Dhareppa Vs Renuka on 18 Nov 2004
Tag: 1-Judge Bench Decision
Puttaraju Vs Shivakumari on 01 Apr 2021
A single judge of Karnataka High Court held that, an offence under the PWDV Act alone is subject to limitation under CrPC but not the application filed belatedly u/s 12 of the Act.
From Paras 16-17,
16. To attract Section 468 of Cr.P.C, essentially the Act alleged must be an offence. Under the DV Act, the offence is not defined, as defined in Section 40 of IPC. Therefore, we have to revert to the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 3(38) of the General Clauses Act defines the offences as follows:
“3(38). “Offence” shall mean any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force.
17. Perusal of the above provision makes it clear that to call an act as offence, act or omission must be made punishable under law. As already pointed out, under Sections 12, 20 and 21 of the DV Act have not made the domestic violence alleged thereunder punishable or defined them as offence. Section 12 of the DV Act is only an enabling provision to initiate enquiry to find out whether such act or omission is committed.
From Para 19-20, Conclusions
19. Perusal of Section 31 of the DV Act makes it clear that only breach of the protection order or interim protection order etc. passed under Section 12 of the DV Act constitutes an offence and made punishable. As held by Punjab High Court in Vikas’s case referred to supra, Section 12 of the DV Act is only enabling provision. Therefore it is clear that the act or omission contemplated under Section 31 of the DV Act is an offence and the application under Section 12 of the DV Act itself is not an offence.
20. When the application under Section 12 of the DV Act is not covered under the term ‘offence’, Section 468 of Cr.P.C. is inapplicable. Therefore the application of Section 468 of Cr.P.C. to an application under Section 12 of the DV Act is clearly a misconception.
From Paras 24-26,
24. Distinguishing judgment in Inderjit Singh Grewal’s case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in subsequent judgment in Krishna Bhattacharjee’s case referred to supra held that the observation regarding domestic relationship in Inderjit Singh Grewal’s case were based on the facts and circumstances of the said case and they are not of general application.
25. Further in para 32 of the judgment in Krishna Bhattacharjee’s case referred to supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the definition of the aggrieved person and domestic relationship remains and the act of domestic violence attracts the term ‘continuing offence’, therefore does not get time barred.
26. In the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to above, the interplay of Section 3(38) of the General Clauses Act, Section 31 of the DV Act and Section 468 of Cr.P.C. had not fallen for consideration. In view of the later judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishna Bhattacharjee’s case referred to supra the judgments of this Court in Srinivas’s case and Gurudev’s case cannot be followed. Therefore this Court does not find any merit in the contention that the petition was time barred. Under the circumstances the respondent is entitled for withdrawal of the amount. The application is allowed.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://primelegal.in/2021/05/20/an-application-under-section-12-of-the-domestic-violence-act-is-not-barred-by-the-limitations-set-out-in-section-468-of-the-criminal-procedure-code-karnataka-high-court/
https://www.indiclegal.com/post/application-of-section-468-to-section-12-of-the-domestic-violence-act-is-clearly-a-misconception-hc
https://www.lawyersclubindia.com/judiciary/sri-puttaraju-vs-smt-shivakumari-5216.asp
Vimlesh Agnihotri and Ors Vs State and Anr on 16 Aug 2021
A single judge of Delhi High Court talks about the alarming increase of false cases of rape and offences under Section 354, 354A, 354B, 354C & 354D only to arm-twist the accused and make them succumb to the demands of the complainant.
From Para 6,
6. A perusal of the abovementioned facts would show that the parties have registered cross-cases against each other for offences under Section 376 IPC. It is tragic to note that practising advocates belonging to the legal fraternity are trivialising the offence of rape. Rape is not merely a physical assault; it is often destructive of the whole personality of the victim. The act of rape has the ability to scar the mental psyche of the victim and this trauma can persist for years.
From Para 8,
8. The issue as to whether the High Courts, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C, should quash an offence under Section 376 IPC has come for consideration before the Supreme Court in a number of cases. Rape is an offence against the society. The Supreme Court has, time and again, directed that the High Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash an offence of rape on the ground that the parties have entered into a compromise.
