Another good judgment from hon’ble Apex Court, setting aside a HC order which cancelled Anticipatory bail on improper ground.
Cunning knife got the bail granted earlier to husband, cancelled by the local magistrate for alleged reason that the appellant is not cooperating in the compromise talk.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has rightly set aside the order of High Court at Ranchi.
Correcting few directions given in Rajesh Sharma judgment here, a Full Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court has issued this judgment.
Shutter Down of Family Welfare Committees
From Para 18,
18. It was submitted by the learned Amicus Curiae that the decision in Rajesh Sharma (supra) requires reconsideration, for the said judgment confers powers on the Family Welfare Committee to be constituted by the District Legal Services Authority which is an extra-judicial committee of para legal volunteers/social workers/retired persons/wives of working officers/other citizens to look into the criminal complaints under Sections 498-A IPC in the first instance and further, there has been a direction that till such time a report of the committee is received, no arrest should be made. It is urged that the constitution of FWC to look into the criminal complaints under Section 498-A IPC is contrary to the procedure prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
From Para 33,
33. On a perusal of the aforesaid paragraphs, we find that the Court has taken recourse to fair procedure and workability of a provision so Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited v. Securities and Exchange Board of India : (2012) 10 SCC 603, Para 52; SCBA v. Union of India : (1998) 4 SCC 409, Para 47; Union of India v. Raghubir Singh (d) by Lrs. : (1989) 2 SCC 754, Para 7; Dayaram v. Sudhir Batham : (2012) 1 SCC 333 State of Punjab v. Dalbir Singh : (2012) 3 SCC 346, Paras 46, 52 & 85 Gian Singh v. State of Punjab : (2012) 10 SCC 303, Para 61 that there will be no unfairness and unreasonableness in implementation and for the said purpose, it has taken recourse to the path of interpretation. The core issue is whether the Court in Rajesh Sharma (supra) could, by the method of interpretation, have issued such directions. On a perusal of the directions, we find that the Court has directed constitution of the Family Welfare Committees by the District Legal Services Authorities and prescribed the duties of the Committees. The prescription of duties of the Committees and further action therefor, as we find, are beyond the Code and the same does not really flow from any provision of the Code. There can be no denial that there has to be just, fair and reasonable working of a provision. The legislature in its wisdom has made the offence under Section 498-A IPC cognizable and non-bailable. The fault lies with the investigating agency which sometimes jumps into action without application of mind. The directions issued in Arnesh Kumar (supra) are in consonance with the provisions contained in Section 41 CrPC and Section 41-A CrPC. Similarly, the guidelines stated in Joginder Kumar (supra) and D.K. Basu (supra) are within the framework of the Code and the power of superintendence of the authorities in the hierarchical system of the investigating agency. The purpose has been to see that the investigating agency does not abuse the power and arrest people at its whim and fancy.
From Para 35,
However, the directions pertaining to Red Corner Notice, clubbing of cases and postulating that recovery of disputed dowry items may not by itself be a ground for denial of bail would stand on a different footing. They are protective in nature and do not sound a discordant note with the Code. When an application for bail is entertained, proper conditions have to be imposed but recovery of disputed dowry items may not by itself be a ground while rejecting an application for grant of bail under Section 498-A IPC. That cannot be considered at that stage. Therefore, we do not find anything erroneous in direction Nos. 19(iv) and (v). So far as direction No. 19(vi) and 19(vii) are concerned, an application has to be filed either under Section 205 CrPC or Section 317 CrPC depending upon the stage at which the exemption is sought.
From Para 38,
38. In the aforesaid analysis, while declaring the directions pertaining to Family Welfare Committee and its constitution by the District Legal Services Authority and the power conferred on the Committee is impermissible. Therefore, we think it appropriate to direct that the investigating officers be careful and be guided by the principles stated in Joginder Kumar (supra), D.K. Basu (supra), Lalita Kumari (supra) and Arnesh Kumar (supra). It will also be appropriate to direct the Director General of Police of each State to ensure that investigating officers who are in charge of investigation of cases of offences under Section 498-A IPC should be imparted rigorous training with regard to the principles stated by this Court relating to arrest.
