Som Mittal Vs Govt. Of Karnataka

Posted on September 11, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this set of judgments from Hon’ble Supreme Court, the importance of sticking to the topic of relevance of the case while writing/delivering judgments.

In Jan 29th judgment, Markandey Katju J went into a irrelevant topic of situation in UP due to unavailability of anticipatory bail in his concurring judgment and thereafter issued directions to send a copy of his judgment to a slew of government entities.

Som Mittal Vs Govt. Of Karnataka on 29 January, 2008

In Feb 21st judgment, another 3 judge bench headed by CJI K G Balakrishnan has held that,

From Para 12,

When this Court renders judgments, it does so with great care and responsibility. The law declared by this Court is binding on all courts. All authorities in the territory of India are required to act in aid of it. Any interpretation of a law or a judgment, by this Court, is a law declared by this Court. The wider the power, more onerous is the responsibility to ensure that nothing is stated or directed in excess of what is required or relevant for the case, and to ensure that the Court’s orders and decisions do not create any doubt or confusion in regard to a legal position in the minds of any authorityor citizen, and also to ensure that they do not conflict with any other decision or existing law. Be that as it may.

Som Mittal Vs Government Of Karnataka on 21 February, 2008

Dhariwal Industries Ltd Vs Kishore Wadhwani on 06 September, 2016

Posted on September 9, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Apex Court held that

In CrPC 301,

The role of the informant or the private party is limited during the prosecution of a case in a Court of Session. The counsel engaged by him is required to act under the directions of public prosecutor.

And, in CrPC 302,

As far as Section 302 CrPC is concerned, power is conferred on the Magistrate to grant permission to the complainant to conduct the prosecution independently.

Rule

when a complainant wants to take the benefit as provided under Section 302 CrPC, he has to file a written application making out a case in terms of J.K. International (supra) so that the Magistrate can exercise the jurisdiction as vested in him and form the requisite opinion.

Dhariwal Industries Ltd Vs Kishore Wadhwani on 06 September , 2016

Sushila Aggarwal and Ors Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 15 May, 2018

Posted on September 9, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this order, Hon’ble Apex Court has referred a matter regarding the valid time period of an anticipatory bail, to larger bench. The landmark pronouncement came on 29 January 2020 by a 5-judge bench here. The landmark precedent from an 1980 constitution bench is available here.

Sushila Aggarwal & Ors Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 5 May, 2018

It was earlier mentioned in Supreme Court on 19 September, 2018 in the court of 3 judges bench led by CJI and was directed to be listed after a week before appropriate Bench as per roster, subject to removal of defects, if any.

Sushila Aggarwal and Ors Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 19 September, 2018

Recently, it was heard by 5-judge bench on 23 October, 2019 and the judgment was reserved, after the arguments were concluded.

Sushila Aggarwal and Ors Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 23 October, 2019

The final status of the case [Case No. SLP(Crl) No. 007281 – 007282 / 2017], is available here.

An detailed analysis is available here.

Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia Etc Vs State of Punjab on 9 April 1980

Posted on September 8, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was held that,

Highlight

Should the operation of an order passed under Section 438(1) be limited in point of time? Not necessarily. The Court may, if there are reasons for doing so, limit the operation of the order to a short period until after the filing of an F.I.R. in respect of the matter covered by the order. The applicant may in such cases be directed to obtain an order of bail under Section 437 or 439 of the Code within a reasonably short period after the filing of the F.I.R. as aforesaid. But this need not be followed as an invariable rule. The normal rule should be not to limit the operation of the order in relation to a period of time.

Another set of clarifications here:

