Himanshu Kumar and Ors Vs State of Chhattisgarh and Ors on 14 Jul 2022

Posted on October 18, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Supreme Court held as follows,

From Para 79,

79. It is true that an affidavit is ‘evidence’ within the meaning of Section 191 of the IPC and a person swearing to a false affidavit is guilty of perjury. But the matter does not rest here. Before initiating the proceedings for perjury, the court concerned has to consider whether it would be expedient in the interest of justice to sanction such prosecution. What the courts have to see at this stage is whether there is evidence in support of the allegations made by the Union of India (respondent herein) to justify the initiation of proceedings against the writ petitioners, more particularly, the writ petitioner no. 1 herein who had filed the affidavit on behalf of himself and the other writ petitioners and not whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant his conviction. However, this does not mean that the court should not prima facie be of the opinion that there are sufficient and reasonable grounds for setting the machinery of criminal law in motion against the accused. As noted above, the Court has further to see that the false statement was deliberate and conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable or likely. In other words, before sanctioning the prosecution there must be a prima facie case of a falsehood on a matter of substance and the court should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge. (see S.P. Kohli v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana, (1979) 1 SCC 212 : AIR 1978 SC 1753)

From Paras 86 and 87,

86. The conflict between the two decisions of this Court of equal strength, i.e. Pritish (supra) and Sharad Pawar (supra), was taken notice of by this Court in the case of the State of Punjab v. Jasbir Singh, (2020) 12 SCC 96. A Bench of two Judges of this Court ultimately thought fit to refer the question to a Larger Bench. The Court observed as under :
“14. In any event, given that the decision of the three-Judge Bench in Sharad Pawar (supra) did not assign any reason as to why it was departing from the opinion expressed by a Coordinate Bench in Pritish (supra) regarding the necessity of a preliminary inquiry under Section 340 of the CrPC, as also the observations made by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah (supra), we find it necessary that the present matter be placed before a larger Bench for its consideration, particularly to answer the following questions:
14.1 (i) Whether Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 mandates a preliminary inquiry and an opportunity of hearing to the would-be accused before a complaint is made under Section 195 of the Code by a Court ?
14.2 (ii) What is the scope and ambit of such preliminary inquiry ?”
87. It appears that the reference on the aforesaid two questions to a larger Bench is still pending.

From Paras 90 and 91,

90. The essential ingredients for invoking Section 211, I.P.C. are that the complaint must have falsely charged a person with having committed an offence. The complainant, at the time of giving the complaint must have known that there is no just or lawful ground for making a charge against the person. This complaint must have been given with an intention to cause injury to a person.
91. The CrPC does not define what constitutes the making of a “charge” of an offence or what amounts to the “institution of criminal proceedings”. But, in our opinion, a false “charge” in this Section must not be understood in any restricted or technical sense, but in its ordinary meaning, of a false accusation made to any authority bound by law to investigate it or to take any steps in regard to it, such as giving information of it to the superior authorities with a view to investigation or other proceedings, and the institution of criminal proceedings includes the setting of the criminal law in motion. The nature of both expressions, and the difference between them has been explained in lucid terms in the decision of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Karim Buksh v. Queen Emp, 17 C. 574. It points out that there may be a charge which does not amount to the institution of criminal proceedings “and there may be criminal proceedings which do not necessarily involve a charge” of any offence. As an illustration of the former it points out that a charge made to the Judge of a Civil Court or to public officers of other kinds, in order to obtain sanction to prosecute may well be a charge “but is not the institution of criminal proceedings”. It further points out that an aggrieved person may seek to put the criminal law in motion either by making a charge or in the language of the Code giving information to the Police (Section 154 CrPC) “or he may” lay a charge, or as the Code calls it, a complaint (Section 190 CrPC) before a Magistrate”.

