S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs Jagannath on 27 Oct 1993

Posted on July 4, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Landmark judgment by a division bench of the Supreme Court of India around perjury/fraud committed upon the Courts. Just read the below line to understand how far the frauds take the Courts for a ride.

This Civil Appeal was numbered 994 of 1972, but got decided on October 27, 1993!
Twenty One (21) years lost at Supreme Court itself!!!

From Para 5,

5. The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. The High Court, however, went haywire and made observations which are wholly perverse. We do not agree with the High Court that “there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence”. The principle of “finality of litigation” cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court-process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who’s case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.

From Para 6,

6. The facts of the present case leave no manner of doubt that Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another’s loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. Jagannath was working as a clerk with Chunilal Sowcar. He purchased the property in the court auction on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. He had, on his own volition, executed the registered release deed (Ex. B-15) in favour of Chunilal Sowcar regarding the property in dispute. He knew that the appellants had paid the total decretal amount to his master Chunilal Sowcar. Without disclosing all these facts, he filed the suit for the partition of the property on the ground that he had purchased the property on his own behalf and not on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. Non-production and even non-mentioning of the release deed at the trial is tantamount to playing fraud on the court. We do not agree with the observations of the High Court that the appellants- defendants could have easily produced the certified registered copy of Ex. B-15 and non-suited the plaintiff. A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party.

S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs Jagannath on 27 Oct 1993 (Original)

Citations : [1994 AIR SC 853], [1993 SCALE 4 277], [1994 UJ SC 1 1], [1993 BC SC 2 546], [1994 BLJR 1 216], [1994 OLR SC 1 201], [1995 PLR 109 293], [1993 SUPP SCR 3 422], [1994 SCC 1 1], [1994 PLJR 1 39], [1994 APLJ SC 1 66], [1994 LW 1 21], [1994 GLH 1 81], [1993 JT SC 6 331]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1151521/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac8fe4b014971140f23f

Index of Perjury related judgments is here.

Nasruddin Mian Vs State of Bihar on 21 Jun 2021

Posted on July 4, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Patna High Court held that this is not how a judgment is to be written, while acquitting a husband from a conviction given for the alleged offence of murdering his wife.

78. The judgment under consideration is an example of how not to write a judgment. It has repeatedly been emphasized by the Supreme Court that the Courts and Judges must make a dispassionate assessment of evidence and that the Courts and Judges should not be swayed by the horror of crime and the character of the person. The judgment should be made by a Judge uninfluenced by his own imagined norms of the functioning of the society.
79. The Trial Court ought to have avoided the sweeping and disparaging remarks made in para 42 of its judgment regarding the conduct of the appellants.
80. I fail to see as to how the Trial Court held in para 44 of its judgment that the charge was framed against the appellants under Section 498-A of the IPC after the informant filed an application for addition to the original charge. The order dated 08.05.2017 passed by the Trial Court, which has been extracted hereinabove, would clearly show that the original charge under Sections 498-A, 306 and 201/34 of the IPC was altered to Sections 304-B, 302 and 201/34 of the IPC. The trial court did not allow the prayer of the informant regarding addition of Sections 304-B and 302 of the IPC to the original charge already framed against them meaning thereby that due to alteration of the original charge vide order dated 08.05.2017, the charge under Sections 498-A and 306 became non-existent.
81. As a matter of fact, for all practical purposes, after alteration of the charge, the appellants were being tried only for the offences punishable under Sections 304-B, 302 and 201/34 of the IPC.
82. Surprisingly, in para 43 of the judgment, the Trial Court held that the case under Section 306 of the IPC is not made out. After alteration of charge, since there was no charge under Section 306 of the IPC, there was no occasion for the Trial Court to have recorded such finding in respect of Section 306 of the IPC.
83. Evidently, while passing the impugned judgment, the Trial Court had misconceived that the appellants were also being tried for the original charge framed under Sections 498-A and 306 of the IPC.
84. While saying so, I am mindful of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shanti Vs. State of Haryana, since reported in (1991) 1 SCC 371, wherein it has been held that Sections 304-B and 498-A of the IPC are not mutually exclusive. They deal with two distinct offences. A person charged and acquitted under Section 304-B of the IPC can be convicted under Section 498-A of the IPC without charge being framed, if such a case is made out. But from the point of view of practice and procedure and to avoid technical defects, it is necessary in such cases to frame charges under both
the sections and if the case is established against the accused, they can be convicted under both the Sections but no separate sentence need be awarded under Section 498-A in view of the substantive sentence being awarded for the major offence under Section 304-B.