From Paras 14-19,
14. Quashing FIR for offences like rape on the basis of compromise will encourage accused to put pressure on the victims to agree to a compromise and this will open doors for the accused to get away with a heinous crime which cannot be permitted.
15. In the present case it appears that both sides have resorted to file complaints of rape without having any sensitivity to the offence of rape. While the repercussions of the offence of rape on the victim have been mentioned above, on the other hand, false allegations of rape have the potential to destroy the life and career of the accused. The accused in a false case of rape loses his honour, cannot face his family and is stigmatized for life. Allegations regarding offences such as one under Section 376 IPC cannot be made at the drop of a hat – in order to settle personal scores.
16. Further, the time spent by the police in investigating false cases hinders them from spending time in investigation of serious offences. As a result, it leads to faulty investigations and the accused end up going scot-free. Valuable judicial time is also spent in hearing cases where false allegations are made and is consequently an abuse of the process of law. Therefore, people who make such false allegations of rape cannot be permitted to go scot-free. This Court is pained to note that there is an alarming increase of false cases of rape and offences under Section 354, 354A, 354B, 354C & 354D only to arm-twist the accused and make them succumb to the demands of the complainant.
17. This Court, at the moment, is not commenting as to whether the present case is a false case or not. However, if it is found that the cases which have been filed by the parties against each other are false and frivolous then action should be taken against the prosecutrix and others who were instrumental in levelling allegations of rape only to settle some personal scores. There is an urgent need to deter such frivolous litigations.
18. False claims and allegations pertaining to cases of molestation and rape need to be dealt with an iron hand due to the serious nature of the offences. Such litigations are instituted by the unscrupulous litigants in the hope that the other party will capitulate to their demands out of fear or shame. Unless wrongdoers are not made to face the consequences of their actions, it would be difficult to prevent such frivolous litigations. The Courts have to ensure that there is no incentive or motive for frivolous litigations which unnecessarily consumes the Court’s otherwise scare time. This Court is of the opinion that this problem can be solved, or at least minimized, to a certain extent, if exemplary cost is imposed on the litigants for instituting frivolous litigations.
19. In view of the mandate of the Supreme Court that High Courts must not exercise its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing an offence of rape only on the ground that the parties have entered into a compromise, this Court is not inclined to entertain this petition.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/53326449/
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/vimlesh-agnihotri-ors-versus-state-anr
Pitchika Lakshmi Vs Pichika Chenna Mallikaharjuana Rao on 24 Dec 2012
Relying on Supreme Court decision here, which was in turn relied on by a division bench of AP High Court here, a single-judge bench of AP High Court held that, a husband cannot be sentenced indefinitely for breach of maintenance orders.
Citations : [2012 SCC ONLINE AP 446], [2013 CRI LJ 4284], [2014 RCR CRI 5 651], [2014 HLR 1 317], [2013 ALD CRI 1 405], [LQ 2012 HC 8200]
Other Sources :
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5d8257ea714d5826cf1dd7cb
https://www.legitquest.com/case/pitchika-lakshmi-v-state-of-andhra-pradesh-rep-by-its-public-prosecutor-high-court-of-ap/78BBB
Jangam Srinivasa Rao Vs Jaagam Rajeshwari and Anr on 13 Mar 1989
Single Judge bench of AP HC held as follows:
From Para 6,
6. The points for determination in these proceedings are
(1) whether the order of maintenance passed in M.C. No. 18/84 stood cancelled ?
(2) Whether under Section 125(3), Cr.P.C. the wife can seek imprisonment of the husband for non-payment of maintenance accumulated beyond a period of 12 months ?
(3) Whether the payment of Rs. 3,250/- paid as per the directions of this court can be appropriated to the maintenance due for the first 25 months as claimed by the wife ?
From Para 11, Point (2) was answered.
