Thota Suresh Babu Vs The Special Officer Mission AP

Posted on December 31, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A PIL was filed to stay the same of government lands in a namesake scam called as Mission Build AP. Outright Sale of land Parcels/Land Assets on behalf of Mission Build AP, Government of Andhra Pradesh, available at Guntur and Visakhapatnam Districts of Andhra Pradesh “as is where is” basis through E-auction.

On 2020-05-28

Adjourned for filing of Counters by State.

2020-05-28 Thota Suresh Babu Vs The Special Officer Mission AP_compressed

On 2020-07-23

Multiple Writs which were filed on same subject were tagged and taken up together.

2020-07-23 Thota Suresh Babu Vs The Special Officer Mission AP_compressed

On 2020-07-30

4 weeks time given to file the stand of the State Government via Counter-affidavits.

2020-09-18 Thota Suresh Babu Vs The Special Officer Mission AP_compressed

On 2020-09-18

More Writs are tagged.

2020-09-18 Thota Suresh Babu Vs The Special Officer Mission AP

On 2020-11-25

Interim Orders were extended until further orders.

2020-11-25 Thota Suresh Babu Vs The Special Officer Mission AP_compressed

On 2020-12-30

Government filed a recusal petition seeking recusal of Justice Rakesh Kumar which was rejected by this Super scathing Order. This is a wonderful judgment from Justice Rakesh Kumar clearly laying out path towards dismantling of the State Government which was been doing all unconstitutional activities.

It would be difficult but will capture the gems from this Order below.

Thota Suresh Babu Vs The Special Officer Mission AP on 30 Dec 2020

Bhushan Kumar and Anr Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 4 April 2012

Posted on December 29, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A 2-judge Division Bench held that Quash petition is maintainable even though this instant matter is dismissed on merits.

From Para 5,

5) The questions which arise for consideration in these appeals are:
(a) Whether taking cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate is same as summoning an accused to appear?
(b) Whether the Magistrate, while considering the question of summoning an accused, is required to assign reasons for the same?

From Para 7,

7) In S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer vs. Videocon International Ltd. & Ors., (2008) 2 SCC 492, the expression “cognizance” was explained by this Court as it merely means“become aware of” and when used with reference to a court or a Judge, it connotes “to take notice of judicially”. It indicates the point when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone. It is entirely a different thing from initiation of proceedings; rather it is the condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate or the Judge. Cognizance is taken of cases and not of persons.

From Para 8 (Very Imp)

8) Under Section 190 of the Code, it is the application of judicial mind to the averments in the complaint that constitutes cognizance. At this stage, the Magistrate has to be satisfied whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of enquiry. If there is sufficient ground for proceeding then the Magistrate is empowered for issuance of process under Section 204 of the Code.

From Para 9,

9) A summon is a process issued by a Court calling upon a person to appear before a Magistrate. It is used for the purpose of notifying an individual of his legal obligation to appear before the Magistrate as a response to violation of law. In other words, the summons will announce to the person to whom it is directed that a legal proceeding has been started against that person and the date and time on which the person must appear in Court. A person who is summoned is legally bound to appear before the Court on the given date and time. Willful disobedience is liable to be punished under Section 174 IPC. It is a ground for contempt of court.

From Paras 10 and 11, (Very IMP)

10) Section 204 of the Code does not mandate the Magistrate to explicitly state the reasons for issuance of summons. It clearly states that if in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for proceeding, then the summons may be issued. This section mandates the Magistrate to form an opinion as to whether there exists a sufficient ground for summons to be issued but it is nowhere mentioned in the section that the explicit narration of the same is mandatory, meaning thereby that it is not a pre-requisite for deciding the validity of the summons issued.
11) Time and again it has been stated by this Court that the summoning order under Section 204 of the Code requires no explicit reasons to be stated because it is imperative that the Magistrate must have taken notice of the accusations and applied his mind to the allegations made in the police report and the materials filed therewith.