Nasruddin Mian Vs State of Bihar on 21 Jun 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/193472418/

Asar Mohammad and Ors Vs State of UP on 24 Oct 2018

Posted on July 2, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Replying on a catena of landmark judgments, a division bench of the Apex Court that the Appellant No.1 is guilty of committing the murder and the Appellant No.2 and 3 are liable to punishment u/s 201 IPC.

Asar Mohammad and Ors Vs State of UP on 24 Oct 2018

Citations : [2018 SCC ONLINE SC 2179], [2019 SCC 12 253], [2019 SCC CRI 4 321], [2018 AIR SC 5264], [2018 CRIMES 4 387], [2019 ALL LJ 1 382], [2018 AIC 192 50], [2019 ECRN 1 148]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/28788694/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5bd343729eff430a1b47f1d9

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/asar-mohammad-and-ors-versus-the-state-of-u-p

https://crlreview.in/asar-mohammad-v-state-of-up/

Kishanvihari Sharma Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors

Posted on June 28, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Two vital and interesting legal questions of interpretation have reached a Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High court.

On 09 Jun 2021,

The Court framed the questions that need determination

(1) As to whether the provision of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. can be invoked by accused alleging improper/delayed investigation or not ?
(2) As to whether the provision of Section 161 Cr.P.C. providing for examination of witnesses by the police can include examination of accused also or not, only for the purpose of ascertaining the truth and not for recording confession ?

Kishanvihari Sharma Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors on 09 Jun 2021

On 24 Jun 2021,

Noting from the submissions of the rival counsels, the Bench held that there are conflicting decision from the Supreme Court on the legal points for determination and so opened up the questions to the entire Bar and sought assistance from the Bar Association.

Kishanvihari Sharma Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors on 24 Jun 2021

On first week of Aug 2021,

S.Gopal Reddy Vs State of Andhra Pradesh on 11 Jul 1996

Posted on June 28, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

This a landmark judgment from a Division bench of the Supreme Court around section 2, 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act 1961.

Definition of Dowry and the offence of Demanding Dowry

The definition of the term ’dowry’ under Section 2 of the Act shows that any property or valuable security given or “agreed to be given” either directly or indirectly by one party to the marriage to the other party to the marriage “at or before or after the marriage” as a “consideration for the marriage of the said parties” would become ’dowry’ punishable under the Act. Property or valuable security so as to constitute ’dowry’ within the meaning of the Act must therefore be given or demanded “as consideration for the marriage”.
Section 4 of the Act aims at discouraging the very “demand” of “dowry” as a ’Consideration for the marriage’ between the parties thereto and lays down that if any person after the commencement of the Act, “demands”, directly or indirectly, from the parents or guardians of a ’bride’ or ’bridegroom’, as the case may be, any ’dowry’, he shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to Rs.5,000/- or with both.
Thus, it would be seen that section 4 makes punishable the very demand of property or valuable security as a consideration for marriage, which demand, if satisfied, would constitute the graver offence under section 3 of the Act punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years and with fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value of such dowry whichever is more.
The definition of the expression ’dowry’ contained in Section 2 of the Act cannot be confined merely to the ’demand’ of money, property or valuable security ’made at or after the performance of marriage’ as is urged by Mr. Rao. The legislature has in its wisdom while providing for the definition of ’dowry’ emphasised that any money, property or valuable security given, as a consideration for marriage, ’before, at or after the marriage would be covered by the expression ’dowry’ and this definition as contained in Section 2 has to be read wherever the expression ’dowry’ occurs in the Act. Meaning of the expression ’dowry’ as commonly used and understood is different than the peculiar definition thereof under the Act. Under Section 4 of the Act, mere demand of ’dowry’ is sufficient to bring home the offence to an accused. Thus, any “demand” of money, property or valuable security made from the bride or her parents or other relatives by the bridegroom or his parents or other relatives or vice-versa would fall within the mischief of ’dowry’ under the Act where such demand is not properly referable to any legally recognised claim and is consideration of marriage. Marriage in this context would include a proposed marriage also more particularly where the non-fulfilment of the “demand of dowry” leads to the ugly consequence of the marriage not taking place at all. The expression ’dowry’ under the Act must be interpreted in the sense which the Statute wishes to attribute to it. Mr. P.P.Rao, learned senior counsel referred to various dictionaries for the meaning of ’dowry’, ’bride’ and ’bridegroom’ and on the basis of those meanings submitted that ’dowry’ must be construed only as such property, goods or valuable security which is given to a husband by and on behalf of the wife at marriage and any demand made prior to marriage would not amount to dowry. We cannot agree. Where definition has been given in a statute itself, it is neither proper nor desirable to look to the dictionaries etc. to find out the meaning of the expression. The definition given in the statute is the determinative- factor. The Act is a piece of social legislation which aims to check the growing menace of the social evil of dowry and it makes punishable not only the actual receiving of dowry but also the very demand of dowry made before or at the time or after the marriage where such demand is referable to the consideration of marriage. Dowry as a quid pro for marriage is prohibited and not the giving of traditional presents to the bride or the bride groom by friends and relatives. Thus, voluntary presents given at or before or after the marriage to the bride or the bridegroom, as the case may be, of a traditional nature, which are given not as a consideration for marriage but out of love, affection on regard, would not fall within the mischief of the expression ’dowry’ mare punishable under the Act.

