Chetram Mali Vs Karishma Saini on 21 Nov 2023

Posted on November 23, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court held as follows:

From Para 6,

6. XX
…
It may be noticed that though respondent claims to have no independent source of income but has reasonable educational background being a graduate from Delhi University. She appears to have voluntarily undertaken social work as claimed despite there being no impediment for undertaking a meaningful employment. The spouse having a reasonable capacity of earning but who chooses to remain unemployed and idle without any sufficient explanation or indicating sincere efforts to gain employment should not be permitted to saddle the other party with one sided responsibility of meeting out the expenses. The equivalence does not have to be with mathematical precision but with the objective to provide relief to the spouse by way of maintenance pendente lite and litigation expenses, who is unable to maintain and support during the pendency of proceedings and to ensure that party should not suffer due to paucity of source of income. The provision is gender neutral and the provisions of Section 24 & 25 of HMA provide for the rights, liabilities and obligations arising from marriage between the parties under HMA.

Chetram Mali Vs Karishma Saini on 21 Nov 2023

Citations:

Other Sources:

Priya Indoria Vs State of Karnataka and Ors on 20 Nov 2023

Posted on November 23, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court passed this Judgment around filing of anticipatory bail petition u/s 438 Cr.P.C.

From Paras 40-41, 44-47, (Regd grant of limited Anticipatory bail in HC/Sessions Court in accused’s local State, outside the State in which FIR is registered)

40. We are conscious that this may also lead the accused to choose the Court of his choice for seeking anticipatory bail. Forum shopping may become the order of the day as the accused would choose the most convenient Court for seeking anticipatory bail. This would also make the concept of territorial jurisdiction which is of importance under the CrPC pale into insignificance. Therefore, in order to avoid the abuse of the process of the Court as well as the law by the accused, it is necessary for the Court before which the plea for anticipatory bail is made, to ascertain the territorial connection or proximity between the accused and the territorial jurisdiction of the Court which is approached for seeking such a relief. Such a link with the territorial jurisdiction of the Court could be by way of place of residence or occupation/work/profession. By this, we imply that the accused cannot travel to any other State only for the purpose of seeking anticipatory bail. The reason as to why he is seeking such bail from a Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the FIR has not been filed must be made clear and explicit to such a Court. Also there must be a reason to believe or an imminent apprehension of arrest for a non-bailable offence made out by the accused for approaching the Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the FIR is not lodged or the inability to approach the Court where the FIR is lodged immediately.
41. Having regard to the vastness of our country and the length and breadth of it and bearing in mind the complex nature of life of the citizens, if an offence has been committed by a person in a particular State and if the FIR is filed in another State and the accused is a resident in a third State, bearing in mind access to justice, the accused who is residing in the third State or who is present there for a legitimate purpose should be enabled to seek the relief of limited anticipatory bail of transitory nature in the third State.
44. Further, on a reading of Section 438 of CrPC, we do not find that the expression “the High Court” or “the Court of Session” is restricted vis-à-vis the local limits or any particular territorial jurisdiction. However, this does not mean that if an FIR is lodged in one State then the accused can approach the Court in another State for seeking anticipatory bail. He can do so, if at the time of lodging of the FIR in any State, he is residing or is present there for a legitimate purpose in any other State. In fact, on a reading of Section 438 of CrPC, it does not emerge that the expression “the High Court” or “the Court of Session” must have reference only to the place or territorial jurisdiction within which the FIR is lodged. If that was the implication, the same would have been expressly evident in the Section itself or by a necessary implication. Further use of the word “the” before the words “High Court” and “Court of Session” also does not mean that only the High Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, within whose jurisdiction the FIR is filed, is competent to exercise jurisdiction for the grant of transit anticipatory bail.
45. At the same time, we are also mindful of the fact that the accused cannot seek full-fledged anticipatory bail in a State where he is a resident when the FIR has been registered in a different State. However, in view of what we have discussed above, he would be entitled to seek a transit anticipatory bail from the Court of Session or High Court in the State where he is a resident which necessarily has to be of a limited duration so as to seek regular anticipatory bail from the Court of competent jurisdiction. The need for such a provision is to secure the liberty of the individual concerned. Since anticipatory bail as well as transit anticipatory bail are intrinsically linked to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and since we have extended the concept of access to justice to such a situation and bearing in mind Article 14 thereof it would be necessary to give a constitutional imprimatur to the evolving provision of transit anticipatory bail. Otherwise, in a deserving case, there is likelihood of denial of personal liberty as well as access to justice for, by the time the person concerned approaches the Court of competent jurisdiction to seek anticipatory bail, it may well be too late as he may be arrested. Needless to say, the Court granting transit anticipatory bail would obviously examine the degree and seriousness of the apprehension expressed by the person who seeks transit anticipatory bail; while the object underlying exercise of such jurisdiction is to thwart arbitrary police action and to protect personal liberty besides providing immediate access to justice though within a limited conspectus.
46. If a rejection of the plea for limited/transitory anticipatory bail is made solely with reference to the concept of territorial jurisdiction it would be adding a restriction to the exercise of powers under Section 438. This, in our view, would result in miscarriage and travesty of justice, aggravating the adversity of the accused who is apprehending arrest. It would also be against the principles of access to justice. We say so for the reason that an accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt and in accordance with law. In the circumstances, we hold that the Court of Session or the High Court, as the case may be, can exercise jurisdiction and entertain a plea for limited anticipatory bail even if the FIR has not been filed within its territorial jurisdiction and depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, if the accused apprehending arrest makes out a case for grant of anticipatory bail but having regard to the fact that the FIR has not been registered within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court or Court of Session, as the case may, at the least consider the case of the accused for grant of transit anticipatory bail which is an interim protection of limited duration till such accused approaches the competent Sessions Court or the High Court, as the case may be, for seeking full-fledged anticipatory bail.
47. There can also be a case where the accused is facing multiple FIRs for the same offence in several States. He may seek an interim protection from a particular Sessions Court or the High Court in a State. Does he have to move from State to State for the purpose of seeking anticipatory bail or seek multiple pre-arrest bails? We would not attempt to give an answer to such a situation as the facts of the present case do not involve such a situation.

