Mahila Vinod Kumari Vs State Of M.P on 11 July, 2008

Posted on August 10, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Supreme Court held that perjury proceedings initiated by Trial Court and High Court does not suffer from any infirmity and as such the petitions were dismissed,

As she resiled from the statement made during investigation, she was permitted to be cross-examined by the prosecution. She even denied to have lodged the first information report (Exh.P-1) and to have given any statement 1 to the police (Exh.P-2). In view of the statement of the petitioner, the two accused persons were acquitted by judgment dated 28.11.2001.

Another gem of the mindset of some women and her family members

Learned counsel for the petitioner stated that being a girl of tender age, she was pressurized by her mother and uncle to give a false report. This is at variance with the statement made in court during trial to the effect that she had not reported anything to the police.

Purpose of Section 344, Cr.P.C.

The purpose of enacting Section 344, Cr.P.C. corresponding to Section 479-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Old Code’) appears to be further arm the Court with a weapon to deal with more flagrant cases and not to take away the weapon already in its possession. The object of the legislature underlying enactment of the provision is that the evil of perjury and fabrication of evidence has to be eradicated and can be better achieved now as it is open to the courts to take recourse to Section 340(1) (corresponding to Section 476 of the Old Code) in cases in which they are failed to take action under Section 344 Cr.P.C.

Conditions to initiate CrPC 344 proceedings

For exercising the powers under the section the Court at the time of delivery of judgment or final order must at the first instance express an opinion to the effect that the witness before it has either intentionally given false evidence or fabricated such evidence. The second condition is that the Court must come to the conclusion that in the interests of justice the witness concerned should be punished summarily by it for the offence which appears to have been committed by the witness. And the third condition is that before commencing the summary trial for punishment the witness must be given reasonable opportunity of showing cause why he should not be so punished. All these conditions arc mandatory. [See Narayanswamy v. State of Muharashtra, (1971) 2 SCC 182].

Mahila Vinod Kumari Vs State Of M.P on 11 July, 2008

Citations : [2008 SCC 8 34], [2008 KERLT 3 509], [2009 SCJ 1 89], [2009 SCJ 1 396], [2008 AIR SC 2965], [2008 SCR 10 869], [2008 SCALE 10 97], [2008 SLT 6 419], [2008 AIR SC 4989], [2009 MPJR 1 7], [2008 CALCRILR 2 490], [2009 ILR MP 332], [2008 KLD 2 513], [2008 RAJLW 3 2379], [2008 AIOL 814], [2009 BOMCR CRI SC 2 494], [2008 SCC CRI 3 414], [2008 AIC SC 69 189], [2008 AIR SCW 4989], [2008 CRLJ SC 3867]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/46073/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae92e4b01497114142e2

https://www.legalauthority.in/judgement/mahila-vinod-kumari-vs-state-of-m-p-13468

Prashant Bharti Vs State of Nct Of Delhi on 23 January, 2013

Posted on August 3, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

The Hon’ble Apex Court has shown her right place for this liar who tried to frame an innocent in a false rape case. The liar was royally concluded to have falsified more than one instance as listed below.

High Court’s observations

“This Court cannot quash the FIR on the ground that FIR was false FIR. In case of a false FIR, it must be brought to its logical conclusion and Investigating Officer must give a report to that effect. In this case, if it is found that the petitioner has been falsely implicated and the complaint was false, it would be obligatory on the part of the Investigating Officer to register a case and book the prosecuterix for falsely implicating the person in an offence under Section 376 IPC. It is a very serious matter that a prosecuterix just by making a false statement can book somebody in offence under Section 376 IPC, which is serious in nature and invites a minimum punishment of 07 years. I consider that Investigating Officer shall submit a detailed report and in case, it is that the petitioner was falsely implicated, he would take steps for booking the complainant for falsely implicating the petitioner.”

