The Husband filed this appeal when his divorce petition was dismissed. Division bench of Kerala High Court relying on landmark judgments, held that the baseless accusation of the wife regd the alleged erectile dysfunction of the husband caused mental cruelty and therefore, granted the Divorce on the ground of cruelty.
Citations:
Other Sources:
A division bench of Madras High Court put the peacefools in their right place and allowed Hindu religious processions in all the streets of the village.
19.As stated earlier, before the year 2012, Temple’s processions were conducted through all the streets in the village and there was no problem. Even from the year 2012 to 2015, processions were conducted through all the streets and roads which have been approved by this Court in W.P.No.23487 of 2012 and W.P.No.33288 of 2015 filed by the private respondent herein. Therefore, it is evident that taking out Temple’s processions through all the streets and roads in V.Kalathur village have been the custom and practice of the Hindus for the past many decades. It seems from the year 2012 onwards, when the Muslims started objecting, the problem seems to have started.
From Para 20,
As per Section 180-A of the District Municipalities Act 1920, roads or streets should be used as access to the people irrespective of their religion, caste or creed. Merely because one religious group is dominating in a particular locality, it cannot be a ground to prohibit from celebrating religious festivals or taking processions of other religious groups through those roads. If it is to be accepted, then a day will come when a particular religious group which is predominantly occupying the area, will not allow the people belonging to other religious groups even to use the roads even for movement, transportation or the normal access. Even the marriage processions and funeral processions would be prohibited/prevented which is not good for our society.
From Para 25,
25.The abovesaid facts of the case would reveal that all along there had been religious tolerance and the religious festivals were conducted very smoothly and religious procession were conducted without any problem through all the streets and roads of the village. If religious intolerance is going to be allowed, it is not good for a secular country. Intolerance in any form by any religious group has to be curtailed and prohibited. In this case,
intolerance of a particular religious group is exhibited by objecting for the festivals which have been conducted for decades together and the procession through the streets and roads of the village are sought to be prohibited stating that the area is dominated by Muslims and therefore, there cannot be any Hindu festival or procession through the locality. India is a secular country and merely because one religious group is living in majority in a particular area, it cannot be a reason for not allowing other religious festivals or processions through that area. If the contention of the private
respondent is to be accepted then it would create a situation in which minority people cannot conduct any festival or procession in most of the areas in India. If resistance is being exhibited by one religious group and it is reciprocated by the other religious groups, there would be chaos, riots, religious fights causing loss of lives and destruction of properties. Consequently, the secular character of our country will be destroyed or damaged.
A division bench of Gauhati High Court held in this Writ Appeal that, CBI to be an unconstitutional body.
Citations : [2013 SCC ONLINE GAU 305], [2014 GAU LR 1 529], [2014 AIC 133 743], [2013 CRI LJ 5009]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/133280611/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56eaac16607dba3c8ce40e16
The above Judgment and Order was stayed in 3 days time by a Division bench of Supreme Court.
Last update from Supreme Court website is this…
A Division bench of the Supreme Court held as follows,
“6………………In our view, validity of the marriage for the purpose of summary proceeding under Section 125 Cr.P.C. is to be determined on the basis of the evidence brought on record by the parties. The standard of proof of marriage in such proceeding is not as strict as is required in a trial of offence under section 494 of the I.P.C. If the claimant in proceedings under Section 125 of the Code succeeds in showing that she and the respondent have lived together as husband and wife, the Court can presume that they are legally wedded spouses, and in such a situation, the party who denies the marital status can rebut the presumption………………”
Citations : [1999 ACR SC 3 2547], [1999 AIR SC 3348], [1999 ALD CRI 2 955], [1999 ALR 37 733], [2000 ALT CRI 1 29], [1999 CALLT SC 3 61], [2000 CLT SC 89 167], [1999 GLH 2 1037], [1999 JT SC 8 329], [2000 LW CRL 1 218], [2000 PLJR 1 61], [2000 RLW SC 1 23], [1999 SCALE 6 579], [1999 SCC 7 675], [1999 SUPP SCR 3 684], [1999 SCC CRI 1345], [1999 SUPREME 8 602], [2000 CRLJ 0 1], [1999 RCR CRIMINAL 4 577], [2000 CRI LJ 0 1], [2000 OCR SC 18 348], [1999 AIR SC 3844], [2000 BOMCR CRI SC 731], [1999 CRIMES SC 3 206], [2000 LW CRL 1 217], [2000 CRLJ SC 1], [1999 AIR SCW 3844]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/305700/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad5ee4b0149711411339
The Division bench of Apex Court reduced Death penalty to Life imprisonment for 30 years without remission.
