Praveen Surendiran Vs State of Karnataka and Anr on 21 Mar 2022

Posted on October 18, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Karnataka High Court held as follows:

From Para 4,

4. The present case concerns an application made by the petitioner before the trial Court seeking release of his passport on the ground that the son of the petitioner studies in a school at Paris – Sports Etudes Concept and was attending classes virtually. Since classes have now started physically, the
petitioner wanted to accompany his son for getting him admitted in the school. This application is rejected by the trial Court. It is the rejection of the application that is called in question in the present proceedings. Therefore, these proceedings concern with the rejection of release of passport of the petitioner and not any other issue that is pending in plethora of cases between the parties.
6. Learned senior counsel Sri Ashok Haranahalli would submit that several proceedings between the parties are pending consideration. The Apex Court has stayed all further proceedings in other cases. The case at hand is not an offshoot of those cases, but an independent case of an application, where the passport of the petitioner is seized, not impounded by the police and there is grave urgency for the petitioner to leave the country and get his son admitted to the school at France.

And then

17. It is not in dispute that the petitioner is facing criminal proceedings before the competent criminal Court and the Police after investigation have also filed charge sheet in the matter in which, the petitioner is arrayed as Accused No.10. Therefore, it is not a case where the passport of the petitioner cannot even be seized or impounded, but, by whom is the question.
18. The Passport Act is a special enactment and is trite that it being a special enactment would prevail over Section 102 or Section 104 of the Cr.P.C., which empower the Police to seize and the Court to impound any document. Impounding of any document produced before the Court cannot stretch to an extent that it can impound the passport. Therefore, the deposit of passport before the Court or passport being held before the Police, both will become without authority of law. The further observation of the Court that it would be in its custody till conclusion of trial is, clearly on the face of it, without authority of law, as it would amount to impounding the passport. This very issue fell for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of SURESH NANDA v. CBI
The Apex Court dealt with the very issue as to who would be the Authority to impound the passport. The Apex Court holds that neither the Police nor the Court invoking powers under Section 102 or Section 104 of the Cr.P.C. can seize or impound a passport. Impounding of a passport is by the Authority vested under the Act as depicted therein. It is not in dispute that the Authority under the Act is not even made aware of seizure or retention of the passport by the Police or before the Court.

From Para 24,

21. The power of impounding a document under Section 104 of the Cr.P.C. is available to a Court. This cannot stretch to an extent of impounding the passport. The passport coming within the purview of the Act and it being a special law would prevail over the provisions of Section 104 of the Cr.P.C. The Court can impound any document, but not the passport as it is dealt with under a special enactment. The power of impounding is available only to the Competent Authority under the Act, in terms of Section 10 of the Act. Wherefore, the order rejecting the release of passport by the Court observing that it is held in safe custody till the conclusion of the trial is unsustainable. Therefore, the petitioner becomes entitled for release of passport in his favour, as right to hold a passport and travel is, without doubt, held to be a fundamental right in plethora of judgments.

Praveen Surendiran Vs State of Karnataka and Anr on 21 Mar 2022

Citations:

Other Sources:

Nachhattar Singh Vs Rai Singh and Anr on 28 Jul 2022

Posted on October 6, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of PHHC held as follows:

