MS Supreme Bhiwandi Wada Manor Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs State of Maharashtra on 26 Jul 2021

Posted on March 21, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division bench of the Apex Court held that, there is no scope for examining the complainant (or any witnesses) u/s 200 CrPC, in a 156(3) CrPC proceeding, since that stage is pre-cognizance of any cognizable offence.

From Paras 16 and 17,

16 The primary basis on which the High Court has allowed the applications under Section 438 is that the complaint filed by the first informant was supported by an affidavit dated 6 February 2016. However, the High Court held that the mandate of Section 200 of the CrPC of examining the complainant on oath has not been fulfilled by the Magistrate. On this basis, the High Court held that this raises a serious doubt about the validity of the order which has been passed under Section 156(3).
17 There is a serious error in the view of the Single Judge. First and foremost, the Magistrate’s order under Section 156(3) was not under challenge before the High Court and has attained finality. The High Court was in error in raising a doubt about the correctness of the order under section 156(3) passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate on 11 May 2016 in the course of considering the complaint filed by the complainant. Secondly, the position in law as set out in the order of the Single Judge does not accord with the principles which have been consistently enunciated in the decisions of this Court specifically in the context of Chapter XV of the CrPC. Sections 200 and 202

From Para 20,

20 In Anju Chaudhary v. State of Uttar Pradesh6, Justice Swatanter Kumar for the Bench noted that Section 156 primarily deals with the powers of the police officer to investigate cognizable cases. While passing an order under Section 156(3), the Magistrate does not take cognizance. The order of the Magistrate is in the nature of ―a pre-emptory reminder or intimation to the police‖ to exercise their primary duty and power of investigation. The court held that the power of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) is not affected by the provisions of Section 202

MS Supreme Bhiwandi Wada Manor Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs State of Maharashtra on 26 Jul 2021

Citations : [AIR 2021 SC 3580], [2021 All.M.R. (Cri.) 3062], [2021 (5) BLJ 114], [2021 CriLJ 3747], [JT 2021 (7) SC 238], [2021 (3) MLJ (Cri) 438], [2021 (3) RCR (Criminal) 691], [2021 (8) SCALE 534], [(2021) 8 SCC 753]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/77704402/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6101a65137988476911e2ec4

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/m-s-supreme-bhiwandi-wada-manor-infrastructure-pvt-ltd-versus-the-state-of-maharashtra-anr

Sarbati Devi and Anr Vs Usha Devi on 06 Dec 1983

Posted on March 15, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that in a case of insurance policy holder dying intestate with some nomination, then the nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them

From Para 4,

4. At the outset it should be mentioned that except the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kesari Devi v. Dharma Devi AIR 1962 All 355 on which reliance was placed by the High Court in dismissing the appeal before it and the two decisions of the Delhi High Court in S. Fauza Singh v. Kuldip SinghAIR 1978 Del 276 and Uma Sehgal v. Dwarka Dass Sehgal AIR 1982 Del 36 in all other decisions cited before us the view taken is that the nominee under Section 39 of the Act is nothing more than an agent to receive the money due under a life insurance policy in the circumstances similar to those in the present case and that the money remains the property of the assured during his lifetime and on his death forms part of his estate subject to the law of succession applicable to him. The cases which have taken the above view are Ramballav Dhandhania v. Gangadhar NathmallAIR 1956 Cal 275; Life Insurance Corporation of India v. United Bank of India Ltd AIR 1970 Cal 513; D. Mohanavelu Mudaliar v. Indian Insurance and Banking Corporation Ltd., Salem6; Sarojini Amma v. Neelakanta Pillai AIR 1961 Ker 126; Atmaram Mohanlal Panchal v. Gunvantiben AIR 1977 Guj 134; Malli Dei v. Kanchan Prava Dei AIR 1973 Ori 83 and Lakshmi Amma v. Saguna BhagathILR 1973 Kant 827. Since there is a conflict of judicial opinion on the question involved in this case it is necessary to examine the above cases at some length.

The operative portion of the Judgment:

12. Moreover there is one other strong circumstance in this case which dissuades us from taking a view contrary to the decisions of all other High Courts and accepting the view expressed by the Delhi High Court in the two recent judgments delivered in the year 1978 and in the year 1982. The Act has been in force from the year 1938 and all along almost all the High Courts in India have taken the view that a mere nomination effected under Section 39 does not deprive the heirs of their rights in the amount payable under a life insurance policy. Yet Parliament has not chosen to make any amendment to the Act. In such a situation unless there are strong and compelling reasons to hold that all these decisions are wholly erroneous, the Court should be slow to take a different view. The reasons given by the Delhi High Court are unconvincing. We, therefore, hold that the judgments of the Delhi High Court in Fauza Singh case and in Uma Sehgal case do not lay down the law correctly. They are, therefore, overruled. We approve the views expressed by the other High Courts on the meaning of Section 39 of the Act and hold that a mere nomination made under Section 39 of the Act does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy on the death of the assured. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them.