11. Considering the different views expressed by the various High Courts I prefer to follow the Division Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Moddari Bin v. Sukdeo Bin, (1967 Cri LJ 335). The other decisions are judgments or single Judges. In my humble opinion the contraction put forward by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court is harmonesus construction and interpretation of the proviso making the proviso applicable to both the limbs of procedure contemplated under sub-section 3 of Section 125, Cr.P.C. I hold on point No. 2 that the wife the maintenance-holder cannot accumulate the maintenance for a period beyond 12 months. No application for execution of the maintenance order can be entertained for a period exceeding 12 months immediately preceding the date of application. I hold this point in favour of the petitioner. In this context I make it clear that they remedy provided under S. 125(3), Cr.P.C. is a speedy and expeditious remedy. By virtue of the order of maintains granted in M.C. 18/84 the right vested in the wife to receive maintenance from the date of the application i.e. 7-12-83. She may not be able to recover the earlier arrears by resorting to an application under Section 126(3), Cr.P.C., but still she would certainly be entitled to claim those arrear by filing a civil suit on the basis that the amount is die to her by virtue of the court order. But at the same time it should be remembered that under civil laws also her claim should be within the period of limitation. For instance, for the maintenance payable for the period 7-12-83 to 7-1-84 she should file a suit on or before 7-1-87. At the most she can recover arrears of maintenance for 3 years by resorting to a civil suit. Unfortunately in this case the right to file a civil suit for the earlier arrears is also barred by time.
Indiankanoon Version:
Casemine Version:
Citations : [1990 CRILJ 2506], [1989 ALT 2 295], [1989 SCC ONLINE AP 66], [1989 AP LJ 2 41], [1989 ALT NRC 2 8]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/471311/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5608f701e4b014971113ef2e
Index to Maintenance judgments is here.
R. Krishnamurthy Vs State of T.N. on 07 Nov 2019
Relying on this decision here, Madras High Court held as follows,
From Para 9,
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his contentions had relied upon the decisions of this Court reported in (i) MANU/TN/0650/2009 (Rev.Samuel D.Stephens and others Vs. Pastor A.Samuel Ramasamy) (ii) an order passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court dated 11.6.2015 in Crl.O.P.No.14184 of 2015 (A.Leo Charles Vs. M.Vijayakumar). The citations referred pertains to entries made for docket order and on a case of private
complaint where the procedure adopted are different . The facts of the above cases, are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
From Para 12,
12. It is seen that the documents are voluminous and hence the petitioner could not be furnished with the same. Further the trial court had rightly rejected the same and this court finds no reason to interfere with it. In view of the petitioner’s specific plea that he needs the copy of documents and non furnishing would greatly cause prejudice to the petitioner in answering the charges and to defend his case, the petitioner shall peruse the voluminious documents and specify the pages of the necessary documents. On such specification, copies of that pages alone has to be furnished to him. The petitioner shall make a copy application to that effect. It is made clear that only specific pages sought by the petitioner has to be furnished to
him on payment of necessary fees.
Citations : [2019 SCC ONLINE MAD 33279]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/124761565/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5ffd8ba29fca1917ab0e6622
Rev. Samuel D. Stephens and Ors Vs Pastor A. Samuel Ramasamy on 27 Feb 2009
Relying on earlier decision here, single judge bench of Madras High Court held as follows:
From Para 12,
12. Mr. V. Karthik has also brought to the notice of the Court the following decisions in Jagatbhai Punjabhai Palkhiwala and others v. Vikrambhai Punjabhai Palkhiwala and others, AIR 1985 Gujarat 112; K. Nagarajan v. K.S Ramasamy, 2003 (3) M.L.J 211; and K.R. Sengottuvelu v. Karuppa Naicker, 2005 (5) CTC 91. The above decisions are relating to Civil cases, wherein it has been held that since the documents are in the custody of the Court, the parties cannot take xerox copies of the same without the permission of the Court, but that does not mean that the Court can refuse such permission only on the ground that they have not become part of the record of the Suit.
