Registrar General Vs State of Meghalaya on 23 Jun 2021

Posted on July 12, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Meghalaya High Court issued the below directions, when the Administration there tried to impose mandatory vaccination upon the traders for them to run their businesses…

Guidelines passed:

In addition thereto, we issue the following directions so that the public at large are provided with an option of making an informed choice:-
(i) All shops/establishments/local taxis/auto-rickshaws/maxi cabs and buses should display prominently at a conspicuous place, a sign, “VACCINATED”, in the event all employees and staff of the concerned shop/establishment are vaccinated. Similarly, in the case of local taxis/auto-rickshaws/maxi cabs and buses where the concerned driver or conductor or helper(s) are vaccinated.
(ii) All shops/establishments/local taxis/auto-rickshaws/maxi cabs and buses should display prominently at a conspicuous place, a sign, “NOT VACCINATED”, in the event all the employees and staff of the concerned shop/establishment are not vaccinated. Similarly, in the case of local taxis/auto-rickshaws/maxi cabs and buses where the concerned driver or conductor or helper(s) are not vaccinated.

Registrar General Vs State of Meghalaya on 23 Jun 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/70432062/

Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs West Bengal Vs Mohan Singh and Ors on 08 Oct 1974

Posted on July 10, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench consisting the legendary Justice P.N. Bhagvati, held that a subsequent petition under 482 CrPC is maintainable if the facts and circumstances are different from earlier application. Here Section 561-A is current Section 482 CrPC.

Section 561-A preserves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as it deems fit to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice and the High Court must, therefore, exercise its inherent powers having regard to the situation prevailing at the particular point of time when its inherent jurisdiction is sought to be invoked. The High Court was in the circumstances entitled to entertain the subsequent application of Respondents 1 and 2 and consider whether on the facts and circumstances then obtaining the continuance of the proceeding against the respondents constituted an abuse of the process of the Court or its quashing was necessary to secure the ends of justice.

Indiankanoon version:

Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs West Bengal Vs Mohan Singh and Ors

Casemine version:

Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs West Bengal Vs Mohan Singh and Ors (Casemine)

Citations : [1975 AIR SC 1002], [1975 PLR 77 147], [1975 SCC 3 706], [1974 CRLR 0 691], [1975 AIR SC 100], [1975 SCJ 11 478], [1976 MLJ CRL 1 1], [1975 SCC CRI 156], [1975 CRLJ SC 812]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1993916/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aba3e4b014971140cf5f

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Gullipilli Sowria Raj Vs Bandaru Pavani on 4 Dec 2008

Posted on July 10, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Going through the Preamble of the HMA 1955, the division bench of the Supreme Court held that the marriage of a Hindu with a Christian is void ab initio.

From Para 18,

18. Although, an attempt has been made to establish that the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, did not prohibit a valid Hindu marriage of a Hindu and another professing a different faith, we are unable to agree with such submission in view of the definite scheme of the 1955 Act.

From Para 20,

20.As submitted by Mr. Rao, the Preamble itself indicates that the Act was enacted to codify the law relating to marriage amongst Hindus. Section 2 of the Act which deals with application of the Act, and has been reproduced hereinabove, reinforces the said proposition.

From Para 21, Use of ‘may’ in section 5 of HMA

21.Section 5 of the Act thereafter also makes it clear that a marriage may be solemnized between any two Hindus if the conditions contained in the said Section were fulfilled. The usage of the expression ‘may’ in the opening line of the Section, in our view, does not make the provision of Section 5 optional. On the other hand, it in positive terms, indicates that a marriage can be solemnized between two Hindus if the conditions indicated were fulfilled. In other words, in the event the conditions remain unfulfilled, a marriage between two Hindus could not be solemnized. The expression ‘may’ used in the opening words of Section 5 is not directory, as has been sought to be argued, but mandatory and non-fulfilment thereof would not permit a marriage under the Act between two Hindus. Section 7 of the 1955 Act is to be read along with Section 5 in that a Hindu marriage, as understood under Section 5, could be solemnized according to the ceremonies indicated therein.

