Sharanappa S. Kallur Vs State of Karnataka on 07 Jun 2011

Posted on June 18, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Karnataka HC, relying on case law here, held as follows,

From Para 10,

10. Unless it is shown from reliable evidence that there was demand made directly or indirectly from the parents of the complainant, Section 4 of the D.P. Act does not get attracted. In the decision cited by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner in the case of Sankar Prosad Shaw v. The State, reported in 1991 Cri.L.J. 639, it has been held that, even mere demand is not sufficient but, it should be given or agreed to be given and at the most, mere demand may come under section 498a of the i.p.c. but not under Section 4 of the D.P. Act. For the above reason, conviction under Section 4 of the D.P. Act cannot be sustained in law.

Sharanappa S. Kallur Vs State of Karnataka on 07 Jun 2011

Citations: [2012 DMC 1 22]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1430200/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56e0ee77607dba38965ed263

Sankar Prasad Shaw and Ors Vs The State and Anr on 27 Jul 1990

Posted on June 18, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Calcutta High Court held as follows,

From Paras 5 and 6,

5. So, as per the definition, dowry means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage or by the parents of either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before or after the carriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties. Sri Mukherjee has laid emphasis on the words ‘given’ or ‘agreed to be given’ at or before or after the marriage in connection with the marriage. Judged in terms of the definition, the learned counsel has submitted that in the case in hand, neither party to the marriage nor their relations had ever given or agreed to give any property or valuable security to the other party at or before or after the marriage, and, therefore, the learned counsel argues, s. 4 of the Act is not attracted to the case in hand.
6. I find much substance in the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners. The complaint petition does not disclose that the complainant had given any property or valuable security or that he had agreed to give such things to the accused petitioner No. 1, either at or before or after the marriage between Usha Shaw and petitioner No. 1 or to his parents or other relations. Although in common parlance we very often use the term “dowry demand” in the cases where the husband or his relations demand valuable security from the parents and other relations of the wife after the marriage, yet, in my opinion this will not amount to demand for dowry under the Act in view of the definition of dowry contained in s. 2 the Act. Demand for dowry under the Act and in the legal sense will mean the demand for dowry only when it refers to property or valuable security given or agreed to be given at or before or after the marriage. The alleged offence as made out in the complaint petition may attract the penal provisions as contained in s. 498A of the Indian Penal Code. The Parliament in its wisdom appended the explanation as to what “cruelty” means and has constructed sub clause (b) of s. 498A in the following words, “Harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand”. In my opinion, if the cases of this nature are to be brought within the ambit of s. 4 of the Act, then the word ‘dowry’ under s. 2 of the Act shall have to be redefined in the light of sub-clause (b) under s. 498A of the Indian Penal Code. The term “extortion demand” popularised by the media may also find a place in the definition of dowry.

Sankar Prasad Shaw and Ors Vs The State and Anr on 27 Jul 1990 (CM Ver)

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/946303/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56095f9ee4b01497112cab8b

Divya Ganesh Nallur Vs Ganesh Nallur Shivu on 08 Jun 2023

Posted on June 15, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Karnataka High Court held as follows,

From Para 2,

2. Learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners finds fault with the impugned order contending that in matters like this, the fact that the parties are residing under the same roof, pales into insignificance except for the purpose of territorial jurisdiction. The fact that the spouses are residing in the same premises could not have been a ground for making the order of the kind. Such a flawed reasoning bewilders the Court, to say the least. Such a fact arguably may show the good culture of the spouses who are otherwise at loggerheads. The reason assigned by the Court below for denying relief to the parties constitutes as error of great magnitude apparent on the face of the record.
In view of the above, this Petition succeeds; a Writ of Certiorari issued quashing the impugned Order; matter is remitted to the portals of the learned Judge of the Court below, requesting him to pass a judgment and decree in terms of the Compromise Petition and the report of the Mediator. This is to be done at the earliest.

