Mohammad Wajid and Anr Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 08 Aug 2023

Posted on June 26, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court cautioned High Courts about malicious matrimonial cases.

From Para 30,

30. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.

Mohammad Wajid and Anr Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 08 Aug 2023

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Ghanshyam Soni Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 04 Jun 2025

Posted on June 17, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court granted Divorce to husband against a lying wife.

From Para 10,

10. A perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by the complainant are that in the year 1999, the Appellant inflicted mental and physical cruelty upon her for bringing insufficient dowry. The Complainant refers to few instances of such atrocities, however the allegations are generic, and rather ambiguous. The allegations against the family members, who have been unfortunately roped in, is that they used to instigate the Appellant husband to harass the Complainant wife, and taunted the Complainant for not bringing enough dowry; however, there is no specific incident of harassment or any evidence to that effect. Similarly, the allegations against the five out of six sisters that they used to insult the Complainant and demanded dowry articles from her, and upon failure beat her up, but there is not even a cursory mention of the incident. An allegation has also been made against a tailor named Bhagwat that he being a friend of the Appellant instigated him against the Complainant, and was allegedly instrumental in blowing his greed. Such allegations are merely accusatory and contentious in nature, and do not elaborate a concrete picture of what may have transpired. For this reason alone, and that the evidence on record is clearly inconsistent with the accusations, the version of the Complainant seems implausible and unreliable. The following observation in K. Subba Rao v. State of Telangana Represented by Its Secretary, Department of Home & Ors.2, fits perfectly to the present scenario:
“6. The Courts should be careful in proceeding against the distant relatives in crimes pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths. The relatives of the husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations unless specific instances of their involvement in the crime are made out.”
11. As regards the Appellant, the purportedly specific allegations levelled against him are also obscure in nature. Even if the allegations and the case of the prosecution is taken at its face value, apart from the bald allegations without any specifics of time, date or place, there is no incriminating material found by the prosecution or rather produced by the complainant to substantiate the ingredients of “cruelty” under section 498A IPC, as recently observed in the case of Jaydedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda & Ors. v. State of Gujarat3 and Rajesh Chaddha v. State of Uttar Pradesh.4 The Complainant has admittedly failed to produce any medical records or injury reports, x-ray reports, or any witnesses to substantiate her allegations. We cannot ignore the fact that the Complainant even withdrew her second Complaint dt. 06.12.1999 six days later on 12.12.1999. There is also no evidence to substantiate the purported demand for dowry allegedly made by the Appellant or his family and the investigative agencies in their own prudence have not added sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 to the chargesheet.

From Para 13,

13. It is rather unfortunate that the Complainant being an officer of the State has initiated criminal machinery in such a manner, where the aged parents-in-law, five sisters and one tailor have been arrayed as an accused. Notwithstanding the possibility of truth behind the allegations of cruelty, this growing tendency to misuse legal provisions has time and again been condemned by this Court. The observations in Dara Lakshmi Narayana & Ors. v. State of Telangana & Anr.5, Preeti Gupta & Anr. v. State of Jharkhand & Anr.6 aptly captures this concern.

From Para 15,

15. It is a settled position of law that for the computation of the limitation period under Section 468 CrPC the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance.7 The dicta laid down in the case of Bharat Damodar Kale & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh8 makes it unequivocally clear that the Magistrate is well within his powers to take cognizance of a complaint filed within a period of three years from the date of the commission of offence as mandated under section 468 CrPC.

Ghanshyam Soni Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 04 Jun 2025

Index of Quash Judgments is here.

Bal Manohar Jalan Vs Sunil Paswan and Anr on 30 Jun 2014

Posted on June 8, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 7,

7. The right of hearing given to accused under Section 401 clause (2) of Criminal Procedure Code was elaborately dealt with by this Court in Manharibhai Muljibhai Kakadia case (supra).
8. In the present case challenge is laid to order dated 4.3.2009 at the instance of the complainant in the revision petition before the High Court and by virtue of Section 401(2) of the Code, the accused mentioned in the First Information Report get the right of hearing before the revisional court although the impugned order therein was passed without their participation. The appellant who is an accused person cannot be deprived of hearing on the face of the express provision contained in Section 401(2) of the Code and on this ground, the impugned order of the High Court is liable to be set aside and the matter has to be remitted.