From Para 94,

94. Thus, as explained by this Court in Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain (supra), the essential ingredient of an offence under Section 211 IPC is to institute or cause, to be instituted any criminal proceeding against a person with intent to cause him injury or with similar intent to falsely charge any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge. Instituting or causing to institute false criminal proceedings assume false charge but false charge may be preferred even when no criminal proceedings result. Now, the expression “falsely charges” in this section, in our opinion, cannot mean giving false evidence as a prosecution witness against an accused person during the course of a criminal trial. “To falsely charge” must refer to the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation and not when seeking to prove the false charge by making deposition in support of the charge framed in that trial. The words “falsely charges” have to be, read along with the expression “institution of criminal proceeding”. Both these expressions, being susceptible of analogous meaning should be understood to have been used in their cognate sense. They get as it were their colour and content from each other. They seem to have been used in a technical sense as commonly understood in our criminal law. The false charge must, therefore, be made initially to a person in authority or to someone who is in a position to get the offender punished by appropriate proceedings. In other words, it must be’ embodied either in a complaint or in a report of a cognizable offence to the police officer or to an officer having authority over the person against whom the allegations are made. The statement in order to constitute the “charges” should be made with the intention and object of setting criminal law in motion.

Himanshu Kumar and Ors Vs State of Chhattisgarh and Ors on 14 Jul 2022

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/62d7ae969fca1923f0b04184

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/himanshu-kumar-and-others-versus-state-of-chhattisgarh-and-others

Index of Perjury Judgment is here.

Sumit Raj Shivhare Vs Anushree Gupta Shivhare on 05 Nov 2024

Posted on October 7, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court directed to enhance Maintenance amount at 5% annually.

From Para 21,

(21) So far as the question for grant of interim maintenance to respondent-wife is concerned, an affidavit along with salary slip filed by appellant-husband clearly shows that he is a Software Engineer working in a private Firm, namely, Dassault System Software Solution Private Limited in Pune and getting gross salary of approximately Rs.1,18,875/-per month including other liability. It is averred that respondent- wife is a B. Com, MBA in Retail Business Management and Marketing from MIT College, Pune. From the record, it is found that the learned Family has already awarded maintenance amount to the extent of Rs.25,000/- per month by allowing the application under Section 125 of CrPC to maintain herself and her minor son Aryaman. The same amount of Rs.25,000/- per month awarded by the Family Court is found to be just and proper and, therefore, there is no need to pass separate order for the same.
However, we may add here that the amount of Rs.25,000/- per month shall fetch enhancement every calendar year @ 5% to meet the ends of justice, till it attains finality or altered subsequently in future, in some appropriate proceedings at the instance of parties.

Sumit Raj Shivhare Vs Anushree Gupta Shivhare on 05 Nov 2024

Index of Maintenance Judgments under Sec 144 BNSS is here.

Rina Kumari Vs Dinesh Kumar Mahto and Anr on 10 Jan 2025

Posted on October 5, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held that mere passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights at the husband’s behest and non-compliance therewith by the wife would not, by itself, be sufficient to attract the disqualification under Section 125(4) Cr.P.C.

Solution is to use same evidence in maintenance case also, that was used in RCR proceedings and win the maintenance case. Simple…
The judiciary (could!) just delayed the inevitable. That’s all.

From Paras 29 and 30,

29. Thus, the preponderance of judicial thought weighs in favour of upholding the wife’s right to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and the mere passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights at the husband’s behest and non-compliance therewith by the wife would not, by itself, be sufficient to attract the disqualification under Section 125(4) Cr.P.C. It would depend on the facts of the individual case and it would have to be decided, on the strength of the material and evidence available, whether the wife still had valid and sufficient reason to refuse to live with her husband, despite such a decree. There can be no hard and fast rule in this regard and it must invariably depend on the distinctive facts and circumstances obtaining in each particular case. In any event, a decree for restitution of conjugal rights secured by a husband coupled with non-compliance therewith by the wife would not be determinative straightaway either of her right to maintenance or the applicability of the disqualification under Section 125(4) Cr.P.C.
30. Another contention that was urged before us is that the findings in the judgment for restitution of conjugal rights by the Family Court, being a Civil Court, would be binding on the Court seized of the petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C, as they are to be treated as criminal proceedings. This specious argument needs mention only to be rejected outright. No doubt, in Shanti Kumar Panda vs. Shakuntala Devi20, this Court held that a decision by a Criminal Court would not bind the Civil Court while a decision by the Civil Court would bind the Criminal Court. However, maintenance proceedings are essentially civil in nature and the reason for inclusion of the provisions dealing therewith in the Code of Criminal Procedure was clarified by the Law Commission of India in September, 1969. Significantly, as long back as in the year 1963, in Mst. Jagir Kaur and another vs. Jaswant Singh21, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court held that proceedings under Section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the precursor to Section 125 Cr.P.C., are in the nature of civil proceedings; the remedy, being a summary one; and the person seeking that remedy, ordinarily being a helpless person. Therefore, even if non-compliance with an order for payment of maintenance entails penal consequences, as may other decrees of a Civil Court, such proceedings would not qualify as or become criminal proceedings. Nomenclature of maintenance proceedings initiated under the Code of Criminal Procedure, as those provisions find place therein, cannot be held to be conclusive as to the nature of such proceedings.