From Para 11,
11. Thus, a witness is normally considered to be independent unless he springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and this usually means that the said witness has cause to bear such enmity against the accused so as to implicate him falsely. In view of the above, there can be no prohibition to the effect that a policeman cannot be a witness or that his deposition cannot be relied upon if it inspires confidence.
Citations : [2013 AD SC 12 587], [2014 AIR SC 394], [2014 AJR 3 489], [2014 AKR 1 305], [2014 ALD CRL SC 1 699], [2014 ALLCC 84 329], [2013 JT SC 15 58], [2014 KARLJ 2 158], [2014 KCCR 2 985], [2014 NCC 1 346], [2013 SCALE 14 502], [2014 SCC 12 419], [2014 SCC CRI 6 765], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 1048], [2014 AIC 133 87], [2014 ECRN 1 668], [2013 SUPREME 8 279], [2013 AIOL 784], [2013 CRIMES SC 4 571], [2013 AIR SC 6766], [2013 AIR SCW 6766], [2014 JCC SC 1 809], [2014 RCR CRIMINAL SC 1 203]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/176649597/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af33e4b0149711415ccf
A Division bench of Apex Court held as follows,
In the absence of cross-examination of the postman on this crucial aspect his statement in the chief-examination has been rightly relied upon. There is an age old rule that if you dispute the correctness of the statement of a witness you must give him opportunity to explain his statement by drawing his attention to that part of it which is objected to as untrue, otherwise you can not impeach his credit. In State of U.P. v. Nahar Sing (dead) and Ors., [1998] 3 SCC 561, a Bench of this Court (to which 1 was a party) stated the principle that Section 138 of the Evidence Act confers a valuable right to cross-examination a witness tendered in evidence by opposite party. The scope of that provision is enlarged by Section 146 of the Evidence Act by permitting a witness to be questioned, inter alia, to test his veracity. It was observed.
“The oft-quoted observation of Lord Herschell, L.C. in Browne v. Dunn clearly elucidates the principle underlying those provisions. It reads thus:
“I cannot help saying, that it seems to me to be absolutely essential to the proper conduct of a cause, where it is intended to suggest that a witness is not speaking the truth on a particular point, to direct his attention to the fact by some questions put in cross-examination showing that that imputation is intended to be made and not to take his evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether unchallenged, and then, when it is impossible for him to explain, as perhaps he might have been able to do if such questions had been put to him, the circumstances which, it is suggested, indicate that the story he tells ought not to be believed, to argue that he is a witness unworthy of credit. My Lords, I have always understood that if you intend to impeach a witness, you are bound, whilst he is in the box, to give an opportunity of making any explanation which is open to him; and, as it seems to me, that is not only a rule of professional practice in the conduct of a case, but it is essential to fair play and fair dealing with witnesses.”
Citations : [2001 AIR SC 3042], [2001 SCALE 5 203], [2001 SUPREME 6 82], [2001 AIR SC 3207], [2001 SCC 7 69], [2002 UJ SC 1 89], [2001 DLT SC 93 1], [2001 UC 2 415], [2001 ALR 44 843], [2002 LW 1 69], [2001 AIR SCW 3042], [2001 JT SC 6 400]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1624346/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad98e4b0149711411cf1
Lot of legal points explained with respect to the statements given by witnesses in Court in this landmark decision by a Division bench of Apex Court.
From Para 13,
13. Clause (iv) of Section 207 Cr.P.C. clearly provides that any statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., shall be made available to the accused along with all the other documents that have been filed along with the charge sheet.
