Abhijit Ankush Shelke and Ors Vs Shubhangi Abhijit Shelke and Anr on 09 May 2025

Posted on June 4, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single Judge of Bombay High Court at Aurangabad held that in DV cases, they being quasi-civil, Constitutional protections under Article 20(3) are not available to either parties and Right to privacy under Article 21 is not absolute, like any other fundamental rights.

From Paras 10 and 11,

10. After having heard both sides what needs to be adjudicated in the present matter is as to whether the Respondent No.1 can be compelled to give her voice sample for soliciting report of verification from the forensic laboratory. It is necessary to focus on the relevant fact that petitioners have come up with plea that Respondent No.1 is having extra marital relations. Her conversation with her paramour has been recorded in a cell-phone. A memory card and compact disc which are marked as Article 1 and 2 are produced along with certificate under section 65(B) as Exhibit-106 on record. A transcript of the conversation prepared by the petitioners has been marked as Exhibit-109. It further reveals from record that the transcript has been verified by the officers of the Court to be as per the contents of the compact disc.
11. The proceedings between the parties are quasi-civil and quasi-criminal in nature. Petitioners cannot be termed as accused persons. As per Section 28(2) of domestic violence act, Magistrate has power to follow the procedure for disposal of application under Section 12 of PWDV Act. There is no provisions to compel the party to the proceedings under domestic violence act to give voice sample. Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India can not be made applicable.

From Paras 19 and 20,

19. Reliance is placed on the judgment the Supreme Court in Ritesh Sinha vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. reported in AIR 2019 SC 3592. That was a case of reference before larger bench. Following questions were referred for the adjudication :
5. Two principal questions arose for determination of the appeal which have been set out in the order of Justice Ranjana Prakash Desai dated 7th December, 2012 in the following terms.
(1) Whether Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, which protects a person Accused of an offence from being compelled to be a witness against himself, extends to protecting such an Accused from being compelled to give his voice sample during the course of investigation into an offence?
(2) Assuming that there is no violation of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, whether in the absence of any provision in the Code, can a Magistrate authorize the investigating agency to record the voice sample of the person Accused of an offence?
20. So far as first question is concerned, it was held that voice sample is not evidence and it is answered in negative. For second question following are observations :
24. Would a judicial order compelling a person to give a sample of his voice violate the fundamental right to privacy Under Article 20(3) of the Constitution, is the next question. The issue is interesting and debatable but not having been argued before us it will suffice to note that in view of the opinion rendered by this Court in Modern Dental College and Research Centre and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. (2016) 7 SCC 353, Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. (1975) 2 SCC 148 and the Nine Judge’s Bench of this Court in K.S. Puttaswamy and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. (2017) 10 SCC 1 the fundamental right to privacy cannot be construed as absolute and but must bow down to compelling public interest. We refrain from any further discussion and consider it appropriate not to record any further observation on an issue not specifically raised before us.
25. In the light of the above discussions, we unhesitatingly take the view that until explicit provisions are engrafted in the Code of Criminal Procedure by Parliament, a Judicial Magistrate must be conceded the power to order a person to give a sample of his voice for the purpose of investigation of a crime. Such power has to be conferred on a Magistrate by a process of judicial interpretation and in exercise of jurisdiction vested in this Court Under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. We order accordingly and consequently dispose the appeals in terms of the above.

From Paras 22-24,

22. In the proceedings under domestic violence act, the parties are not informant and accused in the sense of criminal jurisprudence. They are in domestic relationship. Non applicants would not stand for trial for any offence. Therefore, principles of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India are not attracted. In the matters of compulsion to offer the voice sample, the Supreme Court Ritesh Sinha (supra) is skeptical. It is not laid down that a person can not be compelled to give sample of voice. On the contrary, Magistrate is recorded to be conceded with the power to order a person to give a sample of his voice. Hence, the findings recorded by the Learned Judge in impugned order are unsustainable.
23. When High Court is considering the matter for direction to a person to give voice sample, it is permissible to have recourse to Section 482 of Cr.P.C.(Section 528 of B.N.S.S). Magistrate in the matters of domestic violence has power to adopt the procedure as per Section 28(2) of the Act. Exercise of such power depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No straight jacket formulae can be laid down. If there is adequate material on record having potential to prove the relevant facts, a person can be compelled to give voice sample. Such power is conceded with the Magistrate. Due to advent of technology, electronic evidence is being introduced. The electronic evidence is replacing conventional evidence. There is more need to invest such powers to the Magistrate who is a fact finding authority.
24. I find force in the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioners. Respondent is bound to give her voice sample to be referred to the forensic laboratory for verification.

