High Court of Jammu and Kashmir has given a detailed analysis and conclusions (and limitations it has to implement the conclusions itself) on a 148-year old tradition in Jammu and Kashmir called as Darbar Move. More details here.
Tag: 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision
Yashita Sahu Vs State of Rajasthan on 20 January 2020
Father given custody of minor girl-child.
Citations: AIR 2020 SC 577
Other Source links:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/144083733/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5e2585f53321bc6def498ecc
https://www.reddyandreddy.org/parent-who-is-denied-custody-still-has-the-right-to-talk-to-the-child-everyday/
Raghuvansh Dewanchand Bhasin Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 9 September 2011
Even though Supreme Court upheld High Court decision in holding the Police officer who executed the cancelled Non-bailable warrant against the practicing advocate, it held that Police officer was sufficiently reprimanded. High Court had also granted a compensation of Rs.2000/- from the personal account of Police officer to the Advocate!!!
Citations: [2012 SCC 9 791], [2011 AIOL 663], [2012 AIR BOMR 1 197], [2011 AIR SC 3393], [2011 AIR SC 5347], [2011 ANJ SC SUPP 2 65], [2012 BOMCR CRI SC 1 260], [2011 JT 10 253], [2011 RCR CRIMINAL SC 4 212], [2011 SCALE 10 233], [2011 SLT 7 1], [2012 SCC CRI 4 679]
Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1934058/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/575fd363607dba63d7e6e2d9
Revanasiddappa and Anr Vs Mallikarjun and Ors on 31 March 2011
Supreme Court was constrained to take a view different from the one taken by it in Bharatha Matha on Section 16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act.
From Para 41,
41. In the instant case, Section 16(3) as amended, does not impose any restriction on the property right of such children except limiting it to the property of their parents. Therefore, such children will have a right to whatever becomes the property of their parents, whether self acquired or ancestral.
But thankfully, referred the matter to a larger bench in March 2011.
43. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the matter should be reconsidered by a larger Bench and for that purpose the records of the case be placed before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for constitution of a larger Bench.
Citations: [2011 SCJ 4 4], [2011 AIOL 244], [2011 CTC 2 810], [2013 ILR 4291], [2011 SCC 11 1], [2011 MWN CIVIL 3 528], [2011 MLJ 5 392], [2011 GLH 1 757], [2011 JCR SC 2 259], [2011 CLT SC 112 469], [2011 LW 3 255], [2011 SCALE 4 189], [2011 SCR 4 675], [2011 AIC 101 73], [2011 SCSUPPL CHN 4 50], [2011 AIR SC 2447], [2011 CALLT 3 58], [2011 KCCR 2 1531], [2011 AIR SC SUPP 155], [2011 JT SC 4 90], [2011 AWC SC 3 3126], [2011 UJ 2 1342], [2011 SCC CIV 3 581], [2011 KERLT 2 176], [2011 CGLRW 2 13], [2011 CUTLT 112 469], [2011 GUJ LH 1 757], [2011 ALR 86 450], [2011 RLW SC 3 2547], [2012 CCC SC 4 279]
Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/138849/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aef4e4b014971141545b
The current status of this case is as follows:
The earlier Judgment contradicted by this one is Bharatha Matha and Anr Vs R. Vijaya Renganathan and Ors here.
Bharatha Matha and Anr Vs R. Vijaya Renganathan and Ors on 17 May 2010
Supreme Court has settled the following question of law:
the question of inheritance of co-parcenery property by the illegitimate children, who were born out of the live-in-relationship, could not arise.
Citations: [2010 AIR SCC 2685], [2010 AIR SCC 0 3503], [2010 CTC 3 654], [2010 JT 5 534], [2010 RCR CIVIL 3 252], [2010 SCCC 11 483], [2010 AD 6 478], [2010 SCC 0 515], [2010 SCCJ 5 442], [2010 ALT 5 4], [2010 LW 4 791], [2010 MLJ 7 953], [2010 SLT 4 419], [2010 AIOL 333], [2010 SCALE 6 53], [2010 SUPREME 4 433], [2010 SCCC CIV 4 498], [2010 AIC 91 54], [2010 CALLJ 2 176], [2010 ALR 81 230]
Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1513913/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aee7e4b0149711415176
This is contradicted (but NOT overruled) in Revanasiddappa And Another v. Mallikarjun And Others here.
