Mamta Shailesh Chandra Vs State of Uttarakhand and Ors on 29 Jan 2024

Posted on March 20, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,

We do not agree with the reasoning of the High Court for dismissing the writ petition of the appellant, having regard to the ratio of the judgment of this Court delivered on 04.07.2011 in the case of Joseph Salvaraj A. vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. reported in 2011 (7) SCC 59. That was a case arising from the quashing plea of an F.I.R., where chargesheet was submitted after institution of the petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. A Coordinate Bench of this Court opined that even if the charge sheet had been filed, the Court could still examine if offences alleged to have been committed were prima facie made out or not on the basis of the F.I.R., chargesheet and other documents.

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Bipin Chander Jaisinghbhai Shah Vs Prabhawati on 19 Oct 1956

Posted on March 13, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows, (with respect to ‘desertion’)

Thus the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which differentiates desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned : (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid.

Bipin Chander Jaisinghbhai Shah Vs Prabhawati on 19 Oct 1956

Citations: [1957 AIR 176], [1956 SCR 838]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1131783/

Index of Divorce judgments is here.

Savitri Pandey Vs Prem Chandra Pandey on 8 Jan 2002

Posted on March 13, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows, (with regards to Cruelty)

From Para 6,

6. Cruelty has not been defined under the Act but in relation to matrimonial matters it is contemplated as a conduct of such type which endangers the living of the petitioner with the respondent. Cruelty consists of acts which are dangerous to life, limb or health. Cruelty for the purpose of the Act means where one spouse has so treated the other and manifested such feelings towards her or him as to have inflicted bodily injury, or to have caused reasonable apprehension of bodily injury, suffering or to have injured health. Cruelty may be physical or mental. Mental cruelty is the conduct of other spouse which causes mental suffering or fear to the matrimonial life of the other. “Cruelty”, therefore, postulates a treatment of the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in his or her mind that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the other party. Cruelty, however, has to be distinguished from the ordinary wear and tear of family life. It cannot be decided on the basis of the sensitivity of the petitioner and has to be adjudged on the basis of the course of conduct which would, in general, be dangerous for a spouse to live with the other.

From Para 19, (with regards to the time limit to file an appeal against an Order of Family Court)

At this stage we would like to observe that the period of limitation prescribed for filing the appeal under Section 28(4) is apparently inadequate which facilitates the frustration of the marriages by the unscrupulous litigant spouses. In a vast country like ours, the powers under the Act are generally exercisable by the District Court and the first appeal has to be filed in the High Court. The distance, the geographical conditions, the financial position of the parties and the time required for filing a regular appeal, if kept in mind, would certainly show that the period of 30 days prescribed for filing the appeal is insufficient and inadequate. In the absence of appeal, the other party can solemnise the marriage and attempt to frustrate the appeal right of the other side as appears to have been done in the instant case. We are of the opinion that a minimum period of 90 days may be prescribed for filing the appeal against any judgment and decree under the Act and any marriage solemnised during the aforesaid period be deemed to be void. Appropriate legislation is required to be made in this regard. We direct the Registry that the copy of this judgment may be forwarded to the Ministry of Law & Justice for such action as it may deem fit to take in this behalf.

This judgment led to the passing of amendment here.

Savitri Pandey Vs Prem Chandra Pandey on 8 Jan 2002

Citations: [AIR 2002 SUPREME COURT 591], [2002 (2) SCC 73], [2002 AIR SCW 182], [2002 ALL. L. J. 355], [2002 ALL CJ 1 122], [2002 (2) SRJ 553], [2002 (1) SLT 103], [(2002) 1 ALL WC 472], [(2002) 1 JCR 377 (SC)], [2002 (1) LRI 28], [(2002) 1 JT 25 (SC)], [2002 (1) UJ (SC) 273], [(2002) 1 MARRILJ 277], [2002 (1) ALL CJ 22], [2002 UJ(SC) 1 273], [2002 (1) BLJR 378], [(2002) 3 CIVILCOURTC 318], [(2002) 1 RECCIVR 719], [(2002) 6 BOM CR 511], [(2002) 1 HINDULR 338], [(2002) 2 MAHLR 263], [(2002) 2 PAT LJR 256], [(2002) 2 JLJR 135], [(2002) 2 GUJ LR 1369], [(2002) 1 KER LJ 193], [(2002) WLC(SC)CVL 116], [(2002) 1 SCALE 33], [(2002) 1 RAJ LW 183], [(2002) 3 GUJ LH 470], [(2002) 1 DMC 177], [(2002) 1 ANDH LT 55], [(2002) 1 CURCC 7], [(2002) 22 OCR 280], [(2002) 1 UC 299], [(2002) 1 SCJ 6], [(2002) 46 ALL LR 465], [(2002) 2 CAL HN 50], [(2002) 2 BLJ 177], [(2002) 1 SUPREME 90], [(2002) MATLR 224], [2002 (1) MARR LJ 277], [(2002) 4 CURCRIR 254], [(2002) 1 CAL HN 124], [(2002) 1 ALLCRILR 658], [(2002) 1 CALLT 32]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/325522/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56e0f1ad607dba38965f8bcd

