Based on Sharad Birdhichand here and many other judgments, Allahabad High Court has set-aside the conviction and sentence of the appellants.
Tag: 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision
Nawab Vs State of Uttarakhand on 22 Jan 2020
Based on Sharad BirdhiChand here, Apex Court held that the defence of accused is full of holes and cannot be believed and hence his appeal was dismissed.
Kapil Agarwal and Ors Vs Sanjay Sharma and Ors 01 Mar 2021
Apex Court quashed the FIR in this case, and u/s 210 CrPC, held as follows
From Paras 5 and 6,
Thus, as per Section 210 Cr.P.C., when in a case instituted otherwise than on a police report, i.e., in a complaint case, during the course of the inquiry or trial held by the Magistrate, it appears to the Magistrate that an investigation by the police is in progress in relation to the offence which is the subject matter of the inquiry or trial held by him, the Magistrate shall stay the proceedings of such inquiry or trial and call for a report on the matter from the police officer conducting the investigation. It also provides that if a report is made by the investigating police officer under Section 173 Cr.P.C. and on such report cognizance of any offence is taken by the Magistrate against any person who is an accused in the complaint case, the Magistrate shall inquire into or try together the complaint case and the case arising out of the police report as if both the cases were instituted on a police report. It also further provides that if the police report does not relate to any accused in the complaint case or if the Magistrate does not take cognizance of any offence on the police report, he shall proceed with the inquiry or trial, which was stayed by him, in accordance with the provisions of Cr.P.C.
Thus, merely because on the same set of facts with the same allegations and averments earlier the complaint is filed, there is no bar to lodge the FIR with the police station with the same allegations and averments.
6. However, at the same time, if it is found that the subsequent FIR is an abuse of process of law and/or the same has been lodged only to harass the accused, the same can be quashed in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution or in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. In that case, the complaint case will proceed further in accordance with the provisions of the Cr.P.C.
Citations : [2021 SCC OnLine SC 154]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/97191348/
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/kapil-agarwal-and-others-versus-sanjay-sharma-and-others
https://www.legitquest.com/case/kapil-agarwal-and-others-v-sanjay-sharma-and-others/1DA1F3
https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/tag/inherent-powers-of-high-courts/
U.Surekha Vs State of AP on 04 Mar 2021
Relying on landmark judgment of Apex Court here, a Division bench of AP High Court comprising the Chief Justice held that the rule [Rule 5(2)(a)(i) of Andhra Pradesh State Judicial Service Rules, 2007] which mandates 3 years of practice as requirement from Junior Civil Judge positions in State of AP was unconstitutional and the Notification issued on 03 Dec 2020 was set aside.
Another case got filed at Supreme Court here which was later withdrawn.
Praveen Singh Ramakant Bhadauriya Vs Neelam Praveen Singh Bhadauriya on 01 May 2019
In this short judgment for Contested divorce into MCD, Justice Bhanumathi held that, if the parties do not comply of the terms of compromise, the parties would be liable for contempt of this Court in addition to other remedies available under law.
From Para 8,
8. In case of non-compliance of the terms of compromise, the parties would be liable for contempt of this Court in addition to other remedies available under law.
Citations : [2019 SCC 6 259], [2019 SCC CRI 2 903], [2019 SCC CIV 3 210], [2019 SCC ONLINE SC 644]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/123208079/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5d7b77b13321bc1845b64736
Santokh Singh Vs Izhar Hussain and Anr on 25 Apr 1973
A 2-judge bench of Apex Court held that, in this particular case, the Police officer can not be saddled with IPC 211 and prosecuted u/s 340 CrPC read with 195 CrPC. But the necessary ingredients are clearly articulated and hence this case law has to be relied upon as landmark judgment to file perjury against the person who made the false complaint (FIR need not be registered).
From Para 8,
8. In this Court, Shri Gupta has very forcefully contended that on the material on the record this direction is wholly unjustified, if not positively illegal, being based on misreading of evidence and on erroneous view of law. According to the submission, the appellant had neither lodged the FIR nor otherwise instituted any criminal proceeding or falsely charged Izhar Hussain within the contemplation of Section 211 IPC. Besides, there is absolutely no material on the record on which the High Court could have formed an opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that a complaint under Section 211 IPC should be filed against the appellant.