Badshah Vs Urmila Badshah Godse and Anr on 18 October 2013
Justice A.K.Sikri in a 2-judge bench had held that, for the purpose of claiming maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C., such a woman (who is not a legally wedded wife), is to be treated as the legally wedded wife.
From Para 25,
25. Thus, while interpreting a statute the court may not only take into consideration the purpose for which the statute was enacted, but also the mischief it seeks to suppress. It is this mischief rule, first propounded in Heydon’s Case[11] which became the historical source of purposive interpretation. The court would also invoke the legal maxim construction ut res magis valeat guam pereat, in such cases i.e. where alternative constructions are possible the Court must give effect to that which will be responsible for the smooth working of the system for which the statute has been enacted rather than one which will put a road block in its way. If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation should be avoided. We should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. If this interpretation is not accepted, it would amount to giving a premium to the husband for defrauding the wife. Therefore, at least for the purpose of claiming maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C., such a woman is to be treated as the legally wedded wife.
Citations: [2014 SCJ 2 779], [2014 CRILJ 1076], [2014 SCC 1 188], [2013 SCALE 12 681], [2014 CRLJ SC 1076], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL SC 4 764], [2013 CTC 6 86], [2014 AIR SC 256], [2014 NCC 1 238], [2013 RLW SC 4 3670], [2013 AIOL 3407], [2013 AD SC 11 9], [2013 RCR CIVIL SC 4 830], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 946], [2014 JLJR SC 1 78], [2014 LW CRL 1 646], [2014 SCC CIV 1 51], [2013 JCC SC 4 2765], [2014 LW 2 936], [2013 ACR 3 3010], [2014 MPHT 2 499], [2014 GLH 1 273], [2013 KERLT 4 367], [2013 ALR 101 704], [2013 BOMCR CRI SC 4 616], [2013 SLT 9 543], [2013 DMC 3 518], [2014 ECRN 1 241], [2014 AIR SC 869], [2013 JT 13 570], [2013 AIC 132 108]
Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/15901386/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af37e4b0149711415daf
Earlier Chanmuniya judgment is here.
MS. Bhaskar Industries Ltd Vs MS. Bhiwani Denim and Apparels Ltd and Ors on 27 August 2001
Supreme Court held the scope of 205 CrPC in this judgment as,
Second is that it is difficult, in the absence of other materials, to decide positively whether the order dated 28.4.2000 is an interlocutory order only.
The interdict contained in Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the Code) is that the powers of revision shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order. Whether an order is interlocutory or not, cannot be decided by merely looking at the order or merely because the order was passed at the interlocutory stage. The safe test laid down by this Court through a series of decisions is this: If the contention of the petitioner who moves the superior court in revision, as against the order under challenge is upheld, would the criminal proceedings as a whole culminate? If it would,then the order is not interlocutory in spite of the fact that it was passed during any interlocutory stage.
And
Section 251 is the commencing provision in Chapter XX of the Code which deals with trial of summons cases by magistrates. It enjoins on the court to ask the accused whether he pleads guilty when the accused appears or is brought before the magistrate. The appearance envisaged therein can either be by personal attendance of the accused or through his advocate. This can be understood from Section 205(1) of the Code which says that whenever a magistrate issues a summons, he may, if he sees reason so to do, dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit him to appear by his pleader.
17. Thus, in appropriate cases the magistrate can allow an accused to make even the first appearance through a counsel. The magistrate is empowered to record the plea of the accused even when his counsel makes such plea on behalf of the accused in a case where the personal appearance of the accused is dispensed with. Section 317 of the Code has to be viewed in the above perspective as it empowers the court to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused (provided he is represented by a counsel in that case) even for proceeding with the further steps in the case. However, one precaution which the court should take in such a situation is that the said benefit need be granted only to an accused who gives an undertaking to the satisfaction of the court that he would not dispute his identity as the particular accused in the case, and that a counsel on his behalf would be present in court and that he has no objection in taking evidence in his absence. This precaution is necessary for the further progress of the proceedings including examination of the witnesses.
