Dhariwal Tobaco Products Ltd and Ors Vs State of Maharastra and Anr on 17 Dec 2008

Posted on July 19, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A wonderful decision by Supreme Court of India around High Court’s inherent power under section 482 CrPC against the Revisional Powers u/s 401 CrPC.

From Para 8,

8. Indisputably issuance of summons is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397 of the Code. This Court in a large number of decisions beginning from R .P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 to Som Mittal v. Govt. of Karnataka , [ (2008) 3 SCC 574 ] has laid down the criterion for entertaining an application under Section 482. Only because a revision petition is maintainable, the same by itself, in our considered opinion, would not constitute a bar for entertaining an application under Section 482 of the Code.
Even where a revision application is barred, as for example the remedy by way of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 this Court has held that the remedies under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India would be available. (See Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others, [ (2003) 6 SCC 675 ] ).
Even in cases where a second revision before the High Court after dismissal of the first one by the Court of Sessions is barred under Section 397 (2) of the Code, the inherent power of the Court has been held to be available.

Dhariwal Tobaco Products Ltd and Ors Vs State of Maharastra and Anr on 17 Dec 2008

Citations : [2009 SCC 2 370], [2009 CRLJ SC 974], [2008 SCALE 16 240], [2009 SCC CRI 1 806], [2009 BOMCR CRI SC 1 802], [2008 AIOL 1468], [2008 SCR 17 844], [2009 AIR SC 1032], [2009 AIC SC 75 265], [2009 ECRN SC 2 284]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1891955/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae9ee4b0149711414586

K Santhosha Vs The Karnataka Power Transmission on 24 Jun 2021

Posted on July 16, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Karnataka High Court held that a Son is a son, irrespective of if he is a legitimate son or illegitimate, with regards to compassionate appointments.

K Santhosha Vs The Karnataka Power Transmission on 24 Jun 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

Earlier Writ Petition here; Review Petition here.

Narain Khamman Vs Parduman Kumar Jain on 19 Oct 1984

Posted on July 15, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held the purpose for which the Statement of Objects and Reasons of a Bill may be replied upon.
From Para 12,

12. It is now well settled that though the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying a legislative Bill cannot be used to determine the true meaning and effect of the substantive provisions of a statute, it is permissible to refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying a Bill for the purpose of understanding the background, the antecedent state of affairs, the surrounding circumstances in relation to the statute, and the evil which the statute sought to remedy.

Narain Khamman Vs Parduman Kumar Jain on 19 Oct 1984

Citations : [1985 AIR SC 4], [1985 SCR 1 1025], [1984 SCALE 2 650], [1985 SCC 1 1], [1985 UJ 17 422], [1985 UJ SC 422]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1258047/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac15e4b014971140dfc3

P.K. Shaji Vs State of Kerala on 27 Oct 2005

Posted on July 15, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held that a superior court always has power to give directions to lower court to pass appropriate orders. In this case, to check if the bail conditions are violated and cancel the bail.

The order of the Sessions Court shows that the learned Magistrate has been empowered to consider the question of violation of any of the conditions imposed by the Sessions Court and was given powers to pass appropriate orders. The plea raised by the appellant’s learned Counsel is that when the learned Magistrate had no such power, the Sessions Court was not empowered to invest that power in the Magistrate. We do not find any force in this contention. The superior court can always give directions of this nature and authorise the subordinate court to pass appropriate orders and the trial Magistrate would be the competent authority to decide whether any condition had been violated by the person who had been released on bail. When there is a specific direction to pass appropriate orders as if the conditions for granting bail had been imposed by the learned Magistrate himself, the impugned Order is legal and valid.

