Apex Court confirmed the decision of Bombay High Court which said, Doctor’s (Healthcare) services are within the ambit of Consumer Protection Act 2019.
Citations :
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Bombay High Court decision:
Tag: 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision
Kamlesh Devi Vs Jaipal and Ors on 04 Oct 2019
A division bench of Apex Court held that, there is no allegations of domestic violence against the respondents and more importantly, there is no shared household between the complainant and the respondents.
The High Court has rightly found in effect that the ingredients of domestic violence are wholly absent in this case. The petitioner and the respondents are not persons living together in a shared household. There is a vague allegation that the respondents are family members. There is not a whisper of the respondents with the petitioner. They appear to be neighbours.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/46655686/
https://lawsisto.com/legalnewsread/MzAxMg==/Supreme-Court-If-Parties-Are-Not-Living-Together-In-A-Shared-House-Domestic-Violence-Complaint-Not-Maintainable
https://www.lawyerservices.in/Kamlesh-Devi-Versus-Jaipal-and-Others-2019-10-04
https://lawstreet.co/judiciary/complaint-not-maintainable-if-parties-are-living-separately/
Here is the High Court decision:
The learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Narnaul, after discussing the provisions of the Act found that none of the witnesses on record has established any fact to the effect that the respondents and the petitioner have been living in a shared household and the respondents have caused domestic violence upon them. The Court below also held that no violence whatsoever has been alleged of any kind within the premises of shared household. The only allegation is that though they did obscene activities with the daughters of the petitioner, the allegations as per pleadings are that respondents Jaipal, Krishan Kumar and Sandeep used to misbehave with the daughters of the petitioner, namely, Anusaya and Gaytri while they went outside for the purpose of their study and they used to do obscene activities with the daughters of the petitioner. The findings given by the learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Narnaul, are correct as per evidence and law. No illegality has been committed by the learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Narnaul.
From the perusal of the complaint itself, it transpires that the offence, if any, which has been alleged, falls in the provisions of IPC and it does not attract the provisions of the Act. The important fact that accused Jaipal, Krishan Kumar and Sandeep are the nephews itself will not bring the case under the Act.
The appeal filed by the present petitioner against the judgment of the learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Narnaul, before the learned Sessions Judge was also dismissed by giving the reasoning as per law. The learned Sessions Judge also discussed that there is not an iota of evidence that the petitioner Kamlesh Devi and the respondents are living together in share household. Rather, certificate Ex.C.3/Ex.PW.1/C also shows that it has been mentioned therein that Sube Singh alias Shiv Lal, Siri Ram, Chhote Lal and Babu Lal reside separately in separate houses. Protection Officer had also reported that Kamlesh Devi along with her family is residing at Narnaul since a long time and had performed the marriages of her daughters at Narnaul and Smt. Kamlesh Devi and her husband are not residing in Village Gaud. The learned Sessions Judge, Narnaul also held that Kamlesh Devi-petitioner is not aggrieved person under the provision of Section 2(a) of the Act and is not entitled to any protection under Section 18 of the Act. A perusal of the judgments passed by the Courts below shows that the same have been passed as per evidence and law and the same are upheld.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5e24c7f546571b7222aa868e
Muthu Karuppan Vs Parithi Ilamvazhuthi and Anr on 15 Apr 2011
A division bench of Apex Court held that procedural lapses are crucial in proceedings under Contempt of Courts Act 1971.