Divya Ganesh Nallur Vs Ganesh Nallur Shivu on 08 Jun 2023

Kadar Valli Shaik Vs Union of India and 3 Ors on 07 Mar 2023

Posted on June 13, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court held as follows,

From Paras 102 and 103,

102. In view of the law as laid down by this Court in Marupudi Dhana Koteswara Rao (supra) that the authorities can seek NOC in case of renewal of passport which is implicit in Rule-5, with which view I am also in agreement that the renewal of passport is also governed by the provisions of the Passport Act, including Sections 5, 6 and the Rules, 1980, the submission of the learned counsels for the petitioners to the contrary based on the view taken by the other High Courts is not acceptable and is rejected.
103. To sum up, this Court holds that;
(i) “Issue‟ of passport in Section 5 of the Passports Act includes “renewal‟ of the passport as well;
(ii) While considering the renewal of the passport, the passport authority would be within its jurisdiction and authority to refuse renewal, on the same grounds as in the cases of issuance of the passport for “the first time‟, provided by Section 6 (2) of the Passport Act. In other words, Section 6 (2) of the Passport Act applies to renewal of the passport, as well;
(iii) In the cases for renewal, to which Section 6 (2) (f) of the Passports Act is attracted, i.e., where the applicant is facing criminal trial in a criminal Court in India, renewal of the passport shall be refused, subject to the fulfillment of the condition under the notification of the Central Government, dated 25.08.1993, issued in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 22 of the Passports Act, upon which such applicant shall stand exempted from the operation of the provisions of Clause (f) of sub-section (2) of Section 6;
(iv) In a case where clause (f) of Section 6 (2) is attracted, the holder of the passport, for its renewal, will have to produce an order from the Court concerned, where the proceedings against him are pending trial in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by him, permitting him to depart from India;
(v) The notification dated 25.08.1993 applies to the citizen applicants for renewal of the passport even if already departed from India under the passport of which renewal is sought.
(vi) On production of an order, from the concerned Court, as referred in the notification, the renewal of the passport shall not be refused only on the ground of Section 6 (2) (f), i.e., mere pendency of the criminal case for trial;
(vii) Condition (d) of the notification dated 25.08.1993 is an additional requirement and is not in substitution of the requirement from those citizen/applicants who have to produce an order of the Court concerned, where the criminal case is pending, permitting him to depart from India.

Kadar Valli Shaik Vs Union of India and 3 Ors on 07 Mar 2023

Sana Nitish Kumar Reddy Vs State of Telangana on 26 April 2023

Posted on June 6, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Telangana High Court granted compensation of Rs.2 lakhs for effecting illegal arrest.

From Para 7,

7. There cannot be any iota of doubt that a person who is arrested by the police is looked down by the society. It creates a scar on his personality and character. Arrest in normal course and in compliance with the provision of law, even if it causes injury to the person cannot give rise to cause of action to award damages. However, when there is violation of law and the person is subjected to humiliation and insult, action of the police authorities will have to be condemned in strict terms and consequently compensation in a given case needs to be awarded. The petitioner is well qualified and is working for a reputed company. It is contended that illegal arrest of the petitioner created mental agony, loss of reputation and created permanent scar on his life. Keeping in view the educational qualification and family background of the petitioner, it cannot be said that such statement of loss of reputation, mental agony etc., is an exaggeration. The social status in India varies from person to person. The factors like family background, educational qualification, economical status, profession etc., can be considered for grant of compensation to the victims. Right to live with dignity and self-respect is one of the facets guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. No person shall be deprived of his right to live save by due process of law. The unimpeachable record placed before this Court proves that respondent Nos.6 and 7 acted in derogation of law. The notice under Section 41-A(1) of Cr.P.C. was issued without mentioning date and time and without giving sufficient time to the petitioner for compliance, straight away he was produced before the learned Magistrate who remanded him to judicial custody. For such lapses, respondent Nos.6 and 7 were inflicted with punishment in the departmental disciplinary proceedings. Thus, there is a clear violation of mandate of law in Arnesh Kumar’s case (Supra 1) and by doing so, respondent Nos.6 and 7 have infringed upon the fundamental life of the petitioner guaranteed to him under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

From Para 8,

8. The learned senior counsel appearing for respondent Nos.6 and 7 submitted that respondent No.7 is a young officer having long service and if any further punishment is inflicted by this Court, it would shatter his career opportunities. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Rs.5.00 lakh compensation may be awarded to the petitioner for loss of his reputation in the society on account of his illegal arrest by the erring police officials. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, an amount of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakhs only) is awarded to the petitioner as compensation for the lapses committed by respondent Nos.6 and 7. Respondent No.1 shall pay the said amount to the petitioner within a period of four (4) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Respondent No.1 is at liberty to recover the compensation amount i.e., Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) each from respondent Nos.6 and 7. So far as the other reliefs are concerned, this Court is not inclined to grant any relief as respondent Nos.6 and 7 were already subjected to disciplinary proceedings and punishment was imposed against them.

