Relying on Chanmuniya case, Single-judge bench of AP High Court held that, in case of nullity of marriage under Section 11 or 12 of HMA, 125 CrPC cannot be invoked by knife.
Citations : [2020 ALT CRI 2 227], [2020 ALT 4 329]
Other Sources:
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5f4398cd4653d009c1ff7665
https://www.legitquest.com/case/palla-shanthi-kiran-v-the-state-of-ap-and-ors/1C400E
The Lower Family Court dismissal order is here:
Anticipatory Bail was denied to the alleged corrupt Judicial officer by the single-judge bench of Bombay High Court
Single Judge bench of Manipur High Court held as follows:
From Para 4,
[4] Although it is nowhere mentioned in the application that the same has been filed under the provisions of CPC, it is the provisions of Order 3 Rule 4(2) of CPC which provide that appointment of an Advocate shall be filed in the court and shall be deemed to be in force until determined with the leave of the court by a writing signed by the client or the Advocate as the case may be. An Advocate does not only represent his client but he is also an officer of the court. In any matter in which he is engaged, he has to assist the court till his vakalatnama is determined in accordance with law.
From Para 6,
The normal conduct of a client is that if he wishes to change his counsel for some reason or the other, he should approach him for return of the brief and to obtain “No Objection” from him. In case his counsel returns the brief, it is well and good and if he refuses to return the brief or refuses to give “No Objection”, the client may invoke the provisions of Order 3 Rule 4 of the CPC to redress his grievances. However, in the present case, the applicants have failed to that and without determining the appointment of their earlier counsel, Shri Ng. Kumar, Advocate, they had moved an application for deleting their names from the array of parties in the writ petition through another Advocate which is unfair and unreasonable on the part of the applicants. The moment an Advocate is engaged, a client is expected to be fair and reasonable to him and ought to give proper instructions accordingly. But in any case and for whatever reasons, the applicants have expressed their view that they don’t want Shri Ng. Kumar, Advocate to continue as their counsel and that a new Advocate be engaged in his place and since the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said R.D. Saxena’s Case (supra) has categorically observed that for whatever reason, if a client does not want to continue the engagement of a particular Advocate, it would be a professional requirement consistent with the dignity of the profession that he would return the brief to the client and it is time to hold that such obligation is not only a legal duty but a moral imperative, this court is of the view that this application is liable to be allowed. In view of the above observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is the duty of Shri Ng. Kumar, Advocate to give “No Objection” so that the applicants could engage a new Advocate of their choice. If Shri Ng. Kumar, Advocate is of the view that the action of the applicants being unfair and unreasonable, has caused prejudice to his professional right and privilege as a counsel, it is open to him to seek appropriate relief and redress his grievance from an appropriate forum.
State Government of AP went to a single bench Judge seeking stay on the Elections Schedule for Panchayats in Andhra Pradesh. They got favourable order Staying the election schedule, thereby impacting the Model Code of Conduct for political parties.
This was set aside by a Division bench of the High Court here.
As usual, State Government moved Supreme Court.
A single-judge bench of Punjab High Court held as follows:
The High Court should not be stressed-out to deal with such a combined application compressed into one impugned order needlessly to unravel causing sheer wastage of its precious time in trying to separate what was so casually and mindlessly mixed-up in a cocktail by virtue of bad advice given by some trial lawyer to his client clubbing two disparate legal elements in a portmanteau application claiming amendment in pleadings and at the same time, in the same papers, seeking to introduce third parties in the pending litigation. Every minute of the High Court’s time squandered involves colossal expenditure which is incapable of calculation and therefore recompense. The reward of justice is none other than justice and time consumed in trying to meet it is alone its justification as an end to the means. The time required today for deciding cases of other litigants waiting desperately in the courtroom for their cause to be taken up and decided stands reduced. Poor legal advice given to a client may result in paralyzing many cases for years together causing incalculable injury to just causes needing prompt attention. But bad legal advice tendered leading to filing of interlocutory applications is a judicially unacceptable legal principle or ground itself for generosity in interference. This cannot operate as an exemption or a concession grantable to a litigant complaining that he has suffered because of ill advice to rescue an unsuspecting litigant from a predicament he may face. It has become almost a daily feature in court to wriggle out of the jamb to readily blame counsel without batting an eyelid and accept relief. If the Judge is expected to do his job so is the lawyer expected to assist the Court to the best of his ability. There is a presumption in law that a lawyer knows the law but there is no absolute presumption that a judge should know law. A judge is only called upon to balance the two sides of an argument presented before him.