Abhijit Ankush Shelke and Ors Vs Shubhangi Abhijit Shelke and Anr on 09 May 2025

Index to Domestic Violence cases is here.

Gurram Sitaramaiah Vs Gurram Siva Parvathi and Ors on 08 Jan 2024

Posted on May 3, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

Gurram Sitaramaiah Vs Gurram Siva Parvathi and Ors on 08 Jan 2024

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/659fafffe512165a322a69d7

Index of Maintenance Judgments is here.

Akkala Rami Reddy Vs State of AP and Anr on 30 Apr 2025

Posted on May 1, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice Harinath N has passed this judgment, wherein it was held that,

From Para 36 and 37,

36. The defacto-complainant has been serving as Treasurer of Pastors Fellowship in Pittalavanipalem Mandal. In order to become Pastor one has to essentially convert to Christianity. Evidently the 2nd respondent is a Christian professing Christianity. Having converted to Christianity, the petitioner
cannot continue to be a member of Scheduled Caste community. The caste system is alien to Christianity. Having converted to Christianity and admitting his role as a Pastor in a Church the 2nd respondent could not invoke the provisions of the Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.
37. The SC ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is a protective legislation introduced for preventing atrocities against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. In the present case, the 2nd respondent has misused the Protective Legislation though he is not entitled to invoke the provisions of the Act. The 2nd respondent had voluntarily converted to Christianity and was admittedly working as a Pastor in a Church for the last 10 years as on the date of incident. Thus, the 2nd respondent cannot be permitted to invoke the provisions of the Protective Legislation.

From Para 40,

40. Considering all this, this is a case where the 2nd respondent has misused the SC ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and filed a false complaint. The argument of the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent that the 2nd respondent continues to hold SC Certificate issued by LW.12 is concerned, the same is a matter to be dealt under Section 5 of the Andhra Pradesh (Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes) Regulation of Issue of Community Certificates Act, 1993 by the appropriate authority under the Act. Mere non-cancellation of the caste certificate by the authority to a person who has converted into Christianity cannot instill the protection granted under the Protective Legislation. The 2nd respondent has ceased to be a Member of the Scheduled Caste Community, the day he had converted into Christianity.

Akkala Rami Reddy Vs State of AP and Anr on 30 Apr 2025

Saikat Das Vs State of West Bengal and Anr on 27 Mar 2025

Posted on April 18, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single bench judge of Calcutta High Court denied maintenance to deserter wife.

From Para 24,

24. During the cross-examination of the respondent wife in the Domestic Violence case, the respondent wife has stated that “On 31st January, 2015, I left matrimonial home and came to my parental home”. In the application under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, the respondent wife made out a case that on 3rd February, 2015, her husband and her in-laws have brutally tortured upon her. The Learned Magistrate as well as the Learned Appellate Court finds that as per the case of the wife, she left her matrimonial house on 31st January, 2015 and she never came back to her matrimonial home, how the petitioner and his parents cause torture upon the respondent wife.

From Para 29,

29. This Court finds that the respondent wife in the Domestic Violence case made out the case of torture by the petitioner on 3rd February, 2015 and in the application filed under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. made out a case by making a bald allegation of torture other than the case made out in an application under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. In the case of domestic violence, the respondent wife in support of her case had examined her mother as witness. The mother of the respondent wife in her statement has stated that “she came to depose as per direction of her daughter and her daughter asked her what to tell and her affidavit was prepared by her lawyer and she only put her signature”. She also stated that they provided with several things to her daughter on her reception but not on demand and after marriage there was no demand for dowry. The respondent wife cleverly not brings her mother as witness in the case filed under Section 125 of Cr.P.C.