P.K. Shaji Vs State of Kerala on 27 Oct 2005

Citations : [2005 JT 9 481], [2006 AIR SC 100], [2005 SCC 13 283], [2005 SCALE 8 724], [2005 CRLJ SC 5063], [2005 SCR SUPP 4 840], [2005 CRIMES SC 4 184], [2005 SUPREME 7 2652005 AIOL 534], [2005 AIR SC 5560], [2006 SCC CRI 2 174], [2005 KERLT 4 856], [2005 CRILJ 5063], [2005 ALD CRI 2 517], [2005 JT SC 7 282], [2005 SCC 12 461], [2005 UJ 2 1136], [2006 SCC CRI 174], [2005 CRI LJ 5063], [2005 KLT 4 856], [2005 AIR SCW 5560]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/440533/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae1ee4b0149711413041

Registrar General Vs State of Meghalaya on 23 Jun 2021

Posted on July 12, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Meghalaya High Court issued the below directions, when the Administration there tried to impose mandatory vaccination upon the traders for them to run their businesses…

Guidelines passed:

In addition thereto, we issue the following directions so that the public at large are provided with an option of making an informed choice:-
(i) All shops/establishments/local taxis/auto-rickshaws/maxi cabs and buses should display prominently at a conspicuous place, a sign, “VACCINATED”, in the event all employees and staff of the concerned shop/establishment are vaccinated. Similarly, in the case of local taxis/auto-rickshaws/maxi cabs and buses where the concerned driver or conductor or helper(s) are vaccinated.
(ii) All shops/establishments/local taxis/auto-rickshaws/maxi cabs and buses should display prominently at a conspicuous place, a sign, “NOT VACCINATED”, in the event all the employees and staff of the concerned shop/establishment are not vaccinated. Similarly, in the case of local taxis/auto-rickshaws/maxi cabs and buses where the concerned driver or conductor or helper(s) are not vaccinated.

Registrar General Vs State of Meghalaya on 23 Jun 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/70432062/

Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs West Bengal Vs Mohan Singh and Ors on 08 Oct 1974

Posted on July 10, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench consisting the legendary Justice P.N. Bhagvati, held that a subsequent petition under 482 CrPC is maintainable if the facts and circumstances are different from earlier application. Here Section 561-A is current Section 482 CrPC.

Section 561-A preserves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as it deems fit to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice and the High Court must, therefore, exercise its inherent powers having regard to the situation prevailing at the particular point of time when its inherent jurisdiction is sought to be invoked. The High Court was in the circumstances entitled to entertain the subsequent application of Respondents 1 and 2 and consider whether on the facts and circumstances then obtaining the continuance of the proceeding against the respondents constituted an abuse of the process of the Court or its quashing was necessary to secure the ends of justice.

Indiankanoon version:

Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs West Bengal Vs Mohan Singh and Ors

Casemine version:

Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs West Bengal Vs Mohan Singh and Ors (Casemine)

Citations : [1975 AIR SC 1002], [1975 PLR 77 147], [1975 SCC 3 706], [1974 CRLR 0 691], [1975 AIR SC 100], [1975 SCJ 11 478], [1976 MLJ CRL 1 1], [1975 SCC CRI 156], [1975 CRLJ SC 812]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1993916/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aba3e4b014971140cf5f

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Gullipilli Sowria Raj Vs Bandaru Pavani on 4 Dec 2008

Posted on July 10, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Going through the Preamble of the HMA 1955, the division bench of the Supreme Court held that the marriage of a Hindu with a Christian is void ab initio.

From Para 18,

18. Although, an attempt has been made to establish that the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, did not prohibit a valid Hindu marriage of a Hindu and another professing a different faith, we are unable to agree with such submission in view of the definite scheme of the 1955 Act.

From Para 20,

20.As submitted by Mr. Rao, the Preamble itself indicates that the Act was enacted to codify the law relating to marriage amongst Hindus. Section 2 of the Act which deals with application of the Act, and has been reproduced hereinabove, reinforces the said proposition.