From Para 48, (Regd diluting the jurisdiction of Court to try the Sec 498a IPC cases, by going against many earlier judgments)

48. Another issue that calls for reiteration is, whether, the ordinary place of inquiry and trial would include the place where the complainant-wife resides after being separated from her husband. The position of law regarding the ordinary place of investigation and trial as per Section 177 of the CrPC, especially in matrimonial cases alleging cruelty and domestic violence, alleged by the wife, has advanced from the view held in the case of State of Bihar vs. Deokaran Nenshi, (1972) 2 SCC 890; Sujata Mukherjee (Smt.) vs. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee, (1997) 5 SCC 30; Y. Abraham Ajith vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai, (2004) 8 SCC 100, Ramesh vs. State of T.N. (2005) 3 SCC 507; Manish Ratan vs. State of M.P., (2007) 1 SCC 262 that if none of the ingredients constituting the offence can be said to have occurred within the local jurisdiction, that jurisdiction cannot be the ordinary place of investigation and trial of a matrimonial offence. A three judge Bench of this Court has however clarified in Rupali Devi vs. State of U.P., (2019) 5 SCC 384 (Rupali Devi) that adverse effects on mental health of the wife even while residing in her parental home on account of the acts committed in the matrimonial home would amount to commission of cruelty within the meaning of Section 498A at the parental home. It was held that the Courts at the place where the wife takes shelter after leaving or being driven away from the matrimonial home on account of acts of cruelty committed by the husband or his relatives, would, depending on the factual situation, also have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint alleging commission of offences under Section 498-A of the IPC.