From Para 10,
… The short question posed, therefore, is, if by giving false evidence as a witness against Izhar Hussain the appellant can be said to have charged him within the contemplation of Section 211 IPC. If this question is answered in the affirmative, then it will have to be determined whether there is in fact a false accusation and finally whether it is expedient in the interest of justice on the facts and circumstances of the present case to direct a complaint to be filed under Section 211 IPC. This section as its marginal note indicates renders punishable false charge of offence with intent to injure. The essential ingredient of an offence under Section 211 IPC is to institute or cause to be instituted any criminal proceeding against a person with intent to cause him injury or with similar intent to falsely charge any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge. Instituting or causing to institute false criminal proceedings assume false charge but false charge may be preferred even when no criminal proceedings result. It is frankly conceded by Shri Kohli that the appellant cannot be said to have instituted any criminal proceeding against any person. So that part of Section 211 IPC is eliminated. Now, the expression “falsely charges” in this section, in our opinion, cannot mean giving false evidence as a prosecution witness against an accused person during the course of a criminal trial. To “falsely charge” must refer to the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation and not when speaking to prove the false charge by making deposition in support of the charge framed in that trial. The words “falsely charges” have to be read along with the expression “institution of criminal proceeding”. Both these expressions, being susceptible of analogous meaning should be understood to have been used in their cognate sense. They get as it were their colour and content from each other. They seem to have been used in a technical sense as commonly understood in our criminal law. The false charge must, therefore, be made initially to a person in authority or to someone who is in a position to get the offender punished by appropriate proceedings. In other words, it must be embodied either in a complaint or in a report of a cognizable offence to the police officer or an officer having authority over the person against whom the allegations are made. The statement in order to constitute the “charge” should be made with the intention and object of setting criminal law in motion. Statement on oath falsely supporting the prosecution case against an accused person more appropriately amounts to an offence under Sections 193 and 195 IPC and not under Section 211 IPC. We do not think that the offences contemplated by Sections 193/195 IPC on the one hand and Section 211 IPC on the other were intended by the legislature in this context, to overlap so as to make it optional whether to proceed under one or the other. ..…
From Para 11,
Every incorrect or false statement does not make it incumbent on the court to order prosecution. The Court has to exercise judicial discretion in the light of all the relevant circumstances when it determines the question of expediency. The court orders prosecution in the larger interest of the administration of justice and not to gratify feelings of personal revenge or vindictiveness or to serve the ends of a private party. Too frequent prosecutions for such offences tend to defeat its very object. It is only in glaring cases of deliberate falsehood where conviction is highly likely that the court should direct prosecution.
Original:
Casemine Version.
Citations : [1973 AIR SC 2190], [1974 BLJR 22 877], [1973 SCC 2 406], [1974 SCR 1 78], [1973 CAR 316], [1973 CRLR SC 473], [1973 SCC CR 828], [1973 SCC CRI 828], [1973 CRLJ SC 1176]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/56524/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ab94e4b014971140cd11
Index of Perjury judgments here.
Pankaj Kumar Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 11 Jul 2008
In this landmark judgment, Apex Court held that Right to speedy trial is implicit to Article 21 of Constitution of India and also passed guidelines to ensure that this right is not violated, and it violated, Constitutional Courts have a duty to fix such violation appropriately.
From Para 14,
14. Time and again this Court has emphasized the need for speedy investigations and trial as both are mandated by the letter and spirit of the provisions of the CrPC. (In particular, Sections 197, 173, 309, 437 (6) and 468 etc.) and the constitutional protection enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. Inspired by the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by a seven-Judge Bench of this Court in Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India & Anr., in Hussainara Khatoon & Ors. Vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, this Court had said that Article 21 confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except according to procedure established by law; that such procedure is not some semblance of a procedure but the procedure should be ‘reasonable, fair and just’; and therefrom flows, without doubt, the right to speedy trial. It was also observed that no procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as ‘reasonable, fair or just’ and it would fall foul of Article 21. The Court clarified that speedy trial means reasonably expeditious trial which is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21.
From Para 15,
15. The exposition of Article 21 in Hussainara Khatoon’s case (supra) was exhaustively considered afresh by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors. Vs. R.S. Nayak & Anr.11. Referring to a number of decisions of this Court and the American precedents on the Sixth Amendment of their Constitution, making the right to a speedy and public trial a constitutional guarantee, the Court formulated as many as eleven propositions with a note of caution that these were not exhaustive and were meant only to serve as guidelines. For the sake of brevity, we do not propose to reproduce all the said propositions and it would suffice to note the gist thereof. These are:
(i) fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily;
(ii) right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial;
(iii) in every case where the speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is —
who is responsible for the delay?;
(iv) while determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of right to speedy trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the work-load of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on— what is called, the systemic delays;
(v) each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case;
(vi) ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh several relevant factors—’balancing test’ or ‘balancing process’—and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied;
(vii) Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open and having regard to the nature of offence and other circumstances when the court feels that quashing of proceedings cannot be in the interest of justice, it is open to the court to make appropriate orders, including fixing the period for completion of trial;
(viii) it is neither advisable nor feasible to prescribe any outer time-limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. In every case of complaint of denial of right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint;
(ix) an objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in High Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis.
From Para 17,
17. It is, therefore, well settled that the right to speedy trial in all criminal persecutions is an inalienable right under Article 21 of the Constitution. This right is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in court but also includes within its sweep the preceding police investigations as well. The right to speedy trial extends equally to all criminal persecutions and is not confined to any particular category of cases. In every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the court has to perform the balancing act upon taking into consideration all the attendant circumstances, enumerated above, and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. Where the court comes to the conclusion that the right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, may be quashed unless the court feels that having regard to the nature of offence and other relevant circumstances, quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a situation, it is open to the court to make an appropriate order as it may deem just and equitable including fixation of time for conclusion of trial.