And finally in Para 22,

22.In the facts pleaded by the respondent in her application under Section 12(1)(c) of the 1955 Act and the admission of the appellant that he was and still is a Christian belonging to the Roman Catholic denomination, the marriage solemnized in accordance with Hindu customs was a nullity and its registration under Section 8 of the Act could not and/or did not validate the same. In our view, the High Court rightly allowed the appeal preferred by the respondent herein and the judgment and order of the High Court does not warrant any interference.

Gullipilli Sowria Raj Vs Bandaru Pavani on 4 Dec 2008

Citations : [2009 MPLJ SC 2 48], [2008 SCALE 16 109], [2008 AIOL 1405], [2009 MHLJ SC 2 850], [2008 SCR 17 35], [2009 ALLMR SC 1 488], [2009 BOMCR SC 5 906], [2009 SCC 1 714], [2009 AIR SC 244], [2008 JT 13 450], [2009 SUPREME 1 145], [2009 SCC CIV 1 326], [2009 AIR SC 1085], [2009 AIC SC 74 33], [2009 CHN SC 1 158], [2009 AIR SCW 244]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/421764/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae6ae4b0149711413cbe

Udai Shankar Awasthi Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 09 Jan 2013

Posted on July 9, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division Bench of the Apex Court quash the complaint case filed against the appellants and while doing to enunciated and reiterated lot of legal principles supported by case laws.

From Para 6,

LIMITATION IN CRIMINAL CASES- Section 468 Cr.P.C.:
6. Section 468 Cr.P.C. places an embargo upon court from taking cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the limitation period provided therein. Section 469 prescribes when the period of limitation begins. Section 473 enables the court to condone delay, provided that the court is satisfied with the explanation furnished by the prosecution/complainant, and where, in the interests of justice, extension of the period of limitation is called for. The principle of condonation of delay is based on the general rule of the criminal justice system which states that a crime never dies, as has been
explained by way of the legal maxim, nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi (lapse of time is no bar to the Crown for the purpose of it initiating proceeding against offenders). A criminal offence is considered as a wrong against the State and also the society as a whole, even though the same has been committed against an individual.

From Para 7, regd delay in registering a complaint

7. The question of delay in launching a criminal prosecution may be a circumstance to be taken into consideration while arriving at a final decision, however, the same may not itself be a ground for dismissing the complaint at the threshold. Moreover, the issue of limitation must be examined in light of the gravity of the charge in question.

From Para 8, regd while condoning delay has to record the reasons

8. The court, while condoning delay has to record the reasons for its satisfaction, and the same must be manifest in the order of the court itself. The court is further required to state in its conclusion, while condoning such delay, that such condonation is required in the interest of justice.

From Para 10,

CONTINUING OFFENCE:
10. Section 472 Cr.P.C. provides that in case of a continuing offence, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time period during which the offence continues. The expression, ‘continuing offence’ has not been defined in the Cr.P.C. because it is one of those expressions which does not have a fixed connotation, and therefore, the formula of universal application cannot be formulated in this respect.

From Para 16,

16. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that, in the case of a continuing offence, the ingredients of the offence continue, i.e., endure even after the period of consummation, whereas in an instantaneous offence, the offence takes place once and for all i.e. when the same actually takes place. In such cases, there is no continuing offence, even though the damage resulting from the injury may itself continue.

From Para

SECOND COMPLAINT ON SAME FACTS-MAINTAINABILITY:
17. While considering the issue at hand in Shiv Shankar Singh v. State of Bihar & Anr., (2012) 1 SCC 130, this Court, after considering its earlier judgments in Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar AIR 1962 SC 876; Jatinder Singh & Ors. v. Ranjit Kaur AIR 2001 SC 784; Mahesh Chand v. B. Janardhan Reddy & Anr., AIR 2003 SC 702; Poonam Chand Jain & Anr. v. Fazru AIR 2005 SC 38 held:
“It is evident that the law does not prohibit filing or entertaining of the second complaint even on the same facts provided the earlier complaint has been decided on the basis of insufficient material or the order has been passed without understanding the nature of the complaint or the complete facts could not be placed before the court or where the complainant came to know certain facts after disposal of the first complaint which could have tilted the balance in his favour. However, second complaint would not be maintainable wherein the earlier complaint has been disposed of on full consideration of the case of the complainant on merit.”