“18. A question could legitimately be asked – what might happen if the counsel engaged by the accused (whose personal appearance is dispensed with) does not appear or that the counsel does not co-operate in proceeding with the case? We may point out that the legislature has taken care for such eventualities. Section 205(2) says that the magistrate can in his discretion direct the personal attendance of the accused at any stage of the proceedings. The last limb of Section 317(1) confers a discretion on the magistrate to direct the personal attendance of the accused at any subsequent stage of the proceedings. He can even resort to other steps for enforcing such attendance.
“19. The position, therefore, bogs down to this: It is within the powers of a magistrate and in his judicial discretion to dispense with the personal appearance of an accused either throughout or at any particular stage of such proceedings in a summons case, if the magistrate finds that insistence of his personal presence would itself inflict enormous suffering or tribulations to him, and the comparative advantage would be less. Such discretion need be exercised only in rare instances where due to the far distance at which the accused resides or carries on business or on account of any physical or other good reasons the magistrate feels that dispensing with the personal attendance of the accused would only be in the interests of justice. However, the magistrate who grants such benefit to the accused must take the precautions enumerated above, as a matter of course. We may reiterate that when an accused makes an application to a magistrate through his duly authorised counsel praying for affording the benefit of his personal presence being dispensed with the magistrate can consider all aspects and pass appropriate orders thereon before proceeding further.”
Citations: [2001 INSC 399], [2001 KHC 0 714], [2001 AIR SC 3625], [2001 UC 2 370], [2001 AD SC 6 612], [2001 SCC 6 339], [2001 AWC SC 4 2981], [2001 CRI LJ 4250], [2001 JIC 2 685], [2001 MPLJ 3 664], [2001 SUPREME 6 339], [2001 AIR SC 0 3413], [2001 JCC 2 127], [2001 ACR SC 3 2297], [2001 KERLT 3 307], [2001 JT SC 7 127], [2001 SCC 7 401], [2001 CRIMES SC 4 199], [2002 PLJR 4 95], [2002 MAHLJ 1 81], [2002 BOMCR CRI SC 190], [2002 BOMCR SC 2 265], [2002 ALT CRI 1 13], [2001 RCR CRI 4 137], [2003 JLJ SC 1 56], [2001 SCALE 5 503], [2001 CRLJ 0 4250], [2001 S SCR 2 219], [2001 SCC CR 0 1254], [2001 RCR CRIMINAL 4 137], [2001 DCR SC 602], [2001 OLR 2 613], [2002 LJ 1 161], [2001 CCR 0 208], [2001 SRJ 8 415], [2001 CRLR SC 0 481], [2001 SCC CRI 0 1254], [2001 CALCRILR 0 481], [2001 SLT 6 120], [2001 CCR 3 208], [2001 ALLMR CRI 0 1961], [2001 SCJ 3 176], [2002 BCR 2 265], [2002 MHLJ SC 1 81], [2001 ALD CRI 2 530], [2002 BCR CRI 0 190]
Other Source links:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1255592/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad9ce4b0149711411db4
Puneet Dalmia Vs CBI Hyderabad on 16 December 2019
A division bench of Apex Court relying on Bhaskar Industries and Rameshwar Yadav, held as follows,
From Para 7,
7. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the present appeal is allowed. The impugned Judgment and order passed by the High Court as well as that of the learned Trial Court rejecting the application submitted by the appellant under Section 205 Cr.P.C. are hereby quashed and set aside and consequently the application submitted by the appellant to dispense with his appearance before the learned Trial Court on all dates of adjournments and permitting his counsel Sri Bharadwaj Reddy to appear on his behalf is here by allowed on the following conditions:
(1) That the appellant shall give an undertaking to the learned Trial Court that he would not dispute his identity in the case and that Sri Bharadwaj Reddy advocate who is permitted to represent the appellant, would appear before the learned Trial Court on his behalf on each and every date of hearing and that he shall not object recording of the evidence in his absence and that no adjournment shall be asked for on behalf of the appellant and/or his advocate Sri Bharadwaj Reddy;
(2) That the appellant shall appear before the learned Trial Court for the purpose of framing of the charges and also on other hearing dates whenever the learned Trial Curt insists for his appearance;
(3) If there is any failure on the part of the advocate Sri Bharadwaj Reddy, who is to represent the appellant, either to appear before the learned Trial Court on each adjournment and/or any adjournment is sought on behalf of the appellant and/or if the learned Trial Court is of the opinion that the appellant and/or his advocate is trying to delay the trial, in that case, it would be open for the learned Trial Court to exercise its powers under Section 205 (2) Cr.P.C. and direct the appearance of the appellant on each and every date of adjournment.
