Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/187164/
Citations: 1970 AIR 223, 1970 SCR (2) 648, 1969 SCC (3) 15
Category: Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification
R. Muthukrishnan Vs The Registrar General of The High of Madras on 28 January, 2019
Apex Court held that, the power to discipline/debar an advocate lies with Bar Councils and High Courts cannot usurp the same under the guise of Rules.
Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/60397736/
Citation: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 105, 2019 (2) SCALE 263
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T.C. Mathai and Anr Vs The District and Sessions Judge on 31 March, 1999
Apex Court held as follows, in last paragraph,
“Be that as it may, an agent cannot become a pleader for the party in criminal proceedings, unless the party secures permission from the court to appoint him to act in such proceedings. The respondent-couple have not even moved for such permission and hence no occasion has arisen so far to consider that aspect.”
Key passages from the judgment are,
The definition [of a Pleader u.s 2(q) of CrPC] envelopes two kinds of pleaders within its ambit. The first refers to legal practitioners who are authorised to practise law and the second refers to any other person. If it is the latter its essential requisite is that such person should have been appointed with the permission of the court to act in such proceedings. This is in tune with Section 32 of the Advocates Act 1961 which empowers a Court to permit any person, who is not enrolled as an advocate to appear before it in any particular case. But if he is to plead for another person in a criminal court, such permission should be sought for by that person.
It is not necessary that the pleader so appointed should be the power of attorney holder of the party in the case. What seems to be condition precedent is that his appointment should have preceded by grant of permission of the court. It is for the court to consider whether such permission is necessary in the given case and whether the person proposed to be appointed is capable of helping the court by pleading for the party, for arriving at proper findings on the issues involved in the case.………..
But if the person proposed to be appointed by the party is not such a qualified person the court has first to satisfy itself whether the expected assistance would be rendered by that person. The reason for the Parliament for fixing such a filter in the definition clause [Sec.2(q) of the Code] that prior permission must be secured before a non-advocate is appointed by the party to plead his cause in the court, is to enable the court to verify the level of equipment of such person for pleading on behalf of the party concerned.
Precedent used is here
Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1728750/
Citation: [1999 SCC 3 614], [1999 AIR SC 1385], [1999 AIR SC 1062], [1999 SUPREME 3 308], [1999 SCC CRI 455], [1999 CRLJ SC 2092], [1999 SCALE 2 359], [1999 ACR SC 1 915], [1999 ALT CRI 1 226], [1999 CTC 1 720], [1999 GLH 1 829], [1999 KLJ 1 879], [1999 KLT SC 2 156], [1999 LW CRL 2 658], [1999 RCR CRIMINAL 2 373], [1999 SCR 2 305], [1999 JT SC 2 494], [1999 AIR SCW 1062]
Uday Shankar Triyar Vs Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh and Anr on 10 November, 2005
Apex Court listed out defects routinely found in Vakalatnamas filed in courts
(a) Failure to mention the name/s of the person/s executing the Vakalatnama, and leaving the relevant column blank;
(b) Failure to disclose the name, designation or authority of the person executing the Vakalatnama on behalf of the grantor (where the Vakalatnama is signed on behalf of a company, society or body) by either affixing a seal or by mentioning the name and designation below the signature of the executant (and failure to annex a copy of such authority with the Vakalatnama).
(c) Failure on the part of the pleader in whose favour the Vakalatnama is executed, to sign it in token of its acceptance.
(d) Failure to identify the person executing the Vakalatnama or failure to certify that the pleader has satisfied himself about the due execution of the Vakalatnama.
(e) Failure to mention the address of the pleader for purpose of service (in particular in cases of outstation counsel).
(f) Where the Vakalatnama is executed by someone for self and on behalf of someone else, failure to mention the fact that it is being so executed. For example, when a father and the minor children are parties, invariably there is a single signature of the father alone in the Vakalatnama without any endorsement/statement that the signature is for ’self and as guardian of his minor children’. Similarly, where a firm and its partner, or a company and its Director, or a Trust and its trustee, or an organisation and its office-bearer, execute a Vakalatnama, invariably there will be only one signature without even an endorsement that the signature is both in his/her personal capacity and as the person authorized to sign on behalf of the corporate body/firm/ society/organisation.