Sana Nitish Kumar Reddy Vs State of Telangana on 26 April 2023

Rajendra Kumar Vs Rukhmani Bisen on 02 Feb 2023

Posted on May 16, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single bench judge of MP High Court at Jabalpur held as follows,

From Paras 5 and 6, (What is an interlocutory order?)

5. Now question remains for consideration is whether the order of interim maintenance passed under Section 125 of Cr.P.C is an interlocutory order? Consequently, whether criminal revision petition is lie against that order?
6. Term ‘Interlocutory Order’ has not been defined in the Cr.P.C. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of V.C. Shukla vs State, reported in AIR 1980 (SC) 962, has given following observation in para No.23 regarding the nature of interlocutory order:-
“Thus, summing up the natural and logical meaning of an interlocutory order, the conclusion is inescapable that an order which does not terminate the proceedings or finally decides the rights of the parties is only an interlocutory order. In other words, in the ordinary sense of the term, an interlocutory order is one which only decides a particular aspect or a particular issue or a particular matter in a proceeding, suit or trial but which does not however conclude the trial at all. This would be the result if the term interlocutory order is interpreted in its natural and logical sense without having to resort to Criminal Procedure Code or any other statute. ‘That is to say, if we construe interlocutory order in ordinary parlance it would indicate the attributes, mentioned above, and this is what the term interlocutory order means when used in s. 11(1) of the Act.”

From Para 9,

9. In the case of Sumerchand vs Sandhuran Rani and Others, reported in 1987 Cr.L.J. 1396, Sunil Kumar Sabharwal vs Neelam Sabharwal, reported in 1991 Cr.L.J. 2056 High Court of Haryana and a order dated 15.11.18 passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand in the case of Ashu Dhiman vs Smt Jyoti Dhiman, Cr. Misc. Application (C-482) No.434/2018, it has been held that an order passed for interim maintenance under provisions of Section 125 of Cr.P.C is not an interlocutory order, hence, criminal revision petition is maintainable against such order.

Citations:

Other Sources:

State of AP Vs Mannem Trivikram Reddy on 28 Jun 2017

Posted on May 3, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

The JMFC at Kadapa held that Legal Terrorism must be stopped.

From Para 16,

From the evidence of prosecution it is clear that except filing of Maintenance case and a case under Domestic Violence Act seeking monetary relief of one crore rupees, the court cannot come to a safe conclusion that there were cruelty on the part of accused for the want of additional dowry as was also observed by Apex court in the same Judgment at paragraph No.20, as these salutary provisions cannot be allowed to be misused by relatives, parents, etc., the glaring reality cannot be ignored that the early trend of false implication with a view to harass and black mail and innocent spouse and his relatives, is fast emerging. It is time to stop this unhealthy trend which results in unnecessary misery and torture to numerous affected persons. Even with regard to the omissions to make reference of demand in 161 Cr.P.C., statement the observations made in para No.21 can be considered. Apart from all that the investigating officer had not examined the relative of accused also as was specifically contemplated under police standing order 537 more specifically in clause (3) (d) and (g).

State of AP Vs Mannem Trivikram Reddy on 28 Jun 2017

Annadurai Vs Jaya on 21 Apr 2023

Posted on April 30, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Madras High Court held that the maintenance arrears of a deceased daughter are her property and such property is inheritable to her mother under HSA.

From Para 2, (crucial piece of fact)

2.The fact of the case is that the petitioner is the husband. The respondent is the mother-in-law of the petitioner. The petitioner married the respondent’s daughter Saraswathi in the year 1991. Due to misunderstanding, they separated. The petitioner/ husband by filing a divorce petition under Section 13 (1)(i) (b) of Hindu Marriage Act before the Sub Court, Seyyur, got a divorce decree by an order dated 20.01.2005. Thereafter, Saraswathi filed a maintenance case in M.C.No.1 of 2014 before the Judicial Magistrate No.II, Madurantagam. After trial of the maintenance case, the learned Judge awarded a monthly maintenance of Rs.7,500/- payable by the petitioner/husband to his wife Saraswathi on 22.01.2021 and the amount was ordered to pay from the date of petition i.e. on 04.01.2014.

Continuing from same Para,

For collecting the arrears of maintenance, the wife Saraswathi filed an application in CMP.No.678 of 2021 in M.C.No.1 of 2014 before the Judicial Magistrate No.II, Maduranthagam. In the petition, she claimed the arrears of maintenance amount of Rs.6,37,500/-. Pending petition, the wife
Saraswathi died on 05.06.2021. Thereafter, her mother filed CMP.No.2529 of 2021 to implead her as a petitioner and to permit her to recover the
arrears of maintenance amount of Rs.6,22,500/-. The learned Judge, after hearing both the parties, allowed the petition for impleading the mother-in-law of the petitioner as petitioner for collecting the arrears of maintenance amount of Rs.6,22,500/- on the ground that she all along acted as a
guardian to the deceased wife Saraswathi as she was mentally affected and also a legal heir to the deceased daughter. Aggrieved by this order, the
petitioner/husband filed the present criminal revision case, which is under challenge.