https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/browse/Case?caseId=002002900000&title=savitri-pandey-vs-prem-chandra-pandey

https://lawfyi.io/savitri-pandey-vs-prem-chandra-pandey-on-8-january-2002-case-summary/

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/savitri-pandey-vs-prem-chandra-pandey

http://roundup.manupatra.in/trans/viewdoc.aspx?i=ptiDy4oUEz7W4RhahAaT6h93RFUeTV40hI1vo81W7g5uCfRP5tL0pktJVchar(43)F5g3qk&id=zwKDa4S8QbBCBSkXPhUPwY5CqQmaAQ/9fT/TmfIpDN9bjNPkWKzs5n8Hchar(43)U/Dqe21io8GIp7cHk/RGFLXdXEB6A==

Index of Divorce judgments is here.

Gaurav Nighawan Vs Shweta on 05 Jan 2024

Posted on March 13, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Paras 19 and 20,

19. With regard to Section 13(1) (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the pertinent observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bipin Chandra Jaisinghbhai Shah Vs. Prabhavati 1956 SCC OnLine SC 15 are as under:-
“Thus the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which differentiates desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned : (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid.”
20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bipinchandra Jaisinghbhai Shah(Supra) has further observed that once it is found that one of the spouses has been in desertion, the presumption is that the desertion has continued and that is not necessary for the deserted spouse actually to take steps to bring the deserting spouse back to the matrimonial home.

Finally in Paras 23 and 24,

23. Applying the provisions of Section 13(ib) of the Act, we find that merely within two months of marriage between the parties, the respondent-wife left the matrimonial home. Neither she made any complaint against the appellant nor did she file petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 seeking Restitution of Conjugal Rights. No doubt, even appellant has not been able to show before the learned Family Court and even in this Court that he had made any concrete efforts to bring back his wife to the matrimonial home. However, when he approached the court seeking divorce, despite service through publication, the respondent did not appear before the learned Family Court to contest the allegations made by the appellant. The respondent has even abstained herself from appearing before this Court despite service through the SHO concerned. Relevantly, since the marriage in the year 2015 till the year 2023, the respondent has not made any effort to join company of appellant-husband. There is no doubt that respondent has quietly chosen to stay apart from appellant and broken the bond of marriage, though not legally but otherwise.
24. In the light of afore-noted facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court is of the considered opinion that respondent has wilfully deserted the appellant and so, appellant is entitled to get benefit of provision of Section 13(1) (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The marriage between the parties is thus, dissolved and a decree of divorce is granted. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly.

Gaurav Nighawan Vs Shweta on 05 Jan 2024

Index of Divorce judgments is here.

Ram Prasad Sahni Vs Punita Devi and Ors on 22 Jun 2017

Posted on March 12, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Patna High Court held as follows,