Rina Kumari Vs Dinesh Kumar Mahto and Anr on 10 Jan 2025

Index of HMA judgments is here. Index of Maintenance Judgments is here.

Rinku Baheti Vs Sandesh Sharda on 19 Dec 2024

Posted on October 4, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court did MCD settlement at 12 Crore rupees.

From Paras 14.4, 14.5 and 14.7,

14.4 In the instant case as well, the petitioner-wife has stated that the respondent-husband is a man of means with a net-worth of Rs.5,000 crores with multiple businesses and properties in USA and in India and that he had paid his first wife at least Rs.500 crores upon separation, excluding a house in Virginia, USA. Thus, she claims permanent alimony commensurate to the status of the respondent-husband and on the same principles as was paid to the first wife of the respondent. The respondent-husband on the other hand is willing to pay a reasonable amount to cover the difference in the income and expenditure of the petitioner-wife, which he feels should be in the range of Rs.20 to 40 lakhs as a one-time lump sum payment. Thus, there is a clear and significant divergence or “mismatch” between the offer and the desire.
14.5 We have serious reservations with the tendency of parties seeking maintenance or alimony as an equalisation of wealth with the other party. It is often seen that parties in their application for maintenance or alimony highlight the assets, status and income of their spouse, and then ask for an amount that can equal their wealth to that of the spouse. However, there is an inconsistency in this practice, because the demands of equalisation are made only in cases where the spouse is a person of means or is doing well for himself. But such demands are conspicuously absent in cases where the wealth of the spouse has decreased since the time of separation. There cannot be two different approaches to seeking and granting maintenance or alimony, depending on the status and income of the spouse. The law of maintenance is aimed at empowering the destitute and achieving social justice and dignity of the individual. The husband is under a legal obligation to sufficiently provide for his wife. As per settled law, the wife is entitled to be maintained as far as possible in a manner that is similar to what she was accustomed to in her matrimonial home while the parties were together. But once the parties have separated, it cannot be expected of the husband to maintain her as per his present status all his life. If the husband has moved ahead and is fortunately doing better in life post his separation, then to ask him to always maintain the status of the wife as per his own changing status would be putting a burden on his own personal progress. We wonder, would the wife be willing to seek an equalisation of wealth with the husband if due to some unfortunate events post-separation, he has been rendered a pauper?
14.7 But the petitioner-wife in the instant case has sought equalisation of status not just with the respondent-husband but also with the ex-wife of the respondent. In our opinion, this cannot be an acceptable approach. The fixation of alimony depends on various factors and there cannot be any straight-jacket formula for the same. Thus, the petitioner cannot simply claim an amount equal to what the ex-wife of the respondent had received or on the basis of the income of the respondent. The Court has to not just consider the income of the respondent-husband here, but also bear in mind other factors such as the income of the petitioner-wife, her reasonable needs, her residential rights, and other similar factors. Thus, her entitlement to maintenance has to be decided based on the factors applicable to her and not depend on what the respondent had paid to his ex-wife or solely on his income.