My Assessment:

Once the competent Court held that the divorce was granted on the ground of desertion, there is no scope of granting maintenance u/s 125 CrPC, in the view of Sec 125(4) CrPC. All this farce could have been avoided if the Petitioner herein, moves to cancel the maintenance Order, on the weight of divorce on the ground of desertion.

Annadurai Vs Jaya on 21 Apr 2023

Javed Ahmad Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 13 Feb 2023

Posted on April 13, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Allahabad High Court held as follows,

It is true that filing of first information report (F.I.R.) is not a condition precedent to exercise the power under Section 438(1) Cr.P.C., as held in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia Vs. State of Punjab,(1980) 2 SCC 565, but at the same time it is also to be kept in mind, as held in the aforesaid case by the Hon’ble Apex Court, that“when a person apprehends arrest and approaches a court for anticipatory bail, his apprehension (of arrest), has to be based onconcrete facts (and not vague or general allegations) relatable to a specific offence or particular offences. Applications for anticipatory bail should contain clear and essential facts relating to the offence, and why the applicant reasonably apprehends his or her arrest, as well as his version of the facts. These are important for the court which is considering the application, the extent and reasonableness of the threat or apprehension, its gravity or seriousness and the appropriateness of any condition that may have to be imposed. It is not a necessary condition that an application should be moved only after an FIR is filed; it can be moved earlier,so long as the facts are clear and there is reasonable basis for apprehending arrest.“

Then, What is ‘Reason to Believe‘?

The Hon’ble Apex Court in Adri Dharan Das Vs. State of West Bengal, (2005) 4 SCC 303 has emphasized over this requirement and held as under.
“Section 438 is a procedural provision which is concerned with the personal liberty of an individual who is entitled to plead innocence, since he is not on the date of application for exercise of power under Section 438 CrPC convicted for the offence in respect of which he seeks bail. The applicant must show that he has “reason to believe” that he may be arrested in a non-bailable offence. Use of the expression “reason to believe” shows that the belief that the applicant may be arrested must be founded on reasonable grounds. A belief can be said to be founded on reasonable grounds only if there is something tangible to go by on the basis of which it can be said that the applicant’s apprehension that he may be arrested is genuine. Mere “fear” is not “belief” for which reason it is not enough for the applicant to show that has some sort of vague apprehension that some one is going to make an accusation against him in pursuance of which he may be arrested. Grounds on which the belief on the applicant is based that he may be arrested in non-bailable offence must be capable of being examined. If an application is made to the High Court or the Court of Session, it is for the court concerned to decide whether a case has been made out of for granting of the relief sought. (Para 16)”
The aforesaid theory makes the legal position explicit that Section 438 (1) of Cr.P.C. applies not only at post FIR stage, but it does not require that the offence must have been registered. It is contemplated by this section that if a person is going to apply for anticipatory bail, he must have a reasonable belief that he may be arrested on accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence.

Javed Ahmad Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 13 Feb 2023

Bijumon and Ors Vs The New India Assurance Co on 28 Feb 2023

Posted on March 9, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

Bijumon and Ors Vs The New India Assurance Co on 28 Feb 2023

Source:

https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/kerala-high-court-motor-vehicle-act-road-accident-notional-income-deceased-child-rs-30000-loss-of-dependency-223334

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: 1-Judge Bench Decision

Sharanappa S. Kallur Vs State of Karnataka on 07 Jun 2011

Sankar Prasad Shaw and Ors Vs The State and Anr on 27 Jul 1990

Divya Ganesh Nallur Vs Ganesh Nallur Shivu on 08 Jun 2023

Kadar Valli Shaik Vs Union of India and 3 Ors on 07 Mar 2023

Sana Nitish Kumar Reddy Vs State of Telangana on 26 April 2023

Rajendra Kumar Vs Rukhmani Bisen on 02 Feb 2023

State of AP Vs Mannem Trivikram Reddy on 28 Jun 2017

Annadurai Vs Jaya on 21 Apr 2023

Javed Ahmad Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 13 Feb 2023

Bijumon and Ors Vs The New India Assurance Co on 28 Feb 2023