MS. Bhaskar Industries Ltd Vs MS. Bhiwani Denim and Apparels Ltd and Ors on 27 August 2001

Posted on March 7, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held the scope of 205 CrPC in this judgment as,

Second is that it is difficult, in the absence of other materials, to decide positively whether the order dated 28.4.2000 is an interlocutory order only.
The interdict contained in Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the Code) is that the powers of revision shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order. Whether an order is interlocutory or not, cannot be decided by merely looking at the order or merely because the order was passed at the interlocutory stage. The safe test laid down by this Court through a series of decisions is this: If the contention of the petitioner who moves the superior court in revision, as against the order under challenge is upheld, would the criminal proceedings as a whole culminate? If it would,then the order is not interlocutory in spite of the fact that it was passed during any interlocutory stage.

And

Section 251 is the commencing provision in Chapter XX of the Code which deals with trial of summons cases by magistrates. It enjoins on the court to ask the accused whether he pleads guilty when the accused appears or is brought before the magistrate. The appearance envisaged therein can either be by personal attendance of the accused or through his advocate. This can be understood from Section 205(1) of the Code which says that whenever a magistrate issues a summons, he may, if he sees reason so to do, dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit him to appear by his pleader.
17. Thus, in appropriate cases the magistrate can allow an accused to make even the first appearance through a counsel. The magistrate is empowered to record the plea of the accused even when his counsel makes such plea on behalf of the accused in a case where the personal appearance of the accused is dispensed with. Section 317 of the Code has to be viewed in the above perspective as it empowers the court to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused (provided he is represented by a counsel in that case) even for proceeding with the further steps in the case. However, one precaution which the court should take in such a situation is that the said benefit need be granted only to an accused who gives an undertaking to the satisfaction of the court that he would not dispute his identity as the particular accused in the case, and that a counsel on his behalf would be present in court and that he has no objection in taking evidence in his absence. This precaution is necessary for the further progress of the proceedings including examination of the witnesses.

“18. A question could legitimately be asked – what might happen if the counsel engaged by the accused (whose personal appearance is dispensed with) does not appear or that the counsel does not co-operate in proceeding with the case? We may point out that the legislature has taken care for such eventualities. Section 205(2) says that the magistrate can in his discretion direct the personal attendance of the accused at any stage of the proceedings. The last limb of Section 317(1) confers a discretion on the magistrate to direct the personal attendance of the accused at any subsequent stage of the proceedings. He can even resort to other steps for enforcing such attendance.
“19. The position, therefore, bogs down to this: It is within the powers of a magistrate and in his judicial discretion to dispense with the personal appearance of an accused either throughout or at any particular stage of such proceedings in a summons case, if the magistrate finds that insistence of his personal presence would itself inflict enormous suffering or tribulations to him, and the comparative advantage would be less. Such discretion need be exercised only in rare instances where due to the far distance at which the accused resides or carries on business or on account of any physical or other good reasons the magistrate feels that dispensing with the personal attendance of the accused would only be in the interests of justice. However, the magistrate who grants such benefit to the accused must take the precautions enumerated above, as a matter of course. We may reiterate that when an accused makes an application to a magistrate through his duly authorised counsel praying for affording the benefit of his personal presence being dispensed with the magistrate can consider all aspects and pass appropriate orders thereon before proceeding further.”

Ms Bhaskar Industries Ltd Vs Ms Bhiwani Denim and Apparels Ltd and Ors on 27 August 2001

Citations: [2001 INSC 399], [2001 KHC 0 714], [2001 AIR SC 3625], [2001 UC 2 370], [2001 AD SC 6 612], [2001 SCC 6 339], [2001 AWC SC 4 2981], [2001 CRI LJ 4250], [2001 JIC 2 685], [2001 MPLJ 3 664], [2001 SUPREME 6 339], [2001 AIR SC 0 3413], [2001 JCC 2 127], [2001 ACR SC 3 2297], [2001 KERLT 3 307], [2001 JT SC 7 127], [2001 SCC 7 401], [2001 CRIMES SC 4 199], [2002 PLJR 4 95], [2002 MAHLJ 1 81], [2002 BOMCR CRI SC 190], [2002 BOMCR SC 2 265], [2002 ALT CRI 1 13], [2001 RCR CRI 4 137], [2003 JLJ SC 1 56], [2001 SCALE 5 503], [2001 CRLJ 0 4250], [2001 S SCR 2 219], [2001 SCC CR 0 1254], [2001 RCR CRIMINAL 4 137], [2001 DCR SC 602], [2001 OLR 2 613], [2002 LJ 1 161], [2001 CCR 0 208], [2001 SRJ 8 415], [2001 CRLR SC 0 481], [2001 SCC CRI 0 1254], [2001 CALCRILR 0 481], [2001 SLT 6 120], [2001 CCR 3 208], [2001 ALLMR CRI 0 1961], [2001 SCJ 3 176], [2002 BCR 2 265], [2002 MHLJ SC 1 81], [2001 ALD CRI 2 530], [2002 BCR CRI 0 190]