On the point of Interpretation of Statutes

It is a well known rule of interpretation of statutes that the text and the context of the entire Act must be looked into while interpreting any of the expressions used in a statute. The courts must look to the object which the statute seeks to achieve while interpreting any of the provisions of the Act. A purposive approach for interpreting the Act is necessary. We are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with Mr. Rao that it is only the property or valuable security given at the time of marriage which would bring the same within the definition of ’dowry’ punishable under the Act, as such an interpretation would be defeating the very object for which the Act was enacted. Keeping in view the object of the Act, “demand of dowry” as a consideration for a proposed marriage would also come within the meaning of the expression dowry under the Act. If we were to agree with Mr. Rao that it is only the demand made at or after marriage which is punishable under Section 4 of the Act, Some serious consequences, which the legislature wanted to avoid, are bound to follow. Take for example a case where the bridegroom or his parents or other relatives make a ’demand’ of dowry during marriage negotiations and later on after bringing the bridal party to the bride’s house find that the bride or her parents or relative have not met the earlier ’demand’ and call off the marriage and leave the bride house should they escape the punishment under the Act. The answer has to be an emphatic ’no’. It would be adding insult to injury if we were to countenance that their action would not attract the provisions of Section 4 of the Act. Such an interpretation would frustrate the very object of the Act and would also run contrary to the accepted principles relating to the interpretation of statutes.

S.Gopal Reddy Vs State of Andhra Pradesh on 11 Jul 1996

Citations : [1996 AD SC 5 229], [1996 AIR SC 2184], [1996 ALD CRI 2 926], [1996 ALT CRI 2 418], [1996 BLJR 2 1329], [1996 CRILJ 3237], [1996 CRIMES SC 3 35], [1997 DMC SC 2 100], [1996 JT SC 6 268], [1996 RCR CRIMINAL 3 153], [1996 SCALE 5 78], [1996 SCC 4 596], [1996 SUPP SCR 3 439], [1996 SCC CRI 792], [1996 OLR SC 2 229]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1213429/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ace1e4b014971140fef2

Satbir Singh and Anr Vs State of Haryana on 28 May 2021

Posted on June 18, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division bench of the Apex Court passed these guidelines to the Judges trying the 304 IPC cases.

