Sanjeev Kumar and Ors Vs Sushma Devi on 01 Jun 2023

Posted on October 17, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Himachal Pradesh High Court as follows, regarding framing of points/issues in Domestic Violence cases.

From Para 4(iii),

4(iii) In the instant case, parties led evidence in support of their respective pleadings. The record makes it apparent that the parties led their evidence without any points/issues having been framed in the matter.
Not only the points/issues were framed by the learned Trial Court in its judgment but the onus to prove such issues was also fastened upon respective parties, who were not even aware of formulation of the issues leave aside the onus to prove them. This approach was wholly erroneous. The parties were required to be made aware of the issues or the points they needed to prove in the case before directing them to lead evidence. This would have been not only in the interest of justice and fair play, but would have also provided the parties an opportunity to know the issues required to be proved by them. In accordance with provisions of the Act, demonstration by the complainant of existence of a relationship in the nature of marriage with the petitioner would have been sufficient under the Act. The complainant accordingly led her evidence. However, the learned Trial Court held the complainant could not establish that she was lawfully married to the petitioner. The complainant was not made aware of the points/issues framed by the learned Trial Court that she was required to prove her marriage with the petitioner in order to be successful in the proceedings. In case in the given facts, learned trial Court was of the view that the respondent-complainant was required to prove solemnization of her marriage with the petitioner, then the correct procedure would have been to make this issue known to the parties before ordering them to lead evidence. Framing of issues, for the first time, only in the judgment, placing burden of proving such issues on respective parties, deciding the case on the basis of such issues about which parties have not even been made aware of, is a procedure alien to well established legal and procedural conventions. It was imperative for the learned Trial Court to have framed issues/points for determination before directing the parties to lead evidence. The order passed by the learned Trial Court determining the points/issues and fixing the onus of proving those issues/points at the time of deciding the case was not in consonance with law. The order passed by the learned Trial Court was, therefore, justly interfered with by the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court also correctly observed that the petitioner had not signed the pleadings before the learned Trial Court. Accordingly, it gave an opportunity to the petitioner to rectify this irregularity by filing his affidavit before the learned Trial Court in support of unsigned pleadings.

Sanjeev Kumar and Ors Vs Sushma Devi on 08 Jun 2023

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/58984784/

Index of Domestic Violence cases is here.

Mohit Gupta and Ors vs Govt of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 16 Oct 2006

Posted on October 15, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single bench judge at Delhi High Court held that Shivcharan Lal Verma and Anr Vs State of Madhya Pradesh is the precedent that is binding and not the Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam And Others.