Puneet Dalmia Vs CBI Hyderabad on 16 December 2019

Posted on March 7, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court relying on Bhaskar Industries and Rameshwar Yadav, held as follows,

From Para 7,

7. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the present appeal is allowed. The impugned Judgment and order passed by the High Court as well as that of the learned Trial Court rejecting the application submitted by the appellant under Section 205 Cr.P.C. are hereby quashed and set aside and consequently the application submitted by the appellant to dispense with his appearance before the learned Trial Court on all dates of adjournments and permitting his counsel Sri Bharadwaj Reddy to appear on his behalf is here by allowed on the following conditions:
(1) That the appellant shall give an undertaking to the learned Trial Court that he would not dispute his identity in the case and that Sri Bharadwaj Reddy advocate who is permitted to represent the appellant, would appear before the learned Trial Court on his behalf on each and every date of hearing and that he shall not object recording of the evidence in his absence and that no adjournment shall be asked for on behalf of the appellant and/or his advocate Sri Bharadwaj Reddy;
(2) That the appellant shall appear before the learned Trial Court for the purpose of framing of the charges and also on other hearing dates whenever the learned Trial Curt insists for his appearance;
(3) If there is any failure on the part of the advocate Sri Bharadwaj Reddy, who is to represent the appellant, either to appear before the learned Trial Court on each adjournment and/or any adjournment is sought on behalf of the appellant and/or if the learned Trial Court is of the opinion that the appellant and/or his advocate is trying to delay the trial, in that case, it would be open for the learned Trial Court to exercise its powers under Section 205 (2) Cr.P.C. and direct the appearance of the appellant on each and every date of adjournment.

Puneet Dalmia Vs CBI Hyderabad on 16 December 2019

Citations: [2019 SCC ONLINE SC 1622], [2019 INSC 1379]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/15759089/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5dfbc5f53321bc3818f97bd7

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/puneet-dalmia-versus-central-bureau-of-investigation-hyderabad

Index is here.

Anil Rai Vs State of Bihar on 6 August 2001

Posted on February 24, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Wonderful judgment from Supreme Court, which held that Repeated adjournment of matters ‘for orders‘ after arguments are heard is impermissible. Also passed the following Guidelines.

20. Under the prevalent circumstances in some of the High Courts, I feel it appropriate to provide some guidelines regarding the pronouncement of judgments which, I am sure, shall be followed by all concerned, being the mandate of this Court. Such guidelines, as for present, are as under:
(i) The Chief Justices of the High Courts may issue appropriate directions to the Registry that in case where the judgment is reserved and is pronounced later, a column be added in the judgment where, on the first page, after the cause-title, date of reserving the judgment and date of pronouncing it be separately mentioned by the court officer concerned.
(ii) That Chief Justice of the High Courts, on their administrative side, should direct the Court Officers/ Readers of the various Benches in the High Courts to furnish every month the list of cases in the matters where the judgments reserved are not pronounced within the period of that months.
(iii) On noticing that after conclusion of the arguments the judgment is not pronounced within a period of two months, the concerned Chief Justice shall draw the attention of the Bench concerned to the pending matter. The Chief Justice may also see the desirability of circulating the statement of such cases in which the judgments have not been pronounced within a period of six weeks from the date of conclusion of the arguments amongst the Judges of the High Court for their information. Such communication be conveyed as confidential and in a sealed cover.
(iv) Where a judgment is not pronounced within three months, from the date of reserving it, any of the parties in the case is permitted to file an application in the High Court with prayer for early judgment. Such application, as and when filed, shall be listed before the Bench concerned within two days excluding the intervening holidays.
(v) If the judgment, for any reason, is not pronounced within a period of six months, any of the parties of the said lis shall be entitled to move an application before the Chief Justice of the High Court with a prayer to withdraw the said case and to make it over to any other Bench for fresh arguments. It is open to the Chief Justice to grant the said prayer or to pass any other order as deems fit in the circumstances.
21. We hope and trust that the above guidelines shall be strictly followed and implemented, considering them as self-imposed restraints.

