Namathoti Sankaramma Vs State of A.P. and Ors on 15 Sep 2000

Posted on January 1, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

This is a case decided by single-judge bench of AP High Court regard a case involving CrPC 210.

From Paras 13, 14 and 15,

13. Sub-section (1) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C. is designed to ensure that the enquiry or trial in the case instituted on the basis of a complaint and enquiry or trial on the basis of a police report in respect of the same incident do not proceed tangentially but proceed in tandem. To enable the Magistrate to monitor the enquiry or trial under these two different streams to ensure simultaneously such enquiry or trial, Sub-section (1) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C. provides that when the case is instituted on the basis of a complaint, if it is brought to the notice of the Magistrate during the course of enquiry or trial on the basis of the said complaint that the investigation by the police in relation to the same offence is under way, the Magistrate shall stay the proceedings of such enquiry or trial and call for a report on the matter from the police officer conducting investigation. The condition for applicability of Section 210(1) of Cr.P.C. is that there must be commonality of the ‘offence’ in the subject of investigation by the police and the subject of enquiry by the Magistrate in the complaint case. But considering the context and the object of the provision, the word ‘offence’ used in Sub-section (1) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C. cannot be construed to refer to a particular provision of law defining certain offence. But it must be deemed to denote the incident or transaction in which an offence or offences have been committed.
14. However, under Sub-section (2) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C., the word ‘offence’ appears to have been used to indicate a particular transgression labelled as a particular offence under IPC or any other law. It is obvious from the fact that normally when the Court takes cognizance of an offence, it does not refer to taking cognizance of the whole incident in which offences are committed but to particular violations, which have been defined as specific offences. Inasmuch as the object of the provision appears to be as stated above to avoid enquiries or trials sought to be initiated on two different footings, namely, the complaint and the police report on parallel tracks leading to conflicting results, obviously it is the commonality of the
incident which are the subject matters of the complaint and the first information report under investigation by the police and not the labels of a particular transgression of law affixed by the complainant in the complaint or in the first information report which, if it were not so, the provisions of Section 210 of Cr.P.C. can be evaded by a mere device of labelling the transaction with different offences. As stated above in this case, the stage of staying the proceedings in the complaint case under Sub-section (1) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C., has passed and the stage for calling for a report from the police has also been passed inasmuch as the police report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. has been filed already. The provision in Sub-section (1) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C. has been made as stated above for preventing parallel enquiries or trials. Where a question as to application of the provisions under Section 210 of Cr.P.C. arises at certain stage of enquiry in the complaint case or after the report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. has been filed by the police, it cannot be said that because the stage for invoking Sub-section (1) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C. has crossed, the other provisions under it are not applicable.
15. For application of Sub-section (2) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C., two conditions are required to be satisfied, (i) On the report of the police under Section 173 of Cr.P.C., cognizance of some offences has been taken by the Magistrate; and (ii) Any person who is an accused in the complaint case is among the accused against whom the Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence on the basis of the police report.

From Paras 21 and 22,

21. Section 210(3) Cr.P.C., would apply in two situations (i) Where the police report does not relate to ‘any’ accused in the complaint case, and (ii) if the Magistrate does not take cognizance of any offence on the police report at all. The word ‘any’ with reference to the accused and the offence in Section 210(3) and for that matter in Sub-section (2) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C. would only mean ‘one or more’ and not ‘all’. The Judgment of the Orissa High Court supra proceeds on the basis that Section 210(3) of Cr.P.C., will be applicable where all the offences and all the accused are not common in both the cases.
22. In this case as seen above, in view of the application of the provision of Section 210(2) Cr.P.C., an enquiry on the basis of a police report and the complaint case for the purpose of committal proceedings was required to be conducted together as if both were instituted on a police report.