Falsifications by liar caught by Hon’ble Court

It is apparent from irrefutable evidence, that during the dates under reference and for a period of more than one year and eight months thereafter, she had remained married to Lalji Porwal. In such a fact situation, the assertion made by the complainant/ prosecuterix, that the appellant-accused had physical relations with her, on the assurance that he would marry her, is per se false and as such, unacceptable. She, more than anybody else, was clearly aware of the fact that she had a subsisting valid marriage with Lalji Porwal. Accordingly, there was no question of anyone being in a position to induce her into a physical relationship under an assurance of marriage. it would clearly emerge, that the complainant/prosecuterix was in a relationship of adultery on 23.12.2006, 25.12.2006 and 1.1.2007 with the appellant-accused, while she was validly married to her previous husband Lalji Porwal.
In her aforesaid complaint, Priya, the complainant/prosecuterix had alleged, that the appellant-accused had called her on her phone at 8.45 pm and asked her to meet him at Lodhi Colony, New Delhi. When she reached there, he drove her around in his car. He also offered her a cold drink (Pepsi) containing a poisonous/intoxicating substance. Having consumed the cold drink, she is stated to have felt inebriated, whereupon, he took advantage of her and started misbehaving with her, and also touched her breasts. Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, the presence of the complainant/prosecuterix, as well as the appellant-accused, at the alleged place of occurrence (Lodhi Colony, New Delhi), on the night of 15.2.2007 after 8.45 pm, has been established to be false on the basis of mobile phone call details of the parties concerned. Once it is concluded, that the complainant/prosecuterix and the appellant-accused were at different places, far away from one another, and certainly not in Lodhi Colony, New Delhi on the night of 15.2.2007, it is obvious that the allegation made by Priya, the complainant/ prosecuterix against Prashant Bharti, the appellant-accused of having outraged her modesty, was false.
Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, medical evidence discussed above reveals, that the complaint made by the complainant/prosecuterix alleging a sexual relationship with her by Prashant Bharti, the appellant-accused, was made more than one month after the alleged occurrences. It was, therefore, that during the course of her medical examination at the AIIMS, a vaginal smear was not taken. Her clothes were also not sent for forensic examination by the AIIMS, because she had allegedly changed the clothes which she had worn at the time of occurrence. In the absence of any such scientific evidence, the proof of sexual intercourse between the complainant/prosecuterix and the appellant-accused would be based on an assertion made by the complainant/prosecuterix. And an unequivocal denial thereof, by the appellant-accused. One’s word against the other. Based on the falsity of the statement made by the complainant/prosecuterix noticed above (and other such like falsities, to be narrated hereafter), it is unlikely, that a factual assertion made by the complainant/prosecuterix, would be acceptable over that of the appellant-accused.

Gem of the entire judgment

Even in the charge sheet dated 28.6.2007, (extracted above) the investigating officer has acknowledged, that he could not find any proof to substantiate the charges. The charge-sheet had been filed only on the basis of the statement of the complainant/prosecutrix under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C.

Prashant Bharti Vs State Of Nct Of Delhi on 23 January, 2013

Citations: [2013 ACR 2 1461], [2013 AIC 123 44], [2013 SCALE 1 652], [2013 CRIMES SC 1 195], [2013 RLW SC 4 3155], [2013 ALLCC 81 414], [2013 AJR 4 469], [2013 SCR 1 504], [2013 AD SC 2 89], [2013 ALLMR CRI 1123], [2013 JT SC 2 240], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 85], [2013 AIR SC 2753], [2013 DRJ 135 26], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL 3 399], [2013 SCC CRI 3 920], [2013 CRILJ 3839], [2013 SCC 9 293]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/89372902/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af39e4b0149711415df1

Savitri Vs Shri Govind Singh Rawat on 9 October, 1985

Posted on August 2, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Read for yourself. This is the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court which held that interim maintenance can be given in a Sec 125 CrPC case.