From Para 30,

30. Husband is legally and morally bound to provide maintenance to his wife. The right of the wife to be maintained by the husband stems from the corresponding obligation to perform marital duty. Section 125 (1)(a) of Cr.PC (Section 144 (1) (a) of BNSS) provides maintenance to the wife who is unable to maintain herself. However, the right of the wife to claim maintenance from her husband, who has sufficient means, is not absolute. It is subject to sub-section (4) of Section 125 (Section 144 (4) of BNSS). A wife who chooses to live separately without sufficient reason is disentitled to maintenance under Section 125(4) of Cr.PC (Section 144 (4) of BNSS). It is crucial to assess whether the wife’s decision to live separately is based on valid grounds. If valid grounds, such as cruelty or desertion, exist, she may still claim maintenance despite living apart. In cases where the wife refuses to live with the husband without any just cause and there is no evidence of ill-treatment by the husband, the wife is not entitled to maintenance.

From Para 36,

36. The affidavit of assets and liabilities filed by the parties, this Court finds that both the parties have not disclosed their affidavit of assets and liabilities correctly and thus one party cannot take the benefit of the wrong committed by the other party when the both the party have committed wrong.

From Para 37, (When there is no neglect, it is wrong to sustain maintenance to minor child)

37. This Court has already held that the respondent wife is living separately since 31st January, 2015 without any sufficient reasons and there is no evidence to show that she was ill-treated by the petitioner, thus the order passed by the Learned Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Calcutta in Misc Case No. 29 of 2016 dated 6th September, 2024 is set aside with respect to grant of maintenance of Rs. 7,000/- per month for the respondent wife. As regard the maintenance of the minor, this Court has not interfered with.

Saikat Das Vs State of West Bengal and Anr on 27 Mar 2025

Index of Maintenance Judgements is here.

Analysis by Adv Talari Rajeswari

Asha Rani Vs Ranjit Singh on 11 Dec 2024

Posted on April 12, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court held as follows,

From Para 8,

8. However, it is admitted fact on record that the petitioner is a qualified MA (in Punjabi) and B.Ed. On a Court query, learned counsel for the petitioner has admitted that the petitioner is not working despite being able bodied. When questioned as to why the petitioner is not working, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner was previously giving tuitions. However, now since she is residing with her parents in the village, she is unable to give any tuitions. When it is pointed out that even the children in villages study and therefore need tuitions, learned counsel submits that people in villages do not have high paying capacity. However, when it is pointed out that the petitioner can always take online tuitions in village also, learned counsel for the petitioner has no reply.

From Para 12,

12. It is my considered view that it is first and foremost duty of the petitioner to maintain herself. The ennoble purpose of Section 125 Cr.P.C. is not to spawn idle wives, and to foist the entire burden upon the hapless husband; but is to protect abandoned wives who are unable to maintain themselves from vagrancy and destitution. A bare reading of Section 125 Cr.P.C. itself indicates that maintenance is admissible to a wife who is ‘unable to maintain herself’. In the present case, that is not so.

Asha Rani Vs Ranjit Singh on 11 Dec 2024

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://mynation.net/docs/1558-2024/ (Thanks to MyNation _/\_)

Index of Maintenance Judgments u/s 144 BNSS is here.

Samina Firdaus Vs Shoeb Khan on 24 Jan 2025

Posted on April 7, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Bombay High Court at Nagpur refused to transfer a matrimonial case.

From Para 3,

3. The said application is strongly opposed by the non-applicant on the ground that, the applicant has suppressed several material facts and does not come with clean hand before this Court. He submitted that, though applicant has filed the petition under the provisions of Act of 2005, she never faced any cruelty or any domestic violence at the hands of the present non-applicant and his family members. In fact, the family members of the applicant gave a threat to his life as well life of his family members and they have already attacked on them and therefore, he filed an application before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Malegaon seeking directions to the police to investigate in the matter. After hearing and after considering his application, the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Malegaon directed the Police to lodge/registered the First Information Report (hereinafter referred to as “FIR”) against the present applicant and her family members. Thus, if the matter is transferred to Malegaon, there is a life threat to his life as well as life of his family members and therefore, the application deserves to be rejected.