Now, the question arises as to whether the applicant has been able to prove that her husband left behind the estate which she has inherited but is not in possession and whether the father-in-law is in possession of such estate? For better appreciation of this, the evidence led by the respective sides requires to be analyzed. The applicant-respondent no.1 has examined herself as AW 2. Though she has stated that she does not have any means to maintain herself and has also stated that the father-in-law has 6 kathas of agricultural land and pond and he is running a business of fishery and Makhana and also an orchard and from the aforesaid he is earning Rs.10,000/- per month, if it is compared to the statement made in her application, to some extent, it falsifies the same as she has categorically stated in paragraph no.13 of the application that her father-in-law‟s earning is about Rs.35,000/- to Rs.40,000/- per month. On the point of torture and being thrown out of the house, a question was asked in the cross-examination as to whether on such act done by the father-in-law with the help of his daughter and son-in-law, she filed any complaint case or first information report to which she denied. In the cross-examination, she further states that there is no land or any property in the name of her deceased-husband and she could not show any document or paper in support of her case that the father-in-law is possessing land or orchard and pond etc. She also denied that she could produce any document in support of her contention regarding the monthly income of the father-in-law. She has admitted that she is working as Angawari Sahika and is getting Rs.700/- per month. Now it is interesting to peruse the deposition of AW 1 who happens to be the father of the applicant – respondent no.1. He, in his examination-in-chief, has also stated the factum of marriage, the death of his son-in-law and also that she does not have any means to maintain herself and her children and also that she has been driven away forcibly after assault by the father-in-law. He has categorically stated that Ram Prasad Sahani, i.e., appellant-opposite party has 26 kathas of land and orchard and his earning is Rs.30,000/- to Rs.35,000/- from the aforesaid property. However, in the cross-examination, he has admitted that though his daughter was driven away but he and his daughter did not file any case and there was no property in the name of his deceased son-in-law and also admitted the fact that his Samdhi, i.e., father-in-law of his daughter, is pulling rickshaw for his livelihood. He has also stated that he does not have any document regarding any landed property of his Samdhi and at the same time, has also admitted that his daughter was working as Anganwari Sahiaka in his village and she is doing so for the last 15 years which demolishes his statement in examination-in-chief that she does not have any earning to maintain herself.
The appellant, who has been examined as OPW 1, has stated in his Chief that immediately after the death of his son, the daughter-in-law along with her children went to her Naihar. He does not have any landed property or pond etc. He is only having one thatched house and is having one minor daughter who is to be married but he does not have any means for her marriage and his income is Rs.50/- to Rs.60/- daily. Thus, he is unable to maintain his daughter-in-law, grandsons and granddaughter. In the cross-examination, he has stated that his son, though he was a student, used to do tuition to maintain him and his family. From the perusal of the aforesaid, it is apparent that the applicant as well as her father could not withstand the test of cross-examination and her case was demolished. They could not spell out the details of any landed property. Her father denied in the cross-examination that his son-in-law had any landed property. Thus, it has to be understood that her husband died without leaving any estate. He has also admitted that his Samdhi, i.e., father-in-law of his daughter earns his livelihood by pulling a rickshaw and does not have sufficient means to pay the maintenance amount. Thus, the case of the applicant-petitioner-respondent no.1 does not withstand the legal test under Section 19 or Section 22 of the Act as apparently there is no estate which she has inherited from her husband and even father-in-law is not having sufficient income to maintain her.
Though the materials were available as discussed above, the court below has also not recorded any finding as to whether the opposite party no.1 has sufficient means to maintain herself or not as it has come in the evidence led by the parties that she is working as Aganwari Sahaika for the last 15 years. It is also apparent from the order dated 04.02.2011, passed in the maintenance case that at the time of reconciliation, the father-in-law was ready to take her back but it was the applicant who refused to go with him though she has given a reason that there was threat upon her life but in view of the fact that the said action could not be proved by her, that would also be meaningless.
Unfortunately, the court below without recording any finding whether the husband has left any estate for the applicant or whether her father-in-law has sufficient income or not, has simply directed him without any rhyme and reason to pay maintenance of Rs.1,000/- for applicant no.1 and Rs.300/- per month towards maintenance of her children without holding as to whether the father-in-law is liable in law and in the facts and circumstances to pay such amount or not.

Ram Prasad Sahni Vs Punita Devi and Ors on 22 Jun 2017

Citations:

Other sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/114233990/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5e96f0b24653d05364588a37

Index of judgments under HAMA 1956 are here.

Sunita and Anr Vs Pyare Lal and Ors on 08 Nov 2010

Posted on March 12, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court held as follows,

In view of above admitted and proved facts, the appellants have no right to claim maintenance from respondents no. 1 and 2 or right of residence in the disputed house. Under Section 18 of the Act, a Hindu wife can claim maintenance from her husband. However, under this provision, appellant no. 1 cannot claim maintenance from respondents no. 1 and 2, who are parents-in-law of appellant no. 1.
Under Section 19 of the Act, a Hindu wife can claim maintenance from her father-in-law after the death of her husband, provided and to the extent that she is unable to maintain herself and this right shall not be enforceable if father-in-law has no means to do so from coparcenary property. In the instant case, respondent no. 1 – father-in-law is not possessed of any coparcenary property so as to provide maintenance to appellant no. 1. Consequently, under Sections 18 and 19 of the Act, appellant no. 1 is not entitled to claim any maintenance from respondents no. 1 and 2.
As regards appellant no. 2, under Section 20 of the Act, she is not entitled to claim any maintenance from respondents no. 1 and 2, who are her grandparents because under this provision, a Hindu is bound to maintain his or her children or aged or infirm parents. Even under Sections 21 and 22 of the Act, appellant no. 2 is not entitled to claim maintenance from respondents no. 1 and 2 because respondents no. 1 and 2 have not inherited any estate from their deceased son Anil Kumar. Even otherwise, respondents no. 1 and 2 have no source of income except meager pension of respondent no. 1, who is retired at present. On the other hand, appellants have sufficient means to maintain themselves as appellant no. 1 has got job as Clerk in Municipal Corporation, Delhi and is also receiving family pension of her deceased husband. Appellant no. 1 has also been given a house by her own father. Appellant no. 1 can also seek maintenance from her own father.