Priya Indoria Vs State of Karnataka and Ors on 20 Nov 2023

Citations:

Other Sources:

Neetu Tripathi Vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr on 01 Apr 2022

Posted on November 12, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court said as follows:

We are informed by the complainant that there are four private witnesses. The grievance made is that whenever the first witness is under cross examination and after couple of questions the matter is deferred. If it is so, we cannot appreciate it. Once the witness is in the witness box and is being cross examined every endeavour must be made to ensure that the cross examination is completed on that day. This is more so looking into the nature of the case before the Court which is not a complex criminal trial.

Neetu Tripathi Vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr on 01 Apr 2022

Aditi Sharma (alias Mithi) Vs Jitesh Sharma on 06 Nov 2023

Posted on November 8, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court, recorded that Trial Courts are not following Rajnesh Vs Neha Guidelines and directed the circular to be re-issued for strict adherence and compliance.

From Para 8,

8. The manner in which maintenance payable under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or Section 125 Cr.P.C. is to be assessed, was considered by this Court in its celebrated judgment in Rajnesh v. Neha and Another, (2021) 2 SCC 324. Detailed guidelines were issued. It was noticed that the terms of maintenance are decided on the basis of pleadings of parties and on the basis of some amount of guess work. It is often seen that both the parties submit scanty material and do not disclose correct details. The tendency of the wife is to exaggerate her needs, whereas the husband tends to conceal his actual income. Keeping that in view, this Court laid down the procedure to streamline grant of maintenance. The judgments of various courts were referred to and response from various State Legal Services Authorities was sought. This Court even requested the National Legal Services Authority to submit a report on the suggestions received from the State Legal Services Authorities for framing guidelines on the affidavit of disclosure of assets and liabilities to be filed by the parties. Guidelines were issued in exercise of powers under Article 136 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India, prescribing a uniform format of Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities to be filed in maintenance proceedings. The judgment was delivered on 04.11.2020. The affidavit was to be submitted in all maintenance proceedings including pending proceedings.

From Para 14,

14. Nothing is evident from the record or even pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant at the time of hearing that affidavits were filed by both the parties in terms of judgment of this Court in Rajnesh’s case (supra), which was directed to be communicated to all the High Courts for further circulation to all the Judicial Officers for awareness and implementation. The case in hand is not in isolation. Even after pronouncement of the aforesaid judgment, this Court is still coming across number of cases decided by the courts below fixing maintenance, either interim or final, without their being any affidavit on record filed by the parties. Apparently, the officers concerned have failed to take notice of the guidelines issued by this Court for expeditious disposal of cases involving grant of maintenance. Comprehensive guidelines were issued pertaining to overlapping jurisdiction among courts when concurrent remedies for grant of maintenance are available under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, Section 125 Cr.P.C., the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, and Criteria for determining quantum of maintenance, date from which maintenance is to be awarded, enforcement of orders of maintenance including fixing payment of interim maintenance. As a result, the litigation which should close at the trial level is taken up to this Court and the parties are forced to litigate.

From Para 16,

16. Considering the facts of the case in hand and the other similar cases coming across before this Court not adhering to the guidelines given in Rajnesh’s case (supra), we deem it appropriate to direct the Secretary General of this Court to re-circulate the aforesaid judgment not only to all the Judicial Officers through the High Courts concerned but also to the National Judicial Academy and the State Judicial Academies, to be taken note of during the training programmes as well. Ordered accordingly.

Aditi Sharma Vs Jitesh Sharma on 06 Nov 2023

Earlier ‘cryptic’ Judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court at Gwalior is below.

Jitesh Sharma Vs Aditi Sharma on 28 Jun 2023

Citations: [2023 SCC OnLine SC 1451], [2023 INSC 981], []

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/182154741/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/65570ae40c546b25c61fa465

https://legiteye.com/in-criminal-appeal-no-3446-of-2023-sc-supreme-court-directs-re-circulation-of-rajnesh-v-neha-guidelines-on-maintenance-to-ensure-adherence-in-similar-cases-justice-vikram-nath-justice-rajesh-bindal-06-11-2023/

https://lawfyi.io/aditi-alias-mithi-vs-jitesh-sharma-on-6-november-2023/

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/aditi-alias-mithi-versus-jitesh-sharma

[Landmark Judgement] Aditi V. Jitesh Sharma (2023)

https://www.latestlaws.com/adr/case-analysis/supreme-court-orders-re-circulation-of-rajnesh-versus-neha-judgment-saying-parties-are-forced-to-litigate-where-litigation-should-close-at-trial-level-208275

Rajnesh Vs Neha case is here.