From Para 36,

36. At the cost of repetition, the law under Section 304B, IPC read with Section 113B, Evidence Act can be summarized below:
i. Section 304B, IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and dowry demand.
ii. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section 304B, IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable presumption of causality, provided under Section 113B, Evidence Act operates against the accused.
iii. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304B, IPC cannot be construed to mean ‘immediately before’. The prosecution must establish existence of “proximate and live link” between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives.
iv. Section 304B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.
v. Due to the precarious nature of Section 304B, IPC read with 113B, Evidence Act, Judges, prosecution and defence should be careful during conduction of trial.
vi. It is a matter of grave concern that, often, Trial Courts record the statement under Section 313, CrPC in a very casual and cursory manner, without specifically questioning the accused as to his defense. It ought to be noted that the examination of an accused under Section 313, CrPC cannot be treated as a mere procedural formality, as it based on the fundamental principle of fairness. This aforesaid provision incorporates the valuable principle of natural justice “audi alteram partem” as it enables the accused to offer an explanation for the incriminatory material appearing against him. Therefore, it imposes an obligation on the court to question the accused fairly, with care and caution.
vii. The Court must put incriminating circumstances before the accused and seek his response. A duty is also cast on the counsel of the accused to prepare his defense since the inception of the Trial with due caution, keeping in consideration the peculiarities of Section 304B, IPC read with
Section 113B, Evidence Act.
viii. Section 232, CrPC provides that, “If, after taking the evidence for the prosecution, examining the accused and hearing the prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence, the Judge shall record an order of acquittal”. Such discretion must be utilized by the Trial Courts as an obligation of best efforts.
ix. Once the Trial Court decides that the accused is not eligible to be acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232, CrPC, it must move on and fix hearings specifically for ‘defence evidence’, calling upon the accused to present his defense as per the procedure provided under Section 233, CrPC, which is also an invaluable right provided to the accused.
x. In the same breath, Trial Courts need to balance other important considerations such as the right to a speedy trial. In this regard, we may caution that the above provisions should not be allowed to be misused as delay tactics.
xi. Apart from the above, the presiding Judge should follow the guidelines laid down by this Court while sentencing and imposing appropriate punishment.
xii. Undoubtedly, as discussed above, the menace of dowry death is increasing day by day. However, it is also observed that sometimes family members of the husband are roped in, even though they have no active role in commission of the offence and are residing at distant places. In these cases, the Court need to be cautious in its approach.

Satbir Singh and Anr Vs State of Haryana on 28 May 2021

Citations :

Other Sources:

XXXXX Vs XXXXX on 31 May 2021

Posted on June 7, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

The Husband filed this appeal when his divorce petition was dismissed. Division bench of Kerala High Court relying on landmark judgments, held that the baseless accusation of the wife regd the alleged erectile dysfunction of the husband caused mental cruelty and therefore, granted the Divorce on the ground of cruelty.

XXXXX Vs XXXXX on 31 May 2021

Citations:

Other Sources:

Ramasamy Udayar Vs District Collector and Ors on 30 Apr 2021

Posted on May 31, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Madras High Court put the peacefools in their right place and allowed Hindu religious processions in all the streets of the village.

19.As stated earlier, before the year 2012, Temple’s processions were conducted through all the streets in the village and there was no problem. Even from the year 2012 to 2015, processions were conducted through all the streets and roads which have been approved by this Court in W.P.No.23487 of 2012 and W.P.No.33288 of 2015 filed by the private respondent herein. Therefore, it is evident that taking out Temple’s processions through all the streets and roads in V.Kalathur village have been the custom and practice of the Hindus for the past many decades. It seems from the year 2012 onwards, when the Muslims started objecting, the problem seems to have started.

From Para 20,

As per Section 180-A of the District Municipalities Act 1920, roads or streets should be used as access to the people irrespective of their religion, caste or creed. Merely because one religious group is dominating in a particular locality, it cannot be a ground to prohibit from celebrating religious festivals or taking processions of other religious groups through those roads. If it is to be accepted, then a day will come when a particular religious group which is predominantly occupying the area, will not allow the people belonging to other religious groups even to use the roads even for movement, transportation or the normal access. Even the marriage processions and funeral processions would be prohibited/prevented which is not good for our society.