This should be the end of the matter, but it is necessary to clarify a few points which have given rise to certain misgivings.
Section 438(1) of the Code lays down a condition which has to be satisfied before anticipatory bail can be granted. The applicant must show that he has “reason to believe” that he may be arrested for a non-bailable offence. The use of the expression “reason to believe” shows that the belief that the applicant may be so arrested must be founded on reasonable grounds. Mere ‘fear’ is not ‘belief’, for which reason it is not enough for the applicant to show that he has some sort of a vague apprehension that some one is going to make an accusation against him, in pursuance of which he may be arrested. The grounds on which the belief of the applicant is based that he may be arrested for a non- bailable offence, must be capable of being examined by the court objectively, because it is then alone that the court can determine whether the applicant has reason to believe that he may be so arrested. Section 438(1), therefore, cannot be invoked on the basis of vague and general allegations, as if to arm oneself in perpetuity against a possible arrest. Otherwise, the number of applications for anticipatory bail will be as large as, at any rate, the adult populace. Anticipatory bail is a device to secure the individual’s liberty; it is neither a passport to the commission of crimes nor a shield against any and all kinds of accusations, likely or unlikely.
Secondly, if an application for anticipatory bail is made to the High Court or the Court of Session it must apply its own mind to the question and decide whether a case has been made out for granting such relief. It cannot leave the question for the decision of the Magistrate concerned under Section 437 of the Code, as and when an occasion arises. Such a course will defeat the very object of Section 438.
Thirdly, the filing of a First Information Report is not a condition precedent to the exercise of the power under Section 438. The imminence of a likely arrest founded on a reasonable belief can be shown to exist even if an F.I.R. is not yet filed.
Fourthly, anticipatory bail can be granted even after an F.I.R. is filed, so long as the applicant has not been arrested.
Fifthly, the provisions of Section 438 cannot be invoked after the arrest of the accused. The grant of “anticipatory bail” to an accused who is under arrest involves a contradiction in terms, in so far as the offence or offences for which he is arrested, are concerned. After arrest, the accused must seek his remedy under Section 437 or Section 439 of the Code, if he wants to be released on bail in respect of the offence or offences for which he is arrested.

Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia Etc Vs State Of Punjab on 9 April, 1980

Raghubir Singh & Others Etc Vs State Of Bihar on 19 September, 1986

Posted on September 8, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was held that,

Highlight

The result of our discussion and the case-law in this: An order for release on bail made under the proviso to s.167(2) is not defeated by lapse of time, the filing of the chargesheet or by remand to custody under s. 309(2). The order for release on bail may however be cancelled under s.437(5) or s. 439(2). Generally the grounds for cancellation of bail, broadly, are, interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice, or evasion or attempt to evade the course of justice, or abuse of the liberty granted to him. The due administration of justice may be interfered with by intimidating or suborning witnesses, by interfering with investigation, by creating or causing disappearance of evidence etc. The course of justice may be evaded or attempted to be evaded by leaving the country or going underground or otherwise placing himself beyond the reach of the sureties. He may abuse the liberty granted to him by indulging in similar or other unlawful acts. Where bail has been granted under the proviso to s.167(2) for the default of the prosecution in not completing the investigation in sixty days, after the defect is cured by the filing of a chargesheet, the prosecution may seek to have the bail cancelled on the ground that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence and that it is necessary to arrest him and commit him to custody. In the last mentioned case, one would expect very strong grounds indeed.

Raghubir Singh & Others Etc Vs State Of Bihar on 19 September, 1986

Satvinder Kaur vs State (Govt. Of N.C.T. Of Delhi) on 5 October, 1999

Posted on September 3, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

A landmark judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court which held that,

(1) The S.H.O. has statutory authority under Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code to investigate any cognizable case for which an F.I.R. is lodged.
(2) At the stage of investigation, there is no question of interference under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code on the ground that the Investigating Officer has no territorial jurisdiction.
(3) After investigation is over, if the Investigating Officer arrives at the conclusion that the cause of action for lodging the F.I.R. has not arisen within his territorial jurisdiction, then he is required to submit a report accordingly under Section 170 of the Criminal Procedure Code and to forward the case to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence.
This would be clear from the following discussion. Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers the Police Officer to investigate any cognizable offence. It reads as under :
” 156. Police Officer’s power to investigate cognizable case : –
(1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII.
(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate.
(3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above-mentioned.”

FIR Quash is set aside and the IO at Delhi is allowed to continue investigation.

Satvinder Kaur vs State (Govt. Of N.C.T. Of Delhi) on 5 October, 1999

Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1841921/

Citations: [1999 (8) SCC 728], [AIR 1999 SCC (Crl) 1503]

Sushil Kumar Sharma Vs Union Of India And Ors on 19 July, 2005

Posted on September 1, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this Writ Petition by Sushil Kumar Sharma, which was dismissed though, had this prayer,

By this petition purported to have been filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short ‘the Constitution’) prayer is to declare Section 498A of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short ‘the IPC’) to be unconstitutional and ultra vires in the alternative to formulate guidelines so that innocent persons are victimized by unscrupulous persons making false accusations.

And,

Further prayer is made that whenever, any court comes to the conclusion that the allegations made regarding commission of offence under Section 498 IPC are unfounded, stringent action should be taken against person making the allegations. This according to the petitioner, would discourage persons from coming to courts with unclean hands and ulterior motives. Several instances have been highlighted to show as to how commission of offence punishable under Section 498A IPC has been made with oblige motive and with a view to harass the husband, in-laws and relatives.