Bal Manohar Jalan Vs Sunil Paswan and Anr on 30 Jun 2014

Ritesh Sinha Vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr on 2 Aug 2019

Posted on June 4, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of the Supreme Court answer the references before it in the following way…

From Paras 5 and 6,

5. Two principal questions arose for determination of the appeal which have been set out in the order of Justice Ranjana Prakash Desai dated 7th December, 2012 in the following terms.
“(1) Whether Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, which protects a person accused of an offence from being compelled to be a witness against himself, extends to protecting such an accused from being compelled to give his voice sample during the course of investigation into an offence?
(2) Assuming that there is no violation of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, whether in the absence of any provision in the Code, can a Magistrate authorize the investigating agency to record the voice sample of the person accused of an offence?”
6. While the first question was answered in the negative by both the learned Judges (Justice Ranjana Prakash Desai and Justice Aftab Alam) following the ratio of the law laid down in State of Bombay vs.Kathi Kalu Oghad1, difference of opinion has occurred insofar as second question is concerned.

From Para 10,

10. We may now proceed to answer the second question, namely, whether in the absence of any specific provision in the Cr.P.C. would a Court be competent to authorize the Investigating Agency to record the voice sample of a person accused of an offence. We are told that no authoritative pronouncement of this Court has been rendered by this Court.

From Para 12,

12. None of the said amendments specifically authorize or empower a Magistrate to direct an accused person or any other person to give his/her voice sample for the purposes of an inquiry or investigation under the Code. “Omission” of the Legislature to specifically so provide has led the learned judge (Justice Aftab Alam) on the two judge Bench to doubt as to whether legislative wisdom was in favour of a specific exclusion or omission so as to make a judicial exercise through a process of interpretation impermissible.

Finally, from Paras 24 and 25,

24. Would a judicial order compelling a person to give a sample of his voice violate the fundamental right to privacy under Article 20(3) of the Constitution, is the next question. The issue is interesting and debatable but not having been argued before us it will suffice to note that in view of the opinion rendered by this Court in Modern Dental College and Research Centre and others vs.State of Madhya Pradesh and others11, Gobind vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and another12 and the Nine Judge’s Bench of this Court in K.S. Puttaswamy and another vs. Union of India and others13 the fundamental right to privacy cannot be construed as absolute and but must bow down to compelling public interest. We refrain from any further discussion and consider it appropriate not to record any further observation on an issue not specifically raised before us.
25. In the light of the above discussions, we unhesitatingly take the view that until explicit provisions are engrafted in the Code of Criminal Procedure by Parliament, a Judicial Magistrate must be conceded the power to order a person to give a sample of his voice for the purpose of investigation of a crime. Such power has to be conferred on a Magistrate by a process of judicial interpretation and in exercise of jurisdiction vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. We order accordingly and consequently dispose the appeals in terms of the above.

Ritesh Sinha Vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr on 2 Aug 2019

Citations: [2019 INSC 855]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/18061439/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5d5259333321bc4b5e57ce07

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/ritesh-sinha-vs-the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-anr

https://www.nayalegal.com/ritesh-sinha-v-state-of-up-2019

Shivendra Pratap Singh Thakur Vs State of Chhattisgarh and Ors on 15 May 2024

Posted on May 13, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A Full Bench of Apex Court held that, FIR which was lodged after 39 days of the incident, does not indicate the date or time so this is a fit case warranting exercise of powers conferred upon this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India so as to quash the proceedings of the criminal case.