Rinku Baheti Vs Sandesh Sharda on 19 Dec 2024

Index of Maintenance and Alimony judgments is here.

Parvin Kumar Jain Vs Anju Jain on 10 Dec 2024

Posted on October 1, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court did settlement between parties at around 6 Crore rupees, but at least acknowledged and reproduced Delhi High Court observations. Thanks

From Paras 14 and 15,

14. In this case, the High Court observed that the appellant’s income, primarily from employment and investments, demonstrated his ability to provide for the wife and child’s maintenance adequately. The evidence revealed that the appellant earned over ₹4,00,000 (Rupees four lakhs only) per month
between 2007 and 2016. Although he claimed higher living expenses due to his residence in Mauritius, the High Court found his arguments to be unsubstantiated, as his financial resources allowed him to meet maintenance obligations without undue hardship. The High Court further noted several instances of the appellant’s deliberate attempts to mislead the judicial process. He withheld critical financial documents and selectively disclosed information to conceal the full extent of his wealth. The inquiry into the statutory forms of the appellant revealed that he had investments in mutual funds valued at ₹5.10 crores as early as 2009-2010, significant sums deposited in bank accounts, and other financial transactions that were not initially disclosed.
15. The High Court also identified false representations by the appellant regarding his property and income. He denied ownership of a property located at F-146, Richmond Park, Gurgaon, despite evidence of its ownership and rental income accruing to him. Additionally, the appellant misrepresented his association with Prasham Consultants LLP, wherein he continued to receive financial benefits until his father replaced him in 2016. These findings demonstrated a pattern of deliberate suppression of material facts and assets by the appellant, aimed at minimizing his maintenance liability. Such conduct warranted judicial intervention to ensure justice and provide adequate financial support to the wife and child, reflecting principles of fairness, transparency, and equity. Consequently, the High Court directed the appellant to pay interim maintenance that adequately addressed the needs of the wife and child, proportionate to his financial capacity and consistent with the obligations of a responsible spouse and parent.

From Paras 29

29. The main issue between the parties all these years, since separation, is the quantum of maintenance to be paid by the appellant to the respondent. The issue of maintenance pendente lite is now infructuous with the dissolution of marriage, but the financial interest of the wife still needs to be protected through grant of permanent alimony. The learned senior counsels for the parties have made submissions at length regarding the financial condition of both the parties. In order to establish the correct financial position of both the parties, they have filed their respective affidavits of income and assets as ordered by this Court.

From Para 34,

34. In the present case, it is a matter of record and an admitted fact that the respondent is unemployed while the appellant is a well accomplished banker who has worked in multiple senior roles at various banks over the years. We have perused the records of finances produced before us. Even though the records of the DEMAT accounts and the employment letters produced by the appellant are almost ten years ago or earlier, his financial position can be suitably ascertained from them.

Parvin Kumar Jain Vs Anju Jain on 10 Dec 2024

Citations: [2024 INSC 961], [2024 LiveLaw (SC) 969]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/102090299/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6759168762941119016e16ef

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/permanent-alimony-shouldnt-penalize-husband-but-should-ensure-decent-living-for-wife-supreme-court-lists-out-factors-277959

Parvin Kumar Jain vs Anju Jain Divorce Case

https://testbook.com/recent-judgements/parvin-kumar-jain-vs-anju-jain

https://lawbeat.in/supreme-court-judgments/marriage-be-dissolved-if-succumbed-due-long-standing-differences-supreme-court

PARVIN KUMAR JAIN vs. ANJU JAIN

https://www.lawtext.in/judgement.php?bid=1281

Supreme Court Upholds Financial Security in Marriage Breakdown: A Case Study

Alimony Decoded: 8 Critical Guidelines to Ensure Fair Settlements in Divorce Cases

The impugned Order from the Delhi High Court is below. Few relevant Paras from the said Order follow.