From Para 6,

6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the non-applicant has placed reliance on the decision of Karnatka High Court in the case of Smt. Sushmitha B.L. @ Uma W/o Sri. Raghavendra B.R. ..vs.. Sri Raghavendra B.R. S/o Sri Ravindra Naik, in Civil Petition No.370/2024 wherein, the Karanata High court has observed that, constitutionally, a female has got equal rights as that of a male. As a matter of fact, women are the primary victims in most situations, but that does not mean that men are not affected by the cruelty of women. Therefore, there is necessity for a gender neutral society. Such a society aims at preventing separation of duties according to sex or gender. It will focus on equal treatment of men and women both in domestic affairs and work places. Equality should be in its truest sense and not at the expenses of either gender. However, admirable our efforts to safeguarding women may be, we should not overlook the challenges encountered by men in our society and rejected the application.

Samina Firdaus Vs Shoeb Khan on 24 Jan 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/196783536/

Index of Transfer judgments is here.

Sushmitha B.L. Vs Raghavendra B.R on 07 Jan 2025

Posted on April 7, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single Judge of Karnataka High Court, refused to transfer a divorce case stating that the inconvenience that will be faced by the respondent-husband if the transfer of the case is effected will be more.

From Paras 6-8,

6. Constitutionally, a female has got equal rights as that of a male. As a matter of fact, women are the primary victims in most situations, but that does not mean that men are not affected by the cruelty of women. Therefore, there is necessity for a gender neutral society. Such a society aims at preventing separation of duties according to sex or gender. It will focus on equal treatment of men and women both in domestic affairs and work places. Equality should be in its truest sense and not at the expense of either gender. However admirable our efforts to safeguarding women may be, we should not overlook the challenges encountered by men in our society.
7. Only because the transfer petition is moved by a woman, transfer of the case as sought for cannot be effected. All the attending facts and circumstances have to be looked into.
8. This Court is of the view that the inconvenience projected by the petitioner to attend the Court at Narasimharajapura, Chikkamagaluru District will not be greater than the inconvenience that will be faced by the respondent-husband if the transfer of the case is effected. Also the tender aged children would be put to sufferance. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the relief sought for cannot be granted.

Sushmitha B.L. Vs Raghavendra B.R on 07 Jan 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/677ee68875ee7076ea27c32d

Index of Transfer judgments is here.

Megha Khetrapal Vs Rajat Kapoor on 19 Mar 2025

Posted on April 5, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court held that, the petitioner deliberately avoided employment to maximize Interim maintenance claims.

From Paras 29 and 30,

29. Evidence was adduced showing the petitioner‟s previous employment as an Audit Associate at KPMG Dubai, subsequent work as a Human Resources Manager in her father‟s business, and entrepreneurial venture importing semi-precious jewellery. The respondent referred to her LinkedIn profile confirming her employment history and the learned Principal Judge noted that while the petitioner simply mentioned “Graduate” and “Post Graduate” in her affidavit without specifying details, she concealed her professional qualifications and previous employment history.
30. The learned Principal Judge relied on various precedents holding that prima facie evidence reveals that the petitioner deliberately avoided employment to maximize maintenance claims, referencing the WhatsApp conversation dated 31st December, 2020, i.e., prior to her petition filed on 24th June, 2021. It was further observed that although the petitioner claimed in her petition to be actively seeking employment, she failed to substantiate any job search efforts. The Court below found merit in the respondent’s contention that the petitioner, despite high educational qualifications and work experience, was strategically remaining unemployed.

From Paras 38-40,

38. It is settled that while adjudicating an application for grant of interim maintenance, the Court concerned must be prima facie satisfied whether such case is made out or not.
39. In the instant case, despite the contentions made by the petitioner that she was earlier residing at her maternal home, pursuant to which she started residing with her maternal uncle, who is old and unable to support her, along with the fact that she is unemployed and dispute is existing with respect to her father’s properties, this Court cannot ignore the fact that the petitioner is admittedly a well-qualified and able-bodied person. Furthermore, the whole situation where the petitioner was staying with her parents and now with maternal uncle indicates that she wants to convince the court that she is unable to earn.
40. It is trite to observe that it is the duty of the husband to maintain his wife despite the circumstances, however, for grant of interim maintenance, prima facie satisfaction is necessary to determine whether the wife is genuinely in need of maintenance and the factors leading to such need of maintenance.