From Para 8,

8. These are undoubtedly strong words and clearly show that a person who ostensibly contracts a marriage with a woman and lives with her as husband and wife would also be covered within the meaning of the expression “husband” used in Section 498-A IPC. But the matter does not stop here. The Supreme Court, in the case of Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra), which is a decision of a three-judge bench, was of the contrary view. The facts in that case were that during the lifetime of the first wife, Shivcharan married for the second time. But after the marriage both the first wife and Shivcharan tortured the second wife as a result of which she ultimately committed suicide by burning herself. The incident occurred inside the house while Shivcharan and his first wife were in one room and the second wife was in the other. One of the questions which arose before the Supreme Court was whether the provisions under Section 498-A can at all be attracted since the marriage with the second wife itself was null and void, the same having been performed during the lifetime of the first wife. In answer to this question the Supreme Court observed that there was considerable force in the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant that so far as conviction under Section 498-A was concerned, inasmuch as the alleged marriage with the second wife, during the subsistence of a valid marriage with the first wife, was null and void, the same cannot be sustained. The Supreme Court therefore set aside the conviction and sentence under Section 498-A IPC. Going by this a decision, it is clear that the Supreme Court was of the view that as the second marriage was null and void, Shivcharan could not be regarded as a “husband” within the meaning ascribed to it under Section 498-A IPC. Although the learned Counsel for the respondent had, as noted above, made submissions to the effect that this was not a binding precedent, I don’t see as to how this is would not constitute a binding precedent. The point in issue arose out of the facts of the case. It was specifically raised and specifically answered. The ratio of the decision is that a male partner to a null marriage cannot be covered by the expression “husband” as appearing in Section 498-A IPC. It is another thing that the Supreme Court in the case of Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) did not discuss this question with the same degree of elaboration as in the case of Reema Aggarwal (supra). But, this by itself cannot be construed to mean that in Shivcharan lal Verma (supra), the Supreme Court did not consider the entire scope and ambit of the provisions of Section 498-A IPC. It must also be pointed out that the decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) has not been noticed in Reema Aggarwal (supra) although the latter decision is later in point of time. So, the decision in Reema Aggarwal (supra) has to be regarded as per incuriam. The second point that has to be kept in mind is that the decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) has been rendered by a bench of three honourable judges whereas the decision in the case of Reema Aggarwal (supra) is by a bench of two honourable judges. Clearly, the decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) would be binding. In this context it would be pertinent to note the observations of a Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (2002) 5 SCC 578 wherein the Supreme Court observed [at para 28]:
The well settled principle of precedents which has crystallised into a rule of law is that the bench of lesser strength is bound by the view expressed by a bench of larger strength and cannot take a view in departure or in conflict there from.
Therefore the decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) will clearly take precedence over the decision in Reema Aggarwal (supra).

Indiankanoon version:

Mohit Gupta and Ors vs Govt of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 16 Oct 2006 (IK ver)

Casemine version:

Mohit Gupta and Ors vs Govt of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 16 Oct 2006 (CM ver)

Citations: [2007 AD DEL 1 503], [2007 DRJ 93 606], [2006 DLT 135 390], [2007 DMC 1 47], [2006 SCC ONLINE DEL 1256], [2006 JCC 3 1923], [2007 JCC 3 1923]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/338837/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56090c14e4b0149711176259

Mohit Gupta And Ors. vs State Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi And Anr. on 16 October, 2006

Index of Quash judgements is here and HMA Judgments is here.

Ashmin Kashmiri Vs Pushkar Kashmiri on 04 Jul 2018

Posted on October 10, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench at Himachal Pradesh High Court held that when no prima facie DV is established, no relief will flow, even to children/other respondents.

From Para 3,

3. Learned trial Court taking note of such factual details in the application has disposed of the same with a direction to the respondent-husband to pay `30,000/- per month by way of interim maintenance allowance to the petitioner and her children, however, without recording any prima-facie finding qua the alleged instances of her maltreatment and her children by the respondent and his mother. Therefore, the appeal preferred by the respondent-husband has been allowed by learned Sessions Judge vide order under challenge in this petition with the observation that in a case of domestic violence in order to seek the relief of interim maintenance under Section 23 of the Act, a prima-facie case qua maltreatment and existence of the instances of domestic violence is required to be made out. Learned Appellate Court thereby has not closed the right of the petitioner to claim interim maintenance for herself and also the children and rather remanded the application to learned trial Court for disposal after arriving at a conclusion and recording findings qua the instances of domestic violence, which of course shall be prima facie.
4. The impugned judgment, as such, cannot be said to be legally and factually unsustainable. The same is upheld, however, there shall be a direction to learned trial Court to decide the application at the earliest, preferably within two months from today.

Ashmin Kashmiri Vs Pushkar Kashmiri on 04 Jul 2018

Index of Domestic Violence cases here.

Showkat Aziz Zargar Vs Nabeel Showkat and Anr on 02 Sep 2022

Posted on September 18, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of J&K&L High Court held as follows, while declaring two judgments as per incuriam, relying on multiple Supreme Court decisions as Precedents.