Citations : [2008 RCR CRI 4 890], [2008 AIR SC 0 5165], [2008 JT 8 109], [2008 AIR SC 3077], [2008 RAJ 6 293], [2008 SCC 16 117], [2008 WLC 2 677], [2008 MLJ CRI 2 1649], [2009 SCJ 1 998], [2008 SCALE 9 760], [2008 CCR 3 176], [2008 DLT CRI 3 533], [2008 SLT 6 233], [2008 AIOL 2116], [2008 ANJ SC 2 173], [2008 BOMCR CRI SC 2 590], [2010 SCC CRI 4 217], [2008 AIC SC 68 93], [2009 LLN 2 798], [2009 FLR 122 790], [2008 CRLJ SC 3944], [2008 AIR SCW 5165]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1223002/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae6ae4b0149711413c8f
Nandlal Vs Principal Secretary on 14 Aug 2008
Maharashtra State Legislative Assembly adjudged the petitioner guilty of contempt of the Assembly for avoiding to submit his written explanation under his own signature to its Committee on Privileges and for declining to appear before the Committee for tendering the evidence and resolved that the petitioner be imprisoned in a civil prison for two days. The Speaker of the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly consequently issued the warrant of commitment on 27-3-2008 which was executed by a Senior Inspector of Police on the very day and on 28-3-2008, on completion of two days’ imprisonment, the petitioner was released from the prison.
Bombay High Court dismissed this Writ Petition by the State Election Commission, Nandlal.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1783393/
https://www.lawyerservices.in/Shri-Nandlal-Versus-The-Principal-Secretary-Maharashtra-Legislative-Assembly-and-Others-2008-08-14
Vimal Kumar Vs State of U.P. on 28 Jan 2021
Based on Arnesh Kumar and Manav Adhikar, Allahabad High Court discussed the meaning and import of Sec 41A of CrPC and passed directions not to arrest accused automatically in 498A IPC cases.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://www.barandbench.com/news/litigation/pained-unnecessary-arrest-allahabad-high-court-comply-with-section-41-crpc
https://lawsisto.com/legalnewsread/OTYwNQ==/Guidelines-directing-strict-compliance-with-Section-41-CrPC-issued-by-Allahabad-High-Court
https://www.latestlaws.com/latest-news/while-explaining-amended-meaning-of-section-41-cr-p-c-high-court-passes-several-direction-to-stop-the-routinely-and-arbitrary-arrests-read-order/
Karnataka Power Distribution Vs M RajaShekar on 2 Dec 2016
Karnataka High Court held that (which is wrongly understood by many) once the advocate of a case on record of the Court is discharged, as per procedure established by law (termination letter and communicating the same to advocate), a party has absolute right to engage another advocate and no need of obtaining a separate NOC from the advocate, who was discharged. This was further clarified by a Division Bench here.
From Paras 6 to 9,
6. As could be seen from the observations made in the two decisions extracted above, a party to a litigation has an absolute right to appoint an advocate of his choice, to terminate his services, and to appoint a new advocate. A party has the freedom to change his advocate any time and for whatever reason. However, fairness demands that the party should inform his advocate already on record, though this is not a condition precedent to appoint a new advocate.
7. There is nothing known as irrevocable vakalatnama. The right of a party to withdraw vakalatnama or authorization given to an advocate is absolute. Hence, a party may discharge his advocate any time, with or without cause by withdrawing his vakalatnama or authorization. On discharging the advocate, the party has the right to have the case file returned to him from the advocate, and any refusal by the advocate to return the file amounts to misconduct under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961. In any proceeding, including civil and criminal, a party has an absolute right to appoint a new Advocate. Under no circumstance, a party can be denied of his right to appoint a new advocate of his choice. Therefore, it follows that any rule or law imposing restriction on the said right can’t be construed as mandatory. Accordingly, Courts, Tribunals or other authorities shall not ask for ‘no objection’ of the advocate already on record, to accept the vakalatnama filed by a new advocate.
8. As observed in the decisions referred to above, if an Advocate is discharged by his client and if he has any genuine claim against his client relating to the fee payable to him, the appropriate course for him is to return the brief and to agitate his claim in an appropriate forum, in accordance with law.
9. As stated above, under no circumstance, a party can be denied of his right to appoint a new advocate of his choice. The right is absolute and not conditional. Hence, the objection raised by the Registry on the vakalatnama is overruled. Hereafter, the Registry shall not ask for ‘no objection’ of the advocate already on record, to accept the vakalatnama filed by a new Advocate.
Citations : [2016 SCC ONLINE KAR 6470], [2017 ILR KAR 59], [2017 AIR KAR 1], [2017 KCCR 1 383], [2017 AIR KANT R 4 210]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/128027421/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5845968353bee765a86aed81
Other Judgements on this subject here.