From Para 14,

14. A bare perusal of the impugned FIR would reveal that the same was lodged by complainant-Barkat Ali on 29th June, 2019 with the allegation that the offences alleged were committed by the appellant and co-accused some time prior to 20th May, 2019. Thus, the complainant was not even sure of the date on which the alleged offences were committed. No reason whatsoever has been given in the FIR for huge delay of more than 39 days in approaching the police. The Investigating Officer prepared a site plan during the course of investigation which has been made a part of the record. A perusal of the said site plan would reveal that so far as the plot of Purnima Begum, wife of Barkat Ali is concerned, it is fully encumbered by a boundary wall and no damage is shown to this structure. The site plan indicates that there is some damage to the under-construction house of Sushma Kashyap. In the FIR, the damage suffered by the complainant was quantified at Rs. 6 lakhs whereas the damage suffered by Smt. Sushma Kashyap was quantified as Rs. 4 lakhs owing to the demolition of her under construction house. However, admittedly, Smt. Sushma did not lodge any complaint to the police.

From Paras 16 and 17,

16. Neither Sushma Kashyap nor her husband-Rajkumar Kashyap lodged any complaint regarding the so-called criminal activity committed by the appellant and the co-accused on their land. The site plan further indicates that the plot of the co-accused Saurabh Pratap Singh Thakur is immediately adjoining the plots of complainant-Barkat Ali and Sushma Kashyap. It is thus, apparent that there is an imminent possibility of animus between the complainant and the accused persons on this count. The FIR which was lodged after 39 days of the incident, does not indicate the date or time, when the accused trespassed into the house of the complainant and caused damage to his property and committed the other offences for which the FIR came to be registered. Therefore, we are of the view that the impugned FIR seems to be nothing but a tool to wreak vengeance against the appellant herein.
17. In this background, we feel that it is a fit case warranting exercise of powers conferred upon this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India so as to quash the proceedings of the criminal case.

Shivendra Pratap Singh Thakur Vs State of Chhattisgarh and Ors on 15 May 2024

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Kiran Jyot Maini Vs Anish Pramod Patel on 15 Jul 2024

Posted on April 5, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court passed this decision. Not sure, why this is a reportable judgment!

Kiran Jyot Maini Vs Anish Pramod Patel on 15 Jul 2024

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/669778a11312582eb2f9e52c

Index of Maintenance Judgments under DV Act is here. Divorce Judgments here. DV Judgements here.

Sunita Kachwaha and Ors Vs Anil Kuchwaha on 28 Oct 2014

Posted on April 5, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows,

From para 9,

9. Inability to maintain herself is the precondition for grant of maintenance to the wife. The wife must positively aver and prove that she is unable to maintain herself, in addition to the fact that her husband has sufficient means to maintain her and that he has neglected to maintain her. In her evidence, the appellant wife has stated that only due to help of her retired parents and brothers, she is able to maintain herself and her daughters. Where the wife states that she has great hardships in maintaining herself and the daughters, while her husband’s economic condition is quite good, the wife would be entitled to maintenance.

Sunita Kachwaha and Ors Vs Anil Kuchwaha on 28 Oct 2014

Citations: [AIR 2015 SUPREME COURT 554]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/3786357/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af48e4b01497114160aa

Index of Maintenance Judgments under 144 BNSS is here.

N.Usha Rani and Anr Vs Moodudula Srinivas on 30 Jan 2025

Posted on March 28, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court passed this judgment…

From Para 3, (Madam is very planned: MOU signed with First Husband on 25-Nov-2005; Remarriage with Second Husband on 27-Nov-2005; And someone said our judges are blind-fucks)

3. The facts of the case reveal that Appellant No.1 before this Court – Smt. N. Usha Rani married one Nomula Srinivas on 30.08.1999 at Hyderabad. During the period of their wedlock, she gave birth to a male child, namely, Sai Ganesh on 15.08.2000. The couple lived together until disputes arose between them. Following their return from the United States of America in February 2005, they began living separately. Eventually, on 25.11.2005, a Memorandum of Understanding (‘MoU’) was executed between the couple, dissolving their marriage. Meanwhile, Appellant No. 1 got acquainted with her neighbour,the Respondent, and the couple got married on 27.11.2005.

From Para 10,

10. We have heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the record. The short question before us is whether a woman is entitled to claim maintenance u/s. 125 CrPC from her second husband while her first marriage is allegedly legally subsisting.

