Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 16 Jan 2025

A division bench of the Supreme Court passed this reportable Judgment,

From Paras 10-12,

10.Ordinarily, Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. is invoked by the complainant when the police authorities decline to register a First Information Report. In such circumstances, a private complaint may be made in the court of the Judicial Magistrate and the complainant may pray that police investigation be ordered under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. However, it is the discretion of the concerned Magistrate whether to order police investigation under Section156(3) of Cr.P.C. or take cognizance upon the complaint and issue process or dismiss the complaint under Section 203 of Cr.P.C. Over a period of time and in view of many decisions of this Court, if the officer in-charge of the concerned Police Station for some reasons declines to register the FIR, then the law has left it open for the complainant to file an appropriate application before the Magistrate and pray for police investigation. Once an order is passed for police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., then it becomes a police case. At the end of the investigation the police may either file a charge-sheet or file an appropriate closure report.
11.However, what is important to observe is that whenever any application is filed by the complainant before the Court of Judicial Magistrate seeking police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., it is the duty of the concerned Magistrate to apply his mind for the purpose of ascertaining whether the allegations levelled in the complaint constitute any cognizable offence or not. In other words, the Magistrate may not undertake the exercise to ascertain whether the complaint is false or otherwise, however, the Magistrate is obliged before he proceeds to pass an order for police investigation to closely consider whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are borne out on plain reading of the complaint.

From Paras 24 and 25,

24.Thus, there are prerequisites to be followed by the complainant before approaching the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. which is a discretionary remedy as the provision proceeds with the word ‘may’. The Magistrate is required to exercise his mind while doing so. He should pass orders only if he is satisfied that the information reveals commission of cognizable offences and also about the necessity of police investigation for digging out of evidence neither in possession of the complainant nor can be procured without the assistance of the police. It is, thus, not necessary that in every case where a complaint has been filed under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. the Magistrate should direct the Police to investigate the crime merely because an application has also been filed under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. even though the evidence to be led by the complainant is in his possession or can be produced by summoning witnesses, with the assistance of the court or otherwise. The issue of jurisdiction also becomes important at that stage and cannot be ignored.
25.In fact, the Magistrate ought to direct investigation by the police only where the assistance of the Investigating Agency is necessary and the Court feels that the cause of justice is likely to suffer in the absence of investigation by the police. The Magistrate is not expected to mechanically direct investigation by the police without first examining whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, investigation by the State machinery is actually required or not. If the allegations made in the complaint are simple, where the Court can straightaway proceed to conduct the trial, the Magistrate is expected to record evidence and proceed further in the matter, instead of passing the buck to the Police under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. Ofcourse, if the allegations made in the complaint require complex and complicated investigation which cannot be undertaken without active assistance and expertise of the State machinery, it would only be appropriate for the Magistrate to direct investigation by the police authorities. The Magistrate is, therefore, not supposed to act merely as a Post Office and needs to adopt a judicial approach while considering an application seeking investigation by the Police.

From Para 31,

31.A comparison of Section 175(3) of the BNSS with Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. indicates three prominent changes that have been introduced by the enactment of BNSS as follows:
a. First, the requirement of making an application to the Superintendent of Police upon refusal by the officer in charge of a police station to lodge
the FIR has been made mandatory, and the applicant making an application under Section 175(3) is required to furnish a copy of the application made to the Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4), supported by an affidavit, while making the application to the Magistrate under Section 175(3).
b. Secondly, the Magistrate has been empowered to conduct such enquiry as he deems necessary before making an order directing registration of FIR.
c. Thirdly, the Magistrate is required to consider the submissions of the officer in charge of the police station as regards the refusal to register an FIR before issuing any directions under Section 175(3).