Indiankanoon version:

Anil Rai Vs State of Bihar on 6 August 2001

Casemine version:

Anil Rai v. State of Bihar on 6 August 2001

Citations: [2002 BOMCR SC 3 360], [2009 ELT SC 233 13], [2001 AIR SC 3173], [2001 SCC 7 318], [2001 SCC CRI 1009], [2001 ALD CRI 2 446], [2001 ACR SC 3 2046], [2001 RCR CRIMINAL 3 722], [2001 JT SC 6 515], [2001 SCALE 5 41], [2001 BLJR 3 1777], [2001 SUPP SCR 1 298]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1517737/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad95e4b0149711411c30

S Nagalingam Vs Sivagami on 31 August 2001

Posted on January 24, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Unless a valid marriage is proved, a second marriage stands invalid and no offence under section 494 IPC attracts.

S Nagalingam Vs Sivagami on 31 August 2001

Citations: [2001 AIR SC 3576], [2001 SCALE 6 42], [2001 JT 7 219], [2001 AIR SC 3372], [2001 SCC 7 487], [2001 SUPREME 6 772], [2001 SCC CRI 1273], [2001 OLR 2 648], [2001 ALD CRI 2 634], [2001 AWC SC 4 2998], [2001 ACR SC 3 2486], [2001 DMC SC 2 544], [2002 ALT CRI 1 69]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1386675/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad9ce4b0149711411daa

Swapnanjali Sandeep Patil Vs Sandeep Ananda Patil on 06 March 2019

Posted on January 23, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

The husband did a ‘Marriage deed’ (whatever that means) separation with his first wife and married the second woman.

13.1 At the outset it is required to be noted that the appellant filed the marriage petition for a declaration to declare her marriage with the respondent as null and void on the ground that, at the time of their marriage, the first marriage of the respondent with his first wife was subsisting; that the respondent committed a fraud and suppressed the material fact of his first marriage, and in fact, in the registration form he stated himself to be a bachelor.

Swapnanjali Sandeep Patil Vs Sandeep Ananda Patil on 06 March 2019

Citations: [(2019) SCC Online SC 329]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/163532688/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5c8148999eff4345648def96

Priyanka Srivastava and Anr Vs State of UP and Ors on 19 March, 2015

Posted on December 18, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice Dipak Misra states that Magistrate has to be alive about the allegation brought to him via Non-cognizable case by Police.

From Paras 26 and 27,

26. At this stage it is seemly to state that power under Section 156(3) warrants application of judicial mind. A court of law is involved. It is not the police taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. A principled and really grieved citizen with clean hands must have free access to invoke the said power. It protects the citizens but when pervert litigations takes this route to harass their fellows citizens, efforts are to be made to scuttle and curb the same.
27. In our considered opinion, a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations. This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible. We are compelled to say so as such kind of applications are being filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain persons. That apart, it becomes more disturbing and alarming when one tries to pick up people who are passing orders under a statutory provision which can be challenged under the framework of said Act or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But it cannot be done to take undue advantage in a criminal court as if somebody is determined to settle the scores. We have already indicated that there has to be prior applications under Section 154(1) and 154(3) while filing a petition under Section 156(3). Both the aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application and necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that an the application under Section 156(3) be supported by an affidavit so that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made. It is because once an affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). That apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of allegations of the case. We are compelled to say so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari are being filed. That apart, the learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR.

From Para 30,

30. In the present case, we are obligated to say that learned Magistrate should have kept himself alive to the aforesaid provision before venturing into directing registration of the FIR under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. It is because the Parliament in its wisdom has made such a provision to protect the secured creditors or any of its officers, and needles to emphasize, the legislative mandate, has to be kept in mind.

Priyanka Srivastava and Anr Vs State of UP and Ors on 19 March, 2015

Citations: [AIR 2015 SC 1758], [2015 (3) RLW 2404 (SC)], [2015(3) PLJR 78(SC)], [2015 SCL SC 130 472], [2015 AIOL 3152], [2015 CRIMES SC 2 179], [2015 CRIMES SC 2 209], [2015 CRLJ SC 2396], [2015 JCC SC 2 974], [2015 JT 5 203], [2015 SCALE 4 120], [2015 SCC 6 287], [2015 SLT 3 431], [2015 SUPREME 3 152], [2015 SCC ONLINE SC 272], [2015 CTC 3 103], [2015 KLJ 2 491], [2015 KERLT 2 451], [2015 SCC CRI 4 153], [2015 SCC CIV 3 294]

Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/163299097/

Casemine link: https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5790b242e561097e45a4e25a

The Index for Defamation Judgments is here. Index of Judgments under Sec 156(3) Cr.P.C. are here.