Sunita and Anr Vs Pyare Lal and Ors on 08 Nov 2010

Citations:

Other sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/186634126/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56b493d3607dba348f008648

https://vlex.in/vid/sunita-and-another-vs-572334286

Index of judgments under HAMA 1956 are here.

Laxmi and Anr Vs Shyam Pratap and Anr on 28 Apr 2022

Posted on March 11, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Paras 11-13,

11. The daughter-in-law can claim maintenance from her father-in-law provided he has inherited some estate of her husband. The appellant has failed to disclose any estate of her husband having devolved upon the respondents. Not only this, the respondent No.1 father-in-law has already expired. Now only respondent No.2 mother-in-law survives and the appellants cannot as a matter of right, claim any maintenance from her.
12. Section 22 of the Act provides for maintenance of dependents of the deceased by the heirs of the deceased, but this is subject to the condition that they having inherited the estate from the deceased.
13. As already noted above, no estate has been inherited either by the mother or the sister of the deceased husband of the appellant No.1 from which any maintenance can be claimed by the appellants. There is no infirmity in the impugned order of the learned Family Judge. The appeal is hereby dismissed.

Laxmi and Anr Vs Shyam Pratap and Anr on 28 Apr 2022

Index of judgments under HAMA 1956 are here.

Kanwal Kishore Girdhar Vs Seema Girdhar on 28 Feb 2024

Posted on March 2, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court, held that ‘Mother igniting animosity in children towards father is cruelty, valid ground for divorce’.

From Paras 32-33,

32. It is unfortunate that despite the respondent being educated, she was unable to manage her sentiments and emotions, when it came to her husband. She has made adulterous allegations against the appellant and according to her, she had even taken the phone number and the photographs of the lady. However, significantly nothing has found its way to the present proceedings and no cogent evidence of the same has surfaced. Making such unwarranted allegations of adultery without any corroboration, is an act of mental cruelty as held in the case of Vijaykumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela Vijaykumar Bhate, (2003) 6 SCC 334 and A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur, (2005) 2 SCC 22. Similar observations were also made in the case of Jayanti vs Rakesh Mediratta, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 5760.
33. The differences between two adults may arise due to myriad reasons, some may be temperamental or factual, but the irrationality of the conduct ofthe respondent is brought forth by her conduct of involving in eight years old child, in their disputes. The petitioner and the respondent may not have been able to generate mutual affection, respect and understanding due to their differences, but it does not justify the act of the respondent in embroiling their minor daughter in their fights. Taking a small daughteralong with her with a specific design to the house of the appellant and then to make allegations of adultery and call the Police, is an act of ruining thepsyche of a child and turning her against her father. A person may be a badhusband but that does not lead to the necessary conclusion of he being a badfather. The act of the respondent in trying to turn the children against their father and even making her write a complaint against her father, is a clear case of parental alienation, which in itself is an act of grave mental cruelty.

From Para 36,

36. This is a clear case of parental alienation where the respondent has not even spared her children and has involved them in her differences, with the appellant. Such conduct of making unsubstantiated allegations of adultery coupled with involving their child in the inter se disputes between the parties, can be termed as nothing but an extreme act of cruelty.

Kanwal Kishore Girdhar Vs Seema Girdhar on 28 Feb 2024

Index of Divorce judgments is here.

Mamida Anil Kumar Reddy Vs State of AP and Anr on 05 Feb 2024

Posted on February 18, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

Apex Court trashed the mindless orders passed by AP High Court and quashed the settled criminal proceedings.