From Para 25,

25.The abovesaid facts of the case would reveal that all along there had been religious tolerance and the religious festivals were conducted very smoothly and religious procession were conducted without any problem through all the streets and roads of the village. If religious intolerance is going to be allowed, it is not good for a secular country. Intolerance in any form by any religious group has to be curtailed and prohibited. In this case,
intolerance of a particular religious group is exhibited by objecting for the festivals which have been conducted for decades together and the procession through the streets and roads of the village are sought to be prohibited stating that the area is dominated by Muslims and therefore, there cannot be any Hindu festival or procession through the locality. India is a secular country and merely because one religious group is living in majority in a particular area, it cannot be a reason for not allowing other religious festivals or processions through that area. If the contention of the private
respondent is to be accepted then it would create a situation in which minority people cannot conduct any festival or procession in most of the areas in India. If resistance is being exhibited by one religious group and it is reciprocated by the other religious groups, there would be chaos, riots, religious fights causing loss of lives and destruction of properties. Consequently, the secular character of our country will be destroyed or damaged.

Ramasamy Udayar Vs District Collector and Ors on 30 Apr 2021

Navendra Kumar Vs Union of India on 06 Nov 2013

Posted on May 19, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Gauhati High Court held in this Writ Appeal that, CBI to be an unconstitutional body.

Navendra Kumar Vs Union of India on 06 Nov 2013

Citations : [2013 SCC ONLINE GAU 305], [2014 GAU LR 1 529], [2014 AIC 133 743], [2013 CRI LJ 5009]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/133280611/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56eaac16607dba3c8ce40e16

The above Judgment and Order was stayed in 3 days time by a Division bench of Supreme Court.

Union of India Vs Navendra Kumar on 09 Nov 2013

Last update from Supreme Court website is this…

Union of India Vs Navendra Kumar on 26 Jun 2019

Dwarika Prasad Satpathy Vs Bidyut Prava Dixit and Anr on 14 Oct 1999

Posted on May 13, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division bench of the Supreme Court held as follows,

“6………………In our view, validity of the marriage for the purpose of summary proceeding under Section 125 Cr.P.C. is to be determined on the basis of the evidence brought on record by the parties. The standard of proof of marriage in such proceeding is not as strict as is required in a trial of offence under section 494 of the I.P.C. If the claimant in proceedings under Section 125 of the Code succeeds in showing that she and the respondent have lived together as husband and wife, the Court can presume that they are legally wedded spouses, and in such a situation, the party who denies the marital status can rebut the presumption………………”

Dwarika Prasad Satpathy Vs Bidyut Prava Dixit and Anr on 14 Oct 1999

Citations : [1999 ACR SC 3 2547], [1999 AIR SC 3348], [1999 ALD CRI 2 955], [1999 ALR 37 733], [2000 ALT CRI 1 29], [1999 CALLT SC 3 61], [2000 CLT SC 89 167], [1999 GLH 2 1037], [1999 JT SC 8 329], [2000 LW CRL 1 218], [2000 PLJR 1 61], [2000 RLW SC 1 23], [1999 SCALE 6 579], [1999 SCC 7 675], [1999 SUPP SCR 3 684], [1999 SCC CRI 1345], [1999 SUPREME 8 602], [2000 CRLJ 0 1], [1999 RCR CRIMINAL 4 577], [2000 CRI LJ 0 1], [2000 OCR SC 18 348], [1999 AIR SC 3844], [2000 BOMCR CRI SC 731], [1999 CRIMES SC 3 206], [2000 LW CRL 1 217], [2000 CRLJ SC 1], [1999 AIR SCW 3844]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/305700/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad5ee4b0149711411339

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision

S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs Jagannath on 27 Oct 1993

This Civil Appeal was numbered 994 of 1972, but got decided on October 27, 1993!

Twenty One (21) years lost at Supreme Court itself!!!

Nasruddin Mian Vs State of Bihar on 21 Jun 2021

Asar Mohammad and Ors Vs State of UP on 24 Oct 2018

Kishanvihari Sharma Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors

S.Gopal Reddy Vs State of Andhra Pradesh on 11 Jul 1996

Satbir Singh and Anr Vs State of Haryana on 28 May 2021

XXXXX Vs XXXXX on 31 May 2021

Ramasamy Udayar Vs District Collector and Ors on 30 Apr 2021

Navendra Kumar Vs Union of India on 06 Nov 2013

Dwarika Prasad Satpathy Vs Bidyut Prava Dixit and Anr on 14 Oct 1999