But the bane is that the trial court unfortunately is not empowered to exercise summary jurisdiction of dismissal of misconceived, vexatious, frivolous, and mala fide applications designed only to obstruct the sound rhythm of a suit to achieve its target milestones within a reasonable time and bring it to fruition. Such power should deservedly be conferred on subordinate judges to deliver justice at the doorstep in limine without compromising the quality of justice delivered. But this is for Parliament to remedy and devise ways and means to achieve removal of obstructions designed to impede the life of a suit or wilt its many leaves.
Said Judge Learned Hand: “Thou shall not ration justice”
But time and energy spent in doing justice can be rationed. It can be rationalized to show better results. The trial courts can contribute in a large measure to this end by finding workable solutions thinking on their feet to do summary justice, a small example of what this case represents. The predecessor trial Judge should have returned the joint application in 2010 itself from the dais to its owner and saved valuable time of the court. He should have killed the weed before it grew. But now that has to be uprooted.
For the variety of reasons recorded above, I find no cogent ground to support the impugned order dated April 4, 2013 or to sustain it and to the contrary I think it is eminently fit to be set aside to avoid a failure of justice. It is accordingly so ordered. The matter is remitted back to the trial Judge for a re-consideration. The respondent/plaintiff is left free to file two separate applications, one under Order 6 Rule 17 and one under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC within a fortnight from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. The defendants would file replies thereto within the next fortnight. Thereafter, the learned trial Judge would take up both the applications separately and proceed to dispose them of on merits after hearing the parties after following the rule “costs must follow the event” to its true import and meaning to compensate the aggrieved litigant of the precious time lost in what could have been resolved without any prolonged agony.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://www.legitquest.com/case/nirmal-singh-and-others-v-tarsem-singh-and-others/1838C4
From Para 14,
14. On a careful reading of the aforesaid provision, it is quite vivid that the Court of Session can take cognizance of any offence as a Court of original
jurisdiction except as otherwise expressly provided by the Code or by any other law for the time being in force only if the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate.
From Para 28,
28.From the aforesaid pronouncement of law rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, it is quite vivid that under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Special Judge is not prohibited from exercising power and jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of the Code when there is no exclusion of power in respect of the point raised.
hence, from Paras 32 and 33,
32.Thus, from the aforesaid proposition of law rendered by the Supreme Court in A.R. Antulay (supra) and the M.P. High Court in Anand Swaroop Tiwari (supra), it is quite vivid that the Special Court constituted under Section 14 of the Act of 1989 is the criminal court of original jurisdiction and is not governed by Section 193 of the Code, and the Special Court can take cognizance in any of the circumstances referred to in Section 190 of the Code and is governed by Chapters XV & XVI of the Code and such other provisions of the Code which are not inconsistent with the status and functions as Courts of original jurisdiction. Therefore, the Special Courts constituted under the Act of 1989 will also have power and jurisdiction to invoke Section 156(3) of the Code to direct investigation in exercise of power conferred, to the Station House Officer subject to fulfillment of making two prior applications under Section 154(1) and thereafter under Section 154(3) of the Code by the complainant. As such, I do not find any merit in the submission of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that the Special Judge under SC & ST Act has no power and jurisdiction to invoke Section 156(3) of the Code and to direct registration of FIR and investigation. Such a submission being meritless and substance-less deserves to be and is accordingly rejected.