From Paras 34-35,

34.In light of the judicial interpretation and evolution of Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. by various decisions of this Court as discussed above, it becomes clear that the changes introduced by Section 175(3) of the BNSS to the existing scheme of Section 156(3) merely codify the procedural practices and safeguards which have been introduced by judicial decisions aimed at curbing the misuse of invocation of powers of a Magistrate by unscrupulous litigants for achieving ulterior motives.
35.Further, by requiring the Magistrate to consider the submissions made by the concerned police officer before proceeding to issue directions under Section 175(3), BNSS has affixed greater accountability on the police officer responsible for registering FIRs under Section 173. Mandating the Magistrate to consider the submissions of the concerned police officer also ensures that the Magistrate applies his mind judicially while considering both the complaint and the submissions of the police officer thereby ensuring that the requirement of passing reasoned orders is complied with in a more effective and comprehensive manner.

Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 16 Jan 2025

Index of Judgments under Sec 156(3) Cr.P.C. are here.

M.Chinna Karuppasamy Vs Kanimozhi on 16 Jul 2015

Posted on May 11, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Madras High Court at Madurai Bench, held as follows,

From Paras 22 and 23,

22. In view of Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, if once the decree for divorce is granted on the ground of adultery, such finding is relevant for deciding the issue of adultery in the present case. This Court cannot sit in an appeal over the said decree for divorce granted by the Civil court, when the same has not been challenged by the aggrieved party. There can be no difference between a decree on contest and an ex-parte decree, since, like a decree on contest, an ex-parte decree is also a decree passed on proof of the claim made by means of sufficient evidence. It is well known that though simply because the defendant has remained ex-parte, the Court shall not grant decree, unless the claim made in the plaint is proved, by means of evidence either oral or documentary or both. In the case on hand, therefore, there can be no doubt that the decree for divorce granted by the Civil court in favour of the petitioner is sufficient proof that the respondent was living in adultery. When once such a decree is in force, it is not possible for this Court to take a different view contrary to the decree granted by the Civil court. Therefore, I hold that besides, oral evidence let in, in this case, the decree granted by the Family Court clearly goes to prove that the respondent is living in adultery and thus, she suffers from the disqualification to claim maintenance from the petitioner.
23. In view of the foregoing discussion, I hold that the learned Principal Sessions Judge was not right in reversing the order of the Trial Court and therefore, the order of the learned Principal Sessions Judge impugned in this Criminal Revision Case is liable to be set aside.

M.Chinna Karuppasamy Vs Kanimozhi on 16 Jul 2015

Index of Maintenance judgements u/s 125 CrPC is here.

Arige Venkataramaiah Vs State of Telangana on 20 Dec 2023

Posted on February 7, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Telangana High Court held that, the court can recall NBW without insisting upon the presence of the accused.

From Para 5,

5. Having regard to the rival contentions and the material on record, this Court finds that under Section 70 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (‘Cr.P.C.’ in short), the Court can issue a warrant in writing and under sub-section (2) thereof, every such warrant shall remain in force until it is cancelled by the Court which issued it, or until it is executed. The petitioner claims to have filed the application for recall of the NBW and it is his case that the accused can be represented by his counsel and he need not be present physically during the proceedings when the application for recall of NBW is being considered. In support of this contention, he placed reliance upon the judgment of Madurai Bench of Madras High Court in the case of R.Sundar Vs. The Sub Inspector of Police (1 supra), wherein the Hon’ble High Court has observed that the presence of the accused need not be insisted upon during the proceedings for recall of NBW.

Arige Venkataramaiah Vs State of Telangana on 20 Dec 2023

Index of NBW judgments here.

Aditi Sharma (alias Mithi) Vs Jitesh Sharma on 06 Nov 2023

Posted on November 8, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court, recorded that Trial Courts are not following Rajnesh Vs Neha Guidelines and directed the circular to be re-issued for strict adherence and compliance.

