Baijnath and ors vs State of Madhya Pradesh on 18 Nov 2016

Posted on February 10 by ShadesOfKnife

A two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India, in Baijnath & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (18 November 2016), held that the unnatural death of a married woman within seven years of marriage does not, by itself, amount to dowry death under Section 304B IPC. The Court ruled that the prosecution must prove cruelty or harassment for dowry to sustain such a charge.

The Supreme Court further clarified that the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act does not operate automatically. Courts may invoke it only after the prosecution establishes dowry-related cruelty soon before death. In this case, the evidence on dowry demand was inconsistent, no prior complaint was made, and medical evidence failed to conclusively determine the cause of death.

The Court held that the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal based on presumptions. As the prosecution failed to prove cruelty beyond reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court restored the Trial Court’s acquittal and granted the accused the benefit of doubt.

Relevant Extracts from the Supreme Court Judgment:

“(32) Noticeably this presumption as well is founded on the proof of cruelty or harassment of the woman dead for or in connection with any demand for dowry by the person charged with the offence. The presumption as to dowry death thus would get activated only upon the proof of the fact that the deceased lady had been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry by the accused and that too in the reasonable contiguity of death. Such a proof is thus the legislatively mandated prerequisite to invoke the otherwise statutorily ordained presumption of commission of the offence of dowry death by the person charged therewith.”
“(33) Proof of cruelty or harassment by the husband or her relative or the person charged is thus the sine qua non to inspirit the statutory presumption, to draw the person charged within the coils thereof. If the prosecution fails to demonstrate by cogent coherent and persuasive evidence to prove such fact, the person accused of either of the above referred offences cannot be held guilty by taking refuge only of the presumption to cover up the shortfall in proof.“
“(38) The prosecution in our estimate, has failed to prove this indispensable component of the two offences beyond reasonable doubt. The factum of unnatural death in the matrimonial home and that too within seven years of marriage therefore is thus ipso facto not sufficient to bring home the charge under Sections 304B and 498A of the Code against them.“

Baijnath vs State of MP

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Acquittal from criminal matrimonial cases is here.

Key Contributor:

Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan (B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.)

Contact : +91-9606345150

Neha Lal Vs Abhishek Kumar on 20 Jan 2026

Posted on January 27 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held that Perjury applications shall continue, despite grant to divorce.

From Paras 28 to 30,

28. Now coming to the cases pending between the parties. All the cases pending between the parties, as mentioned in paragraph No.8.8, shall stand disposed of without any further action by them. However, the following applications filed by the parties raising plea of perjury shall continue because no one can be permitted to pollute the stream of justice, as emphasized by this Court in Kusha Duruka vs. The State of Odisha10. The cases being:
(i) Crl. M. A. No.42585 of 2019 in W. P. (Crl.) No.1025 of 2023 (under Section 340 CrPC)
(ii) Application under Section 379 read with 215 BNSS filed in MT No.151 of 2021
(iii) Application under Section 379 read with 215 BNSS filed in MT No.151 of 2021
(iv) Misc. Crl. No.7 of 2019 filed in MT No.853 of 2018
(v) Application under Section 340 CrPC in MT No.853 of 2018
29. It is clarified that if besides the cases mentioned in the paragraph 28, any other application(s) filed by the parties either under section 340 CrPC or under Section 379 read with 215 of BNSS, 2023, the same shall be dealt with on merits by the concerned Courts and will not be disposed of, in view of this order passed by this Court.
30. A copy of the order passed by this Court shall be sent to the Courts concerned for taking action as per the direction in this order. However, if there is any other case arising out of matrimonial dispute, though not mentioned in the list, but pending, the same shall also stand disposed of on production of copy of this order by the parties.

Neha Lal Vs Abhishek Kumar on 20 Jan 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Perjury Judgments is here.