Sarbati Devi and Anr Vs Usha Devi on 06 Dec 1983

Citations : [1983 SCALE 2 869], [1984 AIR SC 346], [1984 SCC 1 424], [1984 SCR 1 992], [1984 SCC TAX 59], [1984 ALR 10 268], [1984 ALJ 194], [1984 BLJR 21], [1984 ACC 2 377], [1984 ACJ 138], [1984 BLJR 32 210], [1984 COMPLJ SC 1 1], [1984 GLH 490], [1984 COMPCAS SC 55 214], [1984 UJ SC 866]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1308094/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac0ce4b014971140de2b

Vijaya Mahantesh Mulemane Vs State of Karnataka and Ors on 03 Mar 2022

Posted on March 10, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

This is such an atrocious case whereby the so-called mother flouts the orders passed by Canadian Courts regd Custody of a minor child and reaches India only to file a 498A IPC case. Crooks!

Vijaya Mahantesh Mulemane Vs State of Karnataka and Ors on 03 Mar 2022

The Earlier decision from Karnataka High Court’s Division Bench, where a parenting plan was devised by the judges.

Vijaya Mahantesh Mulemane Vs State of Karnataka and Ors on 22 Nov 2020

Luckose Zachariah Vs Joseph Joseph on 18 Feb 2022

Posted on March 3, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division bench of the Supreme Court held that the reports filed by police under 173(2) (Original Charge sheet) and 173(8) (Supplementary Charge sheet) are to be considered by the Magistrate to come to an opinion if the accused committed an offence.

From Para 16,

16 In view of the clear position of law which has been enunciated in the judgments of this Court, both in Vinay Tyagi (supra) and Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya (supra), it is necessary for the Magistrate, to have due regard to both the reports, the initial report which was submitted under Section 173(2) as well as the supplementary report which was submitted after further investigation in terms of Section 173(8). It is thereafter that the Magistrate would have to take a considered view in accordance with law as to whether there is ground for presuming that the persons named as accused have committed an offence. While the High Court has relied upon the decision in Vinay Tyagi (supra), it becomes necessary for this Court to set the matter beyond any controversy having due regard to the fact that the Sessions Judge in the present case had while remitting the proceedings back to the Magistrate relied on the judgment of the Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in Joseph (supra) which is contrary to the position set out in Vinay Tyagi. Hence, the JFCM – I Alappuzha shall reexamine both the reports in terms of the decisions of this Court in Vinay Tyagi vs Irshad Ali alias Deepak and Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya vs State of Gujarat as noted above and in terms of the observations contained in the present judgment. The Magistrate shall take a considered decision expeditiously within a period of one month from the date of the present order.

Luckose Zachariah Vs Joseph Joseph on 18 Feb 2022

Citations :

Other Sources :

M.S Jayaraj Vs Commissioner of Excise Kerala and Ors on 29 Sep 2000

Posted on March 3, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A simple but crucial observation by the Apex Court.

From Para 18,

18. We have difficulty to accept the said contention for more than one reason. If the rule-making authority had intended it to be so they would have effortlessly used the words “outside local limits specified in the licence” in the proviso because the same words have been used in sub- rule (1). As the proviso gives powers to the Excise Commissioner to order removal of a shop to a place “outside the limits specified in this sub- rule” it can only refer to the limits specified in that sub-rule and not elsewhere. It must be noted in this context that sub-rule (2) specifies certain limits such as “within 400 metres” (for toddy shops) and “within 200 metres” (for FL 1 shops) from certain institutions mentioned therein. It is with reference to those limits which are specified in sub-rule (2) that the proviso confers power on the Excise Commissioner to pass order for removal.