Index of Maintenance cases is here.

K.S.Sumi Mol Vs Suresh Kumar E.K. on 31 Jul 2023

Posted on October 28, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court passed these guidelines in order to achieve speedy disposal of Matrimonial and family related matters.

From Para 6,

6. In view of the above, and in the absence of any specific Rules regarding the speedy disposal of cases relating to marriage and family affairs within a time frame, we hereby lay down the guidelines for strict observance by all the Family Courts in Delhi, till such time rules are formulated by the State Government in consultation with the High Court of Delhi.
“Guidelines
a. Issue of Summons: When a suit has been duly instituted, a summons may be issued to the defendant to appear and answer the claim and to file the written statement of his defence, if any, within thirty days from the date of service of summons on that defendant:
Provided that no such summons shall be issued when a defendant has appeared at the presentation of plaint and admitted the plaintiff‟s claim:
Provided further that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the written statement on such other day, as may be specified by the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing and on payment of such costs as the Court deems fit, but which shall not be later than one hundred twenty days from the date of service of summons and on expiry of one hundred twenty days from the date of service of summons.
Provided further, the time taken for conciliation, mediation or interaction shall be excluded.
b. Inspection: (1) All parties shall complete inspection of all documents disclosed within thirty days of the date of filing of the written statement. The Court may extend this time limit upon application at its discretion, but not beyond thirty days.
(2) Any party to the proceedings may seek directions from the Court, at any stage of the proceedings, for inspection or production of documents by the other party, of which inspection has been refused by such party or documents have not been produced despite issuance of a notice to produce.
(3) Such application shall be disposed of within thirty days of filing such application, including filing replies and rejoinders (if permitted by Court) and hearing.
(4) If the above application is allowed, inspection and copies thereof shall be furnished to the party seeking it, within five days of such order.
(5) No party shall be permitted to rely on a document, which it had failed to disclose or of which inspection has not been given, save and except with leave of Court.
c. Admission and Denial of Documents: Each party shall submit a statement of admissions or denials of all documents disclosed and of which inspection has been completed, within fifteen days of the completion of inspection or any later date as fixed by the Court.
d. Case Management Hearing: The court shall hold the first Case Management Hearing, not later than four weeks from the date of filing of affidavit of admission or denial of documents by all parties to the suit.
In a Case Management Hearing, after hearing the parties, and once it finds that there are issues of fact and law which require to be tried, the court shall-
(i) frame the issues after examining pleadings, documents and documents produced before it, and on examination conducted by the court under Rule 2 of Order X, if required;
(ii) List the number of witnesses to be examined by the parties;
(iii) Fix the schedule of the dates and evidence led by parties with all endeavour to complete the evidence in six months.
(iv) Fix the date for oral arguments within ten days and it shall be open for the Court to limit the time for oral submissions having regard to the nature and complexity of the matter.
(v) Fix the date for filing the written arguments and a party shall, within four weeks prior to commencing the oral arguments, submit concisely and under distinct headings written arguments in support of their case to the Court and such written arguments shall form part of the record and shall be filed within fifteen days;
(vi)No adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of filing the written arguments unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, considers it necessary to grant such adjournment.
(vii)Set time limits for parties and their advocates to address oral arguments.
In fixing dates or setting time limits, the court shall ensure that the arguments are closed not later than two months from the date when the evidence of the parties was concluded.
(viii)The interim applications for ‘maintenance pendente lite’, ‘interim custody’ and all other miscellaneous applications relating to marriage/family affairs shall be decided within 90 days from the date of filing.
e. Judgment & Decree: (1) The court, shall, within thirty days of the conclusion of arguments, which shall not extend beyond sixty days, pronounce judgment and copies thereof shall be issued to all the parties to the dispute through electronic mail or otherwise.”