33. Having answered question No.1 against the petitioners and in favour of respondent No.2, reverting to the second question whether the learned Special Judge is justified in invoking power and jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of the Code after finding compliance with the provisions contained in subsections (1) & (3) of Section 154 of the Code, it would be necessary to point out here that in order to make a duly constituted application for invoking the jurisdiction of the learned Special Judge under Section 156(3) of the Code, compliance of subsections (1) & (3) of Section 154 of the Code would be absolutely necessary rather it would be sine-qua-non for making the application under Section 156(1) of the Code maintainable.
From Paras 35 and 36,
35.From the focused perusal of Section 154(1) of the Code, it is quite vivid that every information relating to commission of cognizable offence, if given orally to in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant and every such information given in writing or reduced in writing as above-said shall be signed by person giving it and substance thereof shall be entered into book kept by such officer. Subsection (3) of Section 154 of the Code provides the procedure to be followed by informant, if officer in charge of a police station refuses to record the information referred to Section 154(1) of the Code and mandates that substance of such information in writing may be sent by post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned, who if satisfied that such information discloses commission of cognizable offence either investigate himself or direct an officer subordinate to him to investigate in the manner provided by the Code.
36.Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Priyanka Srivastava (supra) laid down duty and approach of Magistrate while exercising power under Section 156(3) of the Code and highlighted preconditions to be satisfied to maintain the application under Section 156(3). It has also been held that power under Section 156(3) warrants application of judicial mind and there has to be prior application under Section 154(1) and 154(3) of the Code.
Even though the MP High Court held the law point correctly, IMHO, the said FIR which was saved by this Court, has no future, unless it was treated as a FIR registered u/s 154 CrPC, which is what the case is here.
From Para 15 16
15/ The submission of counsel for the petitioners is that as per the procedure prescribed in Section 195 of the Cr.P.C., for the purpose of the offence under Section 188 of the IPC a public servant is required to file a complaint before the competent court and, therefore, the FIR cannot be registered.
16/ Such an argument advanced by counsel for the petitioners is devoid of any merit. A bare reading of Section 195(1) Cr.P.C. reveals that the provisions contained in the sub-section are attracted at the stage of taking cognizance. There is no bar under Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. in respect of registration of FIR, therefore, FIR for an offence under Section 188 of the IPC can be registered by the police and after investigation on the basis of the FIR and the material collected during the course of investigation, a competent public servant can file the complaint before the concerned court. What is barred under Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. is that after investigating the offence under Section 188 of the IPC, the police officer cannot file a final report in the Court and the Court cannot take cognizance on that final report, as at that stage the bar contained in Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. comes
into operation.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/zaid-pathan-and-others-vs-state-of-m-p
Based on Inderjit Singh Grewal here, PWDV Act is subject to CrPC 468, so complaint filed after 1 year are time barred, hence the DVC is quashed by Madras High Court.
Note: On the request of respondent-wife, I have removed the name and address details of the litigants on page-1 of the judgment below. No other modifications were made to it.
Citations : [2020 SCC OnLine Mad 1767]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/108935797/
This is the happy tale of the elephant ‘Lalitha’ adjudged by the Madras High Court.
From Paras 12 and 13
12.Lalitha has been accustomed to a certain lifestyle all these years. She changed hands from 1988 to 2000. But she has been in the custody of the petitioner for the last twenty years. She has been attending religious functions. She is being fed well. She is in good health. In fact, the veterinarians appointed by the department have certified that she is being maintained properly by the petitioner. Removing her from the petitioner’s custody is sure to inflict a deep psychological wound on her. It is certainly not in her best interests. Applying the yardstick of what is good for Lalitha, I have to hold that the present arrangement should continue. Lalitha should continue to be with the petitioner and participate in the religious functions hosted in
the region.
13.Lalitha’s usual place of stay is a coconut groove spread over one and half acres. There is a R.O Plant. It is owned by Thiru.Pothiraj. He appeared before me and gave in writing that the land will not be sold or encumbered during the lifetime of Lalitha. She also gets copious amounts of water to drink and to bathe. The ambience is highly conducive.
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