M.S Jayaraj Vs Commissioner of Excise Kerala and Ors on 29 Sep 2000

Casemine Version:

M.S Jayaraj Vs Commissioner of Excise Kerala and Ors on 29 Sep 2000 (CM)

Citations : [2000 AIR SC 3674], [2000 SCC 7 552], [2000 SUPREME 7 105], [2000 JT SUPP 1 487], [2000 AIRSC 3266], [2000 SCALE 6 674], [2000 ECC 72 7], [2000 KLT SC 3 820], [2000 SUPP SCR 3 616], [2000 AIR SCW 3674], [2000 SUPPSCR 3 616]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1919476/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad6fe4b014971141169c

Beena MS Vs Shino G Babu on 04 Feb 2022

Posted on February 28, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division bench of Kerala High Court held the following in a Divorce Matter, wherein one party is withholding the consent in a irretrievably broken-down marriage.

From Para 5,

5. The husband attributes this conduct as a behavioural disorder. The wife denies the same. We are not able to discern ourselves to classify this as
behavioural disorder or not. There are various types of personality disorders. In the absence of any medical evidence before us, we may not be able to classify this behaviour as a personality disorder. But, we are sure unstable emotions and relationships existed between the parties as revealed from Exts.A2 to A4 e-mail chatting reports and Ext.A5 whatsapp message. If one of the spouses is unable to adjust to such behaviour, that party cannot be found fault with. The obsessive nature of the character possessed by the wife would have led to a deteriorating relationship between the parties from the initial phase of life itself. Chasing happiness based on schedules instead of living in the moment, appears to be the vowed daily life routine adopted by her. She was not realistic to the fact that the secret of marital harmony lies in accepting the life as it unfolds and not becoming a stickler of the schedules or routines. Compulsive obsessiveness is also considered as a disorder. Though we are not sure about attributing the appellant as a person who suffers from such disorder, on going though the evidence, we are certain such attitude and behaviour was unbearable to the husband. If the conduct and character of one party causes misery and agony to the other spouse, the element of cruelty to the spouse would surface, justifying grant of divorce. If the parties cannot mend their ways, the law cannot remain oblivious to those who suffer in that relationship. In any matrimonial relationship, spouses may have a different outlook on the marriage based on faith, perceptions, outlook, attitudes, social ethos, etc. Fearing divorce is repugnant to his or her notion, one would refrain from the divorce based on mutual consent. The court cannot leave the life of a spouse to the mercy of the opposite spouse. Human problem requires resolution consistent with the notion of justice. The husband wants to get out of the misery and agony of the relationship; though, what was portrayed before the court is the fault of the wife, the husband also failed in building the relationship. We made an attempt for conciliation. The said attempt failed. There is no scope for reviving the dead marriage. The Apex Court in Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli [(2006) 4 SCC 558], opined that if the parties cannot live together on account of obvious differences, one of the parties is adamant and callous in attitude for having divorce on mutual consent, such attitude can be treated as the cause of mental cruelty to other spouses.

From Para 6,

6. The law on divorce recognises both fault and consent as a cause for separation. When both the parties are unable to lead a meaningful matrimonial life due to inherent differences of opinion and one party is willing for separation and the other party is withholding consent for mutual separation, that itself would cause mental agony and cruelty to the spouse who demands separation. The purpose of marriage is to hold matrimonial ties lifelong, respecting mutual obligations and rights. The companionship of spouses creates oneness of the mind to walk together. It is through mutual respect and courtship, the companionship is built and fortified. The modern jurisprudence of irretrievable break down to allow divorce is premised on the fact that the spouses can never remain together on account of their differences. If the court is able to form an opinion that due to incompatibility, the marriage failed and one of the spouses was withholding consent for mutual separation, the court can very well treat that conduct itself as cruelty. If one of the spouses is refusing to accord divorce on mutual consent after having convinced of the fact that the marriage failed, it is nothing but cruelty to spite the other spouse. No one can force another to continue in a legal tie and relationship if the relationship deteriorated beyond repair. The portrayal of such conduct through manifest behaviour of the spouse in a manner understood by a prudent as ‘cruelty’ is the language of the lawyer for a cause before the court. This case is also not different. The behavioural disorder pointed out against the appellant in the petition for divorce was essentially reflection of incompatibility that existed between the parties. The husband wants to get out of the struggled relationship, on the projected cause of cruelty with reference to the incidents of misbehaviour. Incompatibility is a factor that can be reckoned while considering the ground for cruelty, if one of the spouses withholds the consent of mutual separation, though incompatibility is not recognised as ground for divorce.

Beena MS Vs Shino G Babu on 04 Feb 2022

Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam Vs State of Bihar on 08 Feb 2022

Posted on February 18, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Apex Court quashed the FIR against relatives, which was riddled with vague allegations.