From Para 6,

6. In view of the foregoing it is the duty of the court to interpret the provisions in Chapter IX of the Code in such a way that the construction placed on them would not defeat the very object of the legislation. In the absence of any express prohibition, it is appropriate to construe the provisions in Chapter IX as conferring an implied power on the Magistrate to direct the person against whom an application is made under section 125 of the code to pay some reasonable sum by way of maintenance to the applicant pending final disposal of the application. It is quite common that applications made under section 125 of the code also take several months for being disposed of finally. In order to enjoy the fruits of the proceedings under Section 125, the applicant should be alive till the date of the final order and that the applicant can do in a large number of cases only if an order for payment of interim maintenance is passed by the court. Every court must be deemed to possess by necessary intendment all such powers as are necessary to make its orders effective. This principle is embodied in the maxim “ubi aliquid conceditur, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest” (Where anything is conceded, there is conceded also anything without which the thing itself cannot exist). [Vide Earl Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law, 1959 Edn., p. 1797.] Whenever anything is required to be done by law and it is found impossible to do that thing unless something not authorised in express terms be also done then that something else will be supplied by necessary intendment. Such a construction though it may not always be admissible in the present case however would advance the object of the legislation under consideration. A contrary view is likely to result in grave hardship to the applicant, who may have no means to subsist until the final order is passed. There is no room for the apprehension that the recognition of such implied power would lead to the passing of interim orders in a large number of cases where the liability to pay maintenance may not exist. It is quite possible that such contingency may arise in a few cases but the prejudice caused thereby to the person against whom it is made is minimal as it can be set right quickly after hearing both the parties. The Magistrate may, however, insist upon an affidavit being filed by or on behalf of the applicant concerned stating the grounds in support of the claim for interim maintenance to satisfy himself that there is a prima facie case for making such an order. Such an order may also be made in an appropriate case ex parte pending service of notice of the application subject to any modification or even an order of cancellation that may be passed after the respondent is heard. If a civil court can pass such interim orders on affidavits, there is no reason why a Magistrate should not rely on them for the purpose of issuing directions regarding payment of interim maintenance. The affidavit may be treated as supplying prima facie proof of the case of the applicant. If the allegations in the application or the affidavit are not true, it is always open to the person against whom such an order is made to show that the order is unsustainable. Having regard to the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by a Magistrate under section 125 of the code, we feel that the said provision should be interpreted as conferring power by necessary implication on the Magistrate to pass an order directing a person against whom an application is made under it to pay a reasonable sum by way of interim maintenance subject to the other conditions referred to therein pending final disposal of the application. In taking this view we have also taken note of the provisions of Section 7(2)(a) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (Act 66 of 1984) passed recently by Parliament proposing to transfer the jurisdiction exercisable by Magistrates under section 125 of the code to the Family Courts constituted under the said Act.

Note: By way on an amendment to Cr.P.C. 1973 in 2001, the Parliament brought the following two Provisos.

Provided further that the Magistrate may, during the pendency of the proceeding regarding monthly allowance for the maintenance under this sub-section, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the interim maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, and the expenses of such proceeding which the Magistrate considers reasonable, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct:
Provided also that an application for the monthly allowance for the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding under the second proviso shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within sixty days from the date of the service of notice of the application to such person.

Savitri Vs Shri Govind Singh Rawat on 9 October, 1985

Citations: [1986 AIR SC 984], [1985 AWC SC 11 906], [1986 BOMLR 88 223], [1985 GLH 1184], [1985 MHLJ 976], [1986 PLJR 6], [1985 SCALE 2 697], [1985 SCC 4 337], [1985 SUPP SCR 3 615], [1985 SCC CRI 556], [1985 CRIMES SC 2 872], [1986 CRIMES SC 1 148], [1986 CRLJ SC 41], [1986 CAR 1], [1986 CRLR 1], [1985 BBCJ 160], [1986 MLJ CRI 1 12], [1985 DLT 28 437], [1985 MPLJ SC 662]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1194071/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac1fe4b014971140e17e

https://vlex.in/vid/special-leave-petition-civil-852326810

Chaturbhuj Vs Sita Bai on 27 November, 2007

Posted on August 1, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court explained who is eligible to claim maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. and under what conditions.

From Para 7,

7. Under the law the burden is placed in the first place upon the wife to show that the means of her husband are sufficient. In the instant case there is no dispute that the appellant has the requisite means. But there is an inseparable condition which has also to be satisfied that the wife was unable to maintain herself. These two conditions are in addition to the requirement that the husband must have neglected or refused to maintain his wife. It has to be established that the wife was unable to maintain herself. The appellant has placed material to show that the respondent wife was earning some income. That is not sufficient to rule out application of Section 125 CrPC. It has to be established that with the amount she earned the respondent wife was able to maintain herself.

Heart and soul of this judgment from Hon’ble Apex Court is in Para 8.