From Para 16,
16. The main objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondent is that since the documents filed along with the Complaint have not been marked, the accused, at this stage, are not entitled to get certified copies of the same. In support of the said contention, the learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1970 SC 962, cited supra. It has to be pointed out that in the said decision, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the High Court was not justified, in indirectly applying to cases instituted on Private Complaints the requirements of Section 173(4), Cr.P.C In the said decision what the Hon’ble Court has held is that it was impermissible for the High Court to read into Section 94, Cr.P.C, the requirements of Section 173(4), Cr.P.C on the ground that Section 173(4), Cr.P.C is not applicable to Private Complaints. On the said reasoning, the direction issued by the High Court directing the prosecution to furnish copies of the documents to the accused was set aside. But it has to be pointed out that in that decision, the question as to whether the accused is entitled to get certified copies of the documents filed along with the Private Complaint did not come up for consideration and hence, the said decision is not of any help to the respondent.
From Para 18,
18. In this context, it is pertinent to point out that the learned counsel for the respondent has not referred to any provision in the Criminal Procedure Code containing any prohibition to furnish certified copies of the documents filed along with the Private Complaint. The prohibition like the one contained under Section 173(4), Cr.P.C is not there as far as the documents filed along with the Private Complaint are concerned. Therefore, unless there is a statutory prohibition, it cannot be said that the accused is not entitled to get certified copies of the documents filed along with the Private Complaint.
From Para 20,
20. Similarly, in a Criminal case taken cognizance on the basis of the Private Complaint also if the allegations contained in the Complaint and the documents accompanied with the Complaint do not prima facie reveal the commission of any offence and the ingredients of the offence are not made out, it is always open to the accused to approach the High Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C seeking for quashing of the proceedings. For taking recourse under Section 482, Cr.P.C, it is necessary for the accused to produce before the Court a copy of the Complaint as well as the documents filed along with the Complaint. Since before taking cognizance, the learned Judicial Magistrate is bound to apply his judicial mind not only to the allegations contained in the Complaint but also to the documents accompanying the same and an order taking cognizance is a judicial order and as such the accused is entitled to challenge the cognizance taken in the case. As per Section 363(5), Cr.P.C, Save as otherwise provided in subsection (2), any person affected by an order passed by the Court on an Application made in this behalf and on payment of the prescribed charges be given a copy of such order or of any deposition or other part of the record. If the question is considered in the light of Section 363(5), Cr.P.C, it could be held that since, as pointed out above, an order taking cognizance is a judicial order, Section 363(5) is attracted and on that ground also the accused is entitled to get a copy of the part of the record of a Criminal case to enable him to seek appropriate remedy before the higher forum. In my considered view, Rule 339 of the Criminal Rules of Practice is in consonance with the provisions contained in Section 363(5), Cr.P.C It is also to be pointed out that by furnishing of certified copies of the documents filed along with the Private Complaint, no prejudice whatsoever is going to be caused to the complainant, whereas, if the request of the accused is rejected, it will definitely prejudice the right of the accused in seeking appropriate legal remedy before the higher Courts.
From Para 22,
22. A reading of the aforesaid provision shows that in a case instituted otherwise than on a police report, if it appears to the Magistrate issuing process under Section 204, Cr.P.C, that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall furnish to the accused a copy of each of the documents filed along with the Complaint. That Sections casts duty on the Court to furnish the said documents free of cost. But similar duty is not cast on the Magistrate to furnish copies of the documents free of cost if the case is not triable exclusively by the Court of Session. It would mean that it is not incumbent on the part of the learned Judicial Magistrate to furnish copies of the documents free of cost either at the time of sending the process or on the appearance of the accused. There is no other provision which prohibits the accused from applying for certified copies of those documents filed along with the Complaint. As pointed out above, in the absence of any specific prohibition in the Cr.P.C either expressly or impliedly, in the considered view of this Court, the accused cannot be deprived of his right to get certified copies of the documents filed along with the Complaint so as to defend himself in the case as long as such furnishing of certified copies would not prejudice the case of the respondent.