From Paras 11-15,

11. Learned Counsel for the Appellants vehemently submits that a bare perusal of the complaint filed by Respondent No.2 and the charge-sheet plainly discloses the absence of any necessary ingredients of the charged offences. It is submitted that the allegations are wholly general and omnibus in nature, made only with the intention to harass the Appellants, amounting to an abuseof the process of the law.
12. To buttress his contention, Learned Counsel for the Appellants has drawn the attention of this Court to the fact that Respondent No. 2 filed a petition seeking divorce and onlythereafter, the memo seeking reopening of the criminal proceedings against the Appellants was filed before the Trial Court.
13. This Court has heard the Learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record.
14. In the considered opinion of this Court, there is significant merit in the submissions of the Learned Counsel for the Appellants. A bare perusal of the complaint, statement ofwitnesses’ and the charge-sheet shows that the allegations against the Appellants are wholly general and omnibus in nature; even ifthey are taken in their entirety, they do not prima facie make out a case against the Appellants. The material on record neither discloses any particulars of the offences alleged nor discloses thespecific role/allegations assigned to any of the Appellants in the commission of the offences.
15. The phenomenon of false implication by way of generalomnibus allegations in the course of matrimonial disputes is not unknown to this Court. In Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam v.State of Bihar2, this Court dealt with a similar case wherein theallegations made by the complainant-wife against her in-laws u/s.498A and others were vague and general, lacking any specific role and particulars. The court proceeded to quash the FIR against the accused persons and noted that such a situation, if leftunchecked, would result in the abuse of the process of law.

From Paras 17-18,

17. Considering the dicta in Mahmood Ali (supra), we find that the High Court in this case has failed to exercise due care and has mechanically permitted the criminal proceedings to continue despite specifically finding that the allegations are general and omnibus in nature. The Appellants herein approached the High Court on inter alia grounds that the proceedings were re-initiated on vexatious grounds and even highlighted the commencement of divorce proceedings by Respondent No. 2. In these peculiar circumstances, the High Court had a duty to consider the allegations with great care and circumspection so as to protect against the danger of unjust prosecution.
18. As stated above, given the facts and circumstances of the case, we find that the material on record is wholly insufficient to proceed against the Appellants. Accordingly, the Impugned Orders and the Docket Order dated 20.07.2021 are set aside and the criminal proceedings against the Appellants are consequently quashed.

Mamida Anil Kumar Reddy Vs State of AP and Anr on 05 Feb 2024

The mechanical orders passed by the AP High Court which are dust-binned by Apex Court are below…

CrlP filed by In-Laws:

Mamidi Damodar Reddy and Ors Vs State of AP and Anr on 11 Nov 2022

CrlP filed by Husband:

Mamida Anil Kumar Reddy Vs State of AP and Anr on 23 Nov 2022

Ashwini Pradhan Vs UOI and Anr on 08 Aug 2023

Posted on February 12, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur, held as follows,

From Para 19, (Presumption of Legislature is correct)

19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of U.P., reported in 1960 SCC OnLine SC 16 has held that in the interpretation of the statutes the Court always presumes that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. Therefore, a provision of a statute cannot be used to defeat another unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between them. Hence, the interpretation which involves conflict, must be avoided.

From Para 20,

20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Aphali Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (1989) 4 SCC 378 has explained the principles of interpretation of statutes. It has been held as follows:
“39. …….The best interpretation is made from the context, ‘Injustum est nisi tota lege inspecta, de una aliqua ejus particula proposita judicare vel respondere’. It is unjust to decide or respond as to any particular part of a law without examining the whole of the law. ‘Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus’. To interpret and in such a way as to harmonise laws with laws, is the best mode of interpretation…….”

From Para 21,

21. In the case of Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, reported in (2002) 4 SCC 297, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:
“10. ………Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating (sic altering) the statutory provisions……”

Note: My intention of adding this case on the website is to make use of the Supreme Court judgments cited in this case, specifically the Grasim Industries Ltd one.

Ashwini Pradhan Vs UOI and Anr on 08 Aug 2023

Index of DV cases is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision

Mamta Shailesh Chandra Vs State of Uttarakhand and Ors on 29 Jan 2024

Bipin Chander Jaisinghbhai Shah Vs Prabhawati on 19 Oct 1956

Savitri Pandey Vs Prem Chandra Pandey on 8 Jan 2002

Gaurav Nighawan Vs Shweta on 05 Jan 2024

Ram Prasad Sahni Vs Punita Devi and Ors on 22 Jun 2017

Sunita and Anr Vs Pyare Lal and Ors on 08 Nov 2010

Laxmi and Anr Vs Shyam Pratap and Anr on 28 Apr 2022

Kanwal Kishore Girdhar Vs Seema Girdhar on 28 Feb 2024

Mamida Anil Kumar Reddy Vs State of AP and Anr on 05 Feb 2024

Ashwini Pradhan Vs UOI and Anr on 08 Aug 2023