Shivendra Pratap Singh Thakur Vs State of Chhattisgarh and Ors on 15 May 2024

Posted on May 13, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A Full Bench of Apex Court held that, FIR which was lodged after 39 days of the incident, does not indicate the date or time so this is a fit case warranting exercise of powers conferred upon this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India so as to quash the proceedings of the criminal case.

From Para 14,

14. A bare perusal of the impugned FIR would reveal that the same was lodged by complainant-Barkat Ali on 29th June, 2019 with the allegation that the offences alleged were committed by the appellant and co-accused some time prior to 20th May, 2019. Thus, the complainant was not even sure of the date on which the alleged offences were committed. No reason whatsoever has been given in the FIR for huge delay of more than 39 days in approaching the police. The Investigating Officer prepared a site plan during the course of investigation which has been made a part of the record. A perusal of the said site plan would reveal that so far as the plot of Purnima Begum, wife of Barkat Ali is concerned, it is fully encumbered by a boundary wall and no damage is shown to this structure. The site plan indicates that there is some damage to the under-construction house of Sushma Kashyap. In the FIR, the damage suffered by the complainant was quantified at Rs. 6 lakhs whereas the damage suffered by Smt. Sushma Kashyap was quantified as Rs. 4 lakhs owing to the demolition of her under construction house. However, admittedly, Smt. Sushma did not lodge any complaint to the police.

From Paras 16 and 17,

16. Neither Sushma Kashyap nor her husband-Rajkumar Kashyap lodged any complaint regarding the so-called criminal activity committed by the appellant and the co-accused on their land. The site plan further indicates that the plot of the co-accused Saurabh Pratap Singh Thakur is immediately adjoining the plots of complainant-Barkat Ali and Sushma Kashyap. It is thus, apparent that there is an imminent possibility of animus between the complainant and the accused persons on this count. The FIR which was lodged after 39 days of the incident, does not indicate the date or time, when the accused trespassed into the house of the complainant and caused damage to his property and committed the other offences for which the FIR came to be registered. Therefore, we are of the view that the impugned FIR seems to be nothing but a tool to wreak vengeance against the appellant herein.
17. In this background, we feel that it is a fit case warranting exercise of powers conferred upon this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India so as to quash the proceedings of the criminal case.

Shivendra Pratap Singh Thakur Vs State of Chhattisgarh and Ors on 15 May 2024

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Kiran Jyot Maini Vs Anish Pramod Patel on 15 Jul 2024

Posted on April 5, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court passed this decision. Not sure, why this is a reportable judgment!

Kiran Jyot Maini Vs Anish Pramod Patel on 15 Jul 2024

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/669778a11312582eb2f9e52c

Index of Maintenance Judgments under DV Act is here. Divorce Judgments here. DV Judgements here.

Sunita Kachwaha and Ors Vs Anil Kuchwaha on 28 Oct 2014

Posted on April 5, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows,

From para 9,

9. Inability to maintain herself is the precondition for grant of maintenance to the wife. The wife must positively aver and prove that she is unable to maintain herself, in addition to the fact that her husband has sufficient means to maintain her and that he has neglected to maintain her. In her evidence, the appellant wife has stated that only due to help of her retired parents and brothers, she is able to maintain herself and her daughters. Where the wife states that she has great hardships in maintaining herself and the daughters, while her husband’s economic condition is quite good, the wife would be entitled to maintenance.

Sunita Kachwaha and Ors Vs Anil Kuchwaha on 28 Oct 2014

Citations: [AIR 2015 SUPREME COURT 554]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/3786357/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af48e4b01497114160aa

Index of Maintenance Judgments under 144 BNSS is here.

N.Usha Rani and Anr Vs Moodudula Srinivas on 30 Jan 2025

Posted on March 28, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court passed this judgment…

From Para 3, (Madam is very planned: MOU signed with First Husband on 25-Nov-2005; Remarriage with Second Husband on 27-Nov-2005; And someone said our judges are blind-fucks)

3. The facts of the case reveal that Appellant No.1 before this Court – Smt. N. Usha Rani married one Nomula Srinivas on 30.08.1999 at Hyderabad. During the period of their wedlock, she gave birth to a male child, namely, Sai Ganesh on 15.08.2000. The couple lived together until disputes arose between them. Following their return from the United States of America in February 2005, they began living separately. Eventually, on 25.11.2005, a Memorandum of Understanding (‘MoU’) was executed between the couple, dissolving their marriage. Meanwhile, Appellant No. 1 got acquainted with her neighbour,the Respondent, and the couple got married on 27.11.2005.