Suninder Sandha Vs State of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 02 Dec 2025

Posted on January 13 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 15,

15. Evidently, Section 91 of the Code does not itself prescribe any stage. The core issue remains whether invocation of power under Section 91 of the Code by the Trial Court is as per the manner contemplated/provided for in law. We are mindful that the underlying case in Sarla Gupta (supra)1 concerned the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002. It is seen that State of Orissa v Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568, relied upon by the High Court, was considered by a Bench of equal strength in Sarla Gupta (supra).

From Para 17,

17. The law is no longer res integra, having been lastly settled by the 3-Judge Bench in Sarla Gupta (supra), which provides clarity as to the relevant stage at which power under Section 91 of the Code may be invoked. In the underlying case in these appeals, such stage has not yet been reached, as defence evidence has not commenced.

Suninder Sandha Vs State of NCT of Delhi & Anr on 02 Dec 2025

Vijay Kumar and Ors Vs State of Rajasthan on 08 Jan 2026

Posted on January 9 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court was ‘surprised‘ for the delays in disposing petitions by High Courts, after granting relief of stay… hehe…

It is funny these Judges were earlier High Court judges and they know all to very well, why.

From Para 15,

15. The Criminal Revision Petition filed by the petitioners in the year 2003 came to be taken up for hearing by the learned Single Judge of the High Court on 24-8-2023, i.e., after about 20 years.

From Paras 21-25,

“21. We would like to know first and the foremost why it took 23 years for the High Court to take up the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the petitioners for hearing, more particularly when the subject matter of challenge in the Criminal Revision Petition was an order framing charge in a very sensitive and serious trial like one of dowry death.”
“22. We would like to examine the entire record of the proceedings. We are saying so because we are perturbed by the fact that despite an interim relief operating, why the matter was not taken up for hearing at the earliest.”
23. “We direct the Registrar General of the High Court of Rajasthan to forward the entire record with all the order sheets by a Special Messenger to this Court at the earliest.”
24. “We would also like to know from the Registrar General of the High Court as to how many Criminal Revision Petitions came to be heard and disposed of between 2001 and 2026. We want the High Court to provide us with a break up of how many criminal revision petitions were filed in the year 2001 and how many came to be disposed of. We want this break up right up to the year 2026.”
25. “We would also like to know how many times the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the petitioners – herein in the High Court was notified for hearing from the date of its filing till the date it came to be dismissed.”

From Paras 26 and 27,

26. We would also like to know from the State as to what steps it took as the prosecuting agency to get the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the petitioners heard at the earliest.
27. Why during this interregnum period of 23 years, the State of Rajasthan kept quiet and did not take any steps to get the Criminal Revision Petition heard and decided on merits.

From Paras 29 and 30,

29. If criminal trials in such serious offences remain pending for years together on the strength of interim orders passed by the High Courts, it would lead to nothing but mockery of justice. Justice has to be done with all the parties. Justice cannot be done only with the accused persons. Justice has to be done even with the victim and the family members of the victim. Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.
30. In this regard, we request the Chief Justices of all the High Courts to ensure that the petitions wherein interim orders are passed holding up the trials should be immediately taken up for hearing, more particularly in sensitive and serious matters like murder, dowry death, rape etc.

From Para 35,

35. Let a copy of this order be transmitted to Secretary Generals/Registrar Generals of all the High Courts so as to have the same placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justices.

Next hearing on 15-1-2026.

Vijay Kumar and Ors Vs State of Rajasthan on 08 Jan 2026

Index of Judgments pertaining to Right to Speedy Trial here.

Geddam Jhansi and Anr Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 07 Feb 2025

Posted on December 6, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Supreme Court invoked Article 142 of the Constitution to quash a DV case, which has same allegations as in a false 498A IPC case.