A.Subash Babu Vs State of A.P. and Anr on 21 Jul 2011

Posted on December 14, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

Landmark Judgment to screw the perpetrators of 494 and 495 IPC Bigamy offences. This is specifically helpful to those who have cases in the State of Andhra Pradesh where these two crimes are made Cognizable and Non-bailable, due to a State amendment in 1992 whereas these are Non-cognizable and Bailable in the rest of the States in India.

13. In this regard, it would be, relevant to notice the provisions of Article 246 of the Constitution. Article 246 deals with subject matter of laws made by the Parliament and by the legislatures of State. Clause (1) of Article 246 inter alia provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Clauses (2) and (3) of Article 246, the Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the maters enumerated in List 1 in the Seventh Schedule. Sub-Clause 2 of the said Article provides that notwithstanding anything in Clause (3), Parliament and subject to Clause (1), the legislature of any State also have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List 3 in the Seventh Schedule, whereas, Clause (3) of Article 246 amongst other things provides that subject to Clauses (1) and (2), the legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List 2 in the Seventh Schedule. Entry 2 in List 3 i.e. Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule mentions “Criminal Procedure, including in matters included in the Code of “Criminal procedure, at the commencement of this Constitution”. Thus there is no manner of doubt that Parliament and subject to Clause (1), the legislature of any State also has power to make laws with respect to Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 2(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 defines the phrase “Cognizable Offence” to mean an offence for which and “Cognizable Case” means a case in which, a Police Officer may, in accordance with the First Schedule or under any other law for the time being in force arrest without warrant. Part I of the First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 relating to offences under the Indian Penal Code inter alia mentions that Section 494 and 495 are non-cognizable. Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code relates to information in cognizable cases and provides inter alia that every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an Officer in charge of a Police Station, shall be reduced to writing by him and be read over to the informant. Section 156 of the Code provides that any Officer in charge of a Police Station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over a local area within the limits of such station would have power to enquire into or try under provisions of Chapter XIII of Criminal Procedure Code. As Sections 494 and 495 are made non-cognizable, a Police Officer would not have power to investigate those cases without the order of a Magistrate, having a power to try such cases or commit such cases for trial as provided under Section 155(2) of the Code.
However, this Court finds that the Legislative Assembly of the State of Andhra Pradesh enacted the Code of Criminal Procedure (Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment) Act, 1992. By the said Amending Act, the First Schedule to Central Act 2 of 1974 i.e. the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 came to be amended and against the entries relating to Section 494 in column 4 for the word “Ditto”, the word “Cognizable” and in column 5 for the word “Bailable” the word “Non-bailable” were substituted. Similarly, against the entries relating to Section 495 in column 4, for the word “Ditto” the word “Cognizable” and in column 5 for the word “Ditto”, the word “Non-bailable” were substituted. What is relevant to be noticed is that the Code of Criminal Procedure (Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment) Act, 1992 was reserved by the Governor of Andhra Pradesh on the 21st October, 1991 for consideration and assent of the President. The Presidential assent was received on 10th February, 1992 after which the Code of Criminal Procedure (Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment) Act, 1992 was published on the 15th February, 1992 in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette Part IV-B (Ext.). Thus there is no manner of doubt that Sections 494 and 495 IPC are cognizable offences so far as State of Andhra Pradesh is concerned.