(g) Where the Vakalatnama is executed by a power-of-attorney holder of a party, failure to disclose that it is being executed by an Attorney-holder and failure to annex a copy of the power of attorney;
(h) Where several persons sign a single vakalatnama, failure to affix the signatures seriatim, without mentioning their serial numbers or names in brackets. (Many a time it is not possible to know who have signed the Vakalatnama where the signatures are illegible scrawls);
(i) Pleaders engaged by a client, in turn, executing vakalatnamas in favour of other pleaders for appearing in the same matter or for filing an appeal or revision. (It is not uncommon in some areas for mofussil lawyers to obtain signature of a litigant on a vakalatnama and come to the seat of the High Court, and engage a pleader for appearance in a higher court and execute a Vakalatnama in favour of such pleader).
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Poonam Chand Jain & Anr Vs Fazru on 28 January, 2010
In this judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court, the question which crops-up for determination by this Court is whether after an order of dismissal of complaint has attains finality, the complainant can file another complaint on almost identical facts without disclosing in the second complaint the fact of either filing of the first complaint or its dismissal.
And the conclusion was,
His Lordship held that an order of dismissal under Section 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code (for short ‘the Code’) is, however, no bar to the entertainment of a second complaint on the same facts but it can be entertained only in exceptional circumstances. This Court explained the exceptional circumstances as (a) where the previous order was passed on incomplete record (b) or on a misunderstanding of the nature of the complaint (c) or the order which was passed was manifestly absurd, unjust or foolish or (d) where new facts which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been brought on the record in the previous proceedings. This Court made it very clear that interest of justice cannot permit that after a decision has been given on a complaint upon full consideration of the case, the complainant should be given another opportunity to have the complaint enquired into again.
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S. Rangarajan etc Vs P. Jagjivan Ram on 30 March, 1989
Apex Court has held the “Freedom of expression is the rule and it is generally taken for granted. Every one has a fundamental right to form his own opinion on any issue of general concern. He can form and inform by any legitimate means.” in the case of a Tamil film called as “Ore Oru Gramathile”, starring Lakshmi.
It is difficult to understand how the expression in the film with criticism of reservation policy or praising the colonial rule will affect the security of the State or sovereignty and integrity of India. There is no utterance in the film threatening to overthrow the Govt. by unlawful or unconstitutional means. There is no talk of secession either nor is there any suggestion for impairing the integration of the country. The film seems to suggest that the existing method of reservation on the basis of caste is bad and reservation on the basis of economic backwardness is better. The film also deprecates exploitation of people on caste considerations.
The fundamental freedom under Art. 19(1)(a) can be reasonably restricted only for the purposes mentioned in Art. 19(2) and the restriction must be justified on the anvil of necessity and not the quicks and of convenience and expediency. Open criticism of Government policies and operations is not a ground for restricting expression. We must practice tolerance to the views of others. Intolerance is as much dangerous to democracy as to the person himself.”
A article from NyTimes
Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/341773/
Equivalent citations: 1989 SCR (2) 204, 1989 SCC (2) 574
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Shome Nikhil Danani Vs Tanya Banon Danani on 22 July, 2019
The order granted by Delhi High Court holding that maintenance is to be paid by husband in both 125 CrPC as well as PWDV Act 2005, is not disturbed by Apex Court.
Delhi High Court order is here.
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Rajbir @ Raju and Anr Vs State of Haryana on 22 November, 2010
Here the Supreme Court judges are advising the lower courts as such,
“We further direct all trial Courts in India to ordinarily add Section 302 to the charge of section 304B, so that death sentences can be imposed in such heinous and barbaric crimes against women.”