40. Accordingly, we allow both the present Criminal Appeals as below:
(i) The impugned judgement and order dated 04.04.2022 passed by the Ld. Single Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana in Criminal Petition No. 3105 of 2022 is set aside and the criminal proceedings in “C.C. No. 46 of 2022” pending before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is quashed qua the two appellants, Geddam Jhansi and Geddam Sathyakama Jabali.
(ii) The impugned judgement and order dated 03.02.2022 passed by the Ld. Single Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana in Criminal Petition No. 1002 of 2022 is set aside and the criminal proceedings in DVC No. 25 of 2021 pending before the Court of the Additional Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir is quashed qua the appellant, Geddam Jhansi. This is having regard to the criminal proceeding against her being quashed as above and as identical allegation (paragraph 28 above) are made against her in DVC No. 25 of 2021, and in exercise of our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. This is also by bearing in mind the relationship of the appellant Geddam Jhansi to the complainant, being the latters’s mother-in-law’s sister.

Geddam Jhansi and Anr Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 07 Feb 2025

Citations: [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1], [2025 INSC 160]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/192533816/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/67a6e0c4a1572e13dd1ca525

https://testbook.com/recent-judgements/geddam-jhansi-vs-the-state-of-telangana

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/s498a-ipc-when-family-relations-are-sought-to-be-brought-under-criminal-proceedings-courts-should-be-cautious-supreme-court-283311

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/geddam-jhansi-v-the-state-of-telangana-2025-insc-160-domestic-violence-1567439

Index of DV Judgments is here. Index of Quash Judgments is here.

Rekha Sharad Ushir Vs Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd on 26 Mar 2025

Posted on November 23, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held (again!) as follows,

From Para 11,

11. It is settled law that a litigant who, while filing proceedings in the court, suppresses material facts or makes a false statement, cannot seek justice from the court. The facts suppressed must be material and relevant to the controversy, which may have a bearing on the decision making. Cases of those litigants who have no regard for the truth and those who indulge in suppressing material facts need to be thrown out of the court.

From Para 15,

15. It is pertinent to note that in the counter to the present appeal, the respondent has not denied the receipt of the letters dated 28th November 2016 and 13th December 2016. The complaint and affidavit in support of the complaint only refer to the notice dated 15th November 2016 issued by the advocate for the appellant to the respondent. What is stated in the complaint reads thus:
“……………………………………………………..
[D] The notice sent on the first address has been received on 15.11.2016. However, from the second address, envelope has been returned on 15.11.2016 with the postal remark as ‘left’.”
However, the respondent suppressed the letters dated 28th November 2016 and 13th December 2016 in the complaint and its statement on oath.

From Para 18 and 19,

18. The fact remains that in the complaint, the respondent has suppressed the reply dated 28th November 2016 and the letter dated 13th December 2016 sent by the appellant’s advocate. These two documents have also been suppressed in the statement on oath. The respondent made out a false case that the appellant did not reply to the demand notice. Moreover, the case that the documents as demanded were supplied is not pleaded in the complaint and statement under Section 200 of CrPC.
19. If these two letters were disclosed in the complaint, the learned Magistrate while recording the statement under Section 200 of CrPC, could have always questioned the respondent on the supply of documents to the appellant. What is important is that in the reply dated 28th November 2016, the appellant had reserved her right to give a reply to the demand notice after receiving the documents. It was the respondent’s duty to supply documents to the appellant or her advocate to enable the appellant to properly reply to the demand notice. At least, the inspection of documents could have been provided to the appellant. After noticing the fact that notwithstanding service of two letters written by the appellant, relied upon documents were not provided to the appellant, the learned Magistrate could have dismissed the complaint by exercising power under Section 203 of CrPC, as the appellant could not have replied to the statutory notice without looking at the documents relied upon.

From Para 21,

21. While filing a complaint under Section 200 of CrPC and recording his statement on oath in support of the complaint, as the complainant suppresses material facts and documents, he cannot be allowed to set criminal law in motion based on the complaint. Setting criminal law in motion by suppressing material facts and documents is nothing but an abuse of the process of law.