From Para 10,

10. We have heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the record. The short question before us is whether a woman is entitled to claim maintenance u/s. 125 CrPC from her second husband while her first marriage is allegedly legally subsisting.

From Paras 17 and 18, (Dripping and Simping Wokeism… Thuuu)

17. This encapsulates the full scope and gravity of considerations before this Court as we deliberate on the issue at hand. The present case does not concern a live-in relationship. The Family Court made a factual finding that Appellant No. 1 married the Respondent and that finding is not disputed by the Respondent. Instead, the Respondent seeks to defeat the right to maintenance by claiming that his marriage to Appellant No. 1 is void ab initio as her first marriage is still subsisting. Two other pertinent facts must be considered: firstly, it is not the case of the Respondent that the truth was concealed from him. In fact, the Family Court makes a specific finding that Respondent was fully aware of the first marriage of the Appellant No. 1. Therefore, Respondent knowingly entered into a marriage with Appellant No. 1 not once, but twice. Secondly, Appellant No. 1 places before this Court an MoU of separation with her first husband. While this is not a legal decree of divorce, it also emerges from this document and other evidence that the parties have dissolved their ties, they have been living separately and Appellant No. 1 is not deriving maintenance from her first husband. Therefore, barring the absence of a legal decree, Appellant No. 1 is de facto separated from her first husband and is not deriving any rights and entitlements as a consequence of that marriage.
18. In the opinion of this Court, when the social justice objective of maintenance u/s. 125CrPC is considered against the particular facts and circumstances of this case, we cannot, in good conscience, deny maintenance to Appellant No. 1. It is settled law that social welfare provisions must be subjected to an expansive and beneficial construction and this understanding has been extended to maintenance since Ramesh Chander (supra). An alternate interpretation would not only explicitly defeat the purpose of the provision by permitting vagrancy and destitution, but would also give legal sanction to the actions of the Respondent in knowingly entering into a marriage with Appellant No.1, availing its privileges but escaping its consequent duties and obligations. The only conceivable mischief that could arise in permitting a beneficial interpretation is that the Appellant No.1 could claim dual maintenance–however, that is not the case under the present facts. We are aware that this Court has previously denied maintenance in cases of subsisting marriages (See Yamunabai (supra) and Bakulabai (supra)). However, a plea of separation from the first marriage was not made in those cases and hence, they are factually distinguishable. It must be borne in mind that the right to maintenance u/s. 125 CrPC is not a benefit received by a wife but rather a legal and moral duty owed by the husband.

N.Usha Rani and Anr Vs Moodudula Srinivas on 30 Jan 2025

Citations: [2025 INSC 129]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/56187356/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/67a987a7c254af19d96c5a16

Index of Maintenance Judgements is here.

Chand Dhawan Vs Jawaharlal Dhawan on 11 Jun 1993

Posted on March 23, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court passed this landmark judgment, holding that alimony u/s 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act can be sought only when any decree is passed under sections 9 to 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act.

On the other hand, under the Hindu Marriage Act, in contrast, her claim for maintenance pendente lite is durated on the pendency of a litigation of the kind envisaged under sections 9 to 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, and her claim to permanent maintenance or alimony is based on the supposition that either her marital status has been strained or affected by passing a decree for restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation in favour or against her, or her marriage stands dissolved by a decree of nullity or divorce, with or without her consent. Thus when her marital status is to be affected or disrupted the court does so by passing a decree for or against her. On or at the time of the happening of that event, the court being siezen of the matter, invokes its ancilliary or incidental power to grant permanent alimony. Not only that, the court retains the jurisdiction at subsequent stages to fulfil this incidental or ancilliary obligation when moved by an application on that behalf by a party entitled to relief. The court further retains the power to chance or alter the order in view of the changed circumstances. Thus the whole exercise is within the gammit of a diseased of a broken marriage. And in order to avoid conflict of perceptions the legislature while codifying the Hindu Marriage Act preserved the right of permanent maintenance in favour of the husband or the wife, as the case may be, dependent on the court passing a decree of the kind as envisaged under sections 9 to 14 of the Act. In other words without the marital status being affected or disrupted by the matrimonial court under the Hindu Marriage Act the claim of permanent alimony was not to be valid as ancilliary or incidental to such affectation or disruption.
We have thus, in this light, no hesitation in coming to the view that when by court intervention under the Hindu Marriage Act, affection or disruption to the marital status has come by, at that juncture, while passing the decree, it undoubtedly has the power to grant permanent alimony or maintenance, if that power is invoked at that time. It also retains the power subsequently to be invoked on application by a party entitled to relief.

