Based on Inderjit Singh Grewal here, PWDV Act is subject to CrPC 468, so complaint filed after 1 year are time barred, hence the DVC is quashed by Madras High Court.
Note: On the request of respondent-wife, I have removed the name and address details of the litigants on page-1 of the judgment below. No other modifications were made to it.
Citations : [2020 SCC OnLine Mad 1767]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/108935797/
This is the happy tale of the elephant ‘Lalitha’ adjudged by the Madras High Court.
From Paras 12 and 13
12.Lalitha has been accustomed to a certain lifestyle all these years. She changed hands from 1988 to 2000. But she has been in the custody of the petitioner for the last twenty years. She has been attending religious functions. She is being fed well. She is in good health. In fact, the veterinarians appointed by the department have certified that she is being maintained properly by the petitioner. Removing her from the petitioner’s custody is sure to inflict a deep psychological wound on her. It is certainly not in her best interests. Applying the yardstick of what is good for Lalitha, I have to hold that the present arrangement should continue. Lalitha should continue to be with the petitioner and participate in the religious functions hosted in
the region.
13.Lalitha’s usual place of stay is a coconut groove spread over one and half acres. There is a R.O Plant. It is owned by Thiru.Pothiraj. He appeared before me and gave in writing that the land will not be sold or encumbered during the lifetime of Lalitha. She also gets copious amounts of water to drink and to bathe. The ambience is highly conducive.
This is a case decided by single-judge bench of AP High Court regard a case involving CrPC 210.
From Paras 13, 14 and 15,
13. Sub-section (1) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C. is designed to ensure that the enquiry or trial in the case instituted on the basis of a complaint and enquiry or trial on the basis of a police report in respect of the same incident do not proceed tangentially but proceed in tandem. To enable the Magistrate to monitor the enquiry or trial under these two different streams to ensure simultaneously such enquiry or trial, Sub-section (1) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C. provides that when the case is instituted on the basis of a complaint, if it is brought to the notice of the Magistrate during the course of enquiry or trial on the basis of the said complaint that the investigation by the police in relation to the same offence is under way, the Magistrate shall stay the proceedings of such enquiry or trial and call for a report on the matter from the police officer conducting investigation. The condition for applicability of Section 210(1) of Cr.P.C. is that there must be commonality of the ‘offence’ in the subject of investigation by the police and the subject of enquiry by the Magistrate in the complaint case. But considering the context and the object of the provision, the word ‘offence’ used in Sub-section (1) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C. cannot be construed to refer to a particular provision of law defining certain offence. But it must be deemed to denote the incident or transaction in which an offence or offences have been committed.
14. However, under Sub-section (2) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C., the word ‘offence’ appears to have been used to indicate a particular transgression labelled as a particular offence under IPC or any other law. It is obvious from the fact that normally when the Court takes cognizance of an offence, it does not refer to taking cognizance of the whole incident in which offences are committed but to particular violations, which have been defined as specific offences. Inasmuch as the object of the provision appears to be as stated above to avoid enquiries or trials sought to be initiated on two different footings, namely, the complaint and the police report on parallel tracks leading to conflicting results, obviously it is the commonality of the
incident which are the subject matters of the complaint and the first information report under investigation by the police and not the labels of a particular transgression of law affixed by the complainant in the complaint or in the first information report which, if it were not so, the provisions of Section 210 of Cr.P.C. can be evaded by a mere device of labelling the transaction with different offences. As stated above in this case, the stage of staying the proceedings in the complaint case under Sub-section (1) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C., has passed and the stage for calling for a report from the police has also been passed inasmuch as the police report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. has been filed already. The provision in Sub-section (1) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C. has been made as stated above for preventing parallel enquiries or trials. Where a question as to application of the provisions under Section 210 of Cr.P.C. arises at certain stage of enquiry in the complaint case or after the report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. has been filed by the police, it cannot be said that because the stage for invoking Sub-section (1) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C. has crossed, the other provisions under it are not applicable.15. For application of Sub-section (2) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C., two conditions are required to be satisfied, (i) On the report of the police under Section 173 of Cr.P.C., cognizance of some offences has been taken by the Magistrate; and (ii) Any person who is an accused in the complaint case is among the accused against whom the Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence on the basis of the police report.
From Paras 21 and 22,
21. Section 210(3) Cr.P.C., would apply in two situations (i) Where the police report does not relate to ‘any’ accused in the complaint case, and (ii) if the Magistrate does not take cognizance of any offence on the police report at all. The word ‘any’ with reference to the accused and the offence in Section 210(3) and for that matter in Sub-section (2) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C. would only mean ‘one or more’ and not ‘all’. The Judgment of the Orissa High Court supra proceeds on the basis that Section 210(3) of Cr.P.C., will be applicable where all the offences and all the accused are not common in both the cases.