In an illustrative case where wife was surviving by begging, would not amount to her ability to maintain herself. It can also be not said that the wife has been capable of earning but she was not making an effort to earn. Whether the deserted wife was unable to maintain herself, has to be decided on the basis of the material placed on record. Where the personal income of the wife is insufficient she can claim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The test is whether the wife is in a position to maintain herself in the way she was used to in the place of her husband. In Bhagwan v. Kamla Devi (AIR 1975 SC 83) it was observed that the wife should be in a position to maintain standard of living which is neither luxurious nor penurious but what is consistent with status of a family. The expression “unable to maintain herself” does not mean that the wife must be absolutely destitute before she can apply for maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C.

Chaturbhuj Vs Sita Bai on 27 November, 2007

Citations: [AIR 2008 SUPREME COURT 530], [2007 AIR SCW 7416], [2008 CRI LJ (NOC) 186], [2008 CRI LJ (NOC) 2], [2008 (1) AIR JHAR R 664], [2008 (1) SRJ 29], [(2008) 1 MH LJ (CRI) 644], [(2008) 1 JCC 486 (SC)], [2008 (1) CALCRILR 416], [2008 (1) SCC(CRI) 356], [2008 (2) CRI RJ 401], [2008 ALL MR(CRI) 860], [2008 (2) SCC 316], [2007 (13) SCALE 402], [2007 (8) SUPREME 525], [(2008) 1 MPHT 13], [(2008) 64 ALLINDCAS 735 (CHH)], [(2008) 1 CGLJ 228], [(2008) 1 CHANDCRIC 27], [(2008) 1 DMC 22], [(2008) 1 CIVILCOURTC 233], [(2008) 2 GUJ LR 1159], [(2008) 1 HINDULR 130], [(2008) 2 JAB LJ 70], [(2008) 1 MADLW(CRI) 615], [(2008) 2 MAD LJ 481], [(2008) 1 MAD LJ(CRI) 1400], [(2008) 2 MARRILJ 605], [(2008) MATLR 775], [(2008) MATLR 165], [(2008) 39 OCR 383], [(2008) 1 PUN LR 263], [(2008) 1 RAJ LW 142], [(2008) 1 RECCRIR 163], [(2007) 4 CURCRIR 408], [(2008) 1 RECCIVR 136], [(2008) 2 ALLCRIR 1409], [(2008) 3 CGLJ 473], [(2008) 1 CAL LJ 166], [(2008) 1 ALLCRILR 342], [(2008) 105 CUT LT 729], [(2007) 3 JCC 2446 (DEL)], [(2008) 1 KER LT 41], [(2008) 1 RAJ CRI C 35], [2008 CRILR(SC&MP) 1], [(2008) 1 CRILR(RAJ) 1], [2008 CRILR(SC MAH GUJ) 1], [2008 (1) ALD(CRL) 97], [2008 (1) ANDHLT(CRI) 131 SC], [2007 INSC 1190]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1720873/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae55e4b01497114137ad

https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/browse/Case?caseId=007002893100&title=chaturbhuj-vs-sita-bai

[Landmark Judgement] Chaturbhuj v/s Sita Bai (2008)

Index Maintenance Judgments under Section 125 Cr.P.C. is here.

Shail Kumari Devi & Anr Vs Krishan Bhagwan Pathak on 28 July, 2008

Posted on August 1, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Landmark judgment from Apex Court here around the Sec 125 CrPC and few more details.

From Para 16,

Bare reading of sub-section (1) of Section 125 leaves no room for doubt that if any person having sufficient means, neglects or refuses to maintain his wife who is unable to maintain herself or his legitimate (or illegitimate) child (children) unable to maintain itself (themselves), or his father, or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself, a Court, upon proof of negligence or refusal, order such person to pay maintenance to his wife or child (children) or parents, as the case may be. It is also clear that maximum amount which could be ordered to be paid was Rs.500/- p.m. which was clear from the expression “not exceeding Rs.500/- in the whole”.

From Para 18,

By the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2001 (Act 50 of 2001), subsections (1) and (2) came to be amended with effect from September 24, 2001. The amended sub-sections now read thus:
…..
a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, at such monthly rate, as such Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct:

How the interim maintenance’ came to be about?