From Para 28,

28. Approaching the court at a belated stage for a rightful cause, or even for the violation of the fundamental rights, has always been considered as a good ground for its rejection at the threshold. The ground taken by the learned counsel for respondent No. 2 that the cause of action arose on 20.10.2009 and 5.11.2009, as the appellants refused to return money and other materials, articles and record, does not have substance worth consideration. In case a representation is made by the person aggrieved and the same is rejected by the competent statutory authority, and such an order is communicated to the person aggrieved, making repeated representations will not enable the party to explain the delay.

Citations : [2013 SCALE 1 212], [2013 JT 1 539], [2013 JCC SC 1 711], [2013 SCC 2 435], [2013 SUPREME 1 590], [2013 AIOL 18], [2013 SLT 1 249], [2013 CRIMES SC 1 231], [2013 SCC CIV 1 1121], [2013 SCC CRI 2 708], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 41], [2013 AIC 123 137], [2013 UC 1 449], [2013 ACR 1 689], [2013 BLJ 3 28], [2013 NCC 1 549], [2013 AD SC 1 537], [2013 JLJR 1 235], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL 2 503], [2013 SCR 3 935], [2013 MLJ CRI 1 462], [2013 JCC 1 711], [2013 MLJ CRL 1 462], [2013 JT SC 1 539]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/39425468/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af3fe4b0149711415eef

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/udai-shankar-awasthi-vs-state-of-u-p-anr

The High Court judgment is here.

S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs Jagannath on 27 Oct 1993

Posted on July 4, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Landmark judgment by a division bench of the Supreme Court of India around perjury/fraud committed upon the Courts. Just read the below line to understand how far the frauds take the Courts for a ride.

This Civil Appeal was numbered 994 of 1972, but got decided on October 27, 1993!

Twenty One (21) years lost at Supreme Court itself!!!

From Para 5,

5. The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. The High Court, however, went haywire and made observations which are wholly perverse. We do not agree with the High Court that “there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence”. The principle of “finality of litigation” cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court-process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who’s case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.

From Para 6,

6. The facts of the present case leave no manner of doubt that Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another’s loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. Jagannath was working as a clerk with Chunilal Sowcar. He purchased the property in the court auction on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. He had, on his own volition, executed the registered release deed (Ex. B-15) in favour of Chunilal Sowcar regarding the property in dispute. He knew that the appellants had paid the total decretal amount to his master Chunilal Sowcar. Without disclosing all these facts, he filed the suit for the partition of the property on the ground that he had purchased the property on his own behalf and not on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. Non-production and even non-mentioning of the release deed at the trial is tantamount to playing fraud on the court. We do not agree with the observations of the High Court that the appellants- defendants could have easily produced the certified registered copy of Ex. B-15 and non-suited the plaintiff. A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party.

S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs Jagannath on 27 Oct 1993 (Original)

Citations : [1994 AIR SC 853], [1993 SCALE 4 277], [1994 UJ SC 1 1], [1993 BC SC 2 546], [1994 BLJR 1 216], [1994 OLR SC 1 201], [1995 PLR 109 293], [1993 SUPP SCR 3 422], [1994 SCC 1 1], [1994 PLJR 1 39], [1994 APLJ SC 1 66], [1994 LW 1 21], [1994 GLH 1 81], [1993 JT SC 6 331]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1151521/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac8fe4b014971140f23f

Index of Perjury related judgments is here.

Nasruddin Mian Vs State of Bihar on 21 Jun 2021

Posted on July 4, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Patna High Court held that this is not how a judgment is to be written, while acquitting a husband from a conviction given for the alleged offence of murdering his wife.