From Paras 11-14,

11. As per the settled proposition of law as enumerated hereinabove, proceedings under Section 340 Cr.P.C. are not to be initiated in every case where offences are purportedly made out. In fact, the said proceedings are to be initiated only in a situation, where the Court considers it expedient in the interest of justice to make a complaint. This shows that such a course of filing a complaint will only be adopted, if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. In the present case, no such finding has been recorded, as has already been mentioned above and even otherwise, the dispute is between the parties, who are closely related being brothers.
12. In fact, one of the criteria for proceeding under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. would be where due to the false statement, one party has succeeded in getting a favourable order, which otherwise, he would not have got. Therefore, if the false statement affects the very nature of the order passed by the Court, then, that itself can be one of the circumstances, where proceedings under Section 340 Cr.P.C. ought to be initiated. In the present case, assuming that a false statement had been made either in the written statement or by virtue of filing of affidavits, those pleadings/averments did not affect the fate of the case. In fact the petitioner did obtain a decree in his favour. Therefore, there is no apparent illegality in the orders dated 09.10.2015 (Annexure P-1) and 08.02.2017 (Annexure P-2).
13. Having examined the matter in its entirety, I also find that the dispute in question is between close relatives. Certain pleadings are filed in civil/criminal proceedings and the defendants in a civil proceeding take their defence, which in the present case was denying the right of ownership of the petitioner-complainant. Every person has a right to defend his case and he can take many defence pleas. Taking up a plea by itself would not amount to giving false evidence. Further, in the present case, in view of the discussion above, it would certainly not be expedient in the interest of justice to proceed against the respondents.
14. In view of the facts and circumstances mentioned hereinabove as also the relationship between the parties and the civil proceedings having culminated in favour of the petitioner, as such no advantage has been taken by the respondents by virtue of their allegedly false pleadings/affidavits. Therefore, it would certainly not be expedient in the interest of justice to initiate proceedings under Section 340 Cr.P.C.

Nachhattar Singh Vs Rai Singh and Anr on 28 Jul 2022

Index of Perjury cases here.

Altaf Ahmad Zargar and Anr Vs Sana Alias Ruksana and Anr on 02 Sep 2022

Posted on October 3, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A single bench judge of the Hon’ble High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh has passed an Order in a proceeding u/s 482 CrPC stating that,

From Para 10,

10) The petitioners, in effect, are aggrieved of the impugned petition filed by respondent No.1 against them and the order dated 25.10.2021 passed by the learned trial Magistrate on the said petition. So far as the proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act are concerned, the same cannot be equated with lodging of a criminal complaint or initiation of prosecution. So, the trial Magistrate, after obtaining the response from the husband and his relatives etc. is well within his jurisdiction to revoke his order of issuing summons to them or he can even drop the proceedings. The learned Magistrate would be well within his jurisdiction to cancel the interim order of monetary compensation if he, upon going through the response of the husband and his relatives, finds that they have been unnecessarily roped in or that no case for grant of interim monetary compensation is made out. Since the proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act are not, in strict sense, criminal in nature, as such, bar to alter/revoke an order by a Magistrate is not attracted to these proceedings.

Altaf Ahmad Zargar and Anr Vs Sana Alias Ruksana and Anr on 02 Sep 2022

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://lawtrend.in/sec-12-of-dv-act-magistrate-can-recall-the-order-of-interim-monetary-compensation-if-he-finds-husband-is-unnecessarily-roped-in-the-case-jkl-hc/

https://www.lawyersclubindia.com/judiciary/proceedings-under-section-12-of-domestic-violence-act-cannot-be-equated-with-lodging-a-criminal-complaint-jammu-kashmir-ladakh-high-court-6176.asp

https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/jkl-high-court-dv-act-section-12-proceedings-criminal-complaint-208360

Nahida Rishad Cooper Vs Ali Daruwala and Ors on 25 Feb 2022

Posted on September 13, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of a Sessions Court in Mumbai held as follows:

From Para 5,

5] Perusal of the application under Section 12 of the D. V. Act filed by the applicant has several references to the alleged domestic violence committed by the respondent No. 1. It is not in dispute that he resides separately and not with the appellant or the respondent No. 1. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate in his impugned order has observed that since the respondent No. 1 never resided with the appellant in any shared household he cannot be considered to be the respondent as defined by Section 2 (q) of the D. V. Act. He, therefore, omitted him from the array of the respondents in the main application.