39. In view of the aforesaid premises, the direction contained in paragraph 19(i) as a whole is not in accord with the statutory framework and the direction issued in paragraph 19(ii) shall be read in conjunction with the direction given hereinabove.
40. Direction No. 19(iii) is modified to the extent that if a settlement is arrived at, the parties can approach the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the High Court, keeping in view the law laid down in Gian Singh (supra), shall dispose of the same.
41. As far as direction Nos. 19(iv), 19(v) and 19(vi) and 19(vii) are concerned, they shall be governed by what we have stated in paragraph 35.
So, in summary, the following are the currently active guidelines from SC modified from Rajesh Sharma, apart from Arnesh Kumar.
From Para 19 of Rajesh Sharma Judgment:
iv) If a bail application is filed with at least one clear day’s notice to the Public Prosecutor/ complainant, the same may be decided as far as possible on the same day. Recovery of disputed dowry items may not by itself be a ground for denial of bail if maintenance or other rights of wife/minor children can otherwise be protected. Needless to say that in dealing with bail matters, individual roles, prima facie truth of the allegations, requirement of further arrest/ custody and interest of justice must be carefully weighed;
v) In respect of persons ordinarily residing out of India impounding of passports or issuance of Red Corner Notice should not be a routine;
vi) It will be open to the District Judge or a designated senior judicial officer nominated by the District Judge to club all connected cases between the parties arising out of matrimonial disputes so that a holistic view is taken by the Court to whom all such cases are entrusted; and
vii) Personal appearance of all family members and particularly outstation members may not be required and the trial court ought to grant exemption from personal appearance or permit appearance by video conferencing without adversely affecting progress of the trial. (On filing an application u/s 205 CrPC or 317 CrPC;Judgments here)
Citations : [2018 SCC 10 443], [2019 SCC CRI 1 276], [2018 SCC ONLINE SC 1501], [2018 AIR SC 4273], [2018 DLT 252 175], [2018 CRIMES 3 503], [2018 GUJ LH 3 140]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/81618143/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5b9d5e5d9eff431109ed3e71
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/social-action-forum-for-manav-adhikar-and-another-versus-union-of-india-ministry-of-law-and
Source: https://www.livelaw.in/sec-498a-ipc-only-hc-can-quash-cases-on-settlement-a-third-agency-created-by-courts-cant-exercise-statutory-functionssc/
In Shivangi Bansal Vs Sahib Bansal on 22 Jul 2025, Division Bench of Apex Court restored the Family Welfare Committees.
In this case, hon’ble supreme court did not find any evidence that which “led that the deceased was subjected to cruelty by appellant Nos.2 & 3. Before holding that appellant Nos. 2 & 3 had committed the offence, it had to be found that they are responsible for subjecting her to cruelty or harassment, soon before her death. We find in this case evidence is only confined to the husband and not against appellant Nos. 2 & 3. Hence on the evidence on record, so far as appellant Nos. 2 & 3 are concerned, we extend to them the benefit of doubt and acquit them.”
There was a Criminal appeal filed on this case, the order of which is available below.
Another case, where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive. The hon’ble Supreme Court held that,
the High Court will not hesitate in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceeding under Category 7 as enumerated in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, which is to the following effect:
“(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
Above Category 7 is clearly attracted in the facts of the present case.
This is the order of compensation under CrPC 357 from Hon’ble Supreme Court, made out in a case of alleged kidnap and rape of a minor. What is the basis for the compensation awarded? I am still wondering.
This below is the conviction order, just FYI.
This is the landmark judgment from my favorite judge Shri Dalveer Bhandari J on the duration of a anticipatory bail granted by a High Court of a Sessions Court.
From Para 25,
Mr. Bhushan submitted that a plain reading of the section 438 Cr.P.C. clearly reveals that the legislature has not placed any fetters on the court. In other words, the legislature has not circumscribed court’s discretion in any manner while granting anticipatory bail, therefore, the court should not limit the order only for a specified period till the charge-sheet is filed and thereafter compel the accused to surrender and ask for regular bail under section 439 Cr.P.C., meaning thereby the legislature has not envisaged that the life of the anticipatory bail would only last till the charge-sheet is filed. Mr. Bhushan submitted that when no embargo has been placed by the legislature then this court in some of its orders was not justified in placing this embargo.