From Para 21, Use of ‘may’ in section 5 of HMA

21.Section 5 of the Act thereafter also makes it clear that a marriage may be solemnized between any two Hindus if the conditions contained in the said Section were fulfilled. The usage of the expression ‘may’ in the opening line of the Section, in our view, does not make the provision of Section 5 optional. On the other hand, it in positive terms, indicates that a marriage can be solemnized between two Hindus if the conditions indicated were fulfilled. In other words, in the event the conditions remain unfulfilled, a marriage between two Hindus could not be solemnized. The expression ‘may’ used in the opening words of Section 5 is not directory, as has been sought to be argued, but mandatory and non-fulfilment thereof would not permit a marriage under the Act between two Hindus. Section 7 of the 1955 Act is to be read along with Section 5 in that a Hindu marriage, as understood under Section 5, could be solemnized according to the ceremonies indicated therein.

And finally in Para 22,

22.In the facts pleaded by the respondent in her application under Section 12(1)(c) of the 1955 Act and the admission of the appellant that he was and still is a Christian belonging to the Roman Catholic denomination, the marriage solemnized in accordance with Hindu customs was a nullity and its registration under Section 8 of the Act could not and/or did not validate the same. In our view, the High Court rightly allowed the appeal preferred by the respondent herein and the judgment and order of the High Court does not warrant any interference.

Gullipilli Sowria Raj Vs Bandaru Pavani on 4 Dec 2008

Citations : [2009 MPLJ SC 2 48], [2008 SCALE 16 109], [2008 AIOL 1405], [2009 MHLJ SC 2 850], [2008 SCR 17 35], [2009 ALLMR SC 1 488], [2009 BOMCR SC 5 906], [2009 SCC 1 714], [2009 AIR SC 244], [2008 JT 13 450], [2009 SUPREME 1 145], [2009 SCC CIV 1 326], [2009 AIR SC 1085], [2009 AIC SC 74 33], [2009 CHN SC 1 158], [2009 AIR SCW 244]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/421764/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae6ae4b0149711413cbe

Udai Shankar Awasthi Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 09 Jan 2013

Posted on July 9, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division Bench of the Apex Court quash the complaint case filed against the appellants and while doing to enunciated and reiterated lot of legal principles supported by case laws.

From Para 6,

LIMITATION IN CRIMINAL CASES- Section 468 Cr.P.C.:
6. Section 468 Cr.P.C. places an embargo upon court from taking cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the limitation period provided therein. Section 469 prescribes when the period of limitation begins. Section 473 enables the court to condone delay, provided that the court is satisfied with the explanation furnished by the prosecution/complainant, and where, in the interests of justice, extension of the period of limitation is called for. The principle of condonation of delay is based on the general rule of the criminal justice system which states that a crime never dies, as has been
explained by way of the legal maxim, nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi (lapse of time is no bar to the Crown for the purpose of it initiating proceeding against offenders). A criminal offence is considered as a wrong against the State and also the society as a whole, even though the same has been committed against an individual.

From Para 7, regd delay in registering a complaint

7. The question of delay in launching a criminal prosecution may be a circumstance to be taken into consideration while arriving at a final decision, however, the same may not itself be a ground for dismissing the complaint at the threshold. Moreover, the issue of limitation must be examined in light of the gravity of the charge in question.

From Para 8, regd while condoning delay has to record the reasons

8. The court, while condoning delay has to record the reasons for its satisfaction, and the same must be manifest in the order of the court itself. The court is further required to state in its conclusion, while condoning such delay, that such condonation is required in the interest of justice.

From Para 10,

CONTINUING OFFENCE:
10. Section 472 Cr.P.C. provides that in case of a continuing offence, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time period during which the offence continues. The expression, ‘continuing offence’ has not been defined in the Cr.P.C. because it is one of those expressions which does not have a fixed connotation, and therefore, the formula of universal application cannot be formulated in this respect.

From Para 16,

16. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that, in the case of a continuing offence, the ingredients of the offence continue, i.e., endure even after the period of consummation, whereas in an instantaneous offence, the offence takes place once and for all i.e. when the same actually takes place. In such cases, there is no continuing offence, even though the damage resulting from the injury may itself continue.