From Paras 17 and 18, (Dripping and Simping Wokeism… Thuuu)

17. This encapsulates the full scope and gravity of considerations before this Court as we deliberate on the issue at hand. The present case does not concern a live-in relationship. The Family Court made a factual finding that Appellant No. 1 married the Respondent and that finding is not disputed by the Respondent. Instead, the Respondent seeks to defeat the right to maintenance by claiming that his marriage to Appellant No. 1 is void ab initio as her first marriage is still subsisting. Two other pertinent facts must be considered: firstly, it is not the case of the Respondent that the truth was concealed from him. In fact, the Family Court makes a specific finding that Respondent was fully aware of the first marriage of the Appellant No. 1. Therefore, Respondent knowingly entered into a marriage with Appellant No. 1 not once, but twice. Secondly, Appellant No. 1 places before this Court an MoU of separation with her first husband. While this is not a legal decree of divorce, it also emerges from this document and other evidence that the parties have dissolved their ties, they have been living separately and Appellant No. 1 is not deriving maintenance from her first husband. Therefore, barring the absence of a legal decree, Appellant No. 1 is de facto separated from her first husband and is not deriving any rights and entitlements as a consequence of that marriage.
18. In the opinion of this Court, when the social justice objective of maintenance u/s. 125CrPC is considered against the particular facts and circumstances of this case, we cannot, in good conscience, deny maintenance to Appellant No. 1. It is settled law that social welfare provisions must be subjected to an expansive and beneficial construction and this understanding has been extended to maintenance since Ramesh Chander (supra). An alternate interpretation would not only explicitly defeat the purpose of the provision by permitting vagrancy and destitution, but would also give legal sanction to the actions of the Respondent in knowingly entering into a marriage with Appellant No.1, availing its privileges but escaping its consequent duties and obligations. The only conceivable mischief that could arise in permitting a beneficial interpretation is that the Appellant No.1 could claim dual maintenance–however, that is not the case under the present facts. We are aware that this Court has previously denied maintenance in cases of subsisting marriages (See Yamunabai (supra) and Bakulabai (supra)). However, a plea of separation from the first marriage was not made in those cases and hence, they are factually distinguishable. It must be borne in mind that the right to maintenance u/s. 125 CrPC is not a benefit received by a wife but rather a legal and moral duty owed by the husband.

N.Usha Rani and Anr Vs Moodudula Srinivas on 30 Jan 2025

Citations: [2025 INSC 129]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/56187356/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/67a987a7c254af19d96c5a16

Index of Maintenance Judgements is here.

Chand Dhawan Vs Jawaharlal Dhawan on 11 Jun 1993

Posted on March 23, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court passed this landmark judgment, holding that alimony u/s 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act can be sought only when any decree is passed under sections 9 to 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act.

On the other hand, under the Hindu Marriage Act, in contrast, her claim for maintenance pendente lite is durated on the pendency of a litigation of the kind envisaged under sections 9 to 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, and her claim to permanent maintenance or alimony is based on the supposition that either her marital status has been strained or affected by passing a decree for restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation in favour or against her, or her marriage stands dissolved by a decree of nullity or divorce, with or without her consent. Thus when her marital status is to be affected or disrupted the court does so by passing a decree for or against her. On or at the time of the happening of that event, the court being siezen of the matter, invokes its ancilliary or incidental power to grant permanent alimony. Not only that, the court retains the jurisdiction at subsequent stages to fulfil this incidental or ancilliary obligation when moved by an application on that behalf by a party entitled to relief. The court further retains the power to chance or alter the order in view of the changed circumstances. Thus the whole exercise is within the gammit of a diseased of a broken marriage. And in order to avoid conflict of perceptions the legislature while codifying the Hindu Marriage Act preserved the right of permanent maintenance in favour of the husband or the wife, as the case may be, dependent on the court passing a decree of the kind as envisaged under sections 9 to 14 of the Act. In other words without the marital status being affected or disrupted by the matrimonial court under the Hindu Marriage Act the claim of permanent alimony was not to be valid as ancilliary or incidental to such affectation or disruption.
We have thus, in this light, no hesitation in coming to the view that when by court intervention under the Hindu Marriage Act, affection or disruption to the marital status has come by, at that juncture, while passing the decree, it undoubtedly has the power to grant permanent alimony or maintenance, if that power is invoked at that time. It also retains the power subsequently to be invoked on application by a party entitled to relief.