Here is the legal terrorism comment,

The object of the provision is prevention of the dowry menace. But as has been rightly contended by the petitioner many instances have come to light where the complaints are not bonafide and have filed with oblique motive. In such cases acquittal of the accused does not in all cases wipe out the ignonymy suffered during and prior to trial. Sometimes adverse media coverage adds to the misery. The question, therefore, is what remedial measures can be taken to prevent abuse of the well-intentioned provision. Merely because the provision is constitutional and intra-vires, does not give a licence to unscrupulous persons to wreck personal vendetta or unleash harassment. It may, therefore, become necessary for the legislature to find out ways how the makers of frivolous complaints or allegations can be appropriately dealt with. Till then the Courts have to take care of the situation within the existing frame work. As noted the object is to strike at the roots of dowry menace. But by misuse of the provision a new legal terrorism can be unleashed. The provision is intended to be used a shield and not assassins’ weapon. If cry of “wolf” is made too often as a prank assistance and protection may not be available when the actual “wolf” appears. There is no question of investigating agency and Courts casually dealing with the allegations. They cannot follow any strait jacket formula in the matters relating to dowry tortures, deaths and cruelty. It cannot be lost sight of that ultimate objective of every legal system is to arrive at truth, punish the guilty and protect the innocent. There is no scope for any pre- conceived notion or view. It is strenuously argued by the petitioner that the investigating agencies and the courts start with the presumption that the accused persons are guilty and that the complainant is speaking the truth. This is too wide available and generalized statement. Certain statutory presumption are drawn which again are reputable. It is to be noted that the role of the investigating agencies and the courts is that of watch dog and not of a bloodhound. It should be their effort to see that in innocent person is not made to suffer on account of unfounded, baseless and malicious allegations. It is equally indisputable that in many cases no direct evidence is available and the courts have to act on circumstantial evidence. While dealing with such cases, the law laid down relating to circumstantial evidence has to be kept in view.

And it was dismissed like this,

Prayer has been made to direct investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation (in short the ‘CBI’) in certain matters where the petitioner is arrayed as an accused. We do not find any substance in this plea. If the petitioner wants to prove his innocence, he can do so in the trial, if held.

Sushil Kumar Sharma Vs Union Of India And Ors on 19 July, 2005

Citations: [2005 ALLMR SC 5 982], [2005 SCR 730], [2006 CRLR 44], [2005 SRJ 8 90], [2005 CRLJ 0 3439], [2005 CRI LJ 3439], [2005 RCR CRI 3 745], [2005 SCC CR 0 1473], [2005 AIOL 300], [2005 CCR 3 43], [2005 KERLT 3 611], [2005 JT 6 266], [2005 CRLR 661], [2005 SCALE 5 523], [2005 MLJ CRI 1 887], [2005 ALLMR 5 982], [2006 CALCRILR 44], [2005 SLT 5 438], [2005 JCRIC 2 1193], [2005 ALD CRI 2 633], [2005 DMC 2 325], [2005 SCJ 5 303], [2005 SCC 6 281], [2005 AIR SC 3100], [2005 SCC CRI 0 1473], [2005 AIR SC 0 3569], [2005 UJ SC 2 1057], [2005 SUPREME 5 137]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1172674/ and https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae15e4b0149711412e70

Ramgopal & Anr Vs State Of M.P.& Anr on 30 July, 2010

Posted on September 1, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Supreme Court in this order, has held that,

There are several offences under the IPC that are currently non-compoundable. These include offences punishable under Section 498-A, Section 326, etc. of the IPC. Some of such offence can be made compoundable by introducing a suitable amendment in the statute. We are of the opinion that the Law Commission of India could examine whether a suitable proposal can be sent to theUnion Government in this regard. Any such step would not only relieve the courts of the burden of deciding cases in which the aggrieved parties have themselves arrived at a settlement, but may also encourage the process of re-conciliation between them. We, accordingly, request the Law Commission and the Government of India to examine all these aspects and take such steps as may be considered feasible.
The Secretary General of this Court shall forthwith send a copy of this order to the Law Commission of India as well as to the Law Secretary to the Government of India. The Law Secretary is requested to place a copy of this order before the Hon’ble Minister of Law & Justice, Union of India.

Ramgopal & Anr Vs State Of M.P.& Anr on 30 July, 2010

Amarsang Nathaji As Himself Vs Hardik Harshadbhai Patel And Ors on 23 November, 2016

Posted on September 1, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Apex Court has, in this 341 Appeal, held that it was not expedient in the interest of justice to continue with CrPC 340 proceedings at High Court of Gujarat and moreover it held that lower court has not followed the procedure in making the opinion that it was expedient in the interests of justice to file a complaint against respondent no.1 in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 340 of the CrPC.