From Paras 33-34,

43. Regarding the prima facie evidence of deliberate unemployment, the WhatsApp conversation between the petitioner and her mother, legitimacy of which can be determined at the appropriate stage of trial, wherein the mother advises that employment would jeopardize alimony claims, is particularly telling. This communication, preceding the maintenance petition, strongly suggests a deliberate attempt to remain unemployed to seek maintenance claims.
44. Furthermore, it has been rightly observed by the learned Principal Judge that while the petitioner claims that she cannot sit idle and is trying to search for a job, she has not placed any evidence on record regarding her efforts to secure employment or resume her business activities either before the Court below or before this Court. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that the mere assertion of job-seeking, without corroborative evidence, is insufficient to establish genuine efforts at self-sufficiency.

From Paras 46-47,

46. Here, it is imperative to mention that the petitioner’s reliance on Shailja (Supra), regarding the distinction between “capable of earning” and “actual earning”, the facts of the present case are distinguishable. In the present case, there is prima facie evidence suggesting deliberate avoidance of employment by the petitioner.
47. Taking into consideration the observations made hereinabove, this Court is of the view that qualified wives, having the earning capacity but desirous of remaining idle, should now set up a claim for interim maintenance. Section 125 of the CrPC carries the legislative intent to maintain equality among the spouses, provide protection to the wives, children and parents, and not promote idleness. In light of the same, this Court is of the considered view that a well-educated wife, with experience in a suitable gainful job, ought not to remain idle solely to gain maintenance from her husband. Therefore, interim maintenance is being discouraged in the present case as this Court can see potential in the petitioner to earn and make good of her education.

Finally, from Paras 49-50,

49. The petitioner herein has a master’s degree from Australia, she was earning well in a job in Dubai before her marriage, there are certain conversations between the petitioner and her mother which shows the ex facie mala fides on the part of the petitioner etc. The said factors, upon conjoint consideration to award interim maintenance, do not warrant any inclination of this Court. Moreover, this Court encourages the petitioner to actively look for a job to become self-sufficient as she already got wide exposure and is aware of the worldly affairs unlike other women who are not educated and are completely dependent upon their spouses for basic sustenance.
50. This Court is unable to comprehend the fact as to why, despite being able-bodied and well qualified, the petitioner has remained to choose idle since her return to India. Thus, it is held that the learned Principal Judge rightly passed the impugned order holding that the petitioner herein is not entitled to grant of interim maintenance considering the peculiar facts.

Megha Khetrapal Vs Rajat Kapoor on 19 Mar 2025

Index of Maintenance Judgments under 144 BNSS is here.

Paul George Vs Emarin Paul on 12 Mar 2025

Posted on March 29, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Kerala High Court held that a deserter wife not entitled to claim maintenance.

From Para 6,

6. As stated already, M.C.No.354 of 2017 has been tried along with G.O.(P) Nos.1621 of 2016 & 1334 of 2017. As per the common order, the guardianship of the child was given to the petitioner. A reading of the common order would show that the petitioner specifically contended that the respondent left the matrimonial home without any reason on 16.11.2015, abandoning their 2½-year-old child there and never returned thereafter. The respondent has admitted that she left the matrimonial home on that day. But her contention is that she was forced to leave the matrimonial home and started to live separately due to the ill-treatment of the petitioner. The parties let in evidence regarding these rival contentions. The Family Court, after considering the evidence on record, concluded that the respondent left the matrimonial home leaving the child there without any reason. In paragraph 27 of the common order, there is a finding that even though the respondent has raised a contention that she left the petitioner due to ill-treatment, there is no evidence of any ill-treatment and there was not even a complaint by the respondent against the petitioner before any police. In paragraph 31 of the common order, there is a specific finding that the respondent left the matrimonial home with the definite intention to teach a lesson to the petitioner, and absolutely, there is no evidence to show that she was ill-treated by the petitioner as alleged by the respondent. Thus, there is clear evidence on record to show that the respondent has been living separately since 16.11.2015 without any sufficient reason. That apart, O.P.No.1618 of 2016, filed by the petitioner seeking divorce on the grounds of desertion and cruelty, was allowed on those grounds.

From Para 7,

7. The primary object of marriage, while varying across cultures and beliefs, often encompasses forming a legal and social unit providing companionship and emotional support apart from procreation and raising of children. Marriage brings with it specific rights and liabilities for both husband and wife. Marriage involves a commitment to live together and fulfil the responsibilities inherent in the marital relationship. The primary
duty of parties in marriage is to live together and fulfil their marital obligations. The right to each other’s society, comfort and affection, often referred to as ‘consortium’ is a fundamental aspect of marriage. Withdrawal from society of the other would mean withdrawal from marital obligation by either spouse.