From Paras 13-15,

13) It is a settled principle of interpretation of Statutes that words and expressions used in a Statute have to be assigned their plain meaning. A court does not have power to add or subtract something from a Statute which is not there. If a court finds some ambiguity in a Statute which becomes an impediment in achieving the aim and object of the Statute, the court can give a purposive interpretation to the Statute but where the language of the Statute is clear and unambiguous, it is not open to the Court to add, alter or supply words to the said Statute and no need of interpretation would arise. The purpose of interpretation of Statutes is to help the Judge to ascertain the intention of the Legislature and not to control that intention or to confine it within the limits, which the Judge may deem reasonable or expedient.
14) The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has, in the case of A. R. Antulay vs. R. S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602, held that if the words of the Statute are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the Court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the provision. The Court observed that the question of interpretation arises only in the event of an ambiguity or if the plain meaning of the words used in the Statute would be self defeating.
15) Again, the Supreme in the case of Grasim Industries Ltd. vs. Collector of Customs, Bombay, (2002) 4 SCC 297, has followed the same principle and observed that where the words are clear and there is no obscurity or ambiguity, the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. The Court further observed that while doing so, what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided.

From Paras 22 and 24,

22) In a recent case of Abhilasha vs. Parkash & ors. (Criminal Appeal No.615 of 2020 decided on 15th September, 2020), a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court considered the question as to whether a Hindu unmarried daughter is entitled to claim maintenance from her father under Section 125 of the Cr. P. C only till she attains majority or she can claim maintenance till she remains unmarried. The Court observed that a bare perusal of Section 125(1) of the Cr. P. C indicates that it limits the claim of maintenance of a child until he or she attains majority.
24) From the foregoing analysis of the law on the subject, it is clear that the Supreme Court has taken a consistent view that a major son or daughter cannot be awarded maintenance by a Magistrate in exercise of his powers under Section 125 of the Central Cr. P. C/488 of the Jammu and Kashmir Cr. P. C but in an appropriate case, a Family Court has jurisdiction to grant maintenance to a major Hindu daughter on the basis of a combined reading of the provisions contained in Section 125 of the Cr. P. C and Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act.

Finally,

27) For what has been discussed hereinbefore, the petition is allowed and the impugned order passed by the trial Magistrate as upheld by the Revisional Court is set aside and it is held that the respondents are entitled to maintenance from their father i.e., the petitioner herein, only up to the age of their majority. If any amount of maintenance has been paid by the petitioner to the respondents after the attainment of their age of majority, the same, having regard to the relationship between the parties, shall not be recovered from them. The amount deposited in the Registry pursuant to the order dated 11.09.2019, shall be released in favour of the petitioner. The petition stands disposed of accordingly.

Showkat Aziz Zargar Vs Nabeel Showkat and Anr on 02 Sep 2022

Maintenance cases index here.

Sumeet Vs Himani Sumeet Ninave Nee on 29 Mar 2023

Posted on September 15, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge from Nagpur bench of Bombay High Court held as follows,

From Para 9,

9. In order to appreciate the rival submissions, I have gone through the record and proceedings. I have also gone through the judgments relied upon by both the parties. It is true that as per Section 1 of the D.V. Act, the D.V. Act extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It does not extend beyond the limits of India. The question therefore, is whether for the domestic violence caused to the aggrieved person on the foreign soil can be taken cognizance of by the Court of Magistrate in India at any of the places provided in clause (a) to (c) of Section 27. It is to be noted that subsection 1 and Section 27 of the D.V. Act will have to be harmoniously construed. The D.V. Act is a social beneficial legislation. The object and intention of the legislature behind this enactment is writ large from the statement of the object and reasons of the Act. Section 27 of the Act provides for the jurisdiction of a Court of Magistrate of First Class or Metropolitan Magistrate to entertain the application under this Act. The provisions of Section 27(1) (a) and (b) are applicable irrespective of the place of cause of action. It is to be noted that clause (a) and (b) of Section 27 (1) of the D.V. Act has, therefore, no direct nexus or co-relation with the place where the domestic violence was actually caused. In my view, these two clauses namely (a) and (b) of sub section (1) of Section 27 have to be harmoniously construed with sub section 1 of Section 27 of the Act. If it is so done then it would show that the law makers were mindful of such a situation and therefore, Section 27 have been worded in this form. It therefore goes without saying that though the Domestic Violence Act extend to the whole of India as provided under Section 1 of the D.V. Act, the domestic violence caused on the foreign soil could also be taken cognizance by invoking Section 27 (1) (a) and (b).