Finally,

On the afore analysis we have been led to the conclusion that the step of the wife to move the court of Additional District Judge, Amritsar for grant of maintenance under section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act was ill-advised. The judgment of the High Court under appeal could be no other than the one that it was in the present state of law and the facts and circumstances. It is still open to the wife to stake her claim to maintenance in other fora. The judgments of the High Courts earlier quoted, and others which have been left out, which are not in line with our view are over-ruled. The earlier and predominant view was the correct one and the later an aberration; something unfortunate from the precedential point of view. The appeals thus inevitably have to and are hereby dismissed, but without any order as to costs.

Chand Dhawan Vs Jawaharlal Dhawan on 11 Jun 1993

Citations: [1993 LawSuit(SC) 494], [(1993) 3 S.C.R. 954], [1993 INSC 216], [1993 SCC (3) 406], [1993 AIR SCW 2548], [1993 CRI. L. J. 2930], [1993 SCC(CRI) 915], [(1993) IJR 335 (SC)], [1994 BOM CJ 147], [1993 (2) UJ (SC) 356], [1993 (4) JT 22], [1993 MAH LJ 1731], [(1993) 2 DMC 110], [(1993) 2 HINDULR 203], [(1993) 2 MAHLR 866], [(1993) MARRILJ 459], [(1994) MPLJ 1], [(1993) 3 RECCRIR 545], [(1994) 1 RRR 574], [(1993) 3 SCJ 50], [(1993) 22 ALL LR 240], [(1993) 2 CIVLJ 902], [1993 LawSuit(SC) 494]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1162687/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac8fe4b014971140f246

https://digiscr.sci.gov.in/view_judgment?id=MTk0MTQ=

Chand Dhawan Vs. Jawaharlal Dhawan

SMT. CHAND DHAWAN Vs JAWAHARLAL DHAWAN

https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/browse/Case?caseId=002991343000&title=chanddhawan-vs-jawaharlal

https://www.simplekanoon.com/family-law/smt-chand-dhawan-v-jawaharlal-dhawan-1509/

https://lawfyi.io/smt-chand-dhawan-vs-jawaharlal-dhawan-on-11-june-1993/

https://lawsuitcasefinder.com/casedetail?id=U2FsdGVkX1plo2GAY5xcebh78PQGFoZ2Mju1Jpebh78bGJ5ukMSE1YMgs5

Index to the Maintenance Judgments under Hindu Marriage Act here.

Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 16 Jan 2025

Posted on February 28, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Supreme Court passed this reportable Judgment,

From Paras 10-12,

10.Ordinarily, Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. is invoked by the complainant when the police authorities decline to register a First Information Report. In such circumstances, a private complaint may be made in the court of the Judicial Magistrate and the complainant may pray that police investigation be ordered under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. However, it is the discretion of the concerned Magistrate whether to order police investigation under Section156(3) of Cr.P.C. or take cognizance upon the complaint and issue process or dismiss the complaint under Section 203 of Cr.P.C. Over a period of time and in view of many decisions of this Court, if the officer in-charge of the concerned Police Station for some reasons declines to register the FIR, then the law has left it open for the complainant to file an appropriate application before the Magistrate and pray for police investigation. Once an order is passed for police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., then it becomes a police case. At the end of the investigation the police may either file a charge-sheet or file an appropriate closure report.
11.However, what is important to observe is that whenever any application is filed by the complainant before the Court of Judicial Magistrate seeking police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., it is the duty of the concerned Magistrate to apply his mind for the purpose of ascertaining whether the allegations levelled in the complaint constitute any cognizable offence or not. In other words, the Magistrate may not undertake the exercise to ascertain whether the complaint is false or otherwise, however, the Magistrate is obliged before he proceeds to pass an order for police investigation to closely consider whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are borne out on plain reading of the complaint.

From Paras 24 and 25,

24.Thus, there are prerequisites to be followed by the complainant before approaching the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. which is a discretionary remedy as the provision proceeds with the word ‘may’. The Magistrate is required to exercise his mind while doing so. He should pass orders only if he is satisfied that the information reveals commission of cognizable offences and also about the necessity of police investigation for digging out of evidence neither in possession of the complainant nor can be procured without the assistance of the police. It is, thus, not necessary that in every case where a complaint has been filed under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. the Magistrate should direct the Police to investigate the crime merely because an application has also been filed under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. even though the evidence to be led by the complainant is in his possession or can be produced by summoning witnesses, with the assistance of the court or otherwise. The issue of jurisdiction also becomes important at that stage and cannot be ignored.
25.In fact, the Magistrate ought to direct investigation by the police only where the assistance of the Investigating Agency is necessary and the Court feels that the cause of justice is likely to suffer in the absence of investigation by the police. The Magistrate is not expected to mechanically direct investigation by the police without first examining whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, investigation by the State machinery is actually required or not. If the allegations made in the complaint are simple, where the Court can straightaway proceed to conduct the trial, the Magistrate is expected to record evidence and proceed further in the matter, instead of passing the buck to the Police under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. Ofcourse, if the allegations made in the complaint require complex and complicated investigation which cannot be undertaken without active assistance and expertise of the State machinery, it would only be appropriate for the Magistrate to direct investigation by the police authorities. The Magistrate is, therefore, not supposed to act merely as a Post Office and needs to adopt a judicial approach while considering an application seeking investigation by the Police.