From Para 14,
14. Evidence given in a court under oath has great sanctity, which is why the same is called substantive evidence. Statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. can be used only for the purpose of contradiction and statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C. can be used for both corroboration and contradiction. In a case where the magistrate has to perform the duty of recording a statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., he is under an obligation to elicit all information which the witness wishes to disclose, as a witness who may be an illiterate, rustic villager may not be aware of the purpose for which he has been brought, and what he must disclose in his statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C. Hence, the magistrate should ask the witness explanatory questions and obtain all possible information in relation to the said case.
From Para 15,
15. So far as the statement of witnesses recorded under Section 164 is concerned, the object is two fold; in the first place, to deter the witness from changing his stand by denying the contents of his previously recorded statement, and secondly, to tide over immunity from prosecution by the witness under Section 164. A proposition to the effect that if a statement of a witness is recorded under Section 164, his evidence in Court should be discarded, is not at all warranted.
From Para 16,
16. Section 157 of the Evidence Act makes it clear that a statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., can be relied upon for the purpose of corroborating statements made by witnesses in the Committal Court or even to contradict the same. As the defence had no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses whose statements are recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., such statements cannot be treated as substantive evidence.
During the investigation, the Police Officer may sometimes feel that it is expedient to record the statement of a witness under Section 164 Cr.P.C. This usually happens when the witnesses to a crime are clearly connected to the accused, or where the accused is very influential, owing to which the witnesses may be influenced.
Citations : [2013 AIR SC 651], [2013 ALD CRI 2 153], [2013 CRIMES SC 1 217], [2013 JLJR 1 499], [2013 JT SC 2 447], [2013 KLJ 1 620], [2013 KERLT 1 493], [2013 PLJR 2 145], [2013 SCALE 2 186], [2013 SCC 14 266], [2013 SCR 3 1172], [2013 UC 1 673], [2014 SCC CRI 4 185], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 114], [2013 SLT 1 705], [2013 SUPREME 1 545], [2013 AIOL 72], [2013 AIR SC 1095], [2013 CCR 1 494], [2013 KCCR SN 3 220], [2013 RAJ 1 435], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL SC 1 964], [2013 AIR SCW 1095], [2013 ALLMR CRI SC 1469]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/178895486/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af40e4b0149711415f37
A Division bench of Kerala High Court held that, a wife who is living separately by mutual consent, is not entitled to receive maintenance or Interim maintenance.
From Para 10,
Now, the question arises for consideration is whether the respondent is entitled to receive maintenance or interim maintenance from the petitioner after they have been living separately by mutual consent i.e., from 30.4.2011 onwards.
Going by the above sub-section, no wife is entitled to receive maintenance from her husband if they are living separately by mutual consent. Here, the petitioner and the respondent have been living separately since 30.4.2011. Therefore, Exts.P1 and P2 claims for maintenance and interim maintenance respectively filed by the respondent are hit by sub-section (4) of Section 125 of Cr.P.C. In other words, Exts.P1 and P2 claims are not maintainable. Hence, Ext.P11 common order passed by the Family Court is liable to be set aside. Ext.P1 claim for maintenance is liable to be quashed.
Citations : [2013 SCC ONLINE KER 24120], [2013 CRI LJ 3153], [2013 AIC 125 705], [2013 KLT 1 899], [2014 RCR CRI 1 411], [2014 CCC 1 99]
Other Sources:
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5ac5e4694a93261aa7929df4
https://www.legitquest.com/case/rajesh-r-nair-v-meera-babu/197C65
Referring to a catena of case laws, Division bench of SC said the following:
From Para 5,
It is well settled that Section 195(1)(b) creates a bar against taking cognizance of offences against the administration of justice for the purpose of guarding against baseless or vindictive prosecutions by private parties. The provisions of this Section imply that the Court is the only appropriate authority which is entitled to raise grievance in relation to perjury, forgery of documents produced before the Court, and other offences which interfere with the effective dispensation of justice by the Court. Hence, it for the Court to exercise its discretion and consider the suitability of making a complaint for such offences. However, there is a pertinent difference in the wording of Section 195(1)(b) (i) and Section 195(1)(b)(ii) inasmuch as Section 195(1)(b)(ii) is restricted to offences which are committed in respect of a document which is “produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court”. Whereas Section 195(1)(b)(i) applies to offences against public justice which are committed not only in any proceeding in any court, but also “in relation to” such proceeding. Whether such semantical difference bars the analogous application of precedents relating to Section 195(1)(b)(ii) for interpreting Section 195(1)(b)(i) will be discussed by us later.