78. The judgment under consideration is an example of how not to write a judgment. It has repeatedly been emphasized by the Supreme Court that the Courts and Judges must make a dispassionate assessment of evidence and that the Courts and Judges should not be swayed by the horror of crime and the character of the person. The judgment should be made by a Judge uninfluenced by his own imagined norms of the functioning of the society.
79. The Trial Court ought to have avoided the sweeping and disparaging remarks made in para 42 of its judgment regarding the conduct of the appellants.
80. I fail to see as to how the Trial Court held in para 44 of its judgment that the charge was framed against the appellants under Section 498-A of the IPC after the informant filed an application for addition to the original charge. The order dated 08.05.2017 passed by the Trial Court, which has been extracted hereinabove, would clearly show that the original charge under Sections 498-A, 306 and 201/34 of the IPC was altered to Sections 304-B, 302 and 201/34 of the IPC. The trial court did not allow the prayer of the informant regarding addition of Sections 304-B and 302 of the IPC to the original charge already framed against them meaning thereby that due to alteration of the original charge vide order dated 08.05.2017, the charge under Sections 498-A and 306 became non-existent.
81. As a matter of fact, for all practical purposes, after alteration of the charge, the appellants were being tried only for the offences punishable under Sections 304-B, 302 and 201/34 of the IPC.
82. Surprisingly, in para 43 of the judgment, the Trial Court held that the case under Section 306 of the IPC is not made out. After alteration of charge, since there was no charge under Section 306 of the IPC, there was no occasion for the Trial Court to have recorded such finding in respect of Section 306 of the IPC.
83. Evidently, while passing the impugned judgment, the Trial Court had misconceived that the appellants were also being tried for the original charge framed under Sections 498-A and 306 of the IPC.
84. While saying so, I am mindful of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shanti Vs. State of Haryana, since reported in (1991) 1 SCC 371, wherein it has been held that Sections 304-B and 498-A of the IPC are not mutually exclusive. They deal with two distinct offences. A person charged and acquitted under Section 304-B of the IPC can be convicted under Section 498-A of the IPC without charge being framed, if such a case is made out. But from the point of view of practice and procedure and to avoid technical defects, it is necessary in such cases to frame charges under both
the sections and if the case is established against the accused, they can be convicted under both the Sections but no separate sentence need be awarded under Section 498-A in view of the substantive sentence being awarded for the major offence under Section 304-B.

Nasruddin Mian Vs State of Bihar on 21 Jun 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/193472418/

Asar Mohammad and Ors Vs State of UP on 24 Oct 2018

Posted on July 2, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Replying on a catena of landmark judgments, a division bench of the Apex Court that the Appellant No.1 is guilty of committing the murder and the Appellant No.2 and 3 are liable to punishment u/s 201 IPC.

Asar Mohammad and Ors Vs State of UP on 24 Oct 2018

Citations : [2018 SCC ONLINE SC 2179], [2019 SCC 12 253], [2019 SCC CRI 4 321], [2018 AIR SC 5264], [2018 CRIMES 4 387], [2019 ALL LJ 1 382], [2018 AIC 192 50], [2019 ECRN 1 148]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/28788694/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5bd343729eff430a1b47f1d9

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/asar-mohammad-and-ors-versus-the-state-of-u-p

https://crlreview.in/asar-mohammad-v-state-of-up/

Kishanvihari Sharma Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors

Posted on June 28, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Two vital and interesting legal questions of interpretation have reached a Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High court.

On 09 Jun 2021,

The Court framed the questions that need determination

(1) As to whether the provision of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. can be invoked by accused alleging improper/delayed investigation or not ?
(2) As to whether the provision of Section 161 Cr.P.C. providing for examination of witnesses by the police can include examination of accused also or not, only for the purpose of ascertaining the truth and not for recording confession ?

Kishanvihari Sharma Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors on 09 Jun 2021

On 24 Jun 2021,

Noting from the submissions of the rival counsels, the Bench held that there are conflicting decision from the Supreme Court on the legal points for determination and so opened up the questions to the entire Bar and sought assistance from the Bar Association.

Kishanvihari Sharma Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors on 24 Jun 2021

On first week of Aug 2021,

S.Gopal Reddy Vs State of Andhra Pradesh on 11 Jul 1996

Posted on June 28, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

This a landmark judgment from a Division bench of the Supreme Court around section 2, 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act 1961.

Definition of Dowry and the offence of Demanding Dowry

The definition of the term ’dowry’ under Section 2 of the Act shows that any property or valuable security given or “agreed to be given” either directly or indirectly by one party to the marriage to the other party to the marriage “at or before or after the marriage” as a “consideration for the marriage of the said parties” would become ’dowry’ punishable under the Act. Property or valuable security so as to constitute ’dowry’ within the meaning of the Act must therefore be given or demanded “as consideration for the marriage”.