From Para 31,

31.A comparison of Section 175(3) of the BNSS with Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. indicates three prominent changes that have been introduced by the enactment of BNSS as follows:
a. First, the requirement of making an application to the Superintendent of Police upon refusal by the officer in charge of a police station to lodge
the FIR has been made mandatory, and the applicant making an application under Section 175(3) is required to furnish a copy of the application made to the Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4), supported by an affidavit, while making the application to the Magistrate under Section 175(3).
b. Secondly, the Magistrate has been empowered to conduct such enquiry as he deems necessary before making an order directing registration of FIR.
c. Thirdly, the Magistrate is required to consider the submissions of the officer in charge of the police station as regards the refusal to register an FIR before issuing any directions under Section 175(3).

From Paras 34-35,

34.In light of the judicial interpretation and evolution of Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. by various decisions of this Court as discussed above, it becomes clear that the changes introduced by Section 175(3) of the BNSS to the existing scheme of Section 156(3) merely codify the procedural practices and safeguards which have been introduced by judicial decisions aimed at curbing the misuse of invocation of powers of a Magistrate by unscrupulous litigants for achieving ulterior motives.
35.Further, by requiring the Magistrate to consider the submissions made by the concerned police officer before proceeding to issue directions under Section 175(3), BNSS has affixed greater accountability on the police officer responsible for registering FIRs under Section 173. Mandating the Magistrate to consider the submissions of the concerned police officer also ensures that the Magistrate applies his mind judicially while considering both the complaint and the submissions of the police officer thereby ensuring that the requirement of passing reasoned orders is complied with in a more effective and comprehensive manner.

Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 16 Jan 2025

Index of Judgments under Sec 156(3) Cr.P.C. are here.

Vishal Shah Vs Monalisha Gupta and Ors on 20 Feb 2025

Posted on February 22, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court passed this judgment whereby the marriage of parties is severed and Rs.25 Lakhs alimony was ordered to be paid to wife. Also since DV cases are quasi-criminal in nature, thus, there cannot be any justification to require the personal presence/appearance of the appellant in these proceedings.

From Para 18,

18. In the afore-mentioned complaint case, an application10 was filed by the respondent under Section 26 of the DV Act against the appellant, her mother-in-law, and their five other relatives. A notice was issued to the appellant vide order dated 21st July 2022. Subsequently, on 11th August 2022, the learned JMFC passed an interim order in favour of the respondent, prohibiting her eviction from the matrimonial home and directing the personal appearance of the appellant (respondent therein) and other respondents on the next hearing date. However, when the matter was listed again, the Court noticed that the appellant had not returned to India, and the concerned authorities were directed to initiate the extradition process against him.
We may observe that as the proceedings under the DV Act are quasi-criminal in nature, thus, there cannot be any justification to require the personal presence of the appellant in these proceedings. Thus, the learned Magistrate grossly erred while directing the appellant to remain personally present in the Court.

From Para 20,

20. It is apparent that the appellant’s inability to travel to India and appear in Miscellaneous Case No. 440 of 2022, filed by the respondent under Section 26 of the DV Act, stemmed from the impoundment of his passport, a circumstance beyond his control. Consequently, the order of the learned JMFC directing the initiation of extradition proceedings against the appellant as a consequence of his non-appearance, despite being aware of the fact of impounding of the passport of the appellant, is untenable and unsustainable in the eyes of the law. Otherwise also, as noted above, there is no requirement for the personal presence of any party in the proceedings under the DV Act, because they are quasi-criminal in nature and do not entail any penal consequences except when there is a breach of a protection order, which is the only offence provided under Section 31 of the DV Act.

From Para 26,

26. On the issue as to grant of divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, this Court, in a very recent judgment of Rinku Baheti v Sandesh Sharda13, held that the factual analysis has to be undertaken in each case to determine as to what constitutes an ‘irretrievable breakdown’ while keeping in mind the non-exhaustive factors laid down in Shilpa Sailesh (supra).