Rekha Sharad Ushir Vs Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd on 26 Mar 2025

Citations: [2025 INSC 399], [2025 SCC OnLine SC641]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/120031673/

Index of Perjury Judgments is here.

Sangeeta Gera Vs Sanjeev Gera on 22 Sep 2025

Posted on November 22, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court held that, if you put any property in the joint names of wife and husband, other person, who paid nothing, will also get 50% of that said property.

From Para 29-35,

29. The question for consideration is whether the Respondent is entitled to a 50% share in the proceeds of the property held jointly by the parties. In the Order dated 17.01.2020, the Supreme Court made it clear that this question relating to 50% share of the wife will be taken up for consideration at the time of the MAT Appeal (FC) No. 38 of 2019.
30. Learned counsel for the Respondent had contended that the said proceeds have become part of the Respondent‟s stridhan under Section 14 of the HSA and therefore, she has the exclusive ownership over the same. However, a property jointly purchased at the time of marriage cannot be treated as the stridhan of the woman, as stridhan is confined to those properties which are gifted to her voluntarily by her parents, relatives, husband, or in-laws, either before or after the marriage, and which are intended for her exclusive ownership and enjoyment. A jointly acquired property, purchased in the name of both spouses, is by its very nature a joint asset and cannot fall within the ambit of stridhan, since it is not a gift exclusively made to the wife but rather an acquisition contributed to and held by both parties.
31. Normally, when a husband and wife acquire property during the subsistence of marriage, the presumption in law is that such acquisition is made from common family funds and that both spouses have contributed equally, irrespective of whether one of them is earning or not. In the present case, the subject property was purchased in the joint names of the husband and wife, although it is an admitted position that the entire consideration, including the payment of EMIs, was borne solely by the Appellant/Husband. It is further a matter of record that the title of the subject property is held in the names of both spouses as joint owners, and even the account in HSBC Bank, in which the surplus amount was deposited, was maintained in the joint names of the parties.
32. In this regard, a reference may be made to Section 4 of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 [hereinafter referred to as “Benami Act”], which sets out as follows:-
“4. Prohibition of the right to recover property held benami.—
(1) No suit, claim or action to enforce any right in respect of any property held benami against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person shall lie by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property.
(2) No defence based on any right in respect of any property held benami, whether against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person, shall be allowed in any suit, claim or action by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property.”
33. Section 4 creates an absolute bar against the enforcement of rights in respect of property held benami. It stipulates that no person claiming to be the real owner of such property can institute any suit, claim, or action to enforce rights against the benamidar or any other person in whose name the property stands. Equally, it prohibits the raising of any defence in a pending suit, claim, or action on the ground that the property, though standing in the name of another, actually belongs to the real owner. The combined effect of sub-Sections (1) and (2) is that the real owner is entirely disabled from seeking recognition of any right, title, or interest in the benami property, either by way of initiating proceedings or by way of defence.
34. In this backdrop, once the property stands in the joint names of the spouses, the husband cannot be permitted to claim exclusive ownership merely on the ground that he alone provided the purchase consideration. Such a plea would contravene Section 4 of the Benami Act, which imposes an absolute bar against the enforcement of rights in respect of property held benami. The provision clearly stipulates that no person claiming to be the real owner of a property standing in another‟s name can either institute proceedings or raise a defence asserting such ownership. Thus, the combined effect of the presumption of equal ownership between spouses and the statutory prohibition under Section 4 is that the Appellant is prevented from contending that the amount from the sale of the joint property belongs to him alone.
35. Therefore, the Respondent is entitled to a 50% share in the proceeds of the property held jointly by the parties, and the money must be released to her.