Bhushan Kumar and Anr Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 4 April 2012

Citations : [2012 RCR CRIMINAL SC 2 794], [2012 SUPREME 2 699], [2012 BOMCR CRI SC 4 138], [2012 SLT 3 221], [2012 AIR SC 1747], [2012 SCALE 3 191], [2012 AIOL 161], [2012 CRIMES SC 2 101], [2012 CRLJ SC 2286], [2012 AIR SC 2476], [2012 SCALE 4 191], [2012 SCC 5 424], [2012 SCC CRI 2 872], [2012 JT 4 127], [2012 SCC ONLINE SC 325], [2012 AIC 113 116], [2012 UC 2 1121], [2012 JCR SC 2 269], [2012 ACR SC 2 1514], [2012 LW CRL 2 33], [2012 PLJR 2 422], [2012 JLJR 2 307], [2012 RLW SC 3 2467], [2012 SCC 5 422], [2012 DRJ 130 225], [2012 ALT CRI SC 3 223], [2012 AIR SCW 2476], [2012 DLT SC 189 252]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71570434/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af1de4b0149711415a6b

Jalendra Padhiary Vs Pragati Chhotray on 17 April 2018

Posted on December 24, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

The Division bench of Apex Court delivered this judgment, emphasizing the need for reasoned judgments and the damage caused by cryptic orders.

From Para 8,

8. The short question, which arises for consideration in this appeal, is whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in dismissing the appellant’s appeal in limine and thereby upholding the order of the Family Judge insofar as it related to awarding permanent alimony of Rs.15,00,000/- to the wife(respondent).

From Para 13,

13. The only question involved in the appeal before the High Court, which was carried to this Court in this appeal by the appellant (husband), was whether the award of permanent alimony of Rs.15,00,000/- by the Family Court to the respondent(wife) was legally and factually sustainable.

Obiter Dicta:

15. In our view, mere perusal of the order of the Family Court and the High Court quoted supra, would go to show that both the Courts failed to apply their judicial mind to the factual and legal controversy insofar as award of permanent alimony to the respondent(wife) is concerned. Both the Courts did not even mention the factual narration of the case set up by the parties on the question of award of permanent alimony and without there being any discussion, appreciation, reasoning and categorical findings on the material issues such as, financial earning capacity of husband to pay the alimony and also the financial earning capacity of wife, a direction to pay Rs.15,00,000/- by way of permanent alimony to the wife was given. In our opinion, such direction is wholly unsustainable in law.

Hehehe…

16. Time and again, this Court has emphasized on the Courts the need to pass reasoned order in every case, which must contain the narration of the bare facts of the case of the parties to the lis, the issues arising in the case, the submissions urged by the parties, the legal principles applicable to the issues involved and the reasons in support of the findings recorded based on appreciation of evidence on all the material issues arising in the case.
17. It is really unfortunate that neither the Family Court nor the High Court kept in mind these legal principles and passed cryptic and unreasoned orders. Such orders undoubtedly cause prejudice to the parties and in this case, it caused prejudice to the appellant(husband) because the orders of the High Court and Family Court deprived him to know the reasons for fixing the permanent alimony amount of Rs.15,00,000/- payable to his wife.
18. We cannot countenance the manner in which both the Courts passed the order which has compelled us to remand the matter to the Family Court for deciding the issue afresh on merits.

Jalendra Padhiary Vs Pragati Chhotray on 17 April 2018

Citations : [2018 SCC 16 773], [2019 SCC CIV 1 703], [2018 SCC ONLINE SC 391], [2018 AIR SC 2091], [2018 ALD 4 130], [2018 ALR 130 51], [2018 AIC 188 178], [2018 CHN 3 144], [2018 CTC 6 813]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/112299382/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5ad8c5f99eff431c1103ed06

Md. Ali @ Guddu Vs State of U.P. on 10 Mar 2015

Posted on December 15, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice Dipak Misra sitting in a Division Bench of Supreme Court held that, the story of prosecutrix did not inspire confidence so the sole evidence of prosecutrix unsupported by medical evidence led to the acquittal of the appellants.

Md. Ali @ Guddu Vs State of U.P. on 10 Mar 2015

Citations : [2016 NCC 1 99], [2015 ACR SC 1 972], [2015 AD SC 3 181], [2015 ALD CRL SC 2 43], [2015 CCR SC 2 404], [2015 CCR SC 1 543], [2015 CLT SC 120 418], [2015 CRIMES SC 2 84], [2015 JCC SC 2 1327], [2015 OLR SC 1 856], [2015 RCR CRIMINAL 2 206], [2015 SCC 7 272], [2015 SCJ 4 178], [2015 WLN SC 3 18], [2015 SCC ONLINE SC 192], [2015 SCR 3 416], [2015 ALL LJ 3 489], [2015 CRI LJ 1967], [2015 ALT CRL SC 2 432]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/51474008/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5790b240e561097e45a4e228

https://www.indianbarassociation.org/supreme-court-judgment-md-aliguddu-vs-state-of-uttar-pradesh/