From Para 12,

12. Before we delve into greater detail on the nature and content of allegations made, it becomes pertinent to mention that incorporation of section 498A of IPC was aimed at preventing cruelty committed upon a woman by her husband and her in-laws, by facilitating rapid state intervention. However, it is equally true, that in recent times, matrimoniallitigation in the country has also increased significantly and there is a greater disaffection and friction surrounding the institution of marriage,now, more than ever. This has resulted in an increased tendency to employ provisions such as 498A IPC as instruments to settle personalscores against the husband and his relatives.

From Para 18,

18. The above-mentioned decisions clearly demonstrate that this court has at numerous instances expressed concern over the misuse of section 498A IPC and the increased tendency of implicating relatives of thehusband in matrimonial disputes, without analysing the long term ramifications of a trial on the complainant as well as the accused. It is further manifest from the said judgments that false implication by way of general omnibus allegations made in the course of matrimonial dispute, ifleft unchecked would result in misuse of the process of law. Therefore, this court by way of its judgments has warned the courts from proceedingagainst the relatives and in-laws of the husband when no prima facie case is made out against them.

From Para 21 and 22,

21. Here it must be borne in mind that although the two FIRs may constitute two independent instances, based on separate transactions, the present complaint fails to establish specific allegations against the in-laws of the Respondent wife. Allowing prosecution in the absence of clear allegations against the in-laws Appellants would simply result in an abuse of the process of law.
22. Therefore, upon consideration of the relevant circumstances and in the absence of any specific role attributed to the accused appellants, it would be unjust if the Appellants are forced to go through the tribulations of a trial, i.e., general and omnibus allegations cannot manifest in a situation where the relatives of the complainant’s husband are forced to undergo trial. It has been highlighted by this court in varied instances, that a criminal trial leading to an eventual acquittal also inflicts severe scars upon the accused, and such an exercise must therefore be discouraged.

Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam Vs State of Bihar on 08 Feb 2022

Citations :

Other Sources :

Rajendra Bhagat Vs State of Jharkhand on 03 Jan 2022

Posted on February 18, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Apex Court held that when there is a genuine settlement between the parties and they are living happily together, such settlement has to be upheld by High Court and quash the 498A IPC case. This cites B.S. Joshi & Ors Vs State Of Haryana & Anr on 13 March, 2003

From Para 5, (The bozos who file false matrimonial cases do NOT realize what they are unleashing; in this case Armyman lost his job!)

5. The appeal preferred by the appellant, being Criminal Appeal No. 10 of 2019, was dismissed by Sessions Judge, Gumla on 30.05.2019. Thereafter, the appellant preferred a revision petition before the High Court, being Criminal Revision No. 910 of 2019. While the said revision petition was pending, two significant events took place. The firsthad been sanction of competent authority for dismissal of the appellant from his military service w.e.f. 14.07.2020for having been convicted of the offence under Section 498-A IPC. In the second relevant event, on 24.11.2020, the appellant and the respondent No. 2 submitted a jointapplication before the High Court, inter alia, stating that with the intervention and advice of family members, common relatives and friends, they had entered intosettlement and resolved all their disputes. It was submitted that upon the appellant approaching his wife forsettlement with assurance to keep her with full honour and dignity, the proposal was accepted by the wife (respondent No. 2) with some conditions, while also undertaking todischarge her matrimonial duties. It was submitted that the parties were residing together with love and affectionand with no dispute between them. It was, therefore jointly prayed that since the dispute was a family dispute that arose due to miscommunication and misunderstanding, now the revision petition may be disposed of in view of the changed circumstances and the family status of the parties. This application was registered as I.A. No. 6052 of 2020.

From Para 7,

7. Having examined the matter in its totality, it appears that the High Court, while disposing of the revision petition with the application moved by the parties, did not pause to consider that maintaining of conviction of the appellant of the offence under Section 498-A IPC would not be securing the ends of justice and with such conviction being maintained and the appellant losing his job, the family would again land itself in financial distress which may ultimately operate adverse to the harmony and happy conjugal life of the parties. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the respondent No. 2 both have reiterated their stand that they have resolved their disputes and are living together while leading a happy conjugal life.

From Para 10,

10. In the aforesaid view of the matter, and taking note of the terms of settlement as stated in the application moved before the High Court which include the undertaking of the appellant that he would be nominating the respondent No. 2 as the nominee in his service record; and where the parties are said to be leading a happy conjugal life, we are clearly of the view that the High Court should have accepted the settlement and quashed all the proceedings with annulment of the orders against the appellant. The High Court having not done so, we are inclined to adopt this course so as to secure the ends of justice.