Sangeeta Gera Vs Sanjeev Gera on 22 Sep 2025

Citations: [2025:DHC:8356-DB]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/30016714/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/68d2fb6b3a3e913fa6f579c2

Husband Cannot Claim Sole Ownership of Joint Property Even if He Paid EMIs, Wife Entitled to 50% Proceeds: Delhi High Court

https://transfer-pricing.in/t/husband-cannot-claim-exclusive-ownership-of-a-property-jointly-held-by-both-the-spouses-merely-on-the-ground-that-he-alone-paid-the-emis/148

Index of

Rita Raj Vs Pabitra Roy Chaudhuri on 17 Oct 2025

Posted on October 19, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court observed as follows, while upholding the Family Court’s decision not to grant alimony.

From Paras 53 to 57,

53. In the present Appeal, the Appellant‟s primary challenge is directed against the learned Family Court‟s finding on cruelty. The evidence on record unequivocally establishes a sustained pattern of mental cruelty inflicted by the Appellant upon the Respondent.
54. The most compelling evidence comprises the series of text messages sent from the Appellant‟s mobile number between March and June 2011. These messages, which contained vile, derogatory, and scandalous language, including questioning the Respondent‟s legitimacy and making reprehensible allegations against his mother, were proved beyond doubt.
55. Specific messages dated 09.05.2011, 15.05.2011, and 27.06.2011, which included terms such as “bastard”, “son of a bitch,” and suggestions that his mother should “earn through prostitution”, are by themselves sufficient to constitute mental cruelty of the gravest kind.
56. The Appellant‟s explanation that the Respondent must have sent these messages to himself from her phone is inherently improbable and was rightly rejected by the learned Family Court as an afterthought, particularly since this defense was never pleaded in the written statement and no corroborative evidence was adduced to support it.
57. Words and communications of the sort proved in this case are not innocuous. The law recognizes that mental cruelty may be visited by persistent and deliberate verbal abuse and conduct that degrades a spouse and injures reputation and self-respect. The text messages in question contained imputations of illegitimacy, filthy epithets directed at the Respondent‟s mother and other degrading expressions a pattern of conduct which, cumulatively, the learned Family Court was entitled to regard as causing grave mental agony to the Respondent.

From Para 82,

82. The provision under Section 25 is fundamentally equitable in nature and aims to secure financial justice between spouses, ensuring that a party lacking independent means of subsistence is not left destitute following the dissolution of marriage. However, the grant of such relief is not automatic; it is contingent upon proof of genuine financial necessity and equitable considerations.
83. In the present case, the Appellant is an officer of the IRTS, a highly esteemed branch of the Indian Civil Services, whereas the Respondent is a practicing lawyer.
84. It is an undisputed fact that the Appellant, being a Group ‘A’ officer, holds a senior and responsible position in the Government of India and receives a regular and substantial salary along with numerous allowances and service benefits commensurate with her post. The material on record does not disclose any evidence of financial hardship, dependency, or extraordinary circumstances that would render her incapable of maintaining herself with dignity. There is also no pleading or proof of any financial liability, medical condition, or familial obligation that could necessitate monetary support from the Respondent. Additionally, there is no evidence to suggest a substantial difference between the incomes of the parties.
85. Judicial discretion under Section 25 cannot be exercised to award alimony where the applicant is financially self-sufficient and independent, and such discretion must be exercised properly and judiciously, based on the record, the relative financial capacities of the parties, and the absence of any material demonstrating economic vulnerability on the part of the Appellant.
86. A careful examination of the record further reveals that the parties cohabited as husband and wife only for a brief and transitory period, and the marriage did not evolve into a stable or enduring union characterized by emotional, social, or financial interdependence. The absence of any child from the wedlock further eliminates a continuing financial responsibility that might otherwise justify an award of alimony or maintenance.
87. It is a settled principle that permanent alimony is intended as a measure of social justice and not as a tool for enrichment or equalizing the financial status of two capable individuals. The law requires that the applicant demonstrate a genuine need for financial assistance. In the present case, the Appellant‟s position as a senior government officer, her steady and substantial income, and the absence of dependents collectively establish that she is fully capable of maintaining herself. No evidence of financial incapacity, duress, or other compelling circumstances has been presented to justify judicial intervention.