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Shanti And Anr Vs State of Haryana on 13 November, 1990
This is a landmark judgment from Supreme Court of India which clarified the legal position around sections 304B and 498A IPC.
From Para 6,
Now we shall consider the question as to whether the acquittal of the appellants of the offence punishable under Section 498-A makes any difference. The submission of the learned counsel is that the acquittal under Section 498-A IPC would lead to the effect that the cruelty on the part of the accused is not established. We see no force in this submission. The High Court only held that Section 304-B and Section 498-A IPC are mutually exclusive and that when once the cruelty envisaged in Section 498-A IPC culminates in dowry death of the victim, Section 304-B alone is attracted and in that view of the matter the appellants were acquitted under Section 498-A IPC. It can therefore be seen that the High Court did not hold that the prosecution has not established cruelty on the part of the appellants but on the other hand the High Court considered the entire evidence and held that the element of cruelty which is also an essential of Section 304-B IPC has been established. Therefore the mere acquittal of the appellants under Section 498-A IPC in these circumstances makes no difference for the purpose of this case. However, we want to point out that this view of the High Court is not correct and Sections 304-B and 498-A cannot be held to be mutually exclusive. These provisions deal with two distinct offences. It is true that “cruelty” is a common essential to both the sections and that has to be proved. The Explanation to Section 498-A gives the meaning of “cruelty”. In Section 304-B there is no such explanation about the meaning of “cruelty” but having regard to the common background to these offences we have to take that the meaning of “cruelty or harassment” will be the same as we find in the explanation to Section 498-A under which “cruelty” by itself amounts to an offence and is punishable. Under Section 304-B as already noted, it is the “dowry death” that is punishable and such death should have occurred within seven years of the marriage. No such period is mentioned in Section 498-A and the husband or his relative would be liable for subjecting the woman to “cruelty” any time after the marriage. Further it must also be borne in mind that a person charged and acquitted under Section 304-B can be convicted under Section 498-A without charge being there, if such a case is made out. But from the point of view of practice and procedure and to avoid technical defects it is necessary in such cases to frame charges under both the sections and if the case is established they can be convicted under both the sections but no separate sentence need be awarded under Section 498-A in view of the substantive sentence being awarded for the major offence under Section 304-B.
And the benevolence of the judges overflows for women like juices… yakkk thuuu
From Para 8,
Further both the appellants are women. Under these circumstances, a minimum sentence of seven years’ rigorous imprisonment would serve the ends of justice. Accordingly the convictions are confirmed but the sentence of imprisonment for life under Section 304-B IPC of each of the accused appellant is set aside and instead each of them is sentenced to undergo seven years’ rigorous imprisonment.
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Arun Vyas and Anr Vs Anita Vyas on 14 May 1999
In this landmark judgment, Apex Court held that offence under Section 498-A of the I.P.C. is a continuing offence and that there would be a new starting point of limitation on each occasion on which the victim was subjected to cruelty. It was specifically held that the last act of cruelty was committed when the victim was forced to leave matrimonial home.
Citation: [1999 ACR SC 2 1456], [1999 CRI LJ 3479], [1999 CRIMES SC 3 90], [1999 DMC SC 2 247], [1999 JT SC 4 421], [1999 OLR 2 364], [1999 RCR CRIMINAL 2 828], [1999 SCALE 3 724], [1999 SCC 4 690], [1999 SCR 3 719], [1999 UJ 2 968], [1999 SCC CRI 629], [1999 AIR SC 0 2071], [1999 SCC CR 0 629], [1999 AIR SC 207], [1999 RCR CRI 2 828], [1999 CRLJ 0 3479], [1999 CALCRILR 0 297], [1999 AIR SC 0 1793], [1999 SCC 4 691], [2000 BOMCR SC 1 233], [1999 SUPREME 5 458]
Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1494464/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad5de4b0149711411319 or https://mynation.net/judgments/arun-vyas-anr-vs-anita-vyas-on-14-may-1999/
Orissa High Court passed a similar judgment here.
