Supreme Court granted interim bail to Arnab Goswami, after he suffered judicial custody for 7 days.
Here is the Order.
Here is the Judgment with reasons.
Index of Quash judgments here.
Tag: 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision
Arnab Manoranjan Goswami Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 09 Nov 2020
Division Bench of Bombay High Court, while denying interim protection from arrest to Arnab Goswami, held that,
From Para 45,
45. The principle stated therein will equally apply to the exercise of this Court’s power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure while considering the applications for bail since the petitioner is already in Judicial custody. The legislature has provided specific remedy under Section 439 Cr.P.C. for applying for regular bail. Having regard to the alternate and efficacious remedy available to the petitioner under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this Court has to exercise judicial restraint while entertaining application in the nature of seeking regular bail in a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure.
and from Para 70,
70. In our opinion, the petitioner has an alternate and efficacious remedy under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to apply for regular bail. At the time of concluding the hearing of Applications, we had made it clear that if the petitioner, if so advised, to apply for regular bail under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the concerned Court, then, in that case, we have directed the concerned Court to decide the said
application within four days from filing of the same.
Here is the Bail application
Dr Nallapareddy Sridhar Reddy Vs State of AP and Ors
AP High Court held that u/s 216, Trial Court well within it’s power to frame additional charges based on additional charge sheet filed by police, even when the case is pending pronouncement of judgment. But since the procedure contemplated was not followed by Magistrate, High Court set aside the second set of charges framed on accused and directed the Magistrate to follow the procedure contemplated u/s 217.
But then, Revision-Petitioner went to Supreme Court and there also he lost.
Balaji Baliram Mupade Vs State of Maharashtra on 29 Oct 2020
Supreme Court, again, highlighted the need of delivering judgments at the earliest, as the “problem is compounded where the result is known but not the reasons.”
From Para 3,
3. Further, much later but still almost two decades ago, this Court in Anil Rai v. State of Bihar – 2001 (7) SCC 318 deemed it appropriate to provide some guidelines regarding the pronouncement of judgments, expecting them to be followed by all concerned under the mandate of this Court. It is not necessary to reproduce the directions except to state that normally the judgment is expected within two months of the conclusion of the arguments, and on expiry of three months any of the parties can file an application in the High Court with prayer for early judgment. If, for any reason, no judgment is pronounced for six months, any of the parties is entitled to move an application before the then Chief Justice of the High Court with a prayer to re-assign the case before another Bench for fresh arguments.
From Para 10,
10. We must note with regret that the counsel extended through various judicial pronouncements including the one referred to aforesaid appear to have been ignored, more importantly where oral orders are pronounced. In case of such orders, it is expected that they are either dictated in the Court or at least must follow immediately thereafter, to facilitate any aggrieved party to seek redressal from the higher Court. The delay in delivery of judgments has been observed to be a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in Anil Rai’s case (supra) and as stated aforesaid, the problem gets aggravated when the operative portion is made available early and the reasons follow much later.
Citations :
Other Sources :
Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal Vs State of Gujarat on 9 Sep 2013
Division bench of Supreme Court held that,
From Para 306,
26. Section 306 refers to abetment of suicide. It says that if any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine. The action for committing suicide is also on account of mental disturbance caused by mental and physical cruelty. To constitute an offence under Section 306, the prosecution has to establish that a person has committed suicide and the suicide was abetted by the accused. Prosecution has to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased committed suicide and the accused abetted the commission of suicide. But for the alleged extra marital relationship, which if proved, could be illegal and immoral, nothing has been brought out by the prosecution to show that the accused had provoked, incited or induced the wife to commit suicide.
From Para 28, exoneration of husband,
28. Suicide note completely exonerates A-1, which states that he was not responsible for death of the deceased. On the other hand, the deceased described herself as extremely selfish, egoist and, therefore, not a match for A-1. She entertained the belief that her husband A-1 was in love with A-2 and wanted to marry A-2. Note states it was for their happiness she had decided to end her life. She also wanted to have the marriage of A-1 and A-2 solemnized with pomp and gaiety. On reading the suicide note, one can infer that the deceased was so possessive of her husband, and was always under an emotional stress that she might lose her husband. Too much of possessiveness could also lead to serious emotional stress, over and above the fact that she had one abortion and her daughter died after few days of birth. No evidence is forthcoming in this case to show that A-2 ever evinced any interest to marry A-1. On the other hand, during the subsistence of the alleged relationship, A-2 herself got married.