Ganga Kumar Srivastava Vs The State of Bihar on 20 Jul 2005

Posted on December 15, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

The following are the principles that emerge in regards to the exercise of power of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution:

“(i) The powers of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution are very wide but in criminal appeals this Court does not interfere with the
concurrent findings of fact save in exceptional circumstances.
(ii) It is open to this Court to interfere with the findings of fact given by the High Court, if the High Court has acted perversely or otherwise improperly.
(iii) It is open to this Court to invoke the power under Article 136 only in very exceptional circumstances as and when a question of law of general public importance arises or a decision shocks the conscience of the Court.
(iv) When the evidence adduced by the prosecution fell short of the test of reliability and acceptability and as such it is highly unsafe to act upon it.
(v) Where the appreciation of evidence and finding is vitiated by any error of law of procedure or found contrary to the principles of natural justice, errors of record and misreading of the evidence, or where the conclusions of the High Court are manifestly perverse and unsupportable from the evidence on record.”

Ganga Kumar Srivastava Vs The State of Bihar on 20 Jul 2005

Citations : [2005 SCC 6 211], [2005 JT 6 356], [2005 RCR CRI 3 707], [2005 AIR SC 3123], [2005 CRI 5 95], [2005 SAR CRI 0 640], [2005 SCJ 5 364], [2005 CALCRILR 419], [2005 CRLR 650], [2005 BLJ 1630], [2005 ALD CRI 1 485], [2005 ALD CRI 2 485], [2005 ALL MR CRI 2540], [2005 MAHLR 3 542], [2005 SUPREME 5 123], [2005 SCALE 5 535], [2005 AIR SC 3617], [2005 CCR 3 35], [2005 JCRIC 2 1182], [2005 SRJ 7 47], [2005 SLT 5 393], [2005 SCC CRI 1424], [2005 CRLJ SC 3454], [2005 MADLJ CRI 1 864], [2005 AIR SCW 3617]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1238385/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae1ce4b0149711412fe4

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/ganga-kumar-srivastava-versus-the-state-of-bihar

Sambhaji and Ors vs Gangabai and Ors on 20 Nov 2008

Posted on December 4, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that. ‘a Civil/Trial Court can accept the written statement even after statutory time limit of 90 days‘, as prescribed under Order 8 Rule 1.

15. In the instance case the trial court proceeded on the erroneous premises that there was no scope to accept the written statement after 90 days. The High Court by the impugned order held that though it had power, no case was made out to accept the prayer. We have considered the grounds indicated by the appellants seeking acceptance of the written statement filed belatedly. They cannot be considered to be trivial or without substance. In the case of this nature where close relatives are litigants a liberal approach is called for. In the circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the High Court affirming the order passed by the trial court refusing acceptance of the written statement. The matter is not very complex. We request the trial court to complete trial of the suit within the period of six months. The appeal is allowed without any order as to costs.

Sambhaji and Ors Vs Gangabai and Ors on 20 Nov 2008

Citations : [2009 ELT SC 240 1612008 AIR SC SUPP 7672008 SUPREME 8 7142008 SCC 17 1172009 BOMCR SC 1 812008 JT 13 442008 SCALE 15 5222008 AIOL 13332008 SLT 9 2982009 ALLMR SC 1 9212008 SCR 16 4692009 ELT 240 161]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/90423/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae73e4b0149711413e98

Rajaram Prasad Yadav Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 4 Jul 2013

Posted on November 23, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court passed these guidelines when a witness is called or recalled for evidence.