Finally, from Para 25,

25. The learned Sessions Judge ought to have examined the committal order to ensure whether the requirements under Sub-section (2) of Section 210 Cr.P.C. have been complied with or not. It was necessary for him to ascertain whether the learned Magistrate while enquiring into the matter has treated the material available in the com- plaint case as if it was material brought forth on record in the police report case. This was not done. I am, therefore, satisfied that there was no substantial compliance of Section 210(2) Cr.P.C. For the purpose of committing the case not only the material available in the police report has to be considered, but the material available in the complaint case also requires to be considered as it if it is material placed before the Court in the police report case.

Namathoti Sankaramma Vs State of A.P. and Ors on 15 Sep 2000

Casemine version:

Namathoti Sankaramma Vs State of A.P. and Ors on 15 Sep 2000 Casemine

Citations : [2000 ALD CRI 2 588], [2001 RCR CRIMINAL 2 323], [2000 SCC ONLINE AP 772], [2001 ALT CRI 1 17], [2000 SUP CRLJ AP 4831]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/678335/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5608f7c8e4b0149711140c35

Anil Kumar and 2 Ors Vs State of A.P. Anr on 03 Apr 2019

Posted on December 25, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Single Judge Bench of JUSTICE Dr. B.SIVA SANKARA RAO, quashed the false 498A/DP Act complaint on Father in law and two sisters in law. Just one Paragraph !!!

From Para 6,

6. There is no record even shown from the police charge sheet by collecting from father of de facto complainant as to any so-called additional amount of Rs.4,30,000/- given out of his retirement benefits or 15 tulas of gold. It is crucial if at all to believe as to what were the retirement benefits he received and when from his account he parted with. There is no date or time even mentioned either in the report or from the police investigation to believe, leave about the fact that the so-called marriage performed, from the police investigation out of love affair between A-1 and de facto complainant against the will of the parents of the de facto complainant and the parents of A-1, who are A-2 & A-3 from the beginning agreed for the love marriage with no objection. Once such is the case, even the stray allegation of the petitioners/A-2 to A-4 used to abuse her as not of their caste or religion and if they marry another girl, they could get more dowry itself is unbelievable, for the very marriage is love marriage. Even to say that there was any instigation to A-1 by A-2 to A-4 for additional dowry when it is a love marriage and no dowry shown paid originally and as discussed supra of no any payment of dowry by father of de facto complainant after his retirement from his benefits alleged, the question of any payment of additional dowry is unbelievable. It clearly shows the petitioners/A-2 to A-4 are roped without any basis for reasons better known by the de facto complainant and the police investigation in this regard is also perfunctory and baseless and the legal position is very clear that unless from the specific allegations in the complaint against the other relatives of the husband, no cognizance can be taken against the family members, particularly from the tendency of making baseless allegations in roping them and even a stray sentence as suffered harassment in the hands of in-laws, etc., is not sufficient to sustain any such accusation to rope the other family members of the husband of the de facto complainant, so-called victim.

Anil Kumar and 2 Ors Vs State of A.P. Anr on 03 Apr 2019

Citations :

Other Sources :

Index of Quash judgments here.

Kamlesh Kumar Vs Girish Kapoor and Anr on 12 Apr 1984

Posted on December 13, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

One of the earliest judgments on Stay proceedings in a Revision at Sessions Court.

From Paras 6 and 7,

6. The above order was passed in revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge. Obviously that jurisdiction was exercised Under Section 397, Cr.P.C. Under its provisions the Sessions Judge could pass an interlocutory order by directing “that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended….” It is, therefore, clear that in a revision, the Sessions Judge could, during the pendency of the revision, suspend either sentence or order against which the revision has been filed. In the present case there is no question of any sentence. There was only the order in question against which revision was filed. At best the said order could only be suspended during the pendency of the revision.
7. The question of suspending the order would only arise if it was still to be executed. If the order had already come into operation, there remained nothing to be suspended. In the present case it is undisputed fact that in pursuance of the order of the learned Magistrate, applicant Kamlesh Kumar had already executed the necessary bonds on the same date and had taken delivery of the said print of the film ‘Naseeb’. Accordingly there remained nothing which could be suspended.