Rita Raj Vs Pabitra Roy Chaudhuri on 17 Oct 2025

Citations: [2025:DHC:9233-DB]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/156230068/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/68f2a09ee5e6a9673013a510

Index of Maintenance and Alimony judgment under Hindu Marriage Act is here.

Himanshu Kumar and Ors Vs State of Chhattisgarh and Ors on 14 Jul 2022

Posted on October 18, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Supreme Court held as follows,

From Para 79,

79. It is true that an affidavit is ‘evidence’ within the meaning of Section 191 of the IPC and a person swearing to a false affidavit is guilty of perjury. But the matter does not rest here. Before initiating the proceedings for perjury, the court concerned has to consider whether it would be expedient in the interest of justice to sanction such prosecution. What the courts have to see at this stage is whether there is evidence in support of the allegations made by the Union of India (respondent herein) to justify the initiation of proceedings against the writ petitioners, more particularly, the writ petitioner no. 1 herein who had filed the affidavit on behalf of himself and the other writ petitioners and not whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant his conviction. However, this does not mean that the court should not prima facie be of the opinion that there are sufficient and reasonable grounds for setting the machinery of criminal law in motion against the accused. As noted above, the Court has further to see that the false statement was deliberate and conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable or likely. In other words, before sanctioning the prosecution there must be a prima facie case of a falsehood on a matter of substance and the court should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge. (see S.P. Kohli v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana, (1979) 1 SCC 212 : AIR 1978 SC 1753)

From Paras 86 and 87,

86. The conflict between the two decisions of this Court of equal strength, i.e. Pritish (supra) and Sharad Pawar (supra), was taken notice of by this Court in the case of the State of Punjab v. Jasbir Singh, (2020) 12 SCC 96. A Bench of two Judges of this Court ultimately thought fit to refer the question to a Larger Bench. The Court observed as under :
“14. In any event, given that the decision of the three-Judge Bench in Sharad Pawar (supra) did not assign any reason as to why it was departing from the opinion expressed by a Coordinate Bench in Pritish (supra) regarding the necessity of a preliminary inquiry under Section 340 of the CrPC, as also the observations made by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah (supra), we find it necessary that the present matter be placed before a larger Bench for its consideration, particularly to answer the following questions:
14.1 (i) Whether Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 mandates a preliminary inquiry and an opportunity of hearing to the would-be accused before a complaint is made under Section 195 of the Code by a Court ?
14.2 (ii) What is the scope and ambit of such preliminary inquiry ?”
87. It appears that the reference on the aforesaid two questions to a larger Bench is still pending.

From Paras 90 and 91,

90. The essential ingredients for invoking Section 211, I.P.C. are that the complaint must have falsely charged a person with having committed an offence. The complainant, at the time of giving the complaint must have known that there is no just or lawful ground for making a charge against the person. This complaint must have been given with an intention to cause injury to a person.
91. The CrPC does not define what constitutes the making of a “charge” of an offence or what amounts to the “institution of criminal proceedings”. But, in our opinion, a false “charge” in this Section must not be understood in any restricted or technical sense, but in its ordinary meaning, of a false accusation made to any authority bound by law to investigate it or to take any steps in regard to it, such as giving information of it to the superior authorities with a view to investigation or other proceedings, and the institution of criminal proceedings includes the setting of the criminal law in motion. The nature of both expressions, and the difference between them has been explained in lucid terms in the decision of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Karim Buksh v. Queen Emp, 17 C. 574. It points out that there may be a charge which does not amount to the institution of criminal proceedings “and there may be criminal proceedings which do not necessarily involve a charge” of any offence. As an illustration of the former it points out that a charge made to the Judge of a Civil Court or to public officers of other kinds, in order to obtain sanction to prosecute may well be a charge “but is not the institution of criminal proceedings”. It further points out that an aggrieved person may seek to put the criminal law in motion either by making a charge or in the language of the Code giving information to the Police (Section 154 CrPC) “or he may” lay a charge, or as the Code calls it, a complaint (Section 190 CrPC) before a Magistrate”.