a) Whether the Court is right in thinking that the new evidence is needed by it? Whether the evidence sought to be led in under Section 311 is noted by the Court for a just decision of a case?
b) The exercise of the widest discretionary power under Section 311 Cr.P.C. should ensure that the judgment should not be rendered on inchoate,
inconclusive speculative presentation of facts, as thereby the ends of justice would be defeated.
c) If evidence of any witness appears to the Court to be essential to the just decision of the case, it is the power of the Court to summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person.
d) The exercise of power under Section 311 Cr.P.C. should be resorted to only with the object of finding out the truth or obtaining proper proof for
such facts, which will lead to a just and correct decision of the case.
e) The exercise of the said power cannot be dubbed as filling in a lacuna in a prosecution case, unless the facts and circumstances of the case make it
apparent that the exercise of power by the Court would result in causing serious prejudice to the accused, resulting in miscarriage of justice.
f) The wide discretionary power should be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily.
g) The Court must satisfy itself that it was in every respect essential to examine such a witness or to recall him for further examination in order to
arrive at a just decision of the case.
h) The object of Section 311 Cr.P.C. simultaneously imposes a duty on the Court to determine the truth and to render a just decision.
i) The Court arrives at the conclusion that additional evidence is necessary, not because it would be impossible to pronounce the judgment without it, but because there would be a failure of justice without such evidence being considered.
j) Exigency of the situation, fair play and good sense should be the safe guard, while exercising the discretion. The Court should bear in mind that no party in a trial can be foreclosed from correcting errors and that if proper evidence was not adduced or a relevant material was not brought on record due to any inadvertence, the Court should be magnanimous in permitting such mistakes to be rectified.
k) The Court should be conscious of the position that after all the trial is basically for the prisoners and the Court should afford an opportunity to them in the fairest manner possible. In that parity of reasoning, it would be safe to err in favour of the accused getting an opportunity rather than protecting the prosecution against possible prejudice at the cost of the accused. The Court should bear in mind that improper or capricious exercise of such a discretionary power, may lead to undesirable results.
l) The additional evidence must not be received as a disguise or to change the nature of the case against any of the party.
m) The power must be exercised keeping in mind that the evidence that is likely to be tendered, would be germane to the issue involved and also
ensure that an opportunity of rebuttal is given to the other party.
n) The power under Section 311 Cr.P.C. must therefore, be invoked by the Court only in order to meet the ends of justice for strong and valid reasons and the same must be exercised with care, caution and circumspection. The Court should bear in mind that fair trial entails the interest of the accused, the victim and the society and, therefore, the grant of fair and proper opportunities to the persons concerned, must be ensured being a constitutional goal, as well as a human right.

Rajaram Prasad Yadav Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 4 Jul 2013

Citations : [2013 AD SC 8 583], [2013 AIR SC 3081], [2013 JLJR 3 447], [2013 JCC 3 2179], [2013 JT SC 11 118], [2013 NCC 2 582], [2013 PLJR 4 34], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL 3 726], [2013 SCALE 8 316], [2013 SCC 14 461], [2013 SCR 7 420], [2013 UC 3 1631], [2014 SCC CRI 4 256], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 577], [2013 AIC 128 29], [2013 AIR SC 0 4179], [2013 AIR SC 1746], [2013 CRLJ SC 3777], [2013 SLT 6 571], [2013 SUPREME 4 621], [2013 AIOL 432], [2013 KCCR SN 4 396], [2013 SCJ 7 986], [2013 BOMCR CRI SC 4 35], [2013 AIR SCW 0 4179]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/3583407/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af2be4b0149711415b41

Shailaja Patil Vs Khobbanna Patil on 18 Jan 2017

Posted on November 14, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

In this Order, Supreme Court held as follows,

That apart, we find that the High Court has proceeded on the basis that the appellant No.1 was capable of earning and that is one of the reasons for reducing the maintenance granted to her by the Family Court. Whether the appellant No.1 is capable of earning or whether she is actually earning are two different requirements. Merely because the appellant No.1 is capable of earning is not, in our opinion, sufficient reason to reduce the maintenance awarded by the Family Court.

This means, due to the mistake of High Court in assuming that being capable means earning, Supreme Court clarified that it is NOT so. This principle should apply to men as much as it was applied to women.

And, it is not clear why no Court is asking this question: Why are your needs/expenses out of sync with your income? Just because of the termination of financial assistance from husband?

Shailaja Patil Vs Khobbanna Patil on 18 Jan 2017

Citations : [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 2692017 AIR SC 11742017 AKR 2 3142017 ALLMR CRI 31072017 CRILJ 23062017 KCCR 3 18092017 OLR 1 9212017 RLW SC 3 24902017 RCR CIVIL 2 7012017 RCR CRIMINAL 2 4972017 SCC ONLINE SC 2692017 AIR SC 1174]

Other Sources :

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5a65cbb44a93263320779de5

Here is the High Court Order.