From Para 8,

8. The manner in which maintenance payable under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or Section 125 Cr.P.C. is to be assessed, was considered by this Court in its celebrated judgment in Rajnesh v. Neha and Another, (2021) 2 SCC 324. Detailed guidelines were issued. It was noticed that the terms of maintenance are decided on the basis of pleadings of parties and on the basis of some amount of guess work. It is often seen that both the parties submit scanty material and do not disclose correct details. The tendency of the wife is to exaggerate her needs, whereas the husband tends to conceal his actual income. Keeping that in view, this Court laid down the procedure to streamline grant of maintenance. The judgments of various courts were referred to and response from various State Legal Services Authorities was sought. This Court even requested the National Legal Services Authority to submit a report on the suggestions received from the State Legal Services Authorities for framing guidelines on the affidavit of disclosure of assets and liabilities to be filed by the parties. Guidelines were issued in exercise of powers under Article 136 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India, prescribing a uniform format of Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities to be filed in maintenance proceedings. The judgment was delivered on 04.11.2020. The affidavit was to be submitted in all maintenance proceedings including pending proceedings.

From Para 14,

14. Nothing is evident from the record or even pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant at the time of hearing that affidavits were filed by both the parties in terms of judgment of this Court in Rajnesh’s case (supra), which was directed to be communicated to all the High Courts for further circulation to all the Judicial Officers for awareness and implementation. The case in hand is not in isolation. Even after pronouncement of the aforesaid judgment, this Court is still coming across number of cases decided by the courts below fixing maintenance, either interim or final, without their being any affidavit on record filed by the parties. Apparently, the officers concerned have failed to take notice of the guidelines issued by this Court for expeditious disposal of cases involving grant of maintenance. Comprehensive guidelines were issued pertaining to overlapping jurisdiction among courts when concurrent remedies for grant of maintenance are available under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, Section 125 Cr.P.C., the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, and Criteria for determining quantum of maintenance, date from which maintenance is to be awarded, enforcement of orders of maintenance including fixing payment of interim maintenance. As a result, the litigation which should close at the trial level is taken up to this Court and the parties are forced to litigate.

From Para 16,

16. Considering the facts of the case in hand and the other similar cases coming across before this Court not adhering to the guidelines given in Rajnesh’s case (supra), we deem it appropriate to direct the Secretary General of this Court to re-circulate the aforesaid judgment not only to all the Judicial Officers through the High Courts concerned but also to the National Judicial Academy and the State Judicial Academies, to be taken note of during the training programmes as well. Ordered accordingly.

Aditi Sharma Vs Jitesh Sharma on 06 Nov 2023

Earlier ‘cryptic’ Judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court at Gwalior is below.

Jitesh Sharma Vs Aditi Sharma on 28 Jun 2023

Citations: [2023 SCC OnLine SC 1451], [2023 INSC 981], []

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/182154741/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/65570ae40c546b25c61fa465

https://legiteye.com/in-criminal-appeal-no-3446-of-2023-sc-supreme-court-directs-re-circulation-of-rajnesh-v-neha-guidelines-on-maintenance-to-ensure-adherence-in-similar-cases-justice-vikram-nath-justice-rajesh-bindal-06-11-2023/

Aditi Alias Mithi vs Jitesh Sharma on 6 November 2023

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/aditi-alias-mithi-versus-jitesh-sharma

[Landmark Judgement] Aditi V. Jitesh Sharma (2023)

https://www.latestlaws.com/adr/case-analysis/supreme-court-orders-re-circulation-of-rajnesh-versus-neha-judgment-saying-parties-are-forced-to-litigate-where-litigation-should-close-at-trial-level-208275

Rajnesh Vs Neha case is here.

Index of Maintenance cases is here.

Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRs Vs State of AP and Ors on 24 Feb 2011

Posted on July 22, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held as follows,

From Para 26,

26. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as “liberal approach”, “justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” can not be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the
parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections can not and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers.