Section 4 of the Act aims at discouraging the very “demand” of “dowry” as a ’Consideration for the marriage’ between the parties thereto and lays down that if any person after the commencement of the Act, “demands”, directly or indirectly, from the parents or guardians of a ’bride’ or ’bridegroom’, as the case may be, any ’dowry’, he shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to Rs.5,000/- or with both.

Thus, it would be seen that section 4 makes punishable the very demand of property or valuable security as a consideration for marriage, which demand, if satisfied, would constitute the graver offence under section 3 of the Act punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years and with fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value of such dowry whichever is more.

The definition of the expression ’dowry’ contained in Section 2 of the Act cannot be confined merely to the ’demand’ of money, property or valuable security ’made at or after the performance of marriage’ as is urged by Mr. Rao. The legislature has in its wisdom while providing for the definition of ’dowry’ emphasised that any money, property or valuable security given, as a consideration for marriage, ’before, at or after the marriage would be covered by the expression ’dowry’ and this definition as contained in Section 2 has to be read wherever the expression ’dowry’ occurs in the Act. Meaning of the expression ’dowry’ as commonly used and understood is different than the peculiar definition thereof under the Act. Under Section 4 of the Act, mere demand of ’dowry’ is sufficient to bring home the offence to an accused. Thus, any “demand” of money, property or valuable security made from the bride or her parents or other relatives by the bridegroom or his parents or other relatives or vice-versa would fall within the mischief of ’dowry’ under the Act where such demand is not properly referable to any legally recognised claim and is consideration of marriage. Marriage in this context would include a proposed marriage also more particularly where the non-fulfilment of the “demand of dowry” leads to the ugly consequence of the marriage not taking place at all. The expression ’dowry’ under the Act must be interpreted in the sense which the Statute wishes to attribute to it. Mr. P.P.Rao, learned senior counsel referred to various dictionaries for the meaning of ’dowry’, ’bride’ and ’bridegroom’ and on the basis of those meanings submitted that ’dowry’ must be construed only as such property, goods or valuable security which is given to a husband by and on behalf of the wife at marriage and any demand made prior to marriage would not amount to dowry. We cannot agree. Where definition has been given in a statute itself, it is neither proper nor desirable to look to the dictionaries etc. to find out the meaning of the expression. The definition given in the statute is the determinative- factor. The Act is a piece of social legislation which aims to check the growing menace of the social evil of dowry and it makes punishable not only the actual receiving of dowry but also the very demand of dowry made before or at the time or after the marriage where such demand is referable to the consideration of marriage. Dowry as a quid pro for marriage is prohibited and not the giving of traditional presents to the bride or the bride groom by friends and relatives. Thus, voluntary presents given at or before or after the marriage to the bride or the bridegroom, as the case may be, of a traditional nature, which are given not as a consideration for marriage but out of love, affection on regard, would not fall within the mischief of the expression ’dowry’ mare punishable under the Act.

On the point of Interpretation of Statutes

It is a well known rule of interpretation of statutes that the text and the context of the entire Act must be looked into while interpreting any of the expressions used in a statute. The courts must look to the object which the statute seeks to achieve while interpreting any of the provisions of the Act. A purposive approach for interpreting the Act is necessary. We are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with Mr. Rao that it is only the property or valuable security given at the time of marriage which would bring the same within the definition of ’dowry’ punishable under the Act, as such an interpretation would be defeating the very object for which the Act was enacted. Keeping in view the object of the Act, “demand of dowry” as a consideration for a proposed marriage would also come within the meaning of the expression dowry under the Act. If we were to agree with Mr. Rao that it is only the demand made at or after marriage which is punishable under Section 4 of the Act, Some serious consequences, which the legislature wanted to avoid, are bound to follow. Take for example a case where the bridegroom or his parents or other relatives make a ’demand’ of dowry during marriage negotiations and later on after bringing the bridal party to the bride’s house find that the bride or her parents or relative have not met the earlier ’demand’ and call off the marriage and leave the bride house should they escape the punishment under the Act. The answer has to be an emphatic ’no’. It would be adding insult to injury if we were to countenance that their action would not attract the provisions of Section 4 of the Act. Such an interpretation would frustrate the very object of the Act and would also run contrary to the accepted principles relating to the interpretation of statutes.