From Para

SECOND COMPLAINT ON SAME FACTS-MAINTAINABILITY:
17. While considering the issue at hand in Shiv Shankar Singh v. State of Bihar & Anr., (2012) 1 SCC 130, this Court, after considering its earlier judgments in Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar AIR 1962 SC 876; Jatinder Singh & Ors. v. Ranjit Kaur AIR 2001 SC 784; Mahesh Chand v. B. Janardhan Reddy & Anr., AIR 2003 SC 702; Poonam Chand Jain & Anr. v. Fazru AIR 2005 SC 38 held:
“It is evident that the law does not prohibit filing or entertaining of the second complaint even on the same facts provided the earlier complaint has been decided on the basis of insufficient material or the order has been passed without understanding the nature of the complaint or the complete facts could not be placed before the court or where the complainant came to know certain facts after disposal of the first complaint which could have tilted the balance in his favour. However, second complaint would not be maintainable wherein the earlier complaint has been disposed of on full consideration of the case of the complainant on merit.”

From Para 28,

28. Approaching the court at a belated stage for a rightful cause, or even for the violation of the fundamental rights, has always been considered as a good ground for its rejection at the threshold. The ground taken by the learned counsel for respondent No. 2 that the cause of action arose on 20.10.2009 and 5.11.2009, as the appellants refused to return money and other materials, articles and record, does not have substance worth consideration. In case a representation is made by the person aggrieved and the same is rejected by the competent statutory authority, and such an order is communicated to the person aggrieved, making repeated representations will not enable the party to explain the delay.

Citations : [2013 SCALE 1 212], [2013 JT 1 539], [2013 JCC SC 1 711], [2013 SCC 2 435], [2013 SUPREME 1 590], [2013 AIOL 18], [2013 SLT 1 249], [2013 CRIMES SC 1 231], [2013 SCC CIV 1 1121], [2013 SCC CRI 2 708], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 41], [2013 AIC 123 137], [2013 UC 1 449], [2013 ACR 1 689], [2013 BLJ 3 28], [2013 NCC 1 549], [2013 AD SC 1 537], [2013 JLJR 1 235], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL 2 503], [2013 SCR 3 935], [2013 MLJ CRI 1 462], [2013 JCC 1 711], [2013 MLJ CRL 1 462], [2013 JT SC 1 539]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/39425468/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af3fe4b0149711415eef

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/udai-shankar-awasthi-vs-state-of-u-p-anr

The High Court judgment is here.

S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs Jagannath on 27 Oct 1993

Posted on July 4, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Landmark judgment by a division bench of the Supreme Court of India around perjury/fraud committed upon the Courts. Just read the below line to understand how far the frauds take the Courts for a ride.

This Civil Appeal was numbered 994 of 1972, but got decided on October 27, 1993!
Twenty One (21) years lost at Supreme Court itself!!!

From Para 5,

5. The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. The High Court, however, went haywire and made observations which are wholly perverse. We do not agree with the High Court that “there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence”. The principle of “finality of litigation” cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court-process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who’s case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.

From Para 6,

6. The facts of the present case leave no manner of doubt that Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another’s loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. Jagannath was working as a clerk with Chunilal Sowcar. He purchased the property in the court auction on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. He had, on his own volition, executed the registered release deed (Ex. B-15) in favour of Chunilal Sowcar regarding the property in dispute. He knew that the appellants had paid the total decretal amount to his master Chunilal Sowcar. Without disclosing all these facts, he filed the suit for the partition of the property on the ground that he had purchased the property on his own behalf and not on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. Non-production and even non-mentioning of the release deed at the trial is tantamount to playing fraud on the court. We do not agree with the observations of the High Court that the appellants- defendants could have easily produced the certified registered copy of Ex. B-15 and non-suited the plaintiff. A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party.