From Para 8,
Curiously, though the facts of Iqbal Singh Marwah also required a determination as to the applicability of Section 195(1)(b)(i), the Constitution Bench did not express any specific finding on this point. This was perhaps because the limited point for consideration before the Bench was the apparent conflict between Sachida Nand Singh and Surjit Singh (supra). However, it can nevertheless be seen that the Constitution Bench did not interpret Section 195(1)(b)(ii) in isolation, but linked its construction with the overall scheme under Sections 195(1)(b) and 340, CrPC. The Court reiterated the test laid down in Sachida Nand Singh, i.e., that the offence in respect of which only the Court can make a complaint must be one which has a direct correlation to, or a direct impact on, proceedings before a court of justice. It is for this reason that only the relevant Court is vested with the right to consider the desirability of complaining against the guilty party.
From Para 17 (Very important)
17. It is possible that Courts may be more proactive in making complaints under Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC upon application made by the concerned investigative agencies, than in those preferred by private parties. The former being public authorities would enjoy more credence in seeking inquiry into their claims.Therefore, the aforementioned reasons assigned by the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah for adopting a narrow construction of Section 195(1)(b)(ii), CrPC may not be strictly applicable in the present case. However, the general principles of statutory interpretation laid down by the Constitution Bench should not be disregarded. This is especially given that the Court did not consider Section 195(1)(b)(ii) separately but provided a holistic view of the scheme under Section 195(1)(b).
17.1 Just like a private party who has been a victim of forgery committed outside the precincts of the Court, the investigative agency should not be left remediless against persons who have producing false evidence for the purpose of interfering with the investigation process. Moreover, the present case concerns offences alleged to have been committed under the PC Act. Public interest and the reputation of the State will suffer significant harm if corrupt public servants are facilitated by third parties in hiding their assets from scrutiny. Hence any interpretation which negates against the speedy and effective trial of such persons must be avoided.
17.2 The application of the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC to situations such as the present case can lead to two scenarios. The first is one in which the investigative agency, on the basis of false/fabricated material drops the case. Subsequently, it is brought to their notice that the evidence was falsified. Second, the investigative agency at that very stage suspects that the material produced before them is bogus or forged in nature. In both scenarios, the Court has not had an opportunity to consider the allegedly fabricated evidence, as trial has not yet commenced in respect of the offence. Hence it would not be possible for the Court to independently ascertain the need for lodging a complaint under Section 195(1)(b)(i) read with Section 340, CrPC when the evidence alleged to have been falsified is not even present on its records. Rather, it is the investigating agency which is best placed to verify and prove whether such falsification has taken place, through what means and for what purpose.
17.3 In case the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i) is applied to offences committed during the course of investigation, the Court may think it fit to wait till the completion of trial to evaluate whether a complaint should be made or not. Subsequently, the Court may be of the opinion that in the larger scheme of things the alleged fabrication of evidence during investigation has not had any material impact on the trial, and decline to initiate prosecution for the same. The investigation agency cannot be compelled to take a chance and wait for the trial court to form its opinion in each and every case. This may give the offender under Section 193, IPC sufficient time to fabricate more falsehoods to hide the original crime. Further, irrespective of the potential impact that such false evidence may have on the opinion formed by the trial court, the investigating agency has a separate right to proceed against the accused for attempting to obstruct fair and transparent probe into a criminal offence. Thus, we are of the view that it would be impracticable to insist upon lodging of written complaint by the Court under Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC in such a situation.
Even though this is not a matrimonial case, the following is nice statement made by the Division bench of Madurai bench of Madras High Court.
From Para 17,
….
It is needless to point out that a person who enjoyed the benefit of an interim order, is liable to compensate the other party, when the main case is decided against him.
….
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/110371360/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5728e0d6e561092708a3c705
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