Casemine Version:

Kamlesh Kumar Vs Girish Kapoor and Anr on 12 Apr 1984

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1179659/

https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/473801/kamlesh-kumar-vs-girish-kapoor-anr

Arun Thakur Vs State of Chhattisgarh on 10 July 2019

Posted on December 12, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Whether an Advocate, while acting under the instructions of his client and proceeding professionally, can be prosecuted / punished for the offence of defamation punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code is the precise question involved in this petition which came before High Court of Chhattisgarh.

From Para 10,

10. It appears from the aforesaid genealogical tree that respondent No.2 herein has been shown to be the concubine / wife of Ghanshyam Pandey. This, according to respondent No.2, is defamatory, as she is the legally married wife of Ghanshyam Pandey after the death of his first wife Smt. Tarini Pandey and that led to the present dispute.

From Para 24,

24. In light of above-stated legal analysis, an advocate, who acted professionally as per instructions of his/her client, cannot be made criminally liable for the offence of defamation under Section 500 of the IPC unless contrary is alleged and established.

From Para 26,

….
As such, an Advocate who has acted professionally and drafted plaint making averment as per the instructions of his client, cannot be held liable for the offence of defamation under Section 500 of the IPC.

Finally from Para 33,

33. Admittedly, respondent No.2 claims that the alleged incident happened in the year 2014 and after lapse of 3-4 years, FIR has been lodged which clearly goes to show that there was no intention of the petitioner to cause harm, as in such a case, she would have rushed to the police authority well in time. As such, even it cannot be held that the petitioner has abused and insulted respondent No.2 in terms of Section 506 of the IPC.

Arun Thakur Vs State of Chhattisgarh on 10 July 2019

Vipul Lakhanpal Vs Pooja Sharma on 01 June 2015

Posted on December 12, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Single-judge bench held that husband has to pay maintenance even if wife is earning salary and he does not have salary. Just 15 pages. Read yourself.

Vipul Lakhanpal Vs Pooja Sharma on 01 June 2015

Nafisa Anjum Vs State of Chhattisgarh on 26 Sep 2018

Posted on December 2, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Relatives not living in a shared household were implicated in a false DV case, so High Court of Chhattisgarh quashed the DV proceedings against the petitioners.

Nafisa Anjum Vs State of Chhattisgarh on 26 Sep 2018

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/100106255/

https://www.lawyerservices.in/Nafisa-Anjum-Versus-State-of-Chhattisgarh-Through-Officer-In-Charge-Police-Station-2018-09-26

http://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/Browse/Case?CaseId=028102399000

Jugal Vs State of Rajasthan on 25 Nov 2020

Posted on November 28, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Rajasthan High Court passed a direction to all trial Courts in Rajasthan that, in all Bail matters u/s 437/438, a detailed report on antecedents of the accused is to be filed along with judgment.

There is no mention regarding the status of criminal antecedents of the present petitioner in the impugned order. It is often seen by this Court that the learned courts below are not specific in regard to antecedents of the accused persons, which causes delay in the disposal of the bail applications, as, if the person is not having antecedents and his antecedents are called, receiving of such antecedents reports takes quite some time. Though the antecedent alone is not a ground of rejecting or accepting a bail, but it is must that the Hon’ble High Court should have the antecedent report to check the applicability of Section 437 (1) of Cr.P.C. as well as to weigh the case of the accused person with overall perspective of the allegations levelled.
Thus, this Court directs that all learned trial courts shall, while allowing or disallowing any regular/anticipatory bail application of any accused person,give the complete details of the antecedents, if any, and also record that there are no antecedents of the accused person in case of none being there. If there are antecedents of the accused, then the complete details of the antecedents i.e. FIR Number(s) & Case Number(s), Section(s), date(s), status and date of arrest & release on any previous occasion, if any, in the chart form shall be prepared and incorporated in the learned trial courts’ order, while granting or dismissing the bail application.
This order shall be conveyed by the Registry of this Court to all learned District & Sessions Judges of the State, who shall ensure the immediate implementation of this order amongst all the judicial officers and all courts in their respective jurisdiction, which are hearing the bail applications. The detailed antecedents report in aforesaid format so provided in the trial courts’ order shall be the requirement of disposal of any bail application in State of Rajasthan. It is also directed that the learned Public Prosecutors all over the State shall call for the antecedents report well in advance in every case of bail, so as to enable the courts to have a definite and correct information regarding previous criminal antecedents of the accused. A certified copy of this order be also sent by the Registry to the Director of the Prosecution Department of the State for necessary compliance, amongst the learned Public Prosecutors all over the State of Rajasthan.
The Registry of this Hon’ble Court shall ensure compliance of this order, in its letter and spirit, and submit such compliance before this Court on 05.01.2021.