K.S.Sumi Mol Vs Suresh Kumar E.K. on 31 Jul 2023

MS Godrej Sara Lee Limited Vs Excise and Taxation Officer cum AO and Ors on 01 Feb 2023

Posted on October 25, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held that, Not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for a Writ’s dismissal.

Further it was held that, A writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a high court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to the petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed relief would not further public interest.

From Para 4,

4. Before answering the questions, we feel the urge to say a few words on the exercise of writ powers conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution having come across certain orders passed by the high courts holding writ petitions as “not maintainable” merely because the alternative remedy provided by the relevant statutes has not been pursued by the parties desirous of invocation of the writ jurisdiction. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 is plenary in nature. Any limitation on the exercise of such power must be traceable in the Constitution itself. Profitable reference in this regard may be made to Article 329 and ordainments of other similarly worded articles in the Constitution. Article 226 does not, in terms, impose any limitation or restraint on the exercise of power to issue writs. While it is true that exercise of writ powers despite availability of a remedy under the very statute which has been invoked and has given rise to the action impugned in the writ petition ought not to be made in a routine manner, yet, the mere fact that the petitioner before the high court, in a given case, has not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for its dismissal. It is axiomatic that the high courts (bearing in mind the facts of each particular case) have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition or not. One of the self-imposed restrictions on the exercise of power under Article 226 that has evolved through judicial precedents is that the high courts should normally not entertain a writ petition, where an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is available. At the same time, it must be remembered that mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision, which the party invoking the jurisdiction of the high court under Article 226 has not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the high court and render a writ petition “not maintainable”. In a long line of decisions, this Court has made it clear that availability of an alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the “maintainability” of a writ petition and that the rule, which requires a party to pursue the alternative remedy provided by a statute, is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Though elementary, it needs to be restated that “entertainability” and “maintainability” of a writ petition are distinct concepts. The fine but real distinction between the two ought not to be lost sight of. The objection as to “maintainability” goes to the root of the matter and if such objection were found to be of substance, the courts would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication. On the other hand, the question of “entertainability” is entirely within the realm of discretion of the high courts, writ remedy being discretionary. A writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a high court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to the petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed relief would not further public interest. Hence, dismissal of a writ petition by a high court on the ground that the petitioner has not availed the alternative remedy without, however, examining whether an exceptional case has been made out for such entertainment would not be proper.

MS Godrej Sara Lee Limited Vs Excise and Taxation Officer cum AO and Ors on 01 Feb 2023

Citations : [2023 INSC 92], [2023 SCC ONLINE SC 95]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/62928741/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/63dc0f95831db01604ba254b

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/Judgement/Search/AdvancedV2?docid=2368646

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/m-s-godrej-sara-lee-ltd-vs-the-excise-and-taxation-officer-cum-assessing-authority

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/godrej-taxation-alternative-remedy-not-absolute-writ-petition-maintainability-entertainability-apex-court-1460513

Godrej Sara Lee Limited Vs The Excise and Taxation officer-cum-Assessing Authority & Ors (Supreme Court)

Deepti Vs Anil Kumar on 19 Sep 2023

Posted on October 15, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court held that Family Courts cannot grant divorce on ground of Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage.

From Para 4,

4. The Respondent also alleged that from the very first day of marriage, Appellant created scenes at night hours and most of the times did not allow him to enjoy his conjugal rights. She refused him to have access to her and inflicted cruelty upon him. He further alleged that he was allowed by the Appellant only 30-35 times (approximately) to enjoy conjugal relations since their marriage.