Citations: [2011 SCALE 2 703], [2011 AIR SC 1199], [2011 AIR SC 1459], [2011 SUPREME 2 174], [2011 AIOL 144], [2011 SLT 2 378], [2011 BOMCR SC 5 857], [2011 JT 2 540], [2011 SCC 4 363], [2011 MHLJ SC 4 104], [2011 RCR CIVIL SC 2 880], [2011 ALR 86 59], [2011 AWC SC 3 2295], [2011 SCSUPPL CHN 2 130], [2011 CLT SC 112 152], [2011 KCCR SN 2 124], [2011 LW 3 26], [2011 SCR 3 2172909 CIVIL APPEAL NO OF 2913 2005], [2011 BOMCR 5 857], [2011 KCCRSN 2 124], [2011 RCR CIVIL 2 880], [2011 AIR SCW 1459]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/912526/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af08e4b0149711415652

https://vlex.in/vid/c-no-002909-002913-852352762

Y.Narasimha Rao and Ors Vs Y.Venkata Lakshmi and Anr on 9 Jul 1991

Posted on January 19, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court gave these interpretations to the various conditions under Section 13 of C.P.C. while deciding a foreign judgment is enforceable in India or not.

From Para 12,

12. We believe that the relevant provisions of Section 13 of the Code are capable of being interpreted to secure the required certainty in the sphere of this branch of law in conformity with public policy, justice, equity and good conscience, and the rules so evolved will protect the sanctity of the institution of marriage and the unity of family which are the corner stones of our societal life.

Clause (a) of Section 13 states that a foreign judgment shall not be recognised if it has not been pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction. We are of the view that this clause should be interpreted to mean that only that court will be a court of competent jurisdiction which the Act or the law under which the parties are married recognises as a court of competent jurisdiction to entertain the matrimonial dispute. Any other court should be held to be a court without jurisdiction unless both parties voluntarily and unconditionally subject themselves to the jurisdiction of that court. The expression “competent court” in Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act has also to be construed likewise.

Clause (b) of Section 13 states that if a foreign has not been given on the merits of the case, the courts in this country will not recognise such judgment. This clause should be interpreted to mean (a) that the decision of the foreign court should be on a ground available under the law under which the parties are married, and (b) that the decision should be a result of the contest between the parties. The latter requirement is fulfilled only when the respondent is duly served and voluntarily and unconditionally submits himself/herself to the jurisdiction of the court and contests the claim, or agrees to the passing of the decree with or without appearance. A mere filing of the reply to the claim under protest and without submitting to the jurisdiction of the court, or an appearance in the Court either in person or through a representative for objecting to the jurisdiction of the Court, should not be considered as a decision on the merits of the case. In this respect the general rules of the acquiescence to the jurisdiction of the Court which may be valid in other matters and areas should be ignored and deemed inappropriate.

The second part of clause (c) of Section 13 states that where the judgment is founded on a refusal to recognise the law of this country in cases in which such law is applicable, the judgment will not be recognised by the courts in this country. The marriages which take place in this country can only be under either the customary or the statutory law in force in this country. Hence, the only law that can be applicable to the matrimonial disputes is the one under which the parties are married, and no other law. When, therefore, a foreign judgment is founded on a jurisdiction or on ground not recognised by such law, it is a judgment which is in defiance of the Law. Hence, it is not conclusive of the matters adjudicated therein and therefore, unenforceable in this country. For the same reason, such a judgment will also be unenforceable under clause (f) of Section 13, since such a judgment would obviously be in breach of the matrimonial law in force in this country.

Clause (d) of Section 13 which makes a foreign judgment unenforceable on the ground that the proceedings in which it is obtained are opposed to natural justice, states no more than an elementary principle on which any civilised system of justice rests. However, in matters concerning the family law such as the matrimonial disputes, this principle has to b extended to mean something more than mere compliance with the technical rules of procedure. If the rule of audi alteram partem has any meaning with reference to the proceedings in a foreign court, for the purposes of the rule it should not be deemed sufficient that the respondent has been duly served with the process of the court. It is necessary to ascertain whether the respondent was in a position to present or represent himself/herself and contest effectively the said proceedings. This requirement should apply equally to the appellate proceedings if and when they are file by either party. If the foreign court has not ascertained and ensured such effective contest by requiring the petitioner to make all necessary provisions for the respondent to defend including the costs of travel, residence and litigation where necessary, it should be held that the proceedings are in breach of the principles of natural justice. It is for this reason that we find that the rules of Private International Law of some countries insist, even in commercial matters, that the action should be filed in the forum where the defendant is either domiciled or is habitually resident. It is only in special cases which is called special jurisdiction where the claim has some real link with other forum that a judgment of such forum is recognised. This jurisdiction principle is also recognised by the Judgments Convention of this European Community . If, therefore, the courts in this country also insist as a matter of rule that foreign matrimonial judgment will be recognised only it it is of the forum where the respondent is domiciled or habitually and permanently resides, the provisions of clause (d) may be held to have been satisfied. The provision of clause (e) of Section 13 which requires that the courts in this country will not recognise a foreign judgment if it has been obtained by fraud, is self-evident. However, in view of the decision of this Court in Smt. Satya v. Teja Singh, (supra) it must be understood that the fraud need not be only in relation to the merits of the mater but may also be in relation to jurisdictional facts.