41. The Husband disputes the aforesaid finding on concealment. On behalf of the Husband, it has been strenuously urged that the Family Court though takes note of the affidavit dated 11thMay, 2018 filed by the Husband however, it does not deal with the same. We have carefully gone through the said affidavit. In our view, the said affidavit was yet another attempt on the part of the Husband to mislead the Family Court and conceal particulars of his income as well as assets.
47. On behalf of the Husband, it has been vehemently argued that it is the Wife who has filed false affidavits before this Court to the effect that she lives in a rented house and is paying rent on a regular basis. It is further alleged that the Wife has filed a forged Rent Agreement to claim that she is paying monthly rent to one Ms Sudesh Bansal. It is submitted that the Wife has failed to disclose that the house in which she lives has been transferred by Ms Sudesh Bansal in favour of the Wife’s mother vide registered General Power of Attorney and Agreement to Sell dated 25th June, 2009. On the basis of the aforesaid averments, an application has been filed by the Husband under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C before the Family Court, which is yet to be decided.
49. In our view, the explanation offered by the Wife is plausible. A perusal of the Rent Agreement dated 13th December, 2011 shows that the Wife was paying rent of Rs.11,000/- per month. It is not the case of the Husband that the Wife owns the said property or that she has paid any amount towards the purchase of the said property. There is nothing placed on record which would have us believe that what was apparent was not real. The Husband, in our opinion, is seeking to muddy the waters. The Husband’s concealments have been alluded to above. The Husband’s contentions on this count are, therefore, rejected. In our opinion, this cannot be a ground to deny the lawful maintenance to the Wife.
50. It must be emphasized that the discussion above leaves no doubt in our minds that the Husband has grossly concealed the real income as well as his movable and immovable assets in order to avoid paying the rightful amount of maintenance to the wife. The Family Court has correctly returned findings with regard to the earnings of the husband as well as attempts on the part of the Husband to conceal his real income.

Parvin Kumar Jain Vs Anju Jain on 01 Aug 2024

Index of Maintenance and Alimony cases under HMA is here.

Arshad Neyaz Khan Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 24 Sep 2025

Posted on September 25, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that IPC 420 and IPC 406 offences cannot co-exist simultaneously in the same set of facts as they are antithetical to each other.

From Para 21,

21. Furthermore, it is pertinent to mention that if it is the case of the complainant/respondent No.2 that the offence of criminal breach of trust as defined under Section 405 IPC, punishable under Section 406 IPC, is committed by the accused, then in the same breath it cannot be said that the accused has also committed the offence of cheating as defined in Section 415, punishable under Section 420 IPC. This Court in Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 10 SCC 690 observed that there is a distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating. For cheating, criminal intention is necessary at the time of making false or misleading representation i.e. since inception. In criminal breach of trust, mere proof of entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in case of criminal breach of trust, the offender is lawfully entrusted with the property, and he dishonestly misappropriates the same. Whereas, in case of cheating, the offender fraudulently or dishonestly induces a person by deceiving him to deliver a property. In such a situation, both offences cannot co-exist simultaneously. Consequently, the complaint cannot contain both the offences that are independent and distinct. The said offences cannot co-exist simultaneously in the same set of facts as they are antithetical to each other.

Arshad Neyaz Khan Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 24 Sep 2025

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Anup Disalva and Anr Vs Union of India on 09 Dec 2022

Posted on September 25, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division Bench of Kerala High Court held as follows,

From Para 4,

4. A Division Bench of this Court in Saumya Ann Thomas v. The Union of India and others [MANU/KE/0255/2010] held that the stipulation of a period of two years as the minimum mandatory period under Section 10A is arbitrary and oppressive and the period of two years has to be read as one year. This was taking note of the one year period stipulated in Section 28(1) of the Special Marriage Act, Section 13B(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act and Section 32B(1) of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act.