Shailaja Patil Vs Khobbanna Patil on 17 Apr 2013

Note: The mistake is this… All Assumptions are highlighted…

Petitioner is said to be working as a Lecturer and in a matrimonial dispute between him and the 1st respondent wife, the Family Court has ordered to pay maintenance of Rs.15,000/- to the wife and Rs.10,000/- per month to the son. According to the petitioner’s counsel, the 1st respondent is also working as a Teacher and is earning.

However, according to the counsel representing the 1st respondent, there is no proof of income being produced and she has no permanent source of income. Accordingly, he has sought for rejection of the application filed by the petitioner and to enhance the maintenance awarded.

Having regard to the fact that the wife is also capable of earning, she could be awarded Rs.6,000/- per month and the son could be awarded Rs.6,000/- per month. Ordered accordingly. Amount in deposit be adjusted towards arrears and also for future payment. Amount in deposit be released in favour of the respondent wife and child, as per the modified award.

Sabina Sahdev and Ors Vs Vidur Sahdev on 9 Jul 2018

Posted on November 14, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division bench of Delhi High Court held that, the law does not prescribe any precondition such that the arrears amount of maintenance has to be deposited before appeal or revision can be allowed.

From Para 22,

22. Neither the language used by the Legislature in Section 399 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C., nor the language used in Section 29 of the DV Act even remotely suggest that the Legislature intended to impose pre-conditions to the availment of the said remedies, of the kind evolved in Rajeev Preenja (supra).

And then from Para 25,

25. Laudable as the object of the learned Single Judge may have been, the question is, whether in the light of the settled law taken note of hereinabove, the learned Single Judge while deciding Rajeev Preenja (supra) could have issued a general direction barring entertainment of criminal revisions under Section 399 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. against orders granting interim maintenance to the wife/ child under Section 125 Cr.P.C., unless the entire arrears of maintenance up to date were first deposited? In our view, with due respect to the learned Single Judge, the answer is clearly in the negative. As to what should be the policy of the law is a matter which squarely falls within the preserve of the Legislature, and it is not a matter which the Courts can dictate, or evolve. It is one thing to interpret an existing law and, while doing so, to adopt an interpretation which is purposive, i.e. one which advances the objective of the enactment. However, it is quite a different thing to evolve a statutory scheme which, even the Legislature did not provide for.

Finally, in Paras 29 and 30,

29. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Bahl, imposition of a limitation on the statutory remedy of revision/ appeal under Section 399 of the Cr.P.C. or Section 29 of the DV Act- as the case may be, also falls foul of Article 14 of the Constitution of India for the reasons noticed by the Division Bench in Gagan Makkar (supra).Even if the condition in question – of the nature directed by the learned Single Judge in Rajeev Preenja (supra), were to exist in the statutory framework, the same may fail the test of reasonableness under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This is for the reason that, in a given case, the order granting interim maintenance passed by the Ld. Magistrate either under Section 125 Cr.P.C or under Section 29 of the DV Act, may be so harsh and so unreasonable, as to make it impossible for the opposite party/ husband to comply with the same. Experience shows that in a large number of cases, the arrears of interim maintenance- which may be granted from the date of moving of the application before the Ld. Magistrate, may accumulate to a very large amount running into lakhs of rupees. The arrears of interim maintenance may not necessarily be a meager amount in all cases. It would be most unjust and unreasonable to bar his statutory remedy of revision/ appeal as the case may be, merely because he may not be in a position to deposit the entire arrears of interim maintenance.

From Para 30 (Corum cleverly clubbed 125 Cr.P.C. cases also along with DV cases!)

30. Thus, we answer the reference by holding that the general direction issued in Rajeev Preenja (supra) in paragraphs 15, 16 and 20 are not sustainable. The said directions could not have been issued by the learned Single Judge as they seek to curtail the statutory remedy of revision available under Section 399 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C, and of appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act, against orders granting interim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and Section 23 of the DV Act respectively. The direction in question over steps into the legislative field, which was impermissible for the Court to do. We agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge in Brijesh Kumar Gupta (supra), that there cannot be an absolute rider that the entire maintenance amount, as granted by the Trial Court, should be deposited prior to the entertainment of the statutory remedy, because it would leave the remedy of statutory revision/ appeal illusory. Accordingly, we hold that a revision under Section 399 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. and an appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act, against the order granting maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and under Section 23 of the DV Act respectively, would be maintainable, and would be entertained and heard without any pre-condition of deposit of the arrears of maintenance as ordered by the Ld. MM. We further hold that the pendency of such a Revision or Appeal- as the case may be, shall not operate as a stay of the operation of the order granting interim maintenance. The reference is answered accordingly.