Y.Narasimha Rao and Ors Vs Y.Venkata Lakshmi and Anr on 9 Jul 1991

Citations : [1991 SCC CRI 1 626], [1991 CRIMES SC 2 855], [1991 SCALE 2 1], [1991 SCR 2 821], [1991 SCC 3 451], [1991 DMC SC 2 366], [1991 JT SC 1 33], [1991 LW 2 646]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/989920/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac6be4b014971140ed08

Sanjay Kumar Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 28 Jan 2014

Posted on December 24, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Full bench of Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 4,

4. Earlier, this Court had issued notice to the petitioner himself to show cause that in case it was a fake institution, what was the reason or rationale for the petitioner to join the same and to continue to serve there for one year. In reply to the said show cause notice, the petitioner submitted that such pleadings be ignored and may not be taken into account for the purpose of disposal of the instant petition. We do not see any reason to allow a party to make a pleading in the petition and then make a submission to the court to ignore it as such an issue has no bearing on the merits of the case being totally irrelevant. Pleadings have to be true to the knowledge of the parties and in case a person takes such misleading pleadings, he can be refused not only any kind of indulgence by the court but can also be tried for perjury. In case, the pleading taken by the petitioner is true, he cannot ask for ignoring the same. In case, it is false and as such statement had been made on oath, he is liable to be tried for perjury. More so, whether such a pleading is relevant or not is a matter to be decided by the court and under Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, court has a right to ask the party even relevant or irrelevant questions and the parties or their counsel cannot raise any objection to any such question.

From Para 5,

Be that as it may, this Court had insisted at the time of first round of hearing of this case that AOR, Shri Manu Shanker Mishra should remain present in the Court at the time of arguments and also passed over the matter for his appearance. In the second round, it was informed to us that the AOR refused to come to the court. We take a very serious note of the conduct of this AOR, particularly, in view of the judgment of this Court In Re: Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, (2014) 1 SCC 572, wherein this Court has categorically held that in case the AOR does not appear in the court, his conduct may tantamount to criminal contempt of the court. In fact, a very few AsOR have spoiled the working system of the institution of AsOR who simply lend their signatures for petty amount. The AOR involved herein is living in a fool’s paradise if he thinks that he can play hide and seek with any court of law.

In such a chaotic situation, any “Arzi”, “Farzi”, half- baked lawyer under the label of “proxy counsel”, a phrase not traceable under the Advocates Act, 1961 or under the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 etc., cannot be allowed to abuse and misuse the process of the court under a false impression that he has a right to waste public time without any authority to appear in the court, either from the litigant or from the AOR, as in the instant case. The AOR, with impunity was disdainful towards the order of this Court directing him to appear in the court. He had also not filed any appearance for the counsel who had appeared, nor the said counsel disclosed his name. The Court takes serious note of the conduct of the AOR, Shri Manu Shanker Mishra and warns him to behave in an appropriate manner befitting the conduct of an advocate and an AOR otherwise this Court will not hesitate to take action against him. His conduct will be under close watch of this Court.