Casemine Version:
Court Kutchehry Version:
Citations : [2009 LW CRL 1 386], [2009 SCC ONLINE MAD 576], [2009 MWN CRI 1 298], [2009 MLJ CRL 2 436]
Other Sources :
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56ea7cf8607dba36cc747754
The Index is here.
K. Nagarajan Vs K.S. Ramasamy and Anr on 17 Jul 2003
A single judge of Madras High Court, relying on earlier Gujarat High Court decision), held that, unmarked copies of documents can be sought for, via Copy application.
From paras 8 and 9,
8. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner contends that it contains certain defamatory, false and malicious allegations against the plaintiff and probably, the plaintiff may prefer to take legal action for giving such a complaint.
9. We are not concerned about the contents of the complaint or the intention of the complainant. What we are concerned is whether a party is entitled to get the certified copy of a document produced in Court, but not marked and which has not become a part of the record of that case.
From Para 12,
12. So far as this case is concerned, there is no dispute that the petitioner filed an application for grant of certified copy. But, the learned Additional District Munsif, returned the application on the sole ground that it has not been marked. Even after the petitioner resubmitted his application by making endorsement that he is entitled under Rule 127 of Civil Rules of Practice, with the same reason once again the copy application has been returned.
From Para 14, Law declared.
14. In any suit apart from the documents marked, there is likelihood of presence of other unmarked documents like warrant issued to the Commissioner or notice given to the Commissioner by the parties etc. Assuming that a party disputes receipt of notice issued by the Advocate Commissioner, then notice said to have been given by the Commissioner will become an important document and certainly copy of such notice shall be required by the other party who claims that actually notice has been given to the party who disputes it. Though the notice given by the Commissioner to the party may not be a part of the record as far as the suit is concerned, since it is not marked as an exhibit in the suit, still a notice can become necessary for a particular party for which he may require copy. Therefore, the document produced in Court even though not marked as a document in evidence in a suit, still necessity may arise for requirement of a certified copy of such a document. That is why under Order 62 and Order XI Rule 15 of Civil Rules of Practice, it is clearly mentioned that any document produced in Court can be inspected. The terms mentioned in Rule 62 and Order XI Rule 15 of Civil Rules of Practice are wider in nature, in the sense that the documents referred are not only marked but also produced in Court.
Indiankanoon Version:
Casemine Version:
Citations : [2003 MLJ 3 211]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/646246/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56090140e4b0149711156312
Shanavas Vs Raseena on 10 Dec 2010
Single-bench of Kerala High Court held as follows,
From Para 6,
6. A Magistrate, on passing an order under Section 23(1) or an ex parte order under Section 23(2) of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, cannot direct arrest of the respondent by issuing non bailable warrant before taking cognizance of the offence, if an offence is committed under sub-section (1) of Section 31. Annexure-VI proceeding paper shows that after passing Annexure-II ex parte order as provided under sub-section (2) of Section 23 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, the petition filed by the first respondent under Section 12 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act was posted for the appearance of the respondents. When first respondent appeared through a counsel, he was directed to appear in person and pay the maintenance. It is on the failure to appear and pay maintenance as ordered, the non bailable warrant was issued. Learned Magistrate cannot order non bailable warrant for the failure to pay maintenance as has been done in this case. It is made clear that Magistrate can proceed against the petitioner or other respondents for non payment of the interim maintenance only as provided under Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act and such an order cannot be enforced as has been done by the learned Magistrate. In such circumstances, the order issuing non bailable warrant can only be quashed.
Citations : [2014 KERLT 1 579], [2014 RCR CRIMINAL 2 6], [2014 AWC SC 3 2190], [2014 SCC 9 176], [2014 RD 123 594], [2014 ALR 103 723], [2010 SCC ONLINE KER 5136], [2014 KLT 1 579]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1357466/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56095a0ce4b01497112a882f
Yogesh Chhibbar Vs State of U.P. on 6 Dec 1999
Single judge bench of Allahabad High Court made pertinent comments on how not to interpret a provision of law.