Citations : [2013 CRLJ SC 44482013 AIOL 5932013 CRIMES SC 4 2952013 CRIMES SC 4 1102013 SCC 10 482013 AIR SC 52192013 RCR CRIMINAL SC 4 2712013 SLT 7 7062014 AIR SC 3312013 SCALE 11 1982013 JT 12 3572013 SUPREME 6 3662014 JLJR SC 1 3902013 SCC CRI 3 8012013 SCC CIV 4 6162013 SCC ONLINE SC 8142013 AIC 130 292013 CRILJ 44482014 PLJR 1 5112013 BOMCR CRI 4 5222013 UC 3 19352013 DMC 3 2452014 ALT CRL AP 1 2582013 ALD CRI 2 7552013 MLJ CRI 3 7002013 OLR 2 8672013 KHC 3 8102013 AD SC 10 452013 ABR 6 1792014 SCJ 1 5262013 RCR CRIMINAL 4 2712014 JLJR 1 3902013 CRI LJ 44482013 MLJ CRL 3 7002013 AIR SCW 5219
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/170814796/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af2de4b0149711415bb9
Husband’s extra- marital relationship does not amount to cruelty
K.V Prakash Babu Vs State of Karnataka on 22 Nov 2016
Supreme Court held that the necessary ingredients to make out a IPC 306 offence are missing in the case.
From Para 15, Mental Cruelty,
15. The concept of mental cruelty depends upon the milieu and the strata from which the persons come from and definitely has an individualistic perception regard being had to one’s endurance and sensitivity. It is difficult to generalise but certainly it can be appreciated in a set of established facts. Extra-marital relationship, per se, or as such would not come within the ambit of Section 498-A IPC. It would be an illegal or immoral act, but other ingredients are to be brought home so that it would constitute a criminal offence. There is no denial of the fact that the cruelty need not be physical but a mental torture or abnormal behaviour that amounts to cruelty or harassment in a given case. It will depend upon the facts of the said case. To explicate, solely because the husband is involved in an extra-marital relationship and there is some suspicion in the mind of wife, that cannot be regarded as mental cruelty which would attract mental cruelty for satisfying the ingredients of Section 306 IPC.
From Para 17, Final nail in the coffin,
17. In the instant case, as the evidence would limpidly show, the wife developed a sense of suspicion that her husband was going to the house of Ashwathamma in Village Chelur where he got involved with Deepa, daughter of Ashwathamma. It has come on record through various witnesses that the people talked in the locality with regard to the involvement of the appellant with Deepa. It needs to be noted that Anjanamma, being not able to digest the humiliation, committed suicide. The mother and the brother of Anjanamma paved the same path. In such a situation, it is extremely difficult to hold that the prosecution has established the charge under Section 498-A IPC and the fact that the said cruelty induced the wife to commit suicide. It is manifest that the wife was guided by the rumour that aggravated her suspicion which has no boundary. The seed of suspicion planted in mind brought the eventual tragedy. But such an event will not constitute the offence or establish the guilt of the appellant-accused under Section 306 IPC.
Citations : [2017 SCC 11 176], [2017 SCC CRI 4 242], [2016 SCC ONLINE SC 1363], [2016 AIR SC 5430], [2016 SCR 11 509], [2016 CRIMES 4 184], [2017 CRI LJ 264], [2017 AIC 169 211], [2017 KLT 1 125], [2017 KCCR 1 673], [2017 ECRN 1 1]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/33506004/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5837160c53bee74f64c25ebc
Bhagwan Das Vs Kartar Singh and Ors on 14 May 2007
Supreme Court held that,
From Paras 15 and 16,
15. In our opinion the view taken by the High Court is correct. It often happens that there are disputes and discords in the matrimonial home and a
wife is often harassed by the husband or her in-laws. This, however, in our opinion would not by itself and without something more attract Section 306 IPC read with Section 107 IPC.
16. However, in our opinion mere harassment of wife by husband due to differences per se does not attract Section 306 read with Section 107 IPC, if
the wife commits suicide. Hence, we agree with the view taken by the High Court. We, however, make it clear that if the suicide was due to demand of
dowry soon before her death then Section 304B IPC may be attracted, whether it is a case of homicide or suicide. Vide Kans Raj vs. State of Punjab & Ors. 2000(5) SCC 207, Satvir Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab & Anr. 2001(8) SCC 633, Smt. Shanti & Anr. vs. State of Haryana AIR 1991 SC 1261.