S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs Jagannath on 27 Oct 1993 (Original)

Citations : [1994 AIR SC 853], [1993 SCALE 4 277], [1994 UJ SC 1 1], [1993 BC SC 2 546], [1994 BLJR 1 216], [1994 OLR SC 1 201], [1995 PLR 109 293], [1993 SUPP SCR 3 422], [1994 SCC 1 1], [1994 PLJR 1 39], [1994 APLJ SC 1 66], [1994 LW 1 21], [1994 GLH 1 81], [1993 JT SC 6 331]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1151521/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac8fe4b014971140f23f

Index of Perjury related judgments is here.

Nasruddin Mian Vs State of Bihar on 21 Jun 2021

Posted on July 4, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Patna High Court held that this is not how a judgment is to be written, while acquitting a husband from a conviction given for the alleged offence of murdering his wife.

78. The judgment under consideration is an example of how not to write a judgment. It has repeatedly been emphasized by the Supreme Court that the Courts and Judges must make a dispassionate assessment of evidence and that the Courts and Judges should not be swayed by the horror of crime and the character of the person. The judgment should be made by a Judge uninfluenced by his own imagined norms of the functioning of the society.
79. The Trial Court ought to have avoided the sweeping and disparaging remarks made in para 42 of its judgment regarding the conduct of the appellants.
80. I fail to see as to how the Trial Court held in para 44 of its judgment that the charge was framed against the appellants under Section 498-A of the IPC after the informant filed an application for addition to the original charge. The order dated 08.05.2017 passed by the Trial Court, which has been extracted hereinabove, would clearly show that the original charge under Sections 498-A, 306 and 201/34 of the IPC was altered to Sections 304-B, 302 and 201/34 of the IPC. The trial court did not allow the prayer of the informant regarding addition of Sections 304-B and 302 of the IPC to the original charge already framed against them meaning thereby that due to alteration of the original charge vide order dated 08.05.2017, the charge under Sections 498-A and 306 became non-existent.
81. As a matter of fact, for all practical purposes, after alteration of the charge, the appellants were being tried only for the offences punishable under Sections 304-B, 302 and 201/34 of the IPC.
82. Surprisingly, in para 43 of the judgment, the Trial Court held that the case under Section 306 of the IPC is not made out. After alteration of charge, since there was no charge under Section 306 of the IPC, there was no occasion for the Trial Court to have recorded such finding in respect of Section 306 of the IPC.
83. Evidently, while passing the impugned judgment, the Trial Court had misconceived that the appellants were also being tried for the original charge framed under Sections 498-A and 306 of the IPC.
84. While saying so, I am mindful of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shanti Vs. State of Haryana, since reported in (1991) 1 SCC 371, wherein it has been held that Sections 304-B and 498-A of the IPC are not mutually exclusive. They deal with two distinct offences. A person charged and acquitted under Section 304-B of the IPC can be convicted under Section 498-A of the IPC without charge being framed, if such a case is made out. But from the point of view of practice and procedure and to avoid technical defects, it is necessary in such cases to frame charges under both
the sections and if the case is established against the accused, they can be convicted under both the Sections but no separate sentence need be awarded under Section 498-A in view of the substantive sentence being awarded for the major offence under Section 304-B.

Nasruddin Mian Vs State of Bihar on 21 Jun 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/193472418/

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision

Dhariwal Tobaco Products Ltd and Ors Vs State of Maharastra and Anr on 17 Dec 2008

K Santhosha Vs The Karnataka Power Transmission on 24 Jun 2021

Narain Khamman Vs Parduman Kumar Jain on 19 Oct 1984

P.K. Shaji Vs State of Kerala on 27 Oct 2005

Registrar General Vs State of Meghalaya on 23 Jun 2021

Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs West Bengal Vs Mohan Singh and Ors on 08 Oct 1974

Gullipilli Sowria Raj Vs Bandaru Pavani on 4 Dec 2008

Udai Shankar Awasthi Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 09 Jan 2013

S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs Jagannath on 27 Oct 1993

This Civil Appeal was numbered 994 of 1972, but got decided on October 27, 1993!

Twenty One (21) years lost at Supreme Court itself!!!

Nasruddin Mian Vs State of Bihar on 21 Jun 2021