Sabina Sahdev and Ors Vs Vidur Sahdev on 9 Jul 2018

Citations : [2018 DLT 251 245], [2018 HLR 3 413], [2019 CRI LJ 218],[2018 (4) RCR (Criminal) 30], [2018 SCC OnLine Del 9747],

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/80568294/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5b44dfac9eff431bb54655a9

Index of PWDV Act cases here. Index of Maintenance cases u/s 144 BNSS (125 Cr.P.C.) here.

State Of Goa Vs Jose Maria Albert Vales @ Robert Vales on 18 Aug 2017

Posted on November 13, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

2-Judge bench held that without prima facie opinion in a complaint made otherwise than a police complaint, invoking of perjury u/s 340 CrPC or 341 CrPC is indefensible.

From Para 58,

58. We are thus of the firm opinion that a Trial Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint under Section 340 and/or Section 341 of the Code, if there is a preliminary inquiry and adequate materials in support of the considerations impelling action under the above provisions are available, would be required to treat such complaint to constitute a case, as if instituted on police report and proceed in accordance with law. However, in absence of any preliminary inquiry or adequate materials, it would be open for the Trial Magistrate, if he genuinely feels it necessary, in the interest of justice and to avoid unmerited prosecution to embark on a summary inquiry to collect further materials and then decide the future course of action as per law. In both the eventualities, the Trial Magistrate has to be cautious, circumspect, rational, objective and further informed with the overwhelming caveat that the offence alleged is one affecting the administration of justice, requiring a responsible, uncompromising and committed approach to the issue referred to him for inquiry and trial, as the case may be. In no case, however, in the teeth of Section 343(1), the procedure prescribed for cases instituted otherwise than on police report would either be relevant or applicable qua the complaints under Section 340 and/or 341 of the Cr.P.C.

And from Final Para,

60. In view of the determination as above, the approach of the High Court is wholly indefensible, as in the face of Section 343(1) of the Cr.P.C., the procedure prescribed for cases instituted otherwise than on police report is not attracted qua a complaint under Section 340 and/or Section 341 of the Code. Even assuming that the Trial Magistrate had examined few witnesses in support of the complaint, it was in the form of a summary inquiry, to be satisfied as to whether the materials on record would justify the framing of charge against the respondent or not and nothing further. Any other view would fly in the face of the ordainment of Section 343(1) of the Cr.P.C. and thus cannot receive judicial imprimatur. The impugned judgment of the High Court in quashing the charge framed by the Trial Magistrate and remanding the case to him to follow the procedure outlined for cases, instituted otherwise than on police report, under Chapter XIX-B is on the face of it unsustainable in law and on facts. It is thus set aside. The appeals are allowed. The Trial Magistrate would proceed from the stage of framing of charge, strictly in compliance of the letter and spirit of the precept contained in Section 343(1) of the Code. We make it clear that we have not offered any observation on the merits of the charge and the Trial Court would further the proceedings in accordance with law.

State Of Goa Vs Jose Maria Albert Vales @ Robert Vales on 18 Aug 2017

Citations : [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 1021], [2017 ALLCC 101 330], [2017 CCR SC 4 28], [2017 JCC 4 2245], [2017 RCR CRIMINAL 3 981], [2017 SCALE 9 527], [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 1021]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/194410529/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5a65cbaf4a93263320778706

Index of Perjury Case laws is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision

Thota Suresh Babu Vs The Special Officer Mission AP

Bhushan Kumar and Anr Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 4 April 2012

Jalendra Padhiary Vs Pragati Chhotray on 17 April 2018

Md. Ali @ Guddu Vs State of U.P. on 10 Mar 2015

Ganga Kumar Srivastava Vs The State of Bihar on 20 Jul 2005

Sambhaji and Ors vs Gangabai and Ors on 20 Nov 2008

Rajaram Prasad Yadav Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 4 Jul 2013

Shailaja Patil Vs Khobbanna Patil on 18 Jan 2017

Sabina Sahdev and Ors Vs Vidur Sahdev on 9 Jul 2018

State Of Goa Vs Jose Maria Albert Vales @ Robert Vales on 18 Aug 2017