A division bench of Supreme Court held that, ‘Typographical Errors In Pleadings Cannot Trigger Proceedings U/S 340 CrPC Unless They Amount To Deliberate Falsehood’ and ‘Wrong Statement’ In Pleadings Not Necessarily A ‘False Statement’.
Note: This is a Criminal Appeal filed in 2015, got disposed in 2026. A full 12 years… Hope the parties are still alive. Right to speedy trail seems to be a myth in India.
From Para 7,
It is by now settled that while entertaining proceedings under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C., it must be borne in mind that the material produced before the Court ought to make out a prima facie case for an inquiry to be made into an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b) of the Penal Code. Further, the Court has to also consider whether it is expedient in the interest of justice that such inquiry should be made into the alleged offence. Reference in this regard can be usefully made to the decision of the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah and another Vs. Meenakshi Marwah and another9.
From Para 10,
10. A reading of the aforesaid observations clearly indicates that the Court was prima facie satisfied that ‘wrong statements’ had been made by the defendant and his learned counsel in the miscellaneous appeal and, hence, a prima facie case for lodging a complaint had been made out.
From Para 11,
11. From the aforesaid provisions, it becomes clear that what is punishable is the giving of ‘false evidence’ under Section 193 or making of a ‘false statement’ under Section 199. What is thus required at the stage of directing initiation of proceedings for an offence punishable under the said provisions is a prima facie case of having given ‘false evidence’ or making a ‘false statement’ in a declaration which by law is receivable as evidence. As noted above, the Court for the purposes of directing the filing of a complaint recorded its prima facie satisfaction that ‘wrong statements’ had been made in the memorandum of appeal and the application for stay preferred by the defendant that was filed through his learned counsel. The order dated 19.01.2006 directing lodging of a complaint does not record any prima facie satisfaction that ‘false statement’ had been made in the aforesaid proceedings. There is a material difference between making a ‘wrong statement’ and ‘false statement’ in the context of Sections 199 and 200 of the Penal Code. A ‘wrong statement’ of fact may not always have the character of a ‘false statement’. While making of a ‘wrong statement’ may not fall within the ambit of Sections 199 and 200 of the Penal Code, a ‘false statement’ would qualify as relevant material for being considered as an offence under the said provisions. The threshold for initiating action for an offence punishable under Sections 199 and 200 of the Penal Code is the making of a ‘false statement’ and not the making of a ‘wrong statement’. It is so because a ‘false statement’ denotes a deliberate intention in making such statement; in other words, it is a wrongful or erroneous statement made intentionally to gain an undue advantage. Thus, the basic premise on which the Court proceeded to direct a complaint to be filed is erroneous and it does not satisfy the necessary threshold. It is, therefore, clear that no prima facie satisfaction was recorded by the Court that ‘false statements’ were made by the defendant and his learned counsel in the memorandum of appeal and in the application for stay, warranting initiation of proceedings for the offence punishable under Sections 193, 199 and 200 of the Penal Code.
From Para 12,
12. It is also pertinent to note that the Court failed to record its satisfaction that it was expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into the alleged offence in view of such statements. Without recording any satisfaction that it was indeed expedient in the interest of justice to hold an enquiry, such a direction was issued. Section 340 (1) of the Cr.P.C. mandates that a Court before directing an inquiry to be made into any offence referred to in Section 195 (1) (b) of the Penal Code, it should form an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that such inquiry is in fact necessary. This would indicate that on the mere making of a ‘wrong statement’, an inquiry cannot be ordered. The forming of an opinion by the Court that holding of an inquiry is in fact expedient in the interests of justice is also a must. Ordering an inquiry without formation of any opinion as required by Section 340 (1) of the Cr.P.C. would render the order bad in law being not in accordance with the mandate of Section 340 (1).
From Para 13,
13. The High Court in the appeal preferred by the appellants challenging the order directing initiation of criminal proceedings proceeded to record its satisfaction that the appellants had filed a false affidavit in support of the application for stay. Such prima facie finding not having been recorded by the court of first instance, the High Court in the appeal preferred by the appellants challenging that order could not have recorded such finding, especially when the plaintiffs had not challenged the said order. The appellants could not have been placed in a worse position by preferring an appeal. The court of first instance having prima facie found that it was a case of making ‘wrong statements’, the High Court went on to record a finding that the appellants had in fact filed a false affidavit. Further, the High Court also recorded a finding as to the expediency of filing a complaint in the interests of justice. This finding was absent in the original order. The High Court has, thus, proceeded to improve the impugned order in an appeal preferred by the appellants, who were in fact aggrieved by the same. Such course is not permissible in law.
From Para 14,
14. We may also note that the application under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. came to be filed by the plaintiffs on 27.04.2005. Much prior thereto, on 20.09.2004 the defendant through his learned counsel moved an application seeking correction of the typing mistakes in the memorandum of appeal as well as the application for stay.
From Para 17,
17. Before parting, it may be noted that the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah and another (supra) was of the view that a direction for filing of a complaint normally ought not to be made during the pendency of the substantive proceedings before the Court but only when the proceedings conclude and the final judgment is rendered. The object is clear inasmuch as the main proceedings ought to be proceeded with and decided instead of diverting them with the aid of Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. It is noticed that at times, the aid of Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. is sought to be taken merely to delay the adjudication of the substantive proceedings, as also in the present case. The dictum of the Constitution Bench, thus, ought to be borne in mind by the Courts.
Citations: [2026 INSC 724]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/25151633/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6a5f599e5fc2952542506833
https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/wrong-statement-in-pleadings-not-necessarily-a-false-statement-supreme-court-quashes-perjury-case-542312
https://www.verdictum.in/supreme-court/prabhakar-yeshwant-masram-and-another-v-sou-tula-namdeorao-jaipurkar-and-another-2026-insc-724-1618292
The Perjury Threshold: Evaluating Wrong Statements in Pleadings
Index of Perjury Judgments here.