From Para 13, (Dumb interpretation)

13. The Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that sufferings of the wife at parental home though may not be directly attributable to commission of acts of cruelty by the husband at matrimonial home but the same would undoubtedly be the consequences of the acts committed at the matrimonial home. It is observed that such consequences, by itself, would amount to distinct offences committed at parental home where she has taken shelter. It is further observed that adverse effects on the mental health in the parental home though on account of acts committed in the matrimonial home would amount to commission of cruelty.

Not sure, which of the 6 reliefs, if/when passed by Magistrate Courts in India, will be executed outside India and how?

Sumeet Vs Himani Sumeet Ninave Nee on 29 Mar 2023 (S Vs H)

Index of DV Judgments is here.

Sunil Kumar and Ors Vs Elizabeth on 07 Feb 2023

Posted on September 14, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

The Kalaburigi bench of Karnataka High Court held that instead of accommodation in the shared household, money towards rent can be given to the aggrieved person.

From Paras 3-6,

3. As per Section 19(1)(f) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 [in short ‘DV Act’], wherever the Court feels to convenient to order for monetary expenses in lieu of the shared house and also taking note of the relationship existing among the parties, a suitable order can be passed in terms of money.
4. In the impugned order, the learned Trial Magistrate after exercising discretionary power granted a sum of Rs.6,000/- as monthly maintenance and a room to be given by the Revision Petitioner in the shared house.
5. Admittedly, the Revision Petitioner No.1 is the husband of the Respondent. However, the Revision Petitioner is living with first wife. Taking note of these aspects of the matter directing the respondent to stay in the same house in a separate room would not be feasible practically and it may give rise to further displeasure among the parties resulting in civil/criminal litigation.
6. Accordingly, this Court exercising its power as is contemplated under Section 19(1)(f) of the DV Act, a sum of Rs.5,000/- be paid instead of the room be provided as the shared house. If a sum of Rs.5,000/- is being ordered, the respondent can find out a suitable alternate premises more than the room that would be provided in the shared house hold as ordered by the Trial Court, it would meet the ends of justice.

Sunil Kumar and Ors Vs Elizabeth on 07 Feb 2023

Index of DV cases here.

Rangesh Srinivasan Vs Madhulika Bawa on 07 Jun 2023

Posted on September 5, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single bench of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Paras 12-14,

12. Going a step deeper, there is another aspect. While exercising the revisional scrutiny of an interim maintenance order passed in proceedings under Section 125 CrPC, the revisional court for yet another reason cannot impose as a pre-condition to grant of stay on operation of the assailed interim maintenance order, such general rider of deposit of the entire amount of awarded maintenance ignoring the overall circumstances of the case. The provision under Section 397 CrPC confers suo motu powers on the Court of Sessions and the High Court. Wherever the statute confers suo motu powers on any judicial authority, such powers are always implicitly accompanied with attendant duty to invoke the powers in order to meet the ends of justice. Once an illegality, incorrectness or impropriety in a judicial order is brought to the notice of the revisional court under Section 397 CrPC, the Court cannot justifiably refuse to entertain the challenge on the grounds of non-compliance with the order impugned before it. From that angle also, in my view, there cannot be generalized direction not to stay the operation of the interim maintenance order solely on the ground that the revisionist did not deposit the entire amount of awarded maintenance. Of course, if otherwise the factual and legal matrix justifies, grant of stay can be denied as well.
13. It is clarified that in the present case this court has refrained itself from analysing as to whether operation of the interim maintenance order facing appellate challenge is otherwise liable to be stayed or not. This issue has to be considered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge on the facts and circumstances of the case in the backdrop of settled legal position.
14. In view of above discussion, the petition is allowed and accordingly the impugned order is set aside, consequently remanding the matter back to the learned Additional Sessions Judge to decide afresh as to whether the interim maintenance order passed by the magisterial court is liable to be stayed during pendency of the appeal.