From Para 93,
Some courts of smaller strength have erroneously observed that section 438 Cr.P.C. should be invoked only in exceptional or rare cases. Those orders are contrary to the law laid down by the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Sibbia’s case (supra).
From Para 94,
The complaint filed against the accused needs to be thoroughly examined including the aspect whether the complainant has filed false or frivolous complaint on earlier occasion. The court should also examine the fact whether there is any family dispute between the accused and the complainant and the complainant must be clearly told that if the complaint is found to be false or frivolous, then strict action will be takenagainst him in accordance with law. If the connivance betweenthe complainant and the investigating officer is established then action be taken against the investigating officer in accordance with law.
From Para 97,
A great ignominy, humiliation and disgrace is attached to the arrest. Arrest leads to many serious consequences not only for the accused but for the entire family and at times for the entire community. Most people do not make any distinction between arrest at a pre-conviction stage or post-conviction stage.
From Para 101,
The proper course of action ought to be that after evaluating the averments and accusation available on the record if the court is inclined to grant anticipatory bail then an interim bail be granted and notice be issued to the public prosecutor. After hearing the public prosecutor the court may either reject the bail application or confirm the initial order of granting bail. The court would certainly be entitled to impose conditions for the grant of bail. The public prosecutor or complainant would be at liberty to move the same court for cancellation or modifying the conditions of bail any time if liberty granted by the court is misused. The bail granted by the court should ordinarily be continued till the trial of the case.
From Para 102, (VERY IMPORTANT)
The order granting anticipatory bail for a limited duration and thereafter directing the accused to surrender and apply before a regular bail is contrary to the legislative intention and the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Sibbia’s case (supra).
From Para 105, (VERY IMPORTANT)
The court which grants the bail has the right to cancel the bail according to the provisions of the General Clauses Act but ordinarily after hearing the public prosecutor when the bail order is confirmed then the benefit of the grant of the bail should continue till the end of the trial of that case.
From Para 106, (VERY IMPORTANT)
The judgment in Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh (supra) is contrary to legislative intent and the spirit of the very provisions of the anticipatory bail itself and has resulted in an artificial and unreasonable restriction on the scope of enactment contrary to the legislative intention.
From Para 108,
Section 438 Cr.P.C. does not mention anything about the duration to which a direction for release on bail in the event of arrest can be granted. The order granting anticipatory bail is a direction specifically to release the accused on bail in the event of his arrest. Once such a direction of anticipatory bail is executed by the accused and he is released on bail, the concerned court would be fully justified in imposing conditions including direction of joining investigation.
From Para 110,
In pursuance to the order of the Court of Sessions or the High Court, once the accused is released on bail by the trial court, then it would be unreasonable to compel the accused to surrender before the trial court and again apply for regular bail.
From Para 112,
The validity of the restrictions imposed by the Apex Court, namely, that the accused released on anticipatory bail must submit himself to custody and only thereafter can apply for regular bail. This is contrary to the basic intention and spirit of section 438 Cr.P.C. It is also contrary to Article 21 of the Constitution. The test of fairness and reasonableness is implicit under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Directing the accused to surrender to custody after the limited period amounts to deprivation of his personal liberty.
From Paras 115, 116 (VERY IMPORTANT)
The Apex Court in Salauddin’s case (supra) held that anticipatory bail should be granted only for a limited period and on the expiry of that duration it should be left to the regular court to deal with the matter is not the correct view. The reasons quoted in the said judgment is that anticipatory bail is granted at a stage when an investigation is incomplete and the court is not informed about the nature of evidence against the alleged offender.
The said reason would not be right as the restriction is not seen in the enactment and bail orders by the High Court and Sessions Court are granted under sections 437 and 439 also at such stages and they are granted till the trial.