Sanjay Kumar Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 28 Jan 2014

Citations : [2014 ALLCC 84 1002], [2014 ALT CRL AP 2 242], [2014 CCR SC 2 37], [2014 COMPLJ SC 3 197], [2014 RCR CIVIL 2 285], [2014 SCALE 1 751], [2014 SCC 9 230], [2014 SCJ 4 412], [2014 SCR 1 848], [2014 UC 1 516], [2014 SCC CRI 5 21], [2014 SCC ONLINE SC 67], [2014 AIOL 52], [2014 SCV 1 397], [2014 SLT 3 298], [2014 RAJ 2 401], [2014 AICLR 1 991], [2014 ALLINDCAS 135 270], [2014 RCR CRIMINAL SC 2 711]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/199130163/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af4ce4b0149711416146

https://www.legalauthority.in/judgement/sanjay-kumar-vs-state-of-bihar-anr-5665

High Court of Madras Vs B Sathish Kumar and Ors on 27 Aug 2021

Posted on August 30, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

High Court of Madras Vs B Sathish Kumar and Ors on 27 Aug 2021

Adv Gorkanti Vinod Kumar

Posted on July 11, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

గోవధ నిషేధ చట్టం

Telangana & AP Cows Laws:

ఆంధ్రప్రదేశ్ మరియు తెలంగాణ గోవధ నిషేధ & పశు సంరక్షణ చట్టం 1977 ( The A.P. & T.S. Prohibition of Cow Slaughter and Animal Preservation Act ) ప్రకారం…

1) Section – 5 : ఆంధ్రప్రదేశ్ మరియు తెలంగాణ లో గోవులను , దూడలను (దూడలు మగవి అయినా , ఆడవి అయినా సరే) ఎట్టి పరిస్థితులలో ఉద్దెశపూర్వకంగా చంపకూడదు.

2) Section – 6 : మిగిలిన పశువులను అంటే ఎద్దు, దున్న, గేదె మొదలైనవాటిని చంపాలంటే , వాటి వయస్సు ఖచ్చితంగా 14 సంవత్సరాలు దాటి వుండాలి, అలాగే వ్యవసాయం కి మరియు బ్రీడ్ డెవలప్మెంటకి పూర్తిగా నిరుపయోగంగా వున్నాయని, ప్రభుత్వము నియమించిన పశు వైద్యుడు సర్టిఫికేట్ ఇవ్వాలి.

౩) Section – 8 : ప్రభుత్వ వైద్యుడి సర్టిఫికేట్ ఉన్నప్పటికీ, వాటిని ప్రభుత్వ అనుమతి వున్న కబేళా (పశువధశాల)లలో మాత్రమే వధించాలి, రోడ్డులపై, ఇండ్లల్లో, ఎక్కడ పడితే అక్కడ పశువులను వధించడం, మాంసాన్ని విక్రయించడం నేరము.

4) Section – 11 : ఈ యొక్క యాక్ట్ కాగ్నిజబుల్ (Cognizable) నేరం కింద వస్తుంది

(CRPC 43 ) సిర్ పిసి 43 :- ప్రకారం ఎప్పుడైనా కాగ్నిజబుల్ (Cognizable) నేరం జరిగినప్పుడు, ఎవ్వరైనా ప్రైవేట్ పర్సన్ (Private Person) అనగా మనం, నేరం చేసిన వ్యక్తిని అరెస్ట్ చేసే హక్కు ఉంటుంది, కావున గో వద అనేది కూడా కాగ్నిజబుల్ (Cognizable) నేరం కింద వస్తుంది, కావున గో వద చేసే రవాణా ని అడ్డుకొని అరెస్ట్ చేసే హక్కు ప్రతి ఒక్క ప్రైవెట్ పర్సన్ అనగా పౌరుడికి వుంది అనగా ఏ వ్యక్తి అయినా ఆపొచ్చు తర్వాత పోలీస్ వాళ్లకు అప్పగించాలి

(Animal Cruelty Act 1960 ) అనిమల్ క్రూయల్టీ యాక్ట్ 1960 :