From Para 23,
23) We have already pointed out that while dealing with criminal contempt in terms of Section 2(c) of the Act, strict procedures are to be adhered. In a series of decisions, this Court has held that jurisdiction to initiate proceedings for contempt as also the jurisdiction to punish for contempt are discretionary with the court. Contempt generally and criminal contempt certainly is a matter between the court and the alleged contemnor. No one can compel or demand as of right initiation of proceedings for contempt. The person filing an application or petition before the court does not become a complainant or petitioner in the proceedings. He is just an informer or relator. His duty ends with the facts being brought to the notice of the court. It is thereafter for the court to act on such information or not. [Vide Om Prakash Jaiswal vs. D.K. Mittal, (2000) 3 SCC 171] Further Section 15 of the Act as well as the Madras High Court Contempt of Court Rules insist that, particularly, for initiation of criminal contempt, consent of the Advocate General is required. Any deviation from the prescribed Rules should not be accepted or condoned lightly and must be deemed to be fatal to the proceedings taken to initiate action for contempt. In the present case, the above provisions have not been strictly adhered to and even the notice issued by the then Division Bench merely sought for explanation from the appellant about the allegations made by Respondent No. 1.
Citations : [2011 AIR SC 1645], [2011 CRI LJ 2680], [2011 CRIMES SC 2 163], [2011 CTC 3 520], [2011 JCR SC 3 23], [2011 JT SC 4 268], [2011 KCCR SN 3 329], [2011 RCR CRIMINAL 2 829], [2011 SCALE 4 664], [2011 SCC 5 496], [2011 SCC CRI 2 709], [2011 SCR 5 329], [2011 UC 2 922], [2011 UJ 2 1658], [2011 AIR SC 2588], [2012 CUTLT 113 822], [2011 AIC 102 74], [2011 AIOL 291], [2011 CRLJ SC 2680], [2011 JT 4 273], [2011 SUPREME 3 217], [2011 SUPREME 3 228], [2011 LW CRL 1 666], [2011 SCC CR 2 709], [2011 SCJ 4 82], [2011 MLJ CRI 3 542], [2011 CCR 2 214], [2011 SLT 3 438], [2011 RCR CRIMINAL SC 2 829], [2011 KCCRSN 3 329], [2012 CUT LT 113 822], [2011 MLJ CRL 3 54], [22011 KHC SN 2 212011 CRLJ 2680], [2011 AIR SCW 2588], [2011 JT 4 268], [2011 CRILJ 2680]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1204818/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aef4e4b014971141544e
Index of all Perjury case laws is here.
D.K. Basu Vs State of West Bengal on 18 Dec 1996
A division bench of Apex Court laid down certain guidelines to be followed in cases of arrest and detention till legal provisions are made in that behalf as preventive measures. The said guidelines read as follows:-
(1) The police personnel carrying out the arrest and handling the interrogation of the arrestee should bear accurate, visible and clear identification and name tags with their designations. The particulars of all such police personnel who handle interrogation of the arrestee must be recorded in a register.
(2) That the police officer carrying out the arrest of the arrestee shall prepare a memo of arrest at the time of arrest and such memo shall be attested by at least one witness, who may either be a member of the family of the arrestee or a respectable person of the locality from where the arrest is made. It shall also be countersigned by the arrestee and shall contain the time and date of arrest.
(3) A person who has been arrested or detained and is being held in custody in a police station or interrogation centre or other lock-up, shall be entitled to have one friend or relative or other person known to him or having interest in his welfare being informed, as soon as practicable, that he has been arrested and is being detained at the particular place, unless the attesting witness of the memo of arrest is himself such a friend or a
relative of the arrestee.
(4) The time, place of arrest and venue of custody of an arrestee must be notified by the police where the next friend or relative of the arrestee lives outside the district or town through the Legal Aid Organisation in the District and the police station of the area concerned telegraphically within a period of 8 to 12 hours after the arrest.
(5) The person arrested must be made aware of this right to have someone informed of his arrest or detention as soon as he is put under arrest or is detained.
(6) An entry must be made in the diary at the place of detention regarding the arrest of the person which shall also disclose the name of the next friend of the person who has been informed of the arrest and the names and particulars of the police officials in whose custody the arrestee is.
(7) The arrestee should, where he so requests, be also examined at the time of his arrest and major and minor injuries, if any present on his/her body, must be recorded at that time. The “Inspection Memo” must be signed both by the arrestee and the police officer effecting the arrest and its copy provided to the arrestee.