Finally,

On the afore analysis we have been led to the conclusion that the step of the wife to move the court of Additional District Judge, Amritsar for grant of maintenance under section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act was ill-advised. The judgment of the High Court under appeal could be no other than the one that it was in the present state of law and the facts and circumstances. It is still open to the wife to stake her claim to maintenance in other fora. The judgments of the High Courts earlier quoted, and others which have been left out, which are not in line with our view are over-ruled. The earlier and predominant view was the correct one and the later an aberration; something unfortunate from the precedential point of view. The appeals thus inevitably have to and are hereby dismissed, but without any order as to costs.

Chand Dhawan Vs Jawaharlal Dhawan on 11 Jun 1993

Citations: [1993 LawSuit(SC) 494], [(1993) 3 S.C.R. 954], [1993 INSC 216], [1993 SCC (3) 406], [1993 AIR SCW 2548], [1993 CRI. L. J. 2930], [1993 SCC(CRI) 915], [(1993) IJR 335 (SC)], [1994 BOM CJ 147], [1993 (2) UJ (SC) 356], [1993 (4) JT 22], [1993 MAH LJ 1731], [(1993) 2 DMC 110], [(1993) 2 HINDULR 203], [(1993) 2 MAHLR 866], [(1993) MARRILJ 459], [(1994) MPLJ 1], [(1993) 3 RECCRIR 545], [(1994) 1 RRR 574], [(1993) 3 SCJ 50], [(1993) 22 ALL LR 240], [(1993) 2 CIVLJ 902], [1993 LawSuit(SC) 494]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1162687/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac8fe4b014971140f246

https://digiscr.sci.gov.in/view_judgment?id=MTk0MTQ=

https://www.shoneekapoor.com/chand-dhawan-vs-jawaharlal-dhawan/

SMT. CHAND DHAWAN Vs JAWAHARLAL DHAWAN

https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/browse/Case?caseId=002991343000&title=chanddhawan-vs-jawaharlal

https://www.simplekanoon.com/family-law/smt-chand-dhawan-v-jawaharlal-dhawan-1509/

https://lawfyi.io/smt-chand-dhawan-vs-jawaharlal-dhawan-on-11-june-1993/

https://lawsuitcasefinder.com/casedetail?id=U2FsdGVkX1plo2GAY5xcebh78PQGFoZ2Mju1Jpebh78bGJ5ukMSE1YMgs5

Index to the Maintenance Judgments under Hindu Marriage Act here.

Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 16 Jan 2025

Posted on February 28, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Supreme Court passed this reportable Judgment,

From Paras 10-12,

10.Ordinarily, Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. is invoked by the complainant when the police authorities decline to register a First Information Report. In such circumstances, a private complaint may be made in the court of the Judicial Magistrate and the complainant may pray that police investigation be ordered under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. However, it is the discretion of the concerned Magistrate whether to order police investigation under Section156(3) of Cr.P.C. or take cognizance upon the complaint and issue process or dismiss the complaint under Section 203 of Cr.P.C. Over a period of time and in view of many decisions of this Court, if the officer in-charge of the concerned Police Station for some reasons declines to register the FIR, then the law has left it open for the complainant to file an appropriate application before the Magistrate and pray for police investigation. Once an order is passed for police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., then it becomes a police case. At the end of the investigation the police may either file a charge-sheet or file an appropriate closure report.
11.However, what is important to observe is that whenever any application is filed by the complainant before the Court of Judicial Magistrate seeking police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., it is the duty of the concerned Magistrate to apply his mind for the purpose of ascertaining whether the allegations levelled in the complaint constitute any cognizable offence or not. In other words, the Magistrate may not undertake the exercise to ascertain whether the complaint is false or otherwise, however, the Magistrate is obliged before he proceeds to pass an order for police investigation to closely consider whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are borne out on plain reading of the complaint.