And… in Para 14

* * * * * *

In view of the above settled legal position, this Court has no doubt that the amendment made in the First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment) Act, 1992, shall prevail in the State of Andhra Pradesh, notwithstanding the fact that in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 offences under Section 494 and 495 are treated as cognizable offences. The reasoning given by the Division Bench of High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Mavuri Rani Veera Bhadranna (supra) that though the State Legislation amended the Schedule making the offence under Section 494 IPC cognizable, the legislation made by the Parliament i.e. Section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code remains and in the event of any repugnancy between the two legislations, the legislation made by the Parliament would prevail, because, Section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code still holds the field despite the fact that the State Legislation made amendment to the Schedule of Criminal Procedure Code, with respect, is erroneous and contrary to all cannons of interpretation of statute. Once First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 stands amended and offences punishable under Sections 494 and 495 IPC are made cognizable offences, those offences will have to be regarded as cognizable offences for all purposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 including for the purpose of Section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 198(1)(c), after the Amendment made by the Code of Criminal Procedure(Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment) Act, 1992 cannot be interpreted in isolation without referring to the fact that offences under Sections 494 and 495 IPC have been made cognizable so far as the State of Andhra Pradesh is concerned. Therefore, the provision made in Section 198(1)(c) that no Court shall take cognizance of an offences punishable under Chapter XX of the IPC except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved will have to be read subject to the amendment made by the Legislative Assembly of the State of Andhra Pradesh in 1992. Once, it is held that the offences under Section 494 and 495 IPC are cognizable offences, the bar imposed by operative part of sub-section 1 of Section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code beginning with the words “No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter XX of the Indian Penal Code except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence” gets lifted so far as offences punishable under Sections 494 and 495 IPC are concerned. As those offences have been made cognizable offences in the State of Andhra Pradesh since 1992, the same will have to be dealt with as provided in the Section 156 which inter alia provides that any officer in charge of a Police Station, may without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to enquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. Even without the authorization under Section 155(2) or Section 156(3) of Criminal Penal Code, offences under Sections 494, 495 and 496 having been rendered cognizable and non-bailable by virtue of the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment Act, 1992) can be investigated by the Police and no illegality is attached to the investigation of these offences by the police. If the Police Officer in charge of a Police Station is entitled to investigate offences punishable under Section 494 and 495 IPC, there is no manner of doubt that the competent Court would have all jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences after receipt of report as contemplated under Section 173(2) of the Code. Thus, this Court finds that correct proposition of law was not laid down in Mavuri Rani Veera Bhadranna (supra) when the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the said case held that as Section 198 of Criminal Procedure Code still holds the field despite the amendment made by State Legislature, the Court would have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 494 IPC on the basis of report submitted by the Investigating Officer. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that in view of Section 198(1)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is disentitled to take cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 494 and 495 IPC despite the State amendment making those offences cognizable, this Court notices that in Mavuri Rani Veera Bhadranna (supra), the Division Bench has considered effect of Section 155(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code and thereafter held that the bar under Section 198 would not be applicable as complaint lodged before police for offence under Section 494 IPC also related to other cognizable offences and if police files a charge sheet, the Court can take cognizance also of offence under Section 494 along with other cognizable offences by virtue of Section 155 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code.

And then in Para 15,

15. Section 155(4) of the Code inter alia provides that:-
“Where a case relates to two or more offences of which at least one is cognizable, the case shall be deemed to be a cognizable case, notwithstanding that the other offences are non-cognizable”
Here in this case in the charge sheet it is mentioned that the appellant has also committed offence punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code which is cognizable and therefore this is a case which relates to two or more offences of which at least one is cognizable and therefore the case must be deemed to be cognizable case notwithstanding that the other offences are non- cognizable. This is not a case in which the FIR is exclusively filed for commission of offences under Sections 494 and 495 IPC. The case of the respondent no. 2 is that the appellant has committed offences punishable under Sections 417, 420, 494, 495 and 498A of the IPC. A question may arise as to what should be the procedure to be followed by a complainant when a case involves not only non-cognizable offence but one or more cognizable offences as well. It is somewhat anomalous that the aggrieved person by the alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 494 and 495 IPC should file complaint before a Court and that the same aggrieved person should approach the police officer for alleged commission of offences under Sections 417, 420 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code. Where the case involves one cognizable offence also along with non-cognizable offences it should not be treated as a non-cognizable case for the purpose of sub-section 2 of Section 155 and that is the intention of legislation which is manifested in Section 155(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the argument that the learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 494 and 495 IPC on the basis of submission of charge sheet, cannot be accepted and is hereby rejected.

A.Subash Babu Vs State of A.P. and Anr on 21 July, 2011

Citations: [2011 SCALE 7 671], [2011 RCR CRIMINAL SC 3 674], [2011 RCR CIVIL SC 3 840], [2011 SCC 7 616], [2011 SLT 5 727], [2011 AIOL 509], [2011 ALLMR CRI SC 2931], [2011 ANJ SC 2 202], [2012 BOMCR CRI SC 1 379], [2011 JCC SC 3 2189], [2011 AIR SC 3031], [2011 SCC CRI 3 267], [2011 SCC CIV 3 851], [2011 AIR SC 4702], [2011 ULJ 3 139], [2011 AIC 107 51], [2011 SHIMLC 3 551], [2011 DMC SC 3 50], [2011 ALT CRI 3 242], [2012 BLJ 1 260], [2011 ACR SC 3 3182], [2011 DMC 2 827], [2011 KCCR SN 4 472], [2011 UC 2 1509], [2012 ALD CRI 1 210], [2011 SCR 9 453], [2011 JT SC 8 483], [2011 CRI LJ 4373], [2011 AIR SCW 4702]

Indiankanoon.org link:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1342950/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aeefe4b0149711415347

Here is the Andhra Pradesh HC judgement here from 2010 that got dislodged.