22. In this case as seen above, in view of the application of the provision of Section 210(2) Cr.P.C., an enquiry on the basis of a police report and the complaint case for the purpose of committal proceedings was required to be conducted together as if both were instituted on a police report.
Finally, from Para 25,
25. The learned Sessions Judge ought to have examined the committal order to ensure whether the requirements under Sub-section (2) of Section 210 Cr.P.C. have been complied with or not. It was necessary for him to ascertain whether the learned Magistrate while enquiring into the matter has treated the material available in the com- plaint case as if it was material brought forth on record in the police report case. This was not done. I am, therefore, satisfied that there was no substantial compliance of Section 210(2) Cr.P.C. For the purpose of committing the case not only the material available in the police report has to be considered, but the material available in the complaint case also requires to be considered as it if it is material placed before the Court in the police report case.
Casemine version:
Citations : [2000 ALD CRI 2 588], [2001 RCR CRIMINAL 2 323], [2000 SCC ONLINE AP 772], [2001 ALT CRI 1 17], [2000 SUP CRLJ AP 4831]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/678335/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5608f7c8e4b0149711140c35
Single Judge Bench of JUSTICE Dr. B.SIVA SANKARA RAO, quashed the false 498A/DP Act complaint on Father in law and two sisters in law. Just one Paragraph !!!
From Para 6,
6. There is no record even shown from the police charge sheet by collecting from father of de facto complainant as to any so-called additional amount of Rs.4,30,000/- given out of his retirement benefits or 15 tulas of gold. It is crucial if at all to believe as to what were the retirement benefits he received and when from his account he parted with. There is no date or time even mentioned either in the report or from the police investigation to believe, leave about the fact that the so-called marriage performed, from the police investigation out of love affair between A-1 and de facto complainant against the will of the parents of the de facto complainant and the parents of A-1, who are A-2 & A-3 from the beginning agreed for the love marriage with no objection. Once such is the case, even the stray allegation of the petitioners/A-2 to A-4 used to abuse her as not of their caste or religion and if they marry another girl, they could get more dowry itself is unbelievable, for the very marriage is love marriage. Even to say that there was any instigation to A-1 by A-2 to A-4 for additional dowry when it is a love marriage and no dowry shown paid originally and as discussed supra of no any payment of dowry by father of de facto complainant after his retirement from his benefits alleged, the question of any payment of additional dowry is unbelievable. It clearly shows the petitioners/A-2 to A-4 are roped without any basis for reasons better known by the de facto complainant and the police investigation in this regard is also perfunctory and baseless and the legal position is very clear that unless from the specific allegations in the complaint against the other relatives of the husband, no cognizance can be taken against the family members, particularly from the tendency of making baseless allegations in roping them and even a stray sentence as suffered harassment in the hands of in-laws, etc., is not sufficient to sustain any such accusation to rope the other family members of the husband of the de facto complainant, so-called victim.
Citations :
Other Sources :
Index of Quash judgments here.
One of the earliest judgments on Stay proceedings in a Revision at Sessions Court.
From Paras 6 and 7,
6. The above order was passed in revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge. Obviously that jurisdiction was exercised Under Section 397, Cr.P.C. Under its provisions the Sessions Judge could pass an interlocutory order by directing “that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended….” It is, therefore, clear that in a revision, the Sessions Judge could, during the pendency of the revision, suspend either sentence or order against which the revision has been filed. In the present case there is no question of any sentence. There was only the order in question against which revision was filed. At best the said order could only be suspended during the pendency of the revision.
7. The question of suspending the order would only arise if it was still to be executed. If the order had already come into operation, there remained nothing to be suspended. In the present case it is undisputed fact that in pursuance of the order of the learned Magistrate, applicant Kamlesh Kumar had already executed the necessary bonds on the same date and had taken delivery of the said print of the film ‘Naseeb’. Accordingly there remained nothing which could be suspended.
Casemine Version:
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1179659/
https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/473801/kamlesh-kumar-vs-girish-kapoor-anr
Whether an Advocate, while acting under the instructions of his client and proceeding professionally, can be prosecuted / punished for the offence of defamation punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code is the precise question involved in this petition which came before High Court of Chhattisgarh.
From Para 10,
10. It appears from the aforesaid genealogical tree that respondent No.2 herein has been shown to be the concubine / wife of Ghanshyam Pandey. This, according to respondent No.2, is defamatory, as she is the legally married wife of Ghanshyam Pandey after the death of his first wife Smt. Tarini Pandey and that led to the present dispute.