From Paras 24 and 25,

24.Thus, there are prerequisites to be followed by the complainant before approaching the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. which is a discretionary remedy as the provision proceeds with the word ‘may’. The Magistrate is required to exercise his mind while doing so. He should pass orders only if he is satisfied that the information reveals commission of cognizable offences and also about the necessity of police investigation for digging out of evidence neither in possession of the complainant nor can be procured without the assistance of the police. It is, thus, not necessary that in every case where a complaint has been filed under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. the Magistrate should direct the Police to investigate the crime merely because an application has also been filed under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. even though the evidence to be led by the complainant is in his possession or can be produced by summoning witnesses, with the assistance of the court or otherwise. The issue of jurisdiction also becomes important at that stage and cannot be ignored.
25.In fact, the Magistrate ought to direct investigation by the police only where the assistance of the Investigating Agency is necessary and the Court feels that the cause of justice is likely to suffer in the absence of investigation by the police. The Magistrate is not expected to mechanically direct investigation by the police without first examining whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, investigation by the State machinery is actually required or not. If the allegations made in the complaint are simple, where the Court can straightaway proceed to conduct the trial, the Magistrate is expected to record evidence and proceed further in the matter, instead of passing the buck to the Police under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. Ofcourse, if the allegations made in the complaint require complex and complicated investigation which cannot be undertaken without active assistance and expertise of the State machinery, it would only be appropriate for the Magistrate to direct investigation by the police authorities. The Magistrate is, therefore, not supposed to act merely as a Post Office and needs to adopt a judicial approach while considering an application seeking investigation by the Police.

From Para 31,

31.A comparison of Section 175(3) of the BNSS with Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. indicates three prominent changes that have been introduced by the enactment of BNSS as follows:
a. First, the requirement of making an application to the Superintendent of Police upon refusal by the officer in charge of a police station to lodge
the FIR has been made mandatory, and the applicant making an application under Section 175(3) is required to furnish a copy of the application made to the Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4), supported by an affidavit, while making the application to the Magistrate under Section 175(3).
b. Secondly, the Magistrate has been empowered to conduct such enquiry as he deems necessary before making an order directing registration of FIR.
c. Thirdly, the Magistrate is required to consider the submissions of the officer in charge of the police station as regards the refusal to register an FIR before issuing any directions under Section 175(3).

From Paras 34-35,

34.In light of the judicial interpretation and evolution of Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. by various decisions of this Court as discussed above, it becomes clear that the changes introduced by Section 175(3) of the BNSS to the existing scheme of Section 156(3) merely codify the procedural practices and safeguards which have been introduced by judicial decisions aimed at curbing the misuse of invocation of powers of a Magistrate by unscrupulous litigants for achieving ulterior motives.
35.Further, by requiring the Magistrate to consider the submissions made by the concerned police officer before proceeding to issue directions under Section 175(3), BNSS has affixed greater accountability on the police officer responsible for registering FIRs under Section 173. Mandating the Magistrate to consider the submissions of the concerned police officer also ensures that the Magistrate applies his mind judicially while considering both the complaint and the submissions of the police officer thereby ensuring that the requirement of passing reasoned orders is complied with in a more effective and comprehensive manner.

Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 16 Jan 2025

Index of Judgments under Sec 156(3) Cr.P.C. are here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Category: Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification

Mohammad Wajid and Anr Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 08 Aug 2023

Ghanshyam Soni Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 04 Jun 2025

Bal Manohar Jalan Vs Sunil Paswan and Anr on 30 Jun 2014

Ritesh Sinha Vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr on 2 Aug 2019

Shivendra Pratap Singh Thakur Vs State of Chhattisgarh and Ors on 15 May 2024

Kiran Jyot Maini Vs Anish Pramod Patel on 15 Jul 2024

Sunita Kachwaha and Ors Vs Anil Kuchwaha on 28 Oct 2014

N.Usha Rani and Anr Vs Moodudula Srinivas on 30 Jan 2025

Chand Dhawan Vs Jawaharlal Dhawan on 11 Jun 1993

Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 16 Jan 2025