R.P. Kapur Vs State of Punjab on 25 March, 1960

Posted on July 28, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down three categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction could and should be exercised to quash proceedings:

(i) where there was a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint did not make out the offence alleged; and
(iii)where either there was no legal evidence adduced in support of the charge or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly failed to prove the charge.

Conclusion:

It is not a case where the appellant can justly contend that on the face of the record the charge levelled against him is unsustainable.

R.P. Kapur Vs State of Punjab 25 March, 1960

Citation: [1960 AIR 862], [1960 SCR (3) 311], [(1960) 3 SCR 388], [1960 CRLJ SC 1239], [1960 CRILJ 239], [1961 AWR 31 49], [1960 AIR SC 866]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1033301/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ab10e4b014971140b8c1

Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in

State Of Orissa Vs Sharat Chandra Sahu & Anr on 8 October, 1996

Posted on July 28, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Supreme Court in this judgment held that,

From Paras 10, 11

10. Sub-section (4) of this Section clearly provides that where the case relates to two offences of which one is cognizable, the case shall be deemed to be a cognizable case notwithstanding that the other offence or offences are non-cognizable.
11. Sub-section (4) creates a legal fiction and provides that although a case may comprise of several offences of which some are cognizable and others are not, it would not be open to the police to investigate the cognizable offences only and omit the non-cognizable offences. Since the whole case (comprising of cognizable and non-cognizable offences) is to be treated a cognizable, the police had no option but to investigate the whole of the case and to submit a chargesheet in respect of all the offences, cognizable or noncognizable both, provided it is found by the police during investigation that the offences appear, prima facie, to have been committed.

State Of Orissa Vs Sharat Chandra Sahu & Anr on 8 October, 1996

Ushaben Vs Kishorbhai Chunilal Talpada & Ors on 23 March, 2012

Posted on July 28, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Apex Court has in this judgment held that,

Legal Point #1:

The above provisions indicate that whereas Section 190(1) empowers the Magistrate to take cognizance of any offence, upon receiving complaint of facts which constitute such offence; upon police report of such facts; upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge that such offence has been committed, Section 198 which relates to prosecution of offences against marriage brings in the concept of complaint by an aggrieved person and Section 198(1)(c) explains how far the scope of term ‘aggrieved person’ can be extended in the context of offence under Section 494 of the IPC.

Legal Point #2:

A conjoint reading of the above provisions makes it clear that a complaint under Section 494 of the IPC must be made by the aggrieved person. Section 498A does not fall in Chapter XX of the IPC. It falls in Chapter XXA. Section 198A which we have quoted hereinabove, permits a court to take cognizance of offence punishable under Section 498A upon a police report of facts which constitute offence. It must be borne in mind that all these provisions relate to cognizance of the offence by the court.

Therefore,

Above provisions, lead us to conclude that if a complaint contains allegations about commission of offence under Section 498A of the IPC which is a cognizable offence, apart from allegations about the commission of offence under Section 494 of the IPC, the court can take cognizance thereof even on a police report.

In addition to CrPC 155(4), legislature brought in CrPC 198A specific to IPC 498A.

Ushaben Vs Kishorbhai Chunilal Talpada & Ors on 23 March, 2012

Sunita Jha Vs State Of Jharkhand & Anr on 13 September, 2010

Posted on July 25, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Again this judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a woman living with a married man, can not be called his relative, for the purpose of IPC 498Aa and hence charge of harassment can not be laid on her by knife.

Sunita Jha Vs State Of Jharkhand & Anr on 13 September, 2010

State Of Punjab Vs Gurmit Singh on 2 July, 2014

Posted on July 24, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Apex Court held that a person who is not a relative of husband, like in this case, Gurmit is the brother of his aunt (chachi), may not be prosecuted for offence under Section 304B IPC but this does not mean that such a person cannot be prosecuted for any other offence viz. Section 306 IPC, in case the allegations constitute offence other than Section 304B IPC.

State Of Punjab Vs Gurmit Singh on 2 July, 2014

Vijeta Gajra Vs State Of Nct Of Delhi on 7 July, 2010

Posted on July 24, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that IPC 498A is applicable to only relatives of husband who are blood relatives or by marriage. And thereby quashed the IPC 498A allegation from FIR. It let the proceeding to continue with IPC 406, in regards to the jewelry.

Vijeta Gajra Vs State Of Nct Of Delhi on 7 July, 2010

U.Suvetha Vs State By Insp.Of Police & Anr on 6 May, 2009

Posted on July 23, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that, a concubine is not a relative to the husband of the knife, with regards to IPC 498A.

The word ‘cruelty” having been defined in terms of the aforesaid explanation, no other meaning can be attributed thereto. Living with another woman may be an act of cruelty on the part of the husband for the purpose of judicial separation or dissolution of marriage but the same, in our opinion, would not attract the wrath of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.