“6. The mere fact that a person has made a contradictory statement in a judicial proceeding is not by itself always sufficient to justify a prosecution under Sections 199 and 200 of the Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”); but it must be shown that the defendant has intentionally given a false statement at any stage of the judicial proceedings or fabricated false evidence for the purpose of using the same at any stage of the judicial proceedings. Even after the above position has emerged also, still the court has to form an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice to initiate an inquiry into the offences of false evidence and offences against public justice and more specifically referred to in Section 340(1) CrPC, having regard to the overall factual matrix as well as the probable consequences of such a prosecution. (See K.T.M.S. Mohd. v. Union of India (1992) 3 SCC 178 , 1992 SCC (Cri) 572.) The court must be satisfied that such an inquiry is required in the interests of justice and appropriate in the facts of the case.”

Amarsang Nathaji As Himself Vs Hardik Harshadbhai Patel And Ors on 23 November, 2016

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/100876905/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5837160d53bee74f64c25ebd

https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2016/11/25/merely-making-contradictory-statement-in-a-judicial-proceeding-is-not-by-itself-always-sufficient-to-justify-a-prosecution-under-sections-199-and-200-ipc/

Index of Perjury case laws is here.

Varala Bharath Kumar Vs The State Of Telangana on 5 September, 2017

Posted on August 31, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

This is classic case of non-application of judicial mind all all levels of a criminal case proceedings, until the Hon’ble Supreme Court stepped in and ruled that the allegations in this case do not attract ingredients of IPC 498A or IPC 406 and thereby quashed the entire proceedings for good.

From Paras 8 and 9,

8. We are conscious of the fact that, Section 498-A was added to the Code with a view to punish the husband or any of his relatives, who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. Keeping the aforementioned object in mind, we have dealt with the matter. We do not find any allegation of subjecting the complainant to cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A IPC. The records at hand could not disclose any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the complainant to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the complainant. So also, there is nothing on record to show that there was a demand of dowry by the appellants or any of their relatives, either prior to the marriage, during the marriage or after the marriage. The record also does not disclose anywhere that the husband of the complainant acted, with a view to coerce her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand of any property or valuable security.
9. The ingredients of criminal breach of trust are also not forthcoming from the records as against the appellants. The allegations contained in the complaint and the charge-sheet do not satisfy the definition of criminal breach of trust, as contained in Section 405 IPC. In view of the blurred allegations, and as we find that the complainant is only citing the incidents of unhappiness with her husband, no useful purpose will be served in continuing the prosecution against the appellants. This is a case where there is a total absence of allegations for the offences punishable under Section 498-A and Section 406 IPC. In the matter on hand, the allegations made in the first information report as well as the material collected during the investigation, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC against the appellant-accused. So also the uncontroverted allegations found against the appellants do not disclose the commission of the offence alleged and make out a case against the accused. The proceedings initiated against the appellants are liable to be quashed.

Varala Bharath Kumar Vs The State Of Telangana on 5 September, 2017

The AP High Court order is here.

Citations : [2017 SCC 9 413], [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 1049], [2017 AIR SC 4434], [2017 ALLCC 101 359], [2017 CCR SC 4 140], [2017 DMCSC 3 529], [2017 RCR CRIMINAL 4 113], [2017 SCALE 11 131], [2017 SCC CRI 3 740]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/164920459/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/59b03f0fce686e45ff91df85

https://www.legalauthority.in/judgement/varala-bharath-kumar-vs-the-state-of-telangana-998

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Category: Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification

Som Mittal Vs Govt. Of Karnataka

Dhariwal Industries Ltd Vs Kishore Wadhwani on 06 September, 2016

Sushila Aggarwal and Ors Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 15 May, 2018

Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia Etc Vs State of Punjab on 9 April 1980

Raghubir Singh & Others Etc Vs State Of Bihar on 19 September, 1986

Satvinder Kaur vs State (Govt. Of N.C.T. Of Delhi) on 5 October, 1999

Sushil Kumar Sharma Vs Union Of India And Ors on 19 July, 2005

Ramgopal & Anr Vs State Of M.P.& Anr on 30 July, 2010

Amarsang Nathaji As Himself Vs Hardik Harshadbhai Patel And Ors on 23 November, 2016

Varala Bharath Kumar Vs The State Of Telangana on 5 September, 2017