From Para 7 and 8,

7. In respect of the ground of cruelty, the Family Court has held that “there was no normal and healthy sexual relationships between (Respondent) and his wife (Appellant) and same has resulted in striking at the very foundation of their marriage. It has been well settled that normal and healthy sexual Relationships between both spouse is one of the basic ingredients for happy and harmonious marriage as the marriage without sex is an anathema. Sex is foundation of marriage and without a vigorous and harmonious sexual activity it would be impossible for any marriage to continue.”
8. The Family Court after holding that there was denial of conjugal relations, noticed that parties had been living separately for more than 11 years and held that the marriage had broken down beyond repair and thus held that the Respondent had successfully established cruelty and thus granted a decree of divorce against the Appellant.

From Para 17,

17. Said ground is clearly not available to the Respondent and the Family Court has erred in returning a finding that there is denial of conjugal relationship by the Appellant. The allegations of the Respondent of denial of conjugal relationship are vague and without any specifics. He has alleged that he was allowed by the Appellant only 30-35 times (approximately) to enjoy conjugal relations since their marriage. This clearly shows that there was never any complete denial.

From Para 25,

25. In terms of the Judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Shilpa Sailesh (supra), the power to grant divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage is exercised by the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do complete justice to both the parties. Such a power is not vested in the High Courts leave alone the Family Courts.
26. In the instant case, the Family Court has merely considered the fact that the parties have lived separately for 11 years and granted divorce on the ground of breakdown of marriage. Such an exercise of powers is not conferred on the Family Court. Family Courts have to restrict their considerations to the parameters of the provision of grant of divorce strictly in accordance with the Act. Irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a ground in the Act.
27. Even the Supreme Court while considering exercise of discretionary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India takes into account several factors and longevity of period is only one of them. Reference may be had to Para 41 of Shilpa Sailesh (supra) extracted hereinabove. Supreme Court has placed a word of caution that “grant of divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage by this Court is not a matter of right, but a discretion which is to be exercised with great care and caution, keeping in mind several factors ensuring that ‘complete justice’ is done to both parties. It is obvious that this Court should be fully convinced and satisfied that the marriage is totally unworkable, emotionally dead and beyond salvation and, therefore, dissolution of marriage is the right solution and the only way forward. That the marriage has irretrievably broken down is to be factually determined and firmly established.”
28. In the present case, the Family Court has erred in travelling beyond the scope of its powers to grant divorce.

Deepti Vs Anil Kumar on 19 Sep 2023

Bimla Tiwari Vs State of Bihar and Ors on 16 Jan 2023

Posted on October 12, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

In this reportable decision of Supreme Court, it was held that the process of criminal law, particularly in matters of grant of bail, is not akin to money recovery proceedings. Recovery of money is essentially within the realm of civil proceedings.

From Paras 9-11,

9. We have indicated on more than one occasion that the process of criminal law, particularly in matters of grant of bail, is not akin to money recovery proceedings but what has been noticed in the present case carries the peculiarities of its own.
10. We would reiterate that the process of criminal law cannot beutilised for arm-twisting and money recovery, particularly while opposing the prayer for bail. The question as to whether pre-arrest bail, or for that matter regular bail, in a given case is to begranted or not is required to be examined and the discretion isrequired to be exercised by the Court with reference to the material on record and the parameters governing bail considerations. Putting it in other words, in a given case, theconcession of pre-arrest bail or regular bail could be declined even if the accused has made payment of the money involved oroffers to make any payment; conversely, in a given case, the concession of pre-arrest bail or regular bail could be granted irrespective of any payment or any offer of payment.
11. We would further emphasize that, ordinarily, there is nojustification in adopting such a course that for the purpose of being given the concession of pre-arrest bail, the personapprehending arrest ought to make payment. Recovery of money is essentially within the realm of civil proceedings.