S.Gopal Reddy Vs State of Andhra Pradesh on 11 Jul 1996

Citations : [1996 AD SC 5 229], [1996 AIR SC 2184], [1996 ALD CRI 2 926], [1996 ALT CRI 2 418], [1996 BLJR 2 1329], [1996 CRILJ 3237], [1996 CRIMES SC 3 35], [1997 DMC SC 2 100], [1996 JT SC 6 268], [1996 RCR CRIMINAL 3 153], [1996 SCALE 5 78], [1996 SCC 4 596], [1996 SUPP SCR 3 439], [1996 SCC CRI 792], [1996 OLR SC 2 229]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1213429/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ace1e4b014971140fef2

Satbir Singh and Anr Vs State of Haryana on 28 May 2021

Posted on June 18, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division bench of the Apex Court passed these guidelines to the Judges trying the 304 IPC cases.

From Para 36,

36. At the cost of repetition, the law under Section 304B, IPC read with Section 113B, Evidence Act can be summarized below:
i. Section 304B, IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and dowry demand.
ii. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section 304B, IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable presumption of causality, provided under Section 113B, Evidence Act operates against the accused.
iii. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304B, IPC cannot be construed to mean ‘immediately before’. The prosecution must establish existence of “proximate and live link” between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives.
iv. Section 304B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.
v. Due to the precarious nature of Section 304B, IPC read with 113B, Evidence Act, Judges, prosecution and defence should be careful during conduction of trial.
vi. It is a matter of grave concern that, often, Trial Courts record the statement under Section 313, CrPC in a very casual and cursory manner, without specifically questioning the accused as to his defense. It ought to be noted that the examination of an accused under Section 313, CrPC cannot be treated as a mere procedural formality, as it based on the fundamental principle of fairness. This aforesaid provision incorporates the valuable principle of natural justice “audi alteram partem” as it enables the accused to offer an explanation for the incriminatory material appearing against him. Therefore, it imposes an obligation on the court to question the accused fairly, with care and caution.
vii. The Court must put incriminating circumstances before the accused and seek his response. A duty is also cast on the counsel of the accused to prepare his defense since the inception of the Trial with due caution, keeping in consideration the peculiarities of Section 304B, IPC read with
Section 113B, Evidence Act.
viii. Section 232, CrPC provides that, “If, after taking the evidence for the prosecution, examining the accused and hearing the prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence, the Judge shall record an order of acquittal”. Such discretion must be utilized by the Trial Courts as an obligation of best efforts.
ix. Once the Trial Court decides that the accused is not eligible to be acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232, CrPC, it must move on and fix hearings specifically for ‘defence evidence’, calling upon the accused to present his defense as per the procedure provided under Section 233, CrPC, which is also an invaluable right provided to the accused.
x. In the same breath, Trial Courts need to balance other important considerations such as the right to a speedy trial. In this regard, we may caution that the above provisions should not be allowed to be misused as delay tactics.
xi. Apart from the above, the presiding Judge should follow the guidelines laid down by this Court while sentencing and imposing appropriate punishment.
xii. Undoubtedly, as discussed above, the menace of dowry death is increasing day by day. However, it is also observed that sometimes family members of the husband are roped in, even though they have no active role in commission of the offence and are residing at distant places. In these cases, the Court need to be cautious in its approach.

Satbir Singh and Anr Vs State of Haryana on 28 May 2021

Citations :

Other Sources:

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision

Registrar General Vs State of Meghalaya on 23 Jun 2021

Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs West Bengal Vs Mohan Singh and Ors on 08 Oct 1974

Gullipilli Sowria Raj Vs Bandaru Pavani on 4 Dec 2008

Udai Shankar Awasthi Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 09 Jan 2013

S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs Jagannath on 27 Oct 1993

This Civil Appeal was numbered 994 of 1972, but got decided on October 27, 1993!

Twenty One (21) years lost at Supreme Court itself!!!

Nasruddin Mian Vs State of Bihar on 21 Jun 2021

Asar Mohammad and Ors Vs State of UP on 24 Oct 2018

Kishanvihari Sharma Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors

S.Gopal Reddy Vs State of Andhra Pradesh on 11 Jul 1996

Satbir Singh and Anr Vs State of Haryana on 28 May 2021