A good judgment from this Magistrate, with legally-valid reasons and conclusions… and also directing perjury proceedings to be initiated…
From Para 26,
26. The first and foremost contention of the accused and their counsel is that FIR No: 488/2017 is barred by limitation, as such the court shall dismiss the proceedings and as per exhibit P1, the alleged last act of cruelty has taken place on 18.09.2012, so the limitation period was expired on 17.09.2015, but the report was given on 03.08.2017, therefore the proceedings are time barred u/s 468 Cr.P.C. while section 473 Cr.P.C provides an exception to bar of limitation, but its application is not automatic and there must be an explanation by the prosecution for such inordinate delay. Since the case is barred by limitation, the court is required to dismiss the proceedings. In support of his contention, he relied on the following judgments:
A. Kamlesh Kalra v. Shilpa Kalra & Ors. Reported in 2020 0 Supreme (SC) 605 wherein it was held that “ As regards, the finding recorded by the High Court in respect of complaint/FIR filed under Section 498A IPC, we are of the firm opinion that the same does not call for interference. In the facts of this case, it is clear that the FIR filed in this regard in 2015 was time barred, having been filed much more than three years after the separation of Manish Kalra(husband) and Shilpika Kalra (wife) and the filing of the divorce petition by the husband, both in 2009. In the facts of the case, the reasons given by the High Court for quashing the proceedings under section 498A IPC are justified and do not call for interference by this Court”.
B. Gudipati Mallikarjun Rao v. Gudiapati Saranya 2023 0 Supreme (A.P) 582 wherein it was held that “ In the circumstances, it would have to be held that the complainant, filed by the defacto complainant, is beyond the period prescribed under Section 468 of Cr.P.C”.
C. Arun Vyas & Anr. V. Anitha Vyas 1999 0 Crl LJ 3479 wherein it was held that “ the court cannot take cognizance of an offence under Section 498-A of IPC, if the FIR is time barred, unless the delay is properly explained and condoned under Section 473 of the CrPC”.
D. Korimerla Videesha Vs. State of A.P. wherein it was held that “ According to Rule 10 of the A.P. Dowry Prohibition Rules, any offence under Section 3 and 4 or any dispute under Section 6 of the Act shall be filed before expiry of one year and finalized within two years from the date of filing”.
From Para 28,
28. In the case on hand the alleged demand for additional dowry was finally made on 18.9.2012 and that is the last date of alleged harassment. Even if the evidence of P.W.1 that the matter is place before the elders in 2013 has taken into consideration, the report is given after 4 years of said incident. But the report was given on 03.08.2017 i.e after 4 years of alleged harassment. So it can be safely conclude that the report is barred by limitation and the court has no power to take cognizance.
From Paras 36-37,
36. He further submitted that the conduct of P.W.1 amounts to perjury and warrants initiation of appropriate proceedings u/s 340 Cr.P.C in order to uphold the rule of law and protect sanctity of justice delivery system. On perusal of the record it appears that after filing the petition under section 340 Cr.P.C., my learned predecessor in the office returned the petition with some objections and the said petition is represented. But the said petition is again returned with endorsement previous objections not complied with and at present the said petition is not pending before the court. Here it is pertinent to mention that after assuming charge of this court, the said petition did not come before me and I have not given any assurance to the
counsel for the accused as mentioned in his written arguments.
37. During the cross examination P.W.1 denied that she completed her B.Tech in the year 2012. As per the evidence of D.W.1, Professor and controller of examination, JNTU Kakinada, P.W.1 completed her engineering graduation in April 2012 and on 16.10.2012 the student collected her provisional certificate from the college and as per the college rules, they cannot produce the provisional certificate of the student unless it is applied by the student. The evidence of D.W.1 clinchingly proves that P.W.1 completed her B.tech in April 2012 from JNTU. The evidence on record shows she intentionally denied that she completed her B.tech in 2012 and she has given false evidence on oath. Hence, she is certainly liable for punishment for giving false evidence. Hence, the Superintendent of this court is directed to give report before 3rd Add. Chief Judicial Magistrate Court against P.W.1 for giving false evidence.
From Paras 39, 41 and 42,
39. Learned counsel for the accused further contended that despite clear admissions of P.W.1 about unregistered land sale deeds dated 31.05.2010, 27.06.2011, this court refused to mark the said photocopies solely on the ground that they were not originals and this refusal is patently erroneous and it is settled law u/s 65 (c) of Indian Evidence Act, the secondary evidence is admissible where the original is lost or not in the possession of the party and a proper foundation is laid.
41. To mark the photocopies of documents, the party who intends to mark shall explain where is the original and as to why he is marking the photocopies of the documents. If the document is with the other party, first he has to give notice to the other party and even after receiving notice the other party fails to produce the document, then he can mark the photocopy. If he lost the original then also he is entitled to mark the photocopy, but in the case on hand there is no material on record to show that the accused or prosecution has given notice to other party to produce the documents and that the originals were lost. Without complying the conditions of section 65 of Indian Evidence Act, blaming this Court that the decision of the court is erroneous is not acceptable.
42. Learned counsel for the accused mentioned in his written arguments that the non production of the original unregistered sale deeds was reasonably explained during cross examination and it was put to P.W.1 that since accused no longer had access to the original land sale deeds dated. 31.05.2010 and 27.06.2011 since the property was transferred to Ch. Appala Raju and the denial of suggestion does not itself negate the reasonable explanation offered by the accused. On perusal of entire cross examination of P.W.1 it appears no such suggestion was given to P.W.1. As such the
contention of counsel for accused that they have given reasonable explanation for not filing the originals is not at all acceptable.
Index of perjury judgments is here.