From Paras 6-7,

6. Divorce by mutual consent reflects the will of the parties to separate and get rid of the marriage. The legislature has put safeguards against impulsive decisions that may permeate such a decision by stipulating a gestation period before presenting a petition for divorce on mutual consent. This period will insulate possible peril that may ensue for the parties as a follow-up of the decision for mutual separation. In the Indian social context, though marriages are solemnized by two individuals, it is seen more as a union for laying the foundation for a strong family and society. Many laws have been made and many rights have been created based on familial relationships. The legislature, therefore, decided that a minimum period of separation must precede before presentation of a petition for divorce on the ground of mutual consent.
7. The problem presented in this case is when the waiting period itself would cause hardship to the parties. Can the law command parties to sit at the
fence and suffer the agony? The legislature in its wisdom contemplated possible repercussions of such fixation of minimum period that would result in
hardships to spouses and accordingly allowed the Courts to entertain a petition within the minimum period in exceptional cases. This is how Section
29 of the Special Marriage Act and Section 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, enabled the Courts to entertain the petition to be presented before one year had lapsed from the date of marriage. There is no corresponding provision in the Divorce Act for the Court to permit the dissolution of marriage by mutual consent until the mandatory period of one year has lapsed from the date of separation. The constitutional validity of the mandatory period is, therefore, questioned in the writ petition filed by the parties. This Court in Saumya’s case (supra) had no occasion to advert to the validity of the minimum mandatory period by which spouses are denied the remedy of approaching the Court before the lapse of one year from the date of marriage or from the date of separation.
The above reasoning of the Court would clearly show that the decision rendered and the conclusion arrived at was on a premise that the mandatory
minimum residence period of two years for Christians is discriminatory as there is no such prescription of two years under the Hindu Marriage Act and the Special Marriage Act etc. This Court, however, considers the question in these cases on a different ground; whether in the absence of any provisions allowing the parties to a marriage to move the Court before the lapse of one year from the date of marriage or the date of separation. Can the provisions stand the test of constitutional scrutiny? The plea of arbitrariness would arise in this context of denial of judicial remedy to approach the Court before the lapse of one year from the date of marriage or separation.

From Para 11,

11. We hold that the fixation of the minimum period of separation of one year as stipulated under Section 10A is violative of the fundamental right and accordingly, strike it down.

Anup Disalva and Anr Vs Union of India on 09 Dec 2022

Index of Divorce Judgments is here.

Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani Vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr on 02 Sep 2025

Posted on September 10, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held as follows in a false rape case,

From Para 13,

13. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, we are of the view that the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate committed an error in passing the summoning order. The High Court too overlooked the relevant aspects of the matter while rejecting the Section 482 application. It is very apparent on a plain reading of the complaint, more particularly, considering the nature of the allegations that the same doesn’t inspire any confidence. There is no good explanation offered, why it took four years for the respondent no.2 to file a complaint.

From Para 20,

20. The following steps should ordinarily determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:-
(i)Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the materials is of sterling and impeccable quality?
(ii) Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false.
(iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant?
(iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?
If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal – proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused. [(See: Rajiv Thapar & Ors. v. Madan Lal Kapoor (Criminal Appeal No. 174 of 2013)]

Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani Vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr on 02 Sep 2025

Citations: [2025 LiveLaw (SC) 880]

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/sc-judgments/2025-livelaw-sc-880-pradeep-kumar-kesarwani-versus-the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-anr-303321

https://www.barandbench.com/news/litigation/supreme-court-quashes-false-rape-case-lays-down-four-step-test-to-quash-frivolous-criminal-complaints

https://lawbeat.in/supreme-court-judgments/sc-quashes-rape-complaint-filed-after-4-years-explains-when-promise-of-marriage-is-not-rape-1518116

https://www.theedulaw.in/content/judgements/235/Court-laid-down-a-structured-four-step-test-to-evaluate-applications-for-quashing-criminal-proceedings.-

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/pages/blog/supreme-court-unveils-four-step-test-to-quash-frivolous-criminal-cases/

SUPREME COURT FOUR STEP TEST FOR QUASHING PETITIONS CLARIFIES SECTION 482 CrPC

PRADEEP KUMAR KESARWANI VERSUS THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH (Supreme Court)

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Addl DG Adjudication DRI Vs Suresh Kumar and Co Impex Pvt Ltd and Ors on 20 Aug 2025

Posted on September 10, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held as follows,