From Para 119, (VERY VERY IMPORTANT)
This Court in the Sibbia’s case (supra) laid down the following principles with regard to anticipatory bail:
a) Section 438(1) is to be interpreted in light of Article21 of the Constitution of India.
b) Filing of FIR is not a condition precedent to exercise of power under section 438.
c) Order under section 438 would not affect the right of police to conduct investigation.
d) Conditions mentioned in section 437 cannot be read into section 438.
e) Although the power to release on anticipatory bail can be described as of an “extraordinary” character this would “not justify the conclusion that the power must be exercised in exceptional cases only.” Powers are discretionary to be exercised in light of the circumstances of each case.
f) Initial order can be passed without notice to the Public Prosecutor. Thereafter, notice must be issued forthwith and question ought to be reexamined after hearing. Such ad interim order must conform to requirements of the section and suitable conditions should be imposed on the applicant.
From Para 128, (VERY VERY IMPORTANT)
In case, the State consider the following suggestions in proper perspective then perhaps it may not be necessary to curtail the personal liberty of the accused in a routine manner. These suggestions are only illustrative and not exhaustive.
1) Direct the accused to join investigation and only when the accused does not cooperate with the investigating agency, then only the accused be arrested.
2) Seize either the passport or such other related documents, such as, the title deeds of properties or the Fixed Deposit Receipts/Share Certificates of the accused.
3) Direct the accused to execute bonds;
4) The accused may be directed to furnish sureties of number of persons which according to the prosecution are necessary in view of the facts of the particular case.
5) The accused be directed to furnish undertaking that he would not visit the place where the witnesses reside so that the possibility of tampering of evidence or otherwise influencing the course of justice can be avoided.
6) Bank accounts be frozen for small duration during investigation.
Citation: [(2011) 1 SCC 694], [AIR 2011 SC 312],
Indiankanoon.org or Casemine link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1108032/
Index of all Anticipatory Bail Matters is here.
In this set of judgments from Hon’ble Supreme Court, the importance of sticking to the topic of relevance of the case while writing/delivering judgments.
In Jan 29th judgment, Markandey Katju J went into a irrelevant topic of situation in UP due to unavailability of anticipatory bail in his concurring judgment and thereafter issued directions to send a copy of his judgment to a slew of government entities.
In Feb 21st judgment, another 3 judge bench headed by CJI K G Balakrishnan has held that,
From Para 12,
When this Court renders judgments, it does so with great care and responsibility. The law declared by this Court is binding on all courts. All authorities in the territory of India are required to act in aid of it. Any interpretation of a law or a judgment, by this Court, is a law declared by this Court. The wider the power, more onerous is the responsibility to ensure that nothing is stated or directed in excess of what is required or relevant for the case, and to ensure that the Court’s orders and decisions do not create any doubt or confusion in regard to a legal position in the minds of any authorityor citizen, and also to ensure that they do not conflict with any other decision or existing law. Be that as it may.
Hon’ble Apex Court held that
In CrPC 301,
The role of the informant or the private party is limited during the prosecution of a case in a Court of Session. The counsel engaged by him is required to act under the directions of public prosecutor.
And, in CrPC 302,
As far as Section 302 CrPC is concerned, power is conferred on the Magistrate to grant permission to the complainant to conduct the prosecution independently.
Rule
when a complainant wants to take the benefit as provided under Section 302 CrPC, he has to file a written application making out a case in terms of J.K. International (supra) so that the Magistrate can exercise the jurisdiction as vested in him and form the requisite opinion.
In this order, Hon’ble Apex Court has referred a matter regarding the valid time period of an anticipatory bail, to larger bench. The landmark pronouncement came on 29 January 2020 by a 5-judge bench here. The landmark precedent from an 1980 constitution bench is available here.
It was earlier mentioned in Supreme Court on 19 September, 2018 in the court of 3 judges bench led by CJI and was directed to be listed after a week before appropriate Bench as per roster, subject to removal of defects, if any.
Recently, it was heard by 5-judge bench on 23 October, 2019 and the judgment was reserved, after the arguments were concluded.
The final status of the case [Case No. SLP(Crl) No. 007281 – 007282 / 2017], is available here.
An detailed analysis is available here.
Bad Behavior has blocked 368 access attempts in the last 7 days.