From Para 6,

6] Such an observation of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate however, is wholly misplaced. It is for the simple reason that the proviso to Section 2 (q) of the D. V. Act makes it very clear that an aggrieved wife can also file a complaint against a relative of the husband. The Act nowhere mandates that an aggrieved person can seek relief only against the persons who have shared household with her. Had that been so, it would have been very convenient to cause violence or any other trouble to the aggrieved person through the relatives not sharing the same household and yet remained out of the clutches of the D. V. Act. Rather, holding that any relative of the husband if not sharing or shared the same household cannot be a respondent would amount to giving licence to those relatives to commit violence to the aggrieved person and thereby rendering the very Act meaningless. That just cannot be and certainly was not the intention while enacting the said statute. As observed earlier, there are sufficient references to show that the respondent No. 1 was also a party to the domestic violence committed to the appellant. As such, the proceedings against him was certainly tenable. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate was obviously wrong in holding that the respondent No. 1 since not shared the household with the appellant could not be a respondent as defined by Section 2 (q) of the D. V. Act. Consequently, the impugned order cannot sustain.

Nahida Rishad Cooper Vs Ali Daruwala and Ors on 25 Feb 2022

A Revision was dismissed by the Bombay High Court here.

Index of DV Cases here.

Maya and Ors Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 19 Mar 2021

Posted on September 12, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Single judge of Allahabad High Court held as follows,

Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petition under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act was filed by the petitioners way back on
16.07.2016 and despite the opposite party nos.2 to 8 have been served, the petition is still pending before the court below and the same has not been
decided as provided under Section 12(5) of the Domestic Violence Act. While drawing the attention of this Court towards the order-sheet of the case, it has been submitted that now the case is pending for cross examination of the prosecution witness no.3.
Learned A.G.A. would have no objection to the prayer of the petitioners as it is otherwise the mandate of law to dispose of the cases pertaining to the Domestic Violence Act at the earliest.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the record and having regard the nature of order proposed to be passed, issuance of notice to the opposite party nos.2 to 8 is dispensed with.
Having regard to the provisions under Section 12(5) of the Domestic Violence Act, the petition is disposed of with the direction to the learned Judicial Magistrate-I, Lucknow to make all endeavors to decide the above-mentioned complaint case within two months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order, without granting soft adjournments to either of the parties, in accordance with law.

Maya and Ors Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 19 Mar 2021

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/51997103/

Connects to a PIL here.

Suyalaly and Anr Vs Alphin Jeyasingh and Ors on 29 Nov 2021

Posted on September 12, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Single judge of Madras High Court held as follows,

From Paras 4 and 5,

4. The complaint has been filed under the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners draws my attention to Section 12(5) of the Act which states that the Magistrate shall endeavour to dispose of every application made under sub-section (1) within a period of sixty days from the date of its first hearing.
5. In this case, the complaint was filed way back in the year 2019. Keeping the petition pending for more than two years is not an acceptable state of affairs. The learned trial Magistrate is directed to dispose of D.V.C.No.11 of 2019 on merits and in accordance with law within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

Suyalaly and Anr Vs Alphin Jeyasingh and Ors on 29 Nov 2021

Other Sources:

Connects to a PIL here.

Tillottama Kumari Vs State of Bihar and Ors on 16 May 2019

Posted on September 12, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Single judge of Patna High Court held as follows,

In my previous order dated 10.04.2019 while calling for a report from the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Katihar as to why any effective order has not been passed till date despite hearing the case on behalf of the parties on several dates, I had already indicated that the Protection of Women fromDomestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short ‘the Act’) has been enacted by the Parliament to provide more effective protection of the rights of women guaranteed under the Constitution.
Section 12(5) of the Act provides that the Magistrate shall endeavour to dispose of every application made under subsection (1) within a period of sixty days from the date of its firsthearing. Under the circumstances, keeping the matter pending for over two years is wholly unjustified.
In that view of the matter, I direct the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Katihar to dispose of the complaint in accordance with law as early as possible preferably within six weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of the order.

Tillottama Kumari Vs State of Bihar and Ors on 16 May 2019

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/82362334/

Connects to a PIL here.

Mrugesh Wasnik Vs Shweta Mrugesh on 22 Jun 2022

Posted on September 12, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Single judge of Bombay High Court held as follows,

From Para 5, (some one tried hard to help the knife just so that she can reap the benefit of interim reliefs!)