Rangesh Srinivasan Vs Madhulika Bawa on 07 Jun 2023

Citations: [2023 Latest Caselaw 774 Del]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/185965631/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6481f4e9e2788a042a651529

https://www.latestlaws.com/judgements/delhi-hc/2023/june/2023-latest-caselaw-774-del

https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/browse/Case?CaseId=103202750100&Title=RANGESH-SRINIVASAN-Vs.-MADHULIKA-BAWA

https://legiteye.com/in-crl-mc-4349-of-2023-del-hc-once-an-illegality-or-impropriety-in-a-judicial-order-is-brought-to-notice-of-revisional-court-it-cannot-justifiably-refuse-to-entertain-the-challenge-on-grounds-of-non-compliance-with-the-order-impugned-before-it-delhi-high-court-justice-girish-kathpalia-07-06-2023/

Index of PWDV Act cases here. Index of Maintenance cases u/s 144 BNSS (125 Cr.P.C.) here.

Zahir Obdullah and Anr Vs Omar Abdullah on 31 Aug 2023

Posted on September 1, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

From Para 33, (Perversity of a High Court!)

33. Both the Petitioners are majors and, therefore, under Section 125 Cr.P.C, they are not entitled to maintenance. However, this Court is of the opinion that the Respondent cannot abandon his children and ought not to abdicate his duties as a father. The Petitioner in CRL.REV.P. 605/2018 has been saddled with the responsibility of paying the entire fee for the education of both the children, however, it was the duty of the father to also contribute towards their education. Therefore, even though the Petitioners in CRL.REV.P 604/2018 are not entitled to any maintenance as per the law, this Court is of the opinion that the Respondent should compensate the Petitioner in CRL.REV.P. 605/2018 by sharing the burden of the amount spent by her towards the expenses and upkeep of the children.

Zahir Obdullah and Anr Vs Omar Abdullah on 31 Aug 2023

Anshu Gupta Vs Adwait Anand on 09 Aug 2023

Posted on August 31, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge from High Court of Uttarakhand passed this Judgment declaring that mother is also liable to pay maintenance to minor child. Interesting…

From Paras 17-22,

17. The provisions of Section 125 (1) Cr.P.C. makes it clear that the liability to maintain a minor child is always on “any person”, if he has sufficient means neglects and refuses to maintain a minor child and such “person” is directed to give the monthly allowance as maintenance at the rate deemed fit to the Magistrate.
18. “The person” word denotes not only the male but a female gender and it cannot be said that such person can only qualify father and not the mother. Section 2 (y) of Cr.P.C. provides as under:- “(y) words and expressions used herein and not defined but defined in the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Code. ”
19. According to Section 2(y) of Cr.P.C., the words and expressions used in the Cr.P.C. but have not been defined in the Cr.P.C., shall have the same meanings assigned to them as defined in the Indian Penal Code. Section 8 of IPC is quoted hereunder:- “8. Gender.—The pronoun “he” and its derivatives are used of any person, whether male or female.”
20. This definition of gender gives an indication that “he” and its derivatives are used of any person whether male or female.
21. Under Section 11 of the IPC, the “person” has also been defined, which includes any company or Association or body of persons, whether incorporated or not.
22. From the meticulous examination of these words having been defined in the Indian Penal Code, it can safely be inferred that any “person” use in the provisions of section 125(1) Cr.P.C. includes both mother and father.