AP High Court had passed similar judgment here in 2014, which diligently follows the present Apex Court judgment as binding precedent under Article 141.

Another decision here in 2020 is partly perverse on the point that the Trial Court cannot take cognizance of a charge sheet because Even though offence under Section 494 IPC is made “cognizable” offence as per amendment Act 3 of 1992, there is no corresponding amendment made to Section 198 Cr.P.C. Therefore, the bar under Section 198 Cr.P.C. still subsists.

Therefore, DO NOT RELY on the above APHC Judgment with respect to taking/not taking of cognizance of a 494 IPC case by a Trial Court Magistrate.

For a similar adjudication from State of Odisha, go here.

Index of Bigamy offence u/s 494 and 495 IPC judgments is here.

Commissioner of Income-Tax Vs Thana Electricity Supply Ltd. on 22 April, 1993

Posted on October 5, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

This a very good judgment from High Court of Bombay talking about binding nature of judgments, specifically termed as stare decisis.

Commissioner of Income-Tax Vs Thana Electricity Supply Ltd. on 22 April, 1993

Citation: [(1994) 206 ITR 727 (Bom)]

Indiankanoon.org Link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/583752/

Thana Singh Vs Central Bureau of Narcotics on 23 January, 2013

Posted on August 14, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Supreme Court has passed directions in this Landmark order that are restricted only to the Bail proceedings under the NDPS Act. The directions pertain to below stages of the trial proceedings.

Adjournments (4th proviso u/s 309 CrPC)
Examination of witnesses (adopt the method of “session’s trials” and assign block dates for examination of witnesses)
Workload of cases on Court
Access to Narcotics laboratories
Personnel
Re-testing Provisions
Monitoring of the NDPS cases
Availability of Public Prosecutors
Other recommendations: For the simplification of the above detailed process u/s 207 CrPC, we direct that the filing of the charge-sheet and supply of other documents must also be provided in electronic form.

Thana Singh Vs Central Bureau of Narcotics on 23 January, 2013

Citations: [2013 BOMCR CRI SC 2 280], [2013 CRLJ SC 1262], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL SC 1 861], [2013 SCALE 1 696], [2013 AIR SC 800], [2013 AIR BOMR 2 935], [2013 AIOL 44], [2013 JT 2 407], [2013 SCC 2 590], [2013 SLT 1 506], [2013 SCC CRI 2 818], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 82], [2013 CRILJ 1262], [2013 AIC 123 177], [2013 ABR 2 935], [2013 ACR 2 1486], [2013 AD SC 3 288], [2013 ALLCC 81 473], [2013 JLJ 1 363], [2013 MLJ CRI 1 607], [2013 MPHT 2 241], [2013 SCR 2 899], [2013 BOMCR CRI 2 280], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL 1 861], [2013 AIR SCW 800], [2013 JT SC 2 407], [2013 MLJ CRL 1 607], [2013 CRI LJ 1262]

Other Sources:

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af37e4b0149711415da8

This was reiterated by Supreme Court in here.

Santhini Vs Vijaya Venketesh on 9 October, 2017

Posted on August 12, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

The Dipak Misra Judgment based on a reference made by a 2-judge bench of Supreme Court here. You can assume how it would have been decided. The earlier judgment which got overruled is here (Krishna Veni Nagam Vs Harish Nagam on 9 March, 2017 ).

Santhini Vs Vijaya Venketesh on 9 October, 2017

Citations : [2017 BOMCR 6 315], [2017 CTC 6 81], [2017 KHC 5 48], [2017 KLT 4 415], [2017 RCR CIVIL 4 623], [2017 SCALE 12 359], [2018 SCC 1 1], [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 1202]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/184536583/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/59dbc07bce686e237b6a89fc

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision

MS. Bhaskar Industries Ltd Vs MS. Bhiwani Denim and Apparels Ltd and Ors on 27 August 2001

Puneet Dalmia Vs CBI Hyderabad on 16 December 2019

Anil Rai Vs State of Bihar on 6 August 2001

S Nagalingam Vs Sivagami on 31 August 2001

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