From Para 40-43,

40. Applying the two maxims referred to above, this Court proceeded to take the view that though Section 65B4 is mandatory, yet it would all depend on the facts of each case, how the same could be said to have been duly complied with.
41. In the facts of the said case, this Court said that the respondents had done everything possible to obtain the necessary certificate which was to be given by a third party over whom the respondents therein had no control and, in such circumstances, must be relieved of the mandatory obligation contained in the said subsection.
42. We have already reproduced paras 51 and 52 respectively of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar (supra) above.
43. Keeping the aforesaid in mind, we are of the view and, more particularly, considering the Record of Proceedings duly signed by the respondents, including the various statements of the respondents recorded under Section 108 of the Act, 1962, that there was due compliance of Section 138C(4) of the Act, 1962. When we say due compliance, the same should not mean that a particular certificate stricto senso in accordance with Section 138C(4) must necessarily be on record. The various documents on record in the form of record of proceedings and the statements recorded under Section 108 of the Act, 1962 could be said to be due compliance of Section 138C(4)of the Act, 1962.

From Para 46,

46. At this stage, we must also look into the observations made by this Court in the case of “Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar vs. State of Karnataka and Another,” reported in 2025 SSC online SC 1426 relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the revenue. We quote:-
“A certificate not given in the prescribed format per se will not make it invalid, especially when the authenticity of these marked documents is not in dispute.”

Addl DG DRI Vs Suresh Kumar and Co Impex Pvt Ltd and Ors on 20 Aug 2025

Citations: [2025 INSC 1050]

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/sc-judgments/2025-livelaw-sc-860-additional-director-general-adjudication-directorate-of-revenue-intelligence-v-suresh-kumar-and-co-impex-pvt-ltd-ors-302591

https://www.supremecourtcases.com/additional-director-general-adjudication-directorate-of-revenue-intelligence-v-suresh-kumar-and-co-impex-pvt-ltd-and-others/

Kundan Singh Vs State of (NCT) of Delhi on 24 Nov 2015

Posted on August 30, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Para 37,

37. Sub-clause (b) to sub-section (5) is rather ambiguously uses the expression “any official” without explaining what is meant by the said term. However, when we read sub-section (4) to Section 65B, the meaning to be given to the expression “any official” emerges. Subclause (b) applies when information is supplied to “any official” in the course of activities carried on by him, i.e., in the course of “official” activities with a view that the said information shall be stored and processed for the purpose of the activities carried on by that officer or official. It is also elucidated that the information could be beyond or otherwise in the course of the said activities. Even in such cases the information is treated as supplied in the course of the activities of the official. We clarify that the word “official”, as used in clause (b) of sub-section (5) of Section 65B, is not intended to mean or be restricted to a person holding an office or employed in public capacity. It connotes, as exemplified by the use of the same expression (albeit in its adjective form) in sub-section (4), a person primarily responsible for the management or the use, upkeep or operations of such device. It would, thus, cover a computer device containing electronic records in the hands or control of a private individual or entity.

Kundan Singh Vs State of (NCT) of Delhi on 24 Nov 2015

Citations: [2015:DHC:9600-DB], [(2015) 11 DEL CK 0089], [2015 SCC Online Del 13647], [MANU/DE/3674/2015]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/10902800/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5728e3ede56109277ee476fe

https://vlex.in/vid/kundan-singh-vs-the-654461357

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/Judgement/Search/AdvancedV2?docid=998850

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision

Himanshu Kumar and Ors Vs State of Chhattisgarh and Ors on 14 Jul 2022

Sumit Raj Shivhare Vs Anushree Gupta Shivhare on 05 Nov 2024

Rina Kumari Vs Dinesh Kumar Mahto and Anr on 10 Jan 2025

Rinku Baheti Vs Sandesh Sharda on 19 Dec 2024

Parvin Kumar Jain Vs Anju Jain on 10 Dec 2024

Arshad Neyaz Khan Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 24 Sep 2025

Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani Vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr on 02 Sep 2025

Addl DG Adjudication DRI Vs Suresh Kumar and Co Impex Pvt Ltd and Ors on 20 Aug 2025

Kundan Singh Vs State of (NCT) of Delhi on 24 Nov 2015