So far as ‘interim’ maintenance is concerned, it is true that Section 125 of the Code as it originally enacted did not expressly empower the Magistrate to make such order and direct payment of interim maintenance. But the Code equally did not prohibit the Magistrate from making such order. Now, having regard to the nature of proceedings, the primary object to secure relief to deserted and destitute wives, discarded and neglected children and disabled and helpless parents and to ensure that no wife, child or parent is left beggared and destitute on the scrap-heap of society so as to be tempted to commit crime or to tempt others to commit crime in regard to them, it was held that the Magistrate had ‘implied power’ to make such order. The jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Chapter IX (Order for Maintenance of Wives, Children and Parents) is not strictly criminal in nature. Moreover, the remedy provided by Section 125 of the Code is a summary remedy for securing reasonable sum by way of maintenance subject to a decree passed by a competent civil Court. Hence, in absence of any express bar or prohibition, Section 125 could be interpreted as conferring power by necessary implication to make interim order of maintenance subject to final outcome in the application.

Golden Words

Again, maintenance is a right which accrues to a wife against her husband the minute the former gets married to the latter. It is not only a moral obligation but is also a legal duty cast upon the husband to maintain his wife. Hence, whenever a wife does not stay with her husband and claims maintenance, the only question which the Court is called upon to consider is whether she was justified to live separately from her husband and still claim maintenance from him? If the reply is in the affirmative, she is entitled to claim maintenance.

Shail Kumari Devi & Anr Vs Krishan Bhagwan Pathak on 28 July, 2008

Citations : [2008 CRLJ SC 3881], [2008 AIR SC 5063], [2008 AIOL 871], [2008 SCR 11 386], [2008 ANJ SC SUPP 2 70], [2009 BOMCR SC SUPP 1 324], [2008 SCC CRI 3 839], [2008 JT 8 227], [2008 SCALE 10 602], [2008 AIR SC 3006], [2008 SCC 9 632], [2008 KERLT 3 576], [2008 AIR SCW 5063]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1952766/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae64e4b0149711413b53

Bhagwan Dutt Vs Kamla Devi And Anr on 17 October, 1974

Posted on August 1, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Apex Court has held the following that Section 488 under Old Code and Section 125 under new CrPC

Section 488 does not confer an absolute right on a neglected wife to get an order of maintenance against the husband nor does it impose an absolute liability on the husband to support her in all circumstances. The use of the word “may” in Section 488(1) indicates that the power conferred on the Magistrate is discretionary. A neglected wife, therefore, cannot, under this Section, claim, as of right, an order of maintenance against the husband. of course, the Magistrate has to exercise his discretion in a judicial manner consistently with the language of the statute with the regard to other relevant circumstances of the case. Nevertheless, the Magistrate has to exercise his discretion primarily towards the end which the Legislature had in view in enacting the provision.

And then…

The mere fact that the language of s.488(1) does not expressly make the inability of a wife to
maintain herself a condition precedent to the maintainability of her petition, does not imply that while determining her claim and fixing the amount of maintenance, the Magistrate is debarred from taking into consideration the wife’s own separate income or means of support. There is a clear distinction between a wife’s locus standi, to file a petition under s. 488 and her being entitled, on merits, to a particular amount of maintenance thereunder. This distinction appears to have been overlooked in Major Joginder Singh’s case (supra). Proof of the preliminary condition attached to a neglected child will establish only his competence to file the petition but his entitlement to maintenance, particularly the fixation of its amount, will still depend upon the discretion of the Magistrate. As the Magistrate is required to exercise that discretion in a just manner, the income of the wife, also, must be put in the scales of justice as against the means of the husband.

Finally,

There is nothing in these provisions to show that in determining the maintenance and its rate, the Magistrate has to inquire into the means of the husband alone, and exclude the means of the wife altogether from consideration. Rather, there is a definite indication in the language of the associate s. 489(1) that the financial resources of the wife are also a relevant consideration in making such a determination. Section 489(1) provides inter alia, that “on proof of a change in the circumstances of any person receiving under s. 488 a monthly allowance, the Magistrate, may make such alteration in the allowance as he thinks fit”. The “circumstances” contemplated by s. 489(1) must include financial circumstances and in that view,the inquiry as to the change in the circumstances must extend to a change in the financial circumstances of the wife.

Bhagwan Dutt Vs Kamla Devi And Anr on 17 October, 1974

R.P. Kapur Vs State of Punjab on 25 March, 1960

Posted on July 28, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down three categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction could and should be exercised to quash proceedings:

(i) where there was a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint did not make out the offence alleged; and
(iii)where either there was no legal evidence adduced in support of the charge or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly failed to prove the charge.