Rajendra Bhagat Vs State of Jharkhand on 03 Jan 2022

Citations :

Other Sources :

Renuka Vs Sangappa on 11 Dec 2019

Posted on November 13, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Karnataka HC held as follow with regards to Cruelty and Desertion grounds as found under Hindu Marriage Act 1955.

From Para 9,

9. The Trial Court examined PWs-1 to 3 and RW-1 and perused Ex.P1 and Exs.R1 to R8. The appellants attitude towards the respondent and staying away from him for years together and so also filing a petition for maintenance in Criminal miscellaneous No.95/2007 and partition suit in O.S.No.73/2005, she has not made any efforts to join her husband. On the other hand, the respondent had filed petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act and petition was not continued on account of appellants readiness and willingness to join the respondent due to which the respondent had withdrawn the petition filed under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Even thereafter the appellant had not joined the respondent. The appellant has not apprised the Trial Court as well as before this Court by producing any material evidence and so also what efforts she has made all these years to join the respondent. The contention of the appellant that she is ready to join her husband is only an afterthought for the reasons that she had ample opportunity of joining the respondent during the pendency of M.C.No.4/2010. Now we are in the year 2019. Even during the period from 30.11.2013, the date on which M.C.No.4/2010 was disposed off, till date she has not shown her willingness to join her husband. If her intention was really to join her husband, both Trial and this Court would have made necessary efforts to refer the matter to the Mediation & Conciliation Centre. Therefore, the attitude of the appellant towards respondent for these many years resulted in failure of marriage among the appellant and the respondent. Once the appellant failed to return to her marital home and remained in her parental house for more than one and half decade amounts to both desertion and cruelty.

From Para 16,

16. The principle is, thus, settled that whether in the facts and circumstances of a given case, the plaintiff has been able to make out a case of grant of divorce on the ground of cruelty would depend upon the nature of pleadings and evidence in that case and there can be no straitjacket formula nor an exhaustive list of instances can be prepared, where cruelty is said to have been committed by one or other party to the marriage. Cruelty can also not be inferred by applying any formula because the said question is to be determined keeping in view the social status of the parties, their financial and other conditions, the atmosphere and the kind of employment or vocation which they carry out would all be important to interfere whether on the given set of allegations it has become difficult for the plaintiff to live with the other side and the behaviour of such degree which amounts to the cruelty.

Renuka Vs Sangappa on 11 Dec 2019

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://www.legitquest.com/case/renuka-v-sangappa/1a2cde

https://www.lawyerservices.in/Renuka-Versus-Sangappa-2019-12-11

Amish Devgan Vs Union of India and Ors on 07 Dec 2020

Posted on October 27, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 84,

84. Lastly, we would also like to clarify that Section 179 of the Criminal Code permits prosecution of cases in the court within whose local jurisdiction the offence has been committed or consequences have ensued. Section 186 of the Criminal Code relates to cases where two separate charge-sheets have been filed on the basis of separate FIRs and postulates that the prosecution would proceed where the first charge-sheet has been filed on the basis of the FIR that is first in point of time. Principle underlying section 186 can be applied at the pre-charge-sheet stage, that is, post registration of
FIR but before charge-sheet is submitted to the Magistrate. In such cases ordinarily the first FIR, that is, the FIR registered first in point of time, should be treated as the main FIR and others as statements under Section 162 of the Criminal Code. However, in exceptional cases and for good reasons, it will be open to the High Court or this Court, as the case may be, to treat the subsequently registered FIR as the principal FIR. However, this should not cause any prejudice, inconvenience or harassment to either the victims, witnesses or the person who is accused. We have clarified the aforesaid position to avoid any doubt or debate on the said aspect.

Amish Devgan Vs Union of India and Ors on 07 Dec 2020

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/179868451/

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/amish-devgan-versus-union-of-india-and-others

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision

MS Supreme Bhiwandi Wada Manor Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs State of Maharashtra on 26 Jul 2021

Sarbati Devi and Anr Vs Usha Devi on 06 Dec 1983

Vijaya Mahantesh Mulemane Vs State of Karnataka and Ors on 03 Mar 2022

Luckose Zachariah Vs Joseph Joseph on 18 Feb 2022

M.S Jayaraj Vs Commissioner of Excise Kerala and Ors on 29 Sep 2000

Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam Vs State of Bihar on 08 Feb 2022

Rajendra Bhagat Vs State of Jharkhand on 03 Jan 2022

Renuka Vs Sangappa on 11 Dec 2019

Amish Devgan Vs Union of India and Ors on 07 Dec 2020