Meaning or definition of “relative”:

In the absence of any statutory definition, the term ‘relative’ must be assigned a meaning as is commonly understood. Ordinarily it would include father, mother, husband or wife, son, daughter, brother, sister, nephew or niece, grandson or grand-daughter of an individual or the spouse of any person. The meaning of the word ‘relative’ would depend upon the nature of the statute. It principally includes a person related by blood, marriage or
adoption.
The word ‘relative’ has been defined in P. Ramanatha Aiyar Advanced Law Lexicon – Volume 4, 3rd Edition as under :-
“Relative, “RELATIVE” includes any person related by blood, marriage or adoption. [Lunacy Act ].
The expression “RELATIVE” means a husband wife, ancestor, lineal descendant, brother or sister. [Estate Duty Act].
“RELATIVE” means in relation to the deceased,
a) the wife or husband of the deceased;
b) the father, mother, children, uncles and aunts of the deceased, and
c) any issue of any person falling, within either of the preceding sub-clauses and the other party to a marriage with any such person or issue [Estate Duty Act].
A person shall be deemed to be a relative of another if, and only if, –
a) they are the members of a Hindu undivided family, or
b) they are husband and wife; or
c) the one is related to the other in the manner indicated in Schedule I-A [Companies Act, 1956].
“RELATIVE” in relation to an individual means –
a) The mother, father, husband or wife of the individual, or
b) a son, daughter, brother, sister, nephew or niece of the individual, or
c) a grandson or grand-daughter of the individual, or
d) the spouse of any person referred to in subclause (b) [Income tax Act].
“RELATIVE” means –
1) spouse of the person ;
2) brother or sister of the person ;
3) brother or sister of the spouse of the person;
4) any lineal ascendant or descendant of the person;
5) any lineal ascendant or descendant of the spouse of the person; [Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act].”

From Para 18,

By no stretch of imagination a girl friend or even a concubine in an etymological sense would be a ‘relative’. The word ‘relative’ brings within its purview a status. Such a status must be conferred either by blood or marriage or adoption. If no marriage has taken place, the question of one being relative of another would not arise.

U.Suvetha Vs State By Insp.Of Police & Anr on 6 May, 2009

Citations: [2009 ACC 67 903], [2009 SCC 6 787], [2009 SCC CRI 3 36], [2009 AIR SC 0 3491], [2009 SUPREME 3 797], [2009 RCR CRI 2 923], [2009 SCC 6 757], [2009 KERLT 2 686], [2009 MLJ CRI 2 1079], [2009 DMC 1 887], [2009 SLT 4 462], [2009 CUTLT SUPPL 1126], [2009 AIOL 675], [2009 AIR SC 1451], [2009 ANJ SC 2 16], [2009 BOMCR CRI SC 3 845], [2009 CRIMES SC 2 357], [2009 JT 7 222], [2009 SCALE 7 149], [2009 SCR 7 902], [2009 AIR SCW 3491], [2009 CRLJ SC 2974]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/953117/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aec9e4b0149711414c47

Suresh Nanda vs C.B.I. on 24 January, 2008

Posted on July 22, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this landmark judgment, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that, no one, except Passport Authority, can impound a passport; nor police nor Courts. Period.

The Apex Court held that

there is a difference between seizing a document and impounding a document. A seizure is made at a particular moment when a person or authority takes into his possession some property which was earlier not in his possession. Thus, the seizure is done at a particular moment of time. However, if after seizing of a property or document, said property or document is retained for some period of time, then such retention amounts impounding of property/or document.

And also

Maintaining that, the Passport Act, 1967 is a special act and thereby prevails over the Cr.P.C. which is a general law, vide G.P. Singh’s Principles of Statutory Interpretation (9th Edition pg. 133). This principle is expressed in the maxim \023Generalia specialibus non derogant\024. Hence, impounding of a passport cannot be done by the Court under Section 104 Cr.P.C. though it can impound any other document or thing.

This judgment has lead to lot of other judgments wherein the various High Courts in India had ordered lower courts to return back the passports of accused, that were either confiscated by the police as part of their search operations or crime investigation or had been surrendered to Courts, as a condition to obtaining Anticipatory Bail. They are listed here.

Suresh Nanda vs C.B.I on 24 January, 2008

Citations : [2008 AIR SC 1414], [2008 AIR SC 0 898], [2008 SCC 3 674], [2008 LW CRL 1 503], [2008 SCALE 2 46], [2008 JT 2 174], [2008 ALL MR CRI 1189], [2008 ALT CRI 2 344], [2008 DLT 147 397], [2008 CCR 1 318], [2008 SLT 2 245], [2008 AIOL 107], [2008 BOMCR CRI SC 2 514], [2008 SCC CRI 2 121], [2008 AIR SCW 898], [2008 CRLJ SC 1599], [2008 MLJ CRL 1 1195]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/572504/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae74e4b0149711413efc

K. Ramachandran Vs V.N. Rajan & Anr on 7 July, 2009

Posted on July 22, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this Landmark judgment from Hon’ble Apex Court, a key legal aspect which was not earlier faced, was deciphered and held. Please read through for yourself.