(8) The arrestee should be subjected to medical examination by a trained doctor every 48 hours during his detention in custody by a doctor on the panel of approved doctors appointed by Director, Health Services of the State or Union Territory concerned. Director, Health Services should prepare such a panel for all tehsils and districts as well.
(9) Copies of all the documents including the memo of arrest, referred to above, should be sent to the Illaqa Magistrate for his record.
(10) The arrestee may be permitted to meet his lawyer during interrogation, though not throughout the interrogation.
(11) A police control room should be provided at all district and State headquarters, where information regarding the arrest and the place of custody of the arrestee shall be communicated by the officer causing the arrest, within 12 hours of effecting the arrest and at the police control room it should be displayed on a conspicuous notice board.
Citations : [1997 ACR SC 21 277], [1997 AIR SC 610], [1997 ALD CRI 1 248], [1998 BLJR 1 161], [1997 CRILJ 743], [1996 CRIMES SC 4 233], [1997 GLR 2 1631], [1997 JT SC 1 1], [1997 RCR CRIMINAL 1 372], [1997 RLW SC 1 94], [1996 SCALE 9 298], [1997 SCC 1 416], [1996 SUPP SCR 10 284], [1997 SCC CRI 92], [1996 SUPPSCR 10 284]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/501198/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ace1e4b014971140fee9#
Dr. Rini Johar and Anr Vs State of MP and Ors on 03 Jun 2016
A division bench of Supreme Court granted compensation to victims of police harassment, while quashing the criminal proceedings.
From Para 27,
27. In the case at hand, there has been violation of Article 21 and the petitioners were compelled to face humiliation. They have been treated with an attitude of insensibility. Not only there are violation of guidelines issued in the case of D.K. Basu (supra), there are also flagrant violation of mandate of law enshrined under Section 41 and Section 41-A of CrPC. The investigating officers in no circumstances can flout the law with brazen proclivity. In such a situation, the public law remedy which has been postulated in Nilawati Behra (supra), Sube Singh v. State of Haryana9, Hardeep Singh v. State of M.P.10, comes into play. The constitutional courts taking note of suffering and humiliation are entitled to grant compensation. That has been regarded as a redeeming feature. In the case at hand, taking into consideration the totality of facts and circumstances, we think it appropriate to grant a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- (rupees five lakhs only) towards compensation to each of the petitioners to be paid by the State of M.P. within three months hence. It will be open to the State to proceed against the erring officials, if so advised.
Citations : [2016 AIOL 3407], [2016 SCC ONLINE SC 594], [2016 SCC 11 703], [2017 SCC CRI 1 364], [2016 AIR SC 2679], [2016 AIC 163 98], [2016 CRI LJ 3156], [2016 GUJ LH 2 607], [2016 KLJ 3 613], [2016 KLT 3 502]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/103942103/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5790b545e561097e45a4e6b3
Geo Varghese Vs State of Rajasthan and Anr on 05 Oct 2021
A division bench of Apex Court held that, there is no mens rea, on part of Appellant-accused, to abet the suicide of the Class 9 student, therefore necessary ingredient for attracting 306 IPC.
From Para 35,
39. Insofar as, the suicide note is concerned, despite our minute examination of the same, all we can say is that suicide note is rhetoric document, penned down by an immature mind. A reading of the same also suggests the hypersensitive temperament of the deceased which led him to take such an extraordinary step, as the alleged reprimand by the accused, who was his teacher, otherwise would not ordinarily induce a similarly circumstanced student to commit suicide.
40. In the absence of any material on record even, prima-facie, in the FIR or statement of the complainant, pointing out any such circumstances showing any such act or intention that he intended to bring about the suicide of his student, it would be absurd to even think that the appellant had any intention to place the deceased in such circumstances that there was no option available to him except to commit suicide.