From Para 24,
24. In light of above-stated legal analysis, an advocate, who acted professionally as per instructions of his/her client, cannot be made criminally liable for the offence of defamation under Section 500 of the IPC unless contrary is alleged and established.
From Para 26,
….
As such, an Advocate who has acted professionally and drafted plaint making averment as per the instructions of his client, cannot be held liable for the offence of defamation under Section 500 of the IPC.
Finally from Para 33,
33. Admittedly, respondent No.2 claims that the alleged incident happened in the year 2014 and after lapse of 3-4 years, FIR has been lodged which clearly goes to show that there was no intention of the petitioner to cause harm, as in such a case, she would have rushed to the police authority well in time. As such, even it cannot be held that the petitioner has abused and insulted respondent No.2 in terms of Section 506 of the IPC.
Single-judge bench held that husband has to pay maintenance even if wife is earning salary and he does not have salary. Just 15 pages. Read yourself.
Relatives not living in a shared household were implicated in a false DV case, so High Court of Chhattisgarh quashed the DV proceedings against the petitioners.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/100106255/
https://www.lawyerservices.in/Nafisa-Anjum-Versus-State-of-Chhattisgarh-Through-Officer-In-Charge-Police-Station-2018-09-26
http://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/Browse/Case?CaseId=028102399000
Rajasthan High Court passed a direction to all trial Courts in Rajasthan that, in all Bail matters u/s 437/438, a detailed report on antecedents of the accused is to be filed along with judgment.
There is no mention regarding the status of criminal antecedents of the present petitioner in the impugned order. It is often seen by this Court that the learned courts below are not specific in regard to antecedents of the accused persons, which causes delay in the disposal of the bail applications, as, if the person is not having antecedents and his antecedents are called, receiving of such antecedents reports takes quite some time. Though the antecedent alone is not a ground of rejecting or accepting a bail, but it is must that the Hon’ble High Court should have the antecedent report to check the applicability of Section 437 (1) of Cr.P.C. as well as to weigh the case of the accused person with overall perspective of the allegations levelled.
Thus, this Court directs that all learned trial courts shall, while allowing or disallowing any regular/anticipatory bail application of any accused person,give the complete details of the antecedents, if any, and also record that there are no antecedents of the accused person in case of none being there. If there are antecedents of the accused, then the complete details of the antecedents i.e. FIR Number(s) & Case Number(s), Section(s), date(s), status and date of arrest & release on any previous occasion, if any, in the chart form shall be prepared and incorporated in the learned trial courts’ order, while granting or dismissing the bail application.
This order shall be conveyed by the Registry of this Court to all learned District & Sessions Judges of the State, who shall ensure the immediate implementation of this order amongst all the judicial officers and all courts in their respective jurisdiction, which are hearing the bail applications. The detailed antecedents report in aforesaid format so provided in the trial courts’ order shall be the requirement of disposal of any bail application in State of Rajasthan. It is also directed that the learned Public Prosecutors all over the State shall call for the antecedents report well in advance in every case of bail, so as to enable the courts to have a definite and correct information regarding previous criminal antecedents of the accused. A certified copy of this order be also sent by the Registry to the Director of the Prosecution Department of the State for necessary compliance, amongst the learned Public Prosecutors all over the State of Rajasthan.
The Registry of this Hon’ble Court shall ensure compliance of this order, in its letter and spirit, and submit such compliance before this Court on 05.01.2021.
Single-judge bench of Andhra Pradesh held that, cross-examination need not be confined to the facts to which the witness testified on his examination-in-chief.
From Para 3,
3. Since O.S. No. 1141 of 2000, later renumbered as O.S. No. 20 of 2003, was ordered to be tried along with O.S. No. 47 of 1998, obviously common evidence is being recorded in both the suits. When two suits are clubbed and tried together, all the parties to the suits have a right to cross-examine the witness examined by the adversary, because Section 138 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (‘the Act’) confers such right on them. As per that Section 138 of the Act the witness called by a party shall first be examined-in-chief and if the adverse party so desires he can cross-examine him and then if the party calling him so desires, can re-examine him. That section specifically lays down that Chief examination and cross-examination must relate to relevant facts, but cross-examination need not be confined to the facts to which the witness testified on his examination-in-chief.
Casemine copy:
Legal Crystal copy:
Citations : [2006 ALD 1 370], legalcrystal.com/442436
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1166172/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5608f85de4b01497111422e0
https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/442436/k-c-kanniyappa-vs-lalitha-anr
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