From Para 94,

94. Thus, as explained by this Court in Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain (supra), the essential ingredient of an offence under Section 211 IPC is to institute or cause, to be instituted any criminal proceeding against a person with intent to cause him injury or with similar intent to falsely charge any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge. Instituting or causing to institute false criminal proceedings assume false charge but false charge may be preferred even when no criminal proceedings result. Now, the expression “falsely charges” in this section, in our opinion, cannot mean giving false evidence as a prosecution witness against an accused person during the course of a criminal trial. “To falsely charge” must refer to the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation and not when seeking to prove the false charge by making deposition in support of the charge framed in that trial. The words “falsely charges” have to be, read along with the expression “institution of criminal proceeding”. Both these expressions, being susceptible of analogous meaning should be understood to have been used in their cognate sense. They get as it were their colour and content from each other. They seem to have been used in a technical sense as commonly understood in our criminal law. The false charge must, therefore, be made initially to a person in authority or to someone who is in a position to get the offender punished by appropriate proceedings. In other words, it must be’ embodied either in a complaint or in a report of a cognizable offence to the police officer or to an officer having authority over the person against whom the allegations are made. The statement in order to constitute the “charges” should be made with the intention and object of setting criminal law in motion.

Himanshu Kumar and Ors Vs State of Chhattisgarh and Ors on 14 Jul 2022

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/62d7ae969fca1923f0b04184

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/himanshu-kumar-and-others-versus-state-of-chhattisgarh-and-others

Index of Perjury Judgment is here.

Sumit Raj Shivhare Vs Anushree Gupta Shivhare on 05 Nov 2024

Posted on October 7, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court directed to enhance Maintenance amount at 5% annually.

From Para 21,

(21) So far as the question for grant of interim maintenance to respondent-wife is concerned, an affidavit along with salary slip filed by appellant-husband clearly shows that he is a Software Engineer working in a private Firm, namely, Dassault System Software Solution Private Limited in Pune and getting gross salary of approximately Rs.1,18,875/-per month including other liability. It is averred that respondent- wife is a B. Com, MBA in Retail Business Management and Marketing from MIT College, Pune. From the record, it is found that the learned Family has already awarded maintenance amount to the extent of Rs.25,000/- per month by allowing the application under Section 125 of CrPC to maintain herself and her minor son Aryaman. The same amount of Rs.25,000/- per month awarded by the Family Court is found to be just and proper and, therefore, there is no need to pass separate order for the same.
However, we may add here that the amount of Rs.25,000/- per month shall fetch enhancement every calendar year @ 5% to meet the ends of justice, till it attains finality or altered subsequently in future, in some appropriate proceedings at the instance of parties.

Sumit Raj Shivhare Vs Anushree Gupta Shivhare on 05 Nov 2024

Index of Maintenance Judgments under Sec 144 BNSS is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision

Baijnath and ors vs State of Madhya Pradesh on 18 Nov 2016

Neha Lal Vs Abhishek Kumar on 20 Jan 2026

Suninder Sandha Vs State of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 02 Dec 2025

Vijay Kumar and Ors Vs State of Rajasthan on 08 Jan 2026

Geddam Jhansi and Anr Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 07 Feb 2025

Rekha Sharad Ushir Vs Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd on 26 Mar 2025

Sangeeta Gera Vs Sanjeev Gera on 22 Sep 2025

Rita Raj Vs Pabitra Roy Chaudhuri on 17 Oct 2025

Himanshu Kumar and Ors Vs State of Chhattisgarh and Ors on 14 Jul 2022

Sumit Raj Shivhare Vs Anushree Gupta Shivhare on 05 Nov 2024