41. In the absence of any specific allegation and material of definite nature, not imaginary or inferential one, it would be travesty of justice, to ask the
appellant-accused to face the trial. A criminal trial is not exactly a pleasant experience and the appellant who is a teacher would certainly suffer great prejudice, if he has to face prosecution on absurd allegations of irrelevant nature.
42. Bearing in mind the factual aspects of the case delineated herein above and the legal principles enunciated by a series of pronouncements of this Court discussed herein above, we are of the view that High Court was not justified in dismissing the application under section 482 CrPC for quashing the First Information Report in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction.
43. We are conscious of the pain and suffering of the complainant who is the mother of the deceased boy. It is also very unfortunate that a young life has been lost in this manner, but our sympathies and the pain and suffering of the complainant, cannot translate into a legal remedy, much less a criminal prosecution.
Citations :
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Bar Council of Kerala Vs Raju Y and Anr on 04 Jan 2019
Supreme Court refused (dismissed summarily) to consider the SLPs filed by Bar Council of Kerala against the decision of the division bench of Kerala High Court upon a writ appeal from here (including one filed against T.Koshy, Diary No. 43042/2018), which held that Bar Council (of any State or India) do not have power to prescribe any fee for the enrolment, either in the form of enrolment fee or special fee. .
Citations:
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Index of Bar Council Antics here.
Bar Council of Kerala Vs T.Koshy on 12 Apr 2018
A division bench of Kerala High Court (Order written by Chief Justice!) upon a writ appeal from here) held that Bar Council (of any State or India) do not have power to prescribe any fee for the enrolment, either in the form of enrolment fee or special fee. This was eventually taken to Supreme Court where the Bar Council failed to convince the Apex Court here.
From Para 7,
7.Thus the surviving question is whether the fixation of special fee is encompassed by the conditions which the Bar Council is entitled to prescribe in the rules made by it in view of section 24(1)(e) and section 28(2)(d). As we have already seen and as found by the learned single Judge, in section 24(1)(f), the Legislature itself has prescribed the enrolment fee payable by a candidate applying for enrolment with a Bar Council of a State. Once the legislature has prescribed enrolment fee, another fee, be it called a special fee or anything else, can legitimately be prescribed by a State Bar Council or any other authority only if there is an express legislative sanction therefor. In so far as section 24(1)(e) is concerned, all that it empowers the State Bar Council is to specify in the rules made by it under Chapter III of the Act the other conditions that a candidate should fulfill for enrolment. That rule making power also finds reflection in section 28(2)(d) which provides for the power of the Bar Council to make rules prescribing the conditions subject to which a person could be admitted as an advocate on its rolls. These provisions, in our view, only deal with the eligibility conditions and those conditions do not empower the Bar Council to prescribe any fee for the enrolment, either in the form of enrolment fee or special fee. Therefore, the prescription of special fee as done by the Bar Council of Kerala is totally ultra vires its powers as conferred under the Advocates Act, 1961.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5b59b5e74a93261b1dbe8e49
Index of Bar Council Antics here.
Kannan Vs Selvamuthukani on 30 Jan 2012
A division bench of Apex Court held that, it has to be clearly established that the family members of Accused-husband knew that his divorce with his first wife was set aside before participating in the second marriage.
9. The prosecution has clearly established that A1 was married to the complainant on 16.6.1980. It is also a fact that A1 obtained a decree of divorce on 20.2.1991 which was set aside on 10.2.1992 in the appeal carried by the complainant against the said decree of divorce. Evidence of the complainant establishes beyond doubt that A1 married A4 on 8.3.1992. The question is whether the fact that the decree of divorce was set aside and the marriage between A1 and the complainant was revived was known to A3, A4 and A5. Merely because A3 is the sister of A1, it cannot be presumed that she knew that the decree of divorce was set aside. If A1 wanted to marry A4, it is possible that he would keep back these facts from his sister as also from A4 and A5 i.e. his second wife and her father respectively.