1) Section – 11 : హింసిస్తూ, దెబ్బలు తాకుతూ, గాలి ఆడకుండా, రక్తం వచ్చేటట్టు కట్టేయడం, ఓవర్ లోడ్ చేస్తూ, నొప్పులతో ఇబ్బంది పెడుతూ తీసుకెళ్లడం నేరం

(A.P. & T.S. Motor Vehicle Rules 1989, Rule 253 Sub Rule (1), Clause (iii) ) ఏ.పి & టి.ఎస్ మోటార్ వెహికల్ రూల్స్ 1989, రూల్ 253 సుబ్ రూల్(1) క్లాస్ (iii) పశువుల రవాణాకు ప్రకారం నియమాలు:-

a) ఒక లారీలో 06 కంటే ఎక్కువ పశువులను రవాణా చేయకూడదు.

b) ఈ 06 కూడా రవాణా చేస్తున్న సమయములో, పశువైద్యుడి ధ్రువపత్రాన్ని కలిగి వుండాలి.

c) వాహనములో పశువులతోబాటు, వాటి బాగోగులు చూసుకునే వ్యక్తి (attedent) వుండాలి.

d) ప్రధమ చికిత్స పెట్టె (First Aid Box) వుండాలి.

e) మేత, నీరు వుండాలి.

f) మూసివేయబడి ఉన్న వాహనాలో (Closed Containers) పశువులను తరలించకూడదు.

(IPC 428 & IPC 429 ) ఐపిసి 428 & ఐపిసి 429 ప్రకారం

1)పశు రవాణా సమయం లో ఏదైనా పశువు అనగా ఆవు లేదా ఎద్దు చనిపోతే ఈ సెక్షన్స్ కింద కేసు నమోదు చేయించాలి, ఈ సెక్షన్స్ జోడించినచొ 2 లేదా 5 సంవత్సరాలు జైలు శిక్ష పడుతుంది, కావున తప్పకుండ ఈ సెక్షన్స్ వేసేటట్టు చూడాలి అక్రమ గోవుల రవాణా వాహనాలు మనకు కనబడగానే వాటిని ఆపి 100 కి కాల్ చేసి, పోలీస్ వారికి తప్పనిసరిగా సమాచారాన్ని ఇవ్వాలి. పోలీస్ వాళ్లు పట్టుకున్న గోవులను, సురక్షితంగా రిజిస్టర్ అయినా గోశాలకు తరలించాలి అక్రమ రవాణా చేస్తున్న వారి మీద, అమ్మినవారి మీద, కోన్నవారి మీద, శిక్ష పడేలా FIR కేసు వేయించాలి.

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Narendra Kumar Srivastava Vs State of Bihar on 4 Feb 2019

Posted on February 28, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that Perjury cannot be pursued via a private complaint.

From para 16, [Purpose of 340 CrPC]

16. Section 340 of Cr.P.C. makes it clear that a prosecution under this Section can be initiated only by the sanction of the court under whose proceedings an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b) has allegedly been committed. The object of this Section is to ascertain whether any offence affecting administration of justice has been committed in relation to any document produced or given in evidence in court during the time when the document or evidence was in custodia legis and whether it is also expedient in the interest of justice to take such action. The court shall not only consider prima facie case but also see whether it is in or against public interest to allow a criminal proceeding to be instituted.

From Para 18 [Talks about the landmark Santohk Singh decision]

18. In Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain and Anr., (1973) 2 SCC 406, this Court has held that every incorrect or false statement does not make it incumbent on the court to order prosecution. The Court has to exercise judicial discretion in the light of all the relevant circumstances when it determines the question of expediency. The court orders prosecution in the larger interest of the administration of justice and not to gratify the feelings of personal revenge or vindictiveness or to serve the ends of a private party. Too frequent prosecutions for such offences tend to defeat its
very object. It is only in glaring cases of deliberate falsehood where conviction is highly likely that the court should direct prosecution.

Narendra Kumar Srivastava Vs State of Bihar on 4 Feb 2019

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/37083044/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5c59bac09eff4333856aec6c

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/sh-narendra-kumar-srivastava-versus-the-state-of-bihar-ors

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