From Para 8,

8. A husband is legally and morally bound to provide maintenance to his wife. The right of the wife to be maintained by the husband stems from the corresponding obligation to perform marital duty. Section 125 (1) (a) of Cr.PC (Section 144 (1) (a) of BNSS) provides maintenance to the wife who is unable to maintain herself. However, the right of the wife to claim maintenance from her husband, who has sufficient means, is not absolute. It is subject to sub-section (4) of Section 125 (Section 144 (4) of BNSS). A wife who chooses to live separately without sufficient reason is disentitled to maintenance under Section 125(4) of Cr.PC (Section 144 (4) of BNSS). It is crucial to assess whether the wife’s decision to live separately is based on valid grounds. If valid grounds, such as cruelty or desertion, exist, she may still claim maintenance despite living apart. In cases where the wife refuses to live with the husband without any just cause and there is no evidence of ill-treatment by the husband, the wife is not entitled to maintenance.

Paul George Vs Emarin Paul on 12 Mar 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Maintenance Judgments us here.

Manoj Arora Vs Mamta Arora on 7 Aug 2018

Posted on March 24, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court held that, it is legally permissible for a person to purchase an immovable property in the name of his spouse from his known sources, and in which position, the property purchased will not be a benami property but the property will be of the de jure owner/plaintiff/husband and not of the de facto owner (in whose name title deeds exist), being the respondent/defendant/wife.

4. Unfortunately, the trial court has committed a grave and fundamental error in rejecting the suit plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC by relying upon the provision of Section 4 and repealed provision of Section 3(2) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act. When the impugned judgment was passed on 19.12.2016, what was, and is now applicable is the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 which became applicable w.e.f 1.11.2016. As per Section 2(9) of the Amended Act what is a Benami Transaction is stated/specified, and also those transactions which are not benami are are also stated/specified. As per the suit plaint/averments, in the present case the existence of the properties in the name of the respondent/defendant/wife will fall as an Exception to the prohibited benami transaction in view of Section 2(9)(A)(b) Exception (iii) inasmuch as it is legally permissible for a person to purchase an immovable property in the name of his spouse from his known sources, and in which position, the property purchased will not be a benami property but the property will be of the de jure owner/plaintiff/husband and not of the de facto owner (in whose name title deeds exist), being the respondent/defendant/wife in the present case.

Manoj Arora Vs Mamta Arora on 7 Aug 2018

Citations: [2018:DHC:4920], [LAWS(DLH)-2018-8-124], [(2018) 08 DEL CK 0082]

Other sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/75898278/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5b6ed88e9eff430e1391a346

https://lextechsuite.com/Manoj-Arora-Versus-Mamta-Arora-2018-08-07

https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/browse/Case?CaseId=108102076300&Title=MANOJ-ARORA-Vs.-MAMTA-ARORA

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/Judgement/Search/t/5102027-manoj-arora-vs-mamta-arora?s=&refine_search=&s_acts=Benami%20Transactions%20(Prohibition)%20Act,%201988

Manoj Arora v. Mamta Arora (2018) 258 Taxman 1 (Delhi)(HC)

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: 1-Judge Bench Decision

Abhijit Ankush Shelke and Ors Vs Shubhangi Abhijit Shelke and Anr on 09 May 2025

Gurram Sitaramaiah Vs Gurram Siva Parvathi and Ors on 08 Jan 2024

Akkala Rami Reddy Vs State of AP and Anr on 30 Apr 2025

Saikat Das Vs State of West Bengal and Anr on 27 Mar 2025

Asha Rani Vs Ranjit Singh on 11 Dec 2024

Samina Firdaus Vs Shoeb Khan on 24 Jan 2025

Sushmitha B.L. Vs Raghavendra B.R on 07 Jan 2025

Megha Khetrapal Vs Rajat Kapoor on 19 Mar 2025

Paul George Vs Emarin Paul on 12 Mar 2025

Manoj Arora Vs Mamta Arora on 7 Aug 2018