Conclusion:

It is not a case where the appellant can justly contend that on the face of the record the charge levelled against him is unsustainable.

R.P. Kapur Vs State of Punjab 25 March, 1960

Citation: [1960 AIR 862], [1960 SCR (3) 311], [(1960) 3 SCR 388], [1960 CRLJ SC 1239], [1960 CRILJ 239], [1961 AWR 31 49], [1960 AIR SC 866]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1033301/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ab10e4b014971140b8c1

Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in

State Of Orissa Vs Sharat Chandra Sahu & Anr on 8 October, 1996

Posted on July 28, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Supreme Court in this judgment held that,

From Paras 10, 11

10. Sub-section (4) of this Section clearly provides that where the case relates to two offences of which one is cognizable, the case shall be deemed to be a cognizable case notwithstanding that the other offence or offences are non-cognizable.
11. Sub-section (4) creates a legal fiction and provides that although a case may comprise of several offences of which some are cognizable and others are not, it would not be open to the police to investigate the cognizable offences only and omit the non-cognizable offences. Since the whole case (comprising of cognizable and non-cognizable offences) is to be treated a cognizable, the police had no option but to investigate the whole of the case and to submit a chargesheet in respect of all the offences, cognizable or noncognizable both, provided it is found by the police during investigation that the offences appear, prima facie, to have been committed.

State Of Orissa Vs Sharat Chandra Sahu & Anr on 8 October, 1996

Ushaben Vs Kishorbhai Chunilal Talpada & Ors on 23 March, 2012

Posted on July 28, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Apex Court has in this judgment held that,

Legal Point #1:

The above provisions indicate that whereas Section 190(1) empowers the Magistrate to take cognizance of any offence, upon receiving complaint of facts which constitute such offence; upon police report of such facts; upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge that such offence has been committed, Section 198 which relates to prosecution of offences against marriage brings in the concept of complaint by an aggrieved person and Section 198(1)(c) explains how far the scope of term ‘aggrieved person’ can be extended in the context of offence under Section 494 of the IPC.

Legal Point #2:

A conjoint reading of the above provisions makes it clear that a complaint under Section 494 of the IPC must be made by the aggrieved person. Section 498A does not fall in Chapter XX of the IPC. It falls in Chapter XXA. Section 198A which we have quoted hereinabove, permits a court to take cognizance of offence punishable under Section 498A upon a police report of facts which constitute offence. It must be borne in mind that all these provisions relate to cognizance of the offence by the court.

Therefore,

Above provisions, lead us to conclude that if a complaint contains allegations about commission of offence under Section 498A of the IPC which is a cognizable offence, apart from allegations about the commission of offence under Section 494 of the IPC, the court can take cognizance thereof even on a police report.

In addition to CrPC 155(4), legislature brought in CrPC 198A specific to IPC 498A.

Ushaben Vs Kishorbhai Chunilal Talpada & Ors on 23 March, 2012

Sunita Jha Vs State Of Jharkhand & Anr on 13 September, 2010

Posted on July 25, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Again this judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a woman living with a married man, can not be called his relative, for the purpose of IPC 498Aa and hence charge of harassment can not be laid on her by knife.

Sunita Jha Vs State Of Jharkhand & Anr on 13 September, 2010

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Category: Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification

Mahila Vinod Kumari Vs State Of M.P on 11 July, 2008

Prashant Bharti Vs State of Nct Of Delhi on 23 January, 2013

Savitri Vs Shri Govind Singh Rawat on 9 October, 1985

Chaturbhuj Vs Sita Bai on 27 November, 2007

Shail Kumari Devi & Anr Vs Krishan Bhagwan Pathak on 28 July, 2008

Bhagwan Dutt Vs Kamla Devi And Anr on 17 October, 1974

R.P. Kapur Vs State of Punjab on 25 March, 1960

State Of Orissa Vs Sharat Chandra Sahu & Anr on 8 October, 1996

Ushaben Vs Kishorbhai Chunilal Talpada & Ors on 23 March, 2012

Sunita Jha Vs State Of Jharkhand & Anr on 13 September, 2010