Categories of case which would justify the High Court in interfering with the finding of acquittal in revision:
“(i) Where the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still acquitted the appellant- accused;
(ii) Where the Trail Court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce;
(iii) Where the appellate Court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the Trial Court to be inadmissible;
(iv) Where the material evidence has been overlooked only (either) by the Trial Court or by the appellate Court; and
(v) Where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law

Of course, these categories were declared by this Court to be illustrative and this Court observed that other cases of similar nature could also be properly held to be exceptional in nature where the High Court could justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal.

K. Ramachandran Vs V.N. Rajan & Anr on 7 July, 2009

Reema Aggarwal Vs Anupam And Ors on 8 January, 2004

Posted on July 21, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Defense of Accused:

Before the trial Court the accused persons put the plea that charge under Section 498-A was thoroughly misconceived as both Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC pre-suppose valid marriage of the alleged victim-woman with the offender-husband. It was required to be shown that the victim-woman was the legally married wife of the accused. Since it was admitted that the appellant had married during the lifetime of the wife of respondent no.1, what happened to his first marriage remained a mystery. Prosecution has failed to establish that it stood dissolved legally. Prosecution having failed to bring any material record in that regard, Section 498-A had no application.

From Para 18,

It would be appropriate to construe the expression ‘husband’ to cover a person who enters into marital relationship and under the colour of such proclaimed or feigned status of husband subjects the woman concerned to cruelty or coerce her in any manner or for any of the purposes enumerated in the relevant provisions Sections 304B/498A, whatever be the legitimacy of the marriage itself for the limited purpose of Sections 498A and 304B IPC. Such an interpretation, known and recognized as purposive construction has to come into play in a case of this nature. The absence of a definition of ‘husband’ to specifically include such persons who contract marriages ostensibly and cohabitate with such woman, in the purported exercise of his role and status as ‘husband’ is no ground to exclude them from the purview of Section 304B or 498A IPC, viewed in the context of the very object and aim of the legislations introducing those provisions.

Finally,

Whether the offences are made out is a matter of trial. The High Court was not justified in summarily rejecting the application for grant of leave. It has a duty to indicate reasons when it refuses to grant leave. Any casual or summary disposal would not be proper. (See State of Punjab v. Bhag Singh (2003 (8) Supreme 611). In the circumstances, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court and remit the matter back to the High Court for hearing the matter on merits as according to us points involved require adjudication by the High Court. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated.

Reema Aggarwal Vs Anupam And Ors on 8 January, 2004

The acquittal of the accused happened at sessions court and a revision on this acquittal at High Court of Punjab and Haryana was dismissed. Read it here.

Citations : [2004 AIR SC 1418], [2004 ALD CRI 1 452], [2004 CALLT SC 3 16], [2004 DMC SC 1 201], [2004 JT SC 1 177], [2004 KLJ 1 825], [2004 KLT SC 2 822], [2004 PLJR 2 64], [2004 SCALE 1 264], [2004 SCC 3 199], [2004 CRIMES SC 1 276], [2004 SCC CRI 699], [2004 SCR 1 378], [2004 SUPREME 1 355], [2004 KHC 0 668], [2004 RCR CRI 1 776], [2004 ACC 48 442], [2004 AIR SC 344], [2004 SRJ 2 49], [2004 CCR 1 163], [2004 JCRIC 1 209], [2004 CRJ 2 432], [2004 SLT 1 466], [2004 AIR SCW 344], [2004 CRLJ SC 892]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1180389/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae01e4b0149711412ad7

https://vlex.in/vid/crl-no-000025-000025-852345777

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Category: Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification

R.P. Kapur Vs State of Punjab on 25 March, 1960

State Of Orissa Vs Sharat Chandra Sahu & Anr on 8 October, 1996

Ushaben Vs Kishorbhai Chunilal Talpada & Ors on 23 March, 2012

Sunita Jha Vs State Of Jharkhand & Anr on 13 September, 2010

State Of Punjab Vs Gurmit Singh on 2 July, 2014

Vijeta Gajra Vs State Of Nct Of Delhi on 7 July, 2010

U.Suvetha Vs State By Insp.Of Police & Anr on 6 May, 2009

Suresh Nanda vs C.B.I. on 24 January, 2008

K. Ramachandran Vs V.N. Rajan & Anr on 7 July, 2009

Reema Aggarwal Vs Anupam And Ors on 8 January, 2004