Jugal Vs State of Rajasthan on 25 Nov 2020

K.C. Kanniyappa Vs K.C. Lalitha and Anr on 26 Sep 2005

Posted on November 26, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Single-judge bench of Andhra Pradesh held that, cross-examination need not be confined to the facts to which the witness testified on his examination-in-chief.

From Para 3,

3. Since O.S. No. 1141 of 2000, later renumbered as O.S. No. 20 of 2003, was ordered to be tried along with O.S. No. 47 of 1998, obviously common evidence is being recorded in both the suits. When two suits are clubbed and tried together, all the parties to the suits have a right to cross-examine the witness examined by the adversary, because Section 138 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (‘the Act’) confers such right on them. As per that Section 138 of the Act the witness called by a party shall first be examined-in-chief and if the adverse party so desires he can cross-examine him and then if the party calling him so desires, can re-examine him. That section specifically lays down that Chief examination and cross-examination must relate to relevant facts, but cross-examination need not be confined to the facts to which the witness testified on his examination-in-chief.

Casemine copy:

K.C. Kanniyappa Vs K.C. Lalitha and Anr on 26 Sep 2005 (casemine)

Legal Crystal copy:

K.C. Kanniyappa Vs K.C. Lalitha and Anr on 26 Sep 2005 (legalcrystal)

Citations : [2006 ALD 1 370], legalcrystal.com/442436

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1166172/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5608f85de4b01497111422e0

https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/442436/k-c-kanniyappa-vs-lalitha-anr

Subhranshu Rout @ Gugul Vs State of Odisha on 23 Nov 2020

Posted on November 25, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Single judge bench of Orissa High Court, in this bail matter, held that right to be forgotten (or left alone) is part of bouquet of rights enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution.

From Para 5,

5. While examining the pages of the case records, prima facie, it appears that the petitioner has uploaded the said photos/videos on a social media platform i.e. Facebook and with the intervention of the police, after some days, he deleted the said objectionable contents from the Facebook. In fact, the information in the public domain is like toothpaste, once it is out of the tube one can’t get it back in and once the information is in the public domain it will never go away. Under the Indian Criminal Justice system a strong penal action is prescribed against the accused for such heinous crime but there is no mechanism available with respect to the right of the victim to get the objectionable photographs deleted from the server of the Facebook. The different types of harassment, threats and assaults that frighten citizens in regard to their online presence pose serious concerns for
citizens. There is an unprecedented escalation of such insensitive behavior on the social media platforms and the victim like the present one could not get those photos deleted permanently from server of such social media platforms like facebook. Though the statute prescribes penal action for the
accused for such crimes, the rights of the victim, especially, her right to privacy which is intricately linked to her right to get deleted in so far as those objectionable photos have been left unresolved. There is a widespread and seemingly consensual convergence towards an adoption and enshrinement of the right to get deleted or forgotten but hardly any effort has been undertaken in India till recently, towards adoption of such a right, despite such an issue has inexorably posed in the technology dominated world. Presently, there is no statute in India which provides for the right to be forgotten/getting the photos erased from the server of the social media platforms permanently. The legal possibilities of being forgotten on line or off line cries for a widespread debate. It is also an undeniable fact that the implementation of right to be forgotten is a thorny issue in terms of practicality and technological nuances. In fact, it cries for a clear cut demarcation of institutional boundaries and redressal of many delicate issues which hitherto remain unaddressed in Indian jurisdiction. The dynamics of hyper connectivity- the abundance, pervasiveness and accessibility of communication network have redefined the memory and the prescriptive mandate to include in the technological contours is of pressing importance.