Citations: [2019 SCC ONLINE SC 1622], [2019 INSC 1379]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/15759089/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5dfbc5f53321bc3818f97bd7
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/puneet-dalmia-versus-central-bureau-of-investigation-hyderabad
Index is here.
Anil Rai Vs State of Bihar on 6 August 2001
Wonderful judgment from Supreme Court, which held that Repeated adjournment of matters ‘for orders‘ after arguments are heard is impermissible. Also passed the following Guidelines.
20. Under the prevalent circumstances in some of the High Courts, I feel it appropriate to provide some guidelines regarding the pronouncement of judgments which, I am sure, shall be followed by all concerned, being the mandate of this Court. Such guidelines, as for present, are as under:
(i) The Chief Justices of the High Courts may issue appropriate directions to the Registry that in case where the judgment is reserved and is pronounced later, a column be added in the judgment where, on the first page, after the cause-title, date of reserving the judgment and date of pronouncing it be separately mentioned by the court officer concerned.
(ii) That Chief Justice of the High Courts, on their administrative side, should direct the Court Officers/ Readers of the various Benches in the High Courts to furnish every month the list of cases in the matters where the judgments reserved are not pronounced within the period of that months.
(iii) On noticing that after conclusion of the arguments the judgment is not pronounced within a period of two months, the concerned Chief Justice shall draw the attention of the Bench concerned to the pending matter. The Chief Justice may also see the desirability of circulating the statement of such cases in which the judgments have not been pronounced within a period of six weeks from the date of conclusion of the arguments amongst the Judges of the High Court for their information. Such communication be conveyed as confidential and in a sealed cover.
(iv) Where a judgment is not pronounced within three months, from the date of reserving it, any of the parties in the case is permitted to file an application in the High Court with prayer for early judgment. Such application, as and when filed, shall be listed before the Bench concerned within two days excluding the intervening holidays.
(v) If the judgment, for any reason, is not pronounced within a period of six months, any of the parties of the said lis shall be entitled to move an application before the Chief Justice of the High Court with a prayer to withdraw the said case and to make it over to any other Bench for fresh arguments. It is open to the Chief Justice to grant the said prayer or to pass any other order as deems fit in the circumstances.
21. We hope and trust that the above guidelines shall be strictly followed and implemented, considering them as self-imposed restraints.
Indiankanoon version:
Casemine version:
Citations: [2002 BOMCR SC 3 360], [2009 ELT SC 233 13], [2001 AIR SC 3173], [2001 SCC 7 318], [2001 SCC CRI 1009], [2001 ALD CRI 2 446], [2001 ACR SC 3 2046], [2001 RCR CRIMINAL 3 722], [2001 JT SC 6 515], [2001 SCALE 5 41], [2001 BLJR 3 1777], [2001 SUPP SCR 1 298]
Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1517737/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad95e4b0149711411c30
S Nagalingam Vs Sivagami on 31 August 2001
Unless a valid marriage is proved, a second marriage stands invalid and no offence under section 494 IPC attracts.
Citations: [2001 AIR SC 3576], [2001 SCALE 6 42], [2001 JT 7 219], [2001 AIR SC 3372], [2001 SCC 7 487], [2001 SUPREME 6 772], [2001 SCC CRI 1273], [2001 OLR 2 648], [2001 ALD CRI 2 634], [2001 AWC SC 4 2998], [2001 ACR SC 3 2486], [2001 DMC SC 2 544], [2002 ALT CRI 1 69]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1386675/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad9ce4b0149711411daa