From Para 15,

15. Thus, it is noticed that these criminal proceedings are being prosecuted only as money recovery proceedings. We have expressed reservations even as regards the aforesaid order dated 10.03.2022, wherein the High Court has proceeded on the propositions of offer made by the co-accused of payment of the sum of Rs.6,00,000/- (six lakhs) and acceptance thereof by the informant (present petitioner). However, since the said order is not before us, we would refrain from making any directions in that regard and else, in our view, even the said order too, on the proposition of granting bail with reference to payment, has its own shortcomings.
16. Even when we are not modifying the condition in the said order dated 10.03.2022 for the same being not before us, so far as the impugned order dated 14.11.2022 is concerned, in our view, it shall be in the interest of justice to annul the requirement of payment of a sum of Rs. 75,000/- (seventy-five thousand) by the accused-respondent No. 2. Hence, the order granting pre-arrest bail to the respondents stands affirmed but, the condition therein, of payment of Rs.75,000/- (seventy-five thousand) by the respondent No.2, stands annulled.

Bimla Tiwari Vs State of Bihar and Ors on 16 Jan 2023

Index of all Bail Matters is here.

Shane George Dsouza Vs State of NCT of Delhi on 04 Oct 2023

Posted on October 12, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held that criminal proceedings cannot be converted into recovery proceedings.

This Court has repeatedly held that the condition of deposit of such amount cannot be a condition of bail. In this case, the appellant had not volunteered to deposit the sum of Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees ten lakhs). The direction in the order dated 18th January, 2023 is not only of imposing a condition on the appellant of bringing a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees ten lakhs) to the Trial Court but a permission has been granted to release the amount to the victim. It is a settled law that criminal proceedings cannot be converted into recovery proceedings.
Hence, in the facts of the case, there was no justification for imposing the condition of deposit of Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees ten lakhs). Accordingly, the appeal must succeed and we set aside clause (a) of the operative part of the order dated 18th January, 2023 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-05, New Delhi District, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi. The rest of the conditions shall remain as it is.

Shane George Dsouza Vs State of NCT of Delhi on 04 Oct 2023

Index of all Bail matters is here.

Mahima Chaturvedi Vs Deepak Malhotra on 26 Jul 2021

Posted on October 10, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court held as follows while denying interim maintenance to a working wife.

From Para 5,

5. The learned Family Judge has observed in its order dated 18.06.2020 that the Object and Intent of Section 24 is to support the spouse who has no independent source of income. The learned Family Court has relied on the income affidavit of the appellant to arrive at a conclusion that the appellant is drawing a salary of Rs. 85,000/- per month and relied on the judgment of this Court in case titled K.N. vs R.G. Reported as MAT. APP(FC) no. 93/18 (date of decision – 12.02.2019) to hold that the provision of Section 24, Hindu Marriage Act, are not meant to equalise the income of wife with that of the husband.

From Para 9,

9. Hence, we are clear that the appellant is a well-qualified professional and is drawing a salary of 85,000/- month which is adequate for a comfortable life. In K.N. v. R.G., it has been held that the provision of section 24 are not meant to equalize the income of the spouses but only to see that no spouse should suffer due to paucity of income. The purpose to grant maintenance is to tide over litigation expenses and to provide a comfortable life to the spouse.

Mahima Chaturvedi Vs Deepak Malhotra on 26 Jul 2021

Index of Maintenance Orders under HMA here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision

Chetram Mali Vs Karishma Saini on 21 Nov 2023

Priya Indoria Vs State of Karnataka and Ors on 20 Nov 2023

Neetu Tripathi Vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr on 01 Apr 2022

Aditi Sharma (alias Mithi) Vs Jitesh Sharma on 06 Nov 2023

K.S.Sumi Mol Vs Suresh Kumar E.K. on 31 Jul 2023

MS Godrej Sara Lee Limited Vs Excise and Taxation Officer cum AO and Ors on 01 Feb 2023

Deepti Vs Anil Kumar on 19 Sep 2023

Bimla Tiwari Vs State of Bihar and Ors on 16 Jan 2023

Shane George Dsouza Vs State of NCT of Delhi on 04 Oct 2023

Mahima Chaturvedi Vs Deepak Malhotra on 26 Jul 2021