From Para 25,

25. It is clear from the aforesaid sub-Section (2) of Section 126 Cr.P.C. that there is no such word “father” or “husband” in the aforesaid sub-section, as it was there in the old Cr.P.C. Section 488 sub-Section (6). Now, in place of “father” or “husband”, “person” has been incorporated and it is provided that “all evidence to such proceedings shall be taken in the presence of the person against whom an order for payment of maintenance is proposed to be made……….” Thus, this case law is also of no help to the revisionist and the same is distinguished by this Court on the aforesaid reasons.

Finally from Para 28,

28. The provisions of Section 125 Cr.P.C. has already been changed, as discussed above and according to the language of the present Section 125 Cr.P.C., in the opinion of this Court “person” would include both male and female and in reference to a minor child whether legitimate or illegitimate mother or father having sufficient means if neglects and refuses to maintain such minor child would be held liable to pay the maintenance of such child.

Anshu Gupta Vs Adwait Anand on 09 Aug 2023

Citations:

Other Sources:

Bhanu Kiran Vs Rahul Khosla and Ors on 28 Feb 2023

Posted on August 22, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge passed this Restricted Order (only downloadable for litigants/advocates on the case),

From Paras 20 and 21,

Under DV Act, Magistrate is competent to pass final as well as interim orders. Sessions Court is appointed as appellate authority to entertain appeal against order passed by Magistrate. As per petitioner, appellate Court is not specifically vested with power to grant interim relief, thus, appellate court cannot pass interim order staying operation of impugned order. If it is held that under Section 29 appellate court is not bestowed with power to pass interim order against interim order because there is no specific power under Section 29, the appellate court would be denuded from power to pass interim order even against final order because there is no such specific power qua final order. Existence of power and use of power are two different dimensions of legal jurisprudence.
Matter needs to be examined from one more angle. The appellate court may or may not exercise power to pass interim order, however, if it is held that appellate court in terms of Section 29 has no power to pass interim order, it would amount to curtailing the powers of appellate court. It seems to be contrary to settled canons of law that appellate authority or court unless specifically barred can exercise all those powers which are vested in subordinate authority. It cannot be approved that Magistrate has power to pass interim order, however, appellate court has no power to pass interim order. Due to overburden, more often than not, appellate courts are unable to finally adjudicate appeal against interim order and if it is held that appellate court has no power to pass interim order, Magistrate may finally decide the issue and appeal would become infructuous.
In view of above-cited judgments and settled principles of law, this court is of the considered opinion that appellate court while exercising powers under Section 29 of DV Act has power to pass interim order.
21. In view of above facts and findings, it is hereby held:
i) Appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act is maintainable against interim order passed under Section 23 of the DV Act.
ii) Appellate Court while exercising power under Section 29 of DV Act has power to pass interim order.

Bhanu Kiran Vs Rahul Khosla and Ors on 28 Feb 2023

Index of DV cases is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: 1-Judge Bench Decision

Sanjeev Kumar and Ors Vs Sushma Devi on 01 Jun 2023

Mohit Gupta and Ors vs Govt of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 16 Oct 2006

Ashmin Kashmiri Vs Pushkar Kashmiri on 04 Jul 2018

Showkat Aziz Zargar Vs Nabeel Showkat and Anr on 02 Sep 2022

Sumeet Vs Himani Sumeet Ninave Nee on 29 Mar 2023

Sunil Kumar and Ors Vs Elizabeth on 07 Feb 2023

Rangesh Srinivasan Vs Madhulika Bawa on 07 Jun 2023

Zahir Obdullah and Anr Vs Omar Abdullah on 31 Aug 2023

Anshu Gupta Vs Adwait Anand on 09 Aug 2023

Bhanu Kiran Vs Rahul Khosla and Ors on 28 Feb 2023