From Para 6,
6. It is not disputed that the learned Magistrate had taken cognizance on the complaint filed by Dowry Prohibition Officer. Section 7(1)(b) of Dowry Prohibition Act bars taking cognizance of an offence under this Act except upon a complaint by the person aggrieved by the offence or a parent or other relative of such person, or by any recognized welfare institution or organisation. In this case undisputedly, the complaint was not filed by opposite party No. 2, or her parents or other relatives. Dowry Prohibition Officer has not been authorised by above section to file complaint. No doubt, Section 8B of Dowry Prohibition Act says that the State Government may appoint as many Dowry Prohibition Officer as it thinks fit and specified area in respect of which they shall exercise their jurisdiction and powers under this Act.
From Paras 8-11,
8. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has observed that though the Dowry Prohibition Officer was not authorised to file complaint, but he had power to collect evidence as may be necessary for the prosecution of persons committing offence under the Act and it appears that it was the intention of the Legislature to empower the District Dowry Prohibition Officer to move to the Court for prosecution of the person, who is found guilty of taking or demanding dowry. He further observed that if he was not empowered to file complaint for prosecution of guilty person, he cannot prevent the taking of dowry and his act of collecting evidence will go waste. In these circumstances, the Dowry Prohibition Officer has got power to collect evidence and also got powers to file complaint. The above observation of the learned Additional Sessions Judge shows that he acted beyond the scope of Section 7(1)(b) of the Act. If the Legislature actually intended to confer power of filing complaint on Dowry Prohibition Officer, it ought to have been mentioned in Section 7(1)(b) of the Act itself.
9. The power to file complaint, therefore, cannot be inferred from the analogy of the powers of Dowry Prohibition Officer enumerated in Section 8B. Anything which is not in the Act cannot be inserted by Courts. The Court does not possess law-making power. The Courts may interpret the law contained in the Act and not insert any fresh provision, which has deliberately not been incorporated by the Legislature. Therefore, the above observation of the learned Additional Sessions Judge that Dowry Prohibition Officer has got power to file the complaint is against the provisions of law.
10. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has further observed that Section 7(1)(b)(ii) and the Explanation to said section says that Court shall take cognizance of a complaint filed by a recognised welfare institution or organisation. The Harijan Welfare Department of the State of U.P. is a welfare institution and if its officer has filed complaint under the provisions of Dowry Prohibition Act, the Magistrate will take cognizance over it under Section 7(1)(b)(ii). This observation of the learned Additional Sessions Judge is also against the provisions of law. The complaint was not filed by Harijan Welfare Department allegedly a recognised welfare institution, but by Dowry Prohibition Officer. If the law requires that complaint should be filed by an institution, then it must be filed by institution and not by other Authority. It may be true that Dowry Prohibition Officer was appointed by Harijan Welfare Department, but that officer did not become the Department itself and no action has been taken by the Department, as there is no such indication in the complaint that it was filed by Harijan Welfare Department through Dowry Prohibition Officer. Therefore, above observations of the learned Additional Sessions Judge are against the provisions of law and cannot be accepted.
11. In the result it is clear that complaint was not filed by person enumerated in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 7 of Dowry Prohibition Act and, therefore it was without authority. Therefore, the cognizance against the applicants on the complaint filed by unauthorised person could not have been taken. Therefore, there was legal bar for taking cognizance against the applicants and cognizance was wrongly taken. The prosecution of applicants on the complaint of unauthorised and incompetent person was nothing but abuse of process of law and on this ground the cognizance as well as proceedings arising out of it are liable to be quashed under the exercise of powers conferred under Section 482, Cr.P.C. Thus, the application succeeds.
Indian kanoon version:
Casemine Version:
Citations : [2000 ACR 1 65], [2000 ALLCC 40 459], [2000 RCR CRIMINAL 3 206], [2000 DMC 2 537], [2000 JIC 2 575], [1999 SCC ONLINE ALL 1527], [2000 ALL LJ 1053], [2000 CRI LJ 2849], [2001 HLR 1 676]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/553049/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5767b12de691cb22da6d5ab0