5. Section 12(5) of the D.V. Act casts the obligation on the Magistrate to make every endevour to dispose of the application within a period of 60 days from the date of first hearing. The record itself speaks that in disregard to the statutory mandate, the Magistrate has adjourned the Matter for no reason. It is informed that the Magistrate has already passed the order of interim maintenance which is prevailing till date. It is submitted that the non-applicant/wife without prosecuting her main petition, is interested in deriving benefits of interim order.

From Para 6, why not?

6. Though it is prayed that the D.V. proceeding be dismissed for want of prosecution, however, the same course is not advisable. As on date, the non-applicant/ wife’s amendment application is on record which is to be responded. At this stage, only requirement is to issue certain directions to the Magistrate to expedite the proceeding. Certainly such direction would be in the interest of non-applicant/wife. The applicant/husband undertakes to file his reply to amendment application on the next date i.e. on 12.07.2022 itself.

From Para 7,

7. In view of above, learned Magistrate is directed to hear and decide the amendment application within one week from filing of reply and the non-applicant/wife shall file evidence-affidavit within one week thereafter. The Magistrate shall not grant adjournment to either of the parties barring exceptional situation. In any case, the Magistrate shall dispose of the D. V. Proceeding within three months from the date of filing of wife’s evidence-affidavit.

Mrugesh Wasnik Vs Shweta Mrugesh on 22 Jun 2022

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/105650848/

Connects to a PIL here.

Vani Santhosh Babu Vs Vijaya Laxmi Vani on 3 Mar 2022

Posted on September 12, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Single judge of Telangana High Court held as follows (while dismissing the petition),

From Para 6,

6. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned order. However, considering the fact that the DVC is of the year, 2018, learned IV Additional Junior Civil Judge-Cum-XII Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Kukatpally, Cyberabad is directed to dispose of DVC.No.4 of 2018 in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible preferably within 60 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

Vani Santhosh Babu Vs Vijaya Laxmi Vani on 3 Mar 2022

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/102447017/

Connects to a PIL here.

Sushila Devi Vs Vikas Kumar Singhal And Ors on 9 Feb 2018

Posted on September 12, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Single judge of Rajasthan High Court held as follows,

On perusal of the certified copy of the order-sheets, it appears that the application under Section 12 of the Act was filed way-back on 08.09.2016. Counsel appeared on behalf of respondents No.1 & 4 on 05.12.2016 and the matter is still pending before the Court of Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate No.1, Neem Ka Thana, Sikar whereas as per provisions of Section 12(5) of the Act mandates that the Magistrate shall endeavour to dispose of every application made under sub-section 12(1) within a period of sixty days from the date of its first hearing. In the present case, five months have been passed, but no effective proceedings have taken place in the present matter. It appears to be an abuse of process of law, looking to the way in which proceedings are taking place in the court concerned.
In view of above, direction is issued to the Court of Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate No.1, Neem Ka Thana, Sikar to make every endeavour to conclude the proceedings within two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.

Sushila Devi Vs Vikas Kumar Singhal And Ors on 9 Feb 2018

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/92995617/

Connects to a PIL here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: 1-Judge Bench Decision

Praveen Surendiran Vs State of Karnataka and Anr on 21 Mar 2022

Nachhattar Singh Vs Rai Singh and Anr on 28 Jul 2022

Altaf Ahmad Zargar and Anr Vs Sana Alias Ruksana and Anr on 02 Sep 2022

Nahida Rishad Cooper Vs Ali Daruwala and Ors on 25 Feb 2022

Maya and Ors Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 19 Mar 2021

Suyalaly and Anr Vs Alphin Jeyasingh and Ors on 29 Nov 2021

Tillottama Kumari Vs State of Bihar and Ors on 16 May 2019

Mrugesh Wasnik Vs Shweta Mrugesh on 22 Jun 2022

Vani Santhosh Babu Vs Vijaya Laxmi Vani on 3 Mar 2022

Sushila Devi Vs Vikas Kumar Singhal And Ors on 9 Feb 2018