10. In our opinion, the evidence of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 does not conclusively establish that the fact that the decree of divorce was set aside on 10.2.1992 was known to A3, A4 and A5 and, therefore, benefit of doubt must be given to A3, A4 and A5. In the circumstances, in our opinion, the impugned judgment and order dated 24.9.2008 so far as it convicts and sentences A3, A4 and A5 needs to be set aside.
Citations : [2012 SCC CRI 3 234], [2012 SUPREME 1 714], [2012 AIR SC 1278], [2012 ANJ SC 1 204], [2012 CRIMES SC 1 225], [2012 RCR CRIMINAL SC 4 331], [2012 JT 1 554], [2012 DMC SC 1 327], [2012 AIOL 2007], [2012 AIR SC 1217], [2012 SLT 1 626], [2012 RCR CIVIL SC 4 356], [2012 SCC 5 570], [2012 BOMCR CRI SC 2 428], [2012 SCC ONLINE SC 92], [2012 AIC 111 270], [2012 UC 1 506], [2012 NCC 1 686], [2012 ALD CRI 2 155], [2012 CALLT SC 3 21], [2012 SCALE 2 9], [2012 AIR SCW 1278], [2012 CRI LJ 1576]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/180112594/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af1de4b0149711415a65
https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/Browse/Case?CaseId=002102170000&Title=KANNAN-Vs.-SELVAMUTHUKANI
https://www.legalauthority.in/judgement/kannan-vs-selvamuthukani-7495
K Neelaveni Vs State Rep By Inspector of Police and Ors on 22 Mar 2010
A division bench of Apex Court held that there are, prima facie, specific allegations in the FIR to attract IPC 406 and 494.
From Paras 8 and 9,
8. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced and we are inclined to accept the submission of Mr. Guru Krishna Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant. From a perusal of the allegations made in the First Information Report, it is evident that the appellant has clearly alleged that her husband had married another lady namely Bharathi and the said marriage had taken place in the presence and with the support of other accused persons. She had also stated that from the second marriage with Bharathi a girl child was born. In the First Information Report, it had clearly been alleged that besides gold ornaments other household articles were given in marriage and further she was subjected to cruelty and driven out from the matrimonial home by the accused persons. In our opinion, the allegations made in the First Information Report, at this stage, have to be accepted as true, and allegations so made prima facie, constitute offences under Sections 406 and 494 of the Indian Penal Code. It has to be borne in mind that while considering the application for quashing of the charge sheet, the allegations made in the First Information Report and the materials collected during the course of the investigation are required to be considered. Truthfulness or otherwise of the allegation is not fit to be gone into at this stage as it is always a matter of trial. Essential ceremonies of the Marriage were gone into or not is a matter of trial.
9. From what we have said above, we are of the opinion that the High Court erred in holding that the charge sheet does not reveal the ingredients constituting the offences under Sections 494 and 406 of the Indian Penal Code.
Citations : [2010 SCJ 3 654], [2010 AIR SC 3191], [2010 SCC 11 607], [2011 KLJ NOC 2 10], [2010 SCALE 3 261], [2010 DMC 1 560], [2010 SLT 2 604], [2010 CUTLT SUPPL 947], [2010 AIOL 153], [2010 CRIMES SC 2 90], [2010 RCR CRIMINAL SC 2 547], [2011 SCC CRI 1 219], [2010 SUPREME 2 543], [2010 ECRN 2 541], [2010 AIR SC 2760], [2010 AIC 88 58], [2010 MLJ CRL 3 352], [2010 CRLJ SC 2819], [2010 JT SC 3 156], [2010 AIR SCW 2760]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1440610/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aeece4b01497114152ae
https://www.legalauthority.in/judgement/k-neelaveni-vs-state-rep-by-insp-of-police-9855
https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/Browse/Case?CaseId=000102622000
https://advocatespedia.com/Case_Study:_K_Neelaveni_Vs_State_Rep_By_Inspector_of_Police_%26_Ors_Case