From Para 14,

14. Section 27 of the draft Personal Data Protection Bill, 2018 contains the right to be forgotten. Under Section 27, a data principal (an individual) has the right to prevent continuing disclosure of personal data by a data fiduciary. The aforesaid provision which falls under Chapter VI (Data Principal Rights) of the Bill, distinctly carves out the “right to be forgotten” in no uncertain terms. In terms of this provision, every data principal shall have the right to restrict or prevent continuing disclosure of personal data (relating to such data principal) by any data fiduciary if such disclosure meets any one of the following three conditions, namely if the disclosure of personal data:
(i) has served the purpose for which it was made or is no longer necessary; or
(ii) was made on the basis of the data principal’s consent and such consent has since been withdrawn; or
(iii) was made contrary to the provisions of the bill or any other law in force.
In addition to this, Section 10 of the Bill provides that a data fiduciary shall retain personal data only as long as may be reasonably necessary to satisfy the purpose for which it is processed. Further, it imposes an obligation on every data fiduciary to undertake periodic reviews in order to determine whether it is necessary to retain the personal data in its possession. If it is not necessary for personal data to be retained by a data fiduciary, then such personal data must be deleted in a manner as may be specified.

Subhranshu Rout @ Gugul Vs State of Odisha on 23 Nov 2020

Index of Article 21 case laws is here.

Amol Barsagade Vs State of Maharashtra on 23 Apr 2018

Posted on November 23, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Single Judge of Bombay High Court held that, burden of proof shifting to accused in POCSO cases is not absolute and that the Prosecution has to establish their case on foundational
facts, only after which burden of proof shifts onto accused.

From Para 4, truth comes out.

4. It is admitted by the victim that Hindi books were found on her desk by the accused. The victim was suggested that since the Hindi books were found or discovered by the accused, she left the examination hall crying. The defence, obviously, is that in order to escape the consequences of the unfair practice while answering the Hindi paper, the victim falsely implicated the accused.

From Para 6,

6. The statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act must be understood and tested on the anvil of the golden thread which runs through web of the criminal jurisprudence system in this country that an accused is presumed to be innocent till the guilt is conclusively established beyond reasonable doubt. In the factual matrix, at best, the prosecution has succeeded in bringing on record material giving rise to some suspicion. However, it is trite law that suspicion is not a substitute to proof. The gulf between “might have committed” and “must have committed” must be bridged by the prosecution by unimpeachable and confidence inspiring evidence.

Amol Barsagade Vs State of Maharashtra on 23 Apr 2018

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/186788466/

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: 1-Judge Bench Decision

Namathoti Sankaramma Vs State of A.P. and Ors on 15 Sep 2000

Anil Kumar and 2 Ors Vs State of A.P. Anr on 03 Apr 2019

Kamlesh Kumar Vs Girish Kapoor and Anr on 12 Apr 1984

Arun Thakur Vs State of Chhattisgarh on 10 July 2019

Vipul Lakhanpal Vs Pooja Sharma on 01 June 2015

Nafisa Anjum Vs State of Chhattisgarh on 26 Sep 2018

Jugal Vs State of Rajasthan on 25 Nov 2020

K.C. Kanniyappa Vs K.C. Lalitha and Anr on 26 Sep 2005

Subhranshu Rout @ Gugul Vs State of Odisha on 23 Nov 2020

Amol Barsagade Vs State of Maharashtra on 23 Apr 2018