Citations : [2007 AIR SC 2045], [2007 SUPREME 3 1073], [2009 ANJ SC 2 160], [2007 CRLJ SC 3420], [2007 SCC 11 205], [2007 SCALE 7 167], [2007 JT 7 36], [2007 SCR 6 474], [2007 AIOL 570], [2007 AIR SC 3107], [2007 AIR SCW 3107]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/366677/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5767b129e691cb22da6d54ae
https://www.latestlaws.com/index.php/latest-caselaw/2007/may/2007-latest-caselaw-439-sc/
Twinkle Rahul Mangaonkar Vs Union of India on 06 Nov 2020
In this Judgment, Gujarat High Court read down two rules and made sure that a Law graduate is allowed a provisional enrollment number so as to allow her to appear for AIBE.
From Para 33,
33. In such circumstances, referred to above, we read down Rules 1 and 2 respectively of the Bar Council of Gujarat (Enrollment) Rules so as to read that a person may be either in full or part time service or employment or is engaged in any trade, business or profession, who otherwise is qualified to be admitted as an Advocate shall be admitted as an Advocate, however, the enrollment certificate of such a person shall be withheld with the Bar Council and shall lie in deposit with the Council until the concerned person makes a declaration that the circumstances mentioned in Rule 2 have ceased to exist and that he or she has started his/her practice.
M. Arjunan Vs State of Tamil Nadu on 4 Dec 2018
Division bench of Supreme Court held that for a conviction to sustain, the following must satisfy.
From Para 8,
(8) The essential ingredients of the offence under Section 306 I.P.C. are: (i) the abetment; (ii) the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide. The act of the accused, however, insulting the deceased by using abusive language will not, by itself, constitute the abetment of suicide. There should be evidence capable of suggesting that the accused intended by such act to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. Unless the ingredients of instigation/abetment to commit suicide are satisfied, accused cannot be convicted under Section 306 I.P.C.
From Para 9,
(9) In our considered view, in the case at hand, M.O.1-letter and the oral evidence of PW-1 to PW-5, would not be sufficient to establish that the suicide by the deceased was directly linked to the instigation or abetment by the appellant-deceased. Having advanced the money to the deceased, the appellant-accused might have uttered some abusive words; but that by itself is not sufficient to constitute the offence under Section 306 I.P.C. From the evidence brought on record and in the facts and circumstances of the case, in our view the ingredients of Section 306 I.P.C. are not established and the conviction of the appellant-accused under Section 306 I.P.C. cannot be sustained.
Citations : [2019 SCC 3 315], [2018 SCC ONLINE SC 2808], [2019 AIR SC 43], [2018 CRIMES 4 570], [2019 CUT LT 127 442]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/65076410/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5c30a3f89eff432f24b9bc83
Swaran Singh and Ors Vs State NCT Delhi and Anr on 18 Aug 2008
Justice Katju held that offending words to a member of SC/ST, are liable under the Act, only if made in any place in public view, but not otherwise. A big relief for those facing false cases.
From Paras 27 and 28,
27. Learned counsel then contended that the alleged act was not committed in a public place and hence does not come within the purview of section 3(1)(x) of the Act. In this connection it may be noted that the aforesaid provision does not use the expression ‘public place’, but instead the expression used is ‘in any place within public view’. In our opinion there is a clear distinction between the two expressions.
28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a ‘Chamar’) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression ‘place within public view’ with the expression ‘public place’. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.
And relating to American cuss word Nigger,
30. In this connection it may be mentioned that in America to use the word ‘Nigger’ today for an African-American is regarded as highly offensive and is totally unacceptable, even if it was acceptable 50 years ago. In our opinion, even if the word ‘Chamar’ was not regarded offensive at one time in our country, today it is certainly a highly offensive word when used in a derogatory sense to insult and humiliate a person. Hence, it should never be used with that intent. The use of the word ‘Chamar’ will certainly attract section 3(1)(x) of the Act, if from the context it appears that it was used in a derogatory sense to insult or humiliate a member of the SC/ST.
And then Husband was held to have NOT insulted the respondent in public view,
34. However, a perusal of the F.I.R. shows that Swaran Singh did not use these offensive words in the public view. There is nothing in the F.I.R. to show that any member of the public was present when Swaran Singh uttered these words, or that the place where he uttered them was a place which ordinarily could be seen by the public. Hence in our opinion no prima facie offence is made out against appellant no.1.
Citations : [2008 SCC 8 435], [2008 SCC CRI 3 527], [2008 AIC SC 69 25], [2008 AIOL 938], [2008 AIR SC SUPP 441], [2009 BOMCR CRI SC 2 431], [2008 CRLJ SC 4369], [2008 JT 9 60], [2009 MPLJ SC 1 503], [2008 SCALE 11 346], [2008 SCR 12 132]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/531612/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/575fd270607dba63d7e69106
