lower courts to return back the passports of accused, that were either confiscated by the police as part of their search operations or crime investigation or had been surrendered to Courts, as a condition to obtaining Anticipatory Bail. They are listed here.

Suresh Nanda vs C.B.I on 24 January, 2008

Citations : [2008 AIR SC 1414], [2008 AIR SC 0 898], [2008 SCC 3 674], [2008 LW CRL 1 503], [2008 SCALE 2 46], [2008 JT 2 174], [2008 ALL MR CRI 1189], [2008 ALT CRI 2 344], [2008 DLT 147 397], [2008 CCR 1 318], [2008 SLT 2 245], [2008 AIOL 107], [2008 BOMCR CRI SC 2 514], [2008 SCC CRI 2 121], [2008 AIR SCW 898], [2008 CRLJ SC 1599], [2008 MLJ CRL 1 1195]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/572504/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae74e4b0149711413efc

Reema Aggarwal Vs Anupam And Ors on 8 January, 2004

Posted on July 21, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Defense of Accused:

Before the trial Court the accused persons put the plea that charge under Section 498-A was thoroughly misconceived as both Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC pre-suppose valid marriage of the alleged victim-woman with the offender-husband. It was required to be shown that the victim-woman was the legally married wife of the accused. Since it was admitted that the appellant had married during the lifetime of the wife of respondent no.1, what happened to his first marriage remained a mystery. Prosecution has failed to establish that it stood dissolved legally. Prosecution having failed to bring any material record in that regard, Section 498-A had no application.

From Para 18,

It would be appropriate to construe the expression ‘husband’ to cover a person who enters into marital relationship and under the colour of such proclaimed or feigned status of husband subjects the woman concerned to cruelty or coerce her in any manner or for any of the purposes enumerated in the relevant provisions Sections 304B/498A, whatever be the legitimacy of the marriage itself for the limited purpose of Sections 498A and 304B IPC. Such an interpretation, known and recognized as purposive construction has to come into play in a case of this nature. The absence of a definition of ‘husband’ to specifically include such persons who contract marriages ostensibly and cohabitate with such woman, in the purported exercise of his role and status as ‘husband’ is no ground to exclude them from the purview of Section 304B or 498A IPC, viewed in the context of the very object and aim of the legislations introducing those provisions.

Finally,

Whether the offences are made out is a matter of trial. The High Court was not justified in summarily rejecting the application for grant of leave. It has a duty to indicate reasons when it refuses to grant leave. Any casual or summary disposal would not be proper. (See State of Punjab v. Bhag Singh (2003 (8) Supreme 611). In the circumstances, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court and remit the matter back to the High Court for hearing the matter on merits as according to us points involved require adjudication by the High Court. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated.

Reema Aggarwal Vs Anupam And Ors on 8 January, 2004

The acquittal of the accused happened at sessions court and a revision on this acquittal at High Court of Punjab and Haryana was dismissed. Read it here.

Citations : [2004 AIR SC 1418], [2004 ALD CRI 1 452], [2004 CALLT SC 3 16], [2004 DMC SC 1 201], [2004 JT SC 1 177], [2004 KLJ 1 825], [2004 KLT SC 2 822], [2004 PLJR 2 64], [2004 SCALE 1 264], [2004 SCC 3 199], [2004 CRIMES SC 1 276], [2004 SCC CRI 699], [2004 SCR 1 378], [2004 SUPREME 1 355], [2004 KHC 0 668], [2004 RCR CRI 1 776], [2004 ACC 48 442], [2004 AIR SC 344], [2004 SRJ 2 49], [2004 CCR 1 163], [2004 JCRIC 1 209], [2004 CRJ 2 432], [2004 SLT 1 466], [2004 AIR SCW 344], [2004 CRLJ SC 892]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1180389/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae01e4b0149711412ad7

https://vlex.in/vid/crl-no-000025-000025-852345777

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision

Nitya Dharmananda @ K. Lenin Vs Sri Gopal Sheelum Reddy on 7 December, 2017

K. Subba Rao Vs The State Of Telangana on 21 August, 2018

Sri Rameshwar Yadav Vs The State Of Bihar on 16 March, 2018

Mahila Vinod Kumari Vs State Of M.P on 11 July, 2008

Prashant Bharti Vs State of Nct Of Delhi on 23 January, 2013

Savitri Vs Shri Govind Singh Rawat on 9 October, 1985

Chaturbhuj Vs Sita Bai on 27 November, 2007

U.Suvetha Vs State By Insp.Of Police & Anr on 6 May, 2009

Suresh Nanda vs C.B.I. on 24 January, 2008

Reema Aggarwal Vs Anupam And Ors on 8 January, 2004