From Para 31,

31. The filing of the aforesaid cases by the respondent-wife reflects her vindictive attitude towards the appellant and his family members and unambiguously reflects the bitterness that has seeped into the marital relationship. The tumultuous state of the marital relationship between the parties is quite evident, irrespective of the fate of the criminal complaints and the imputations made by the parties against each other. The passport of the appellant was also impounded by the concerned authorities, pursuant to the pending cases filed by the respondent.

From Paras 35-37,

35. Whatever may be the justification for the spouses living separately, with so much time having passed by any marital love or affection that may have developedbetween the parties seems to have evanesced. This is a classic case of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. The admitted long-standing separation, nature of differences, prolonged and multiple litigations pending adjudication, and the unwillingness of the parties to reconcile are evidence enough to establish beyond all manner of doubt that the marriage between the parties has broken down irretrievably and that there is no scope whatsoever for marriage to survive. Thus, no useful purpose, emotional or practical, would be served by continuing the soured relationship. On the basis ofthe above factual matrix, the present appears to be a case of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.
36. Apart from the irreconcilable status of the relationship between the parties, in the present case, another factor that has weighed with this Court in favour of the exercise of the power under Article 142(1)of the Constitution of India is that there is no child born from the wedlock and therefore, any direction to allowthe parties to part ways would only affect the parties themselves and not any innocent child.
37. Thus, this is a fit case warranting the exercise of the discretion conferred under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India to dissolve the marriage between the parties on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

From Paras 42-43,

42. Before we conclude our discussion, we must note that the act of impounding the passport of the appellant by the concerned authorities of the Government of India was ex-facie illegal in the eyes of the law. In the present case, the appellant’s passport was impounded on the mere premise that the respondent has filed numerous cases before the various courts in India.
43. The law regarding the impounding of a passport of an individual has been settled by this Court in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Anr.16, wherein it was held that the rules of natural justice must be followed before impounding a passport under Section 10(3) of the Passports Act, 1967.

From Paras 45-46,

45. Further, this Court, in Rajesh Sharma v. State of U.P.17, while dealing with the question of arrest and fair investigation in a case alleging the offence of cruelty under Section 498A IPC, was of the view that in respect of persons ordinarily residing out of India impounding of passports or issuance of ‘Red Corner Notice’ should not be a routine.
46. Applying the afore-mentioned legal principles to the present case, we find that the act of impounding the appellant’s passport under Section 10 of the Passport Act, 1967, was carried out without granting the appellant an opportunity to be heard. This clear violation of the principles of natural justice renders the act of impounding the passport ex-facie illegal. Consequently, we hold that the concerned authorities should release the appellant’s passport within a period of one week from today.

Vishal Shah Vs Monalisha Gupta and Ors on 20 Feb 2025

Citations: [2025 INSC 254], [2025 LiveLaw (SC) 240]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/97306350/

https://www.caseciter.com/vishal-shah-vs-monalisha-gupta-2025-insc-254-domestic-violence-act-passport-impounding-irretrievable-breakdown-of-marriage-permanent-alimony/

Index of Domestic Violence Judgments is here. Divorce Judgments are here. Passport judgements are here.

Sukhdev Singh Vs Sukhbir Kaur on 12 Feb 2025

Posted on February 12, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Supreme Court passed this order to a reference from a division bench.

From Para 6,

6. The following questions arise for our consideration:
(i)Whether a spouse of a marriage declared as void by a competent Court under Section 11 of the 1955 Act is entitled to claim permanent alimony and maintenance under Section 25 of the 1955 Act?
(ii)Whether in a petition filed seeking a declaration under Section 11 of the 1955 Act, a spouse is entitled to seek maintenance pendente lite under Section 24 of the 1955 Act?

From Para 26,

26. An apprehension is the expression by the learned counsel for the appellant that if it is held that Section 25 of the 1955 Act also applies to void marriages, it will lead to a ridiculous result. He gave an example of a wife whose first marriage is subsisting, inducing another man to marry her. He also gave an example of a daughter getting married to her father. We must note that Sub-Section 1 of Section 25 uses the word “may”. A grant of a decree under Section 25 of the 1955 Act is discretionary. If the conduct of the spouse who applies for maintenance is such that the said spouse is not entitled to discretionary relief, the Court can always turn down the prayer for the grant of permanent alimony under Section 25 of the 1955 Act. Equitable considerations do apply when the Court considers the prayer for maintenance under Section 25. The reason is that Section 25 lays down that while considering the prayer for granting relief under Section 25, the conduct of the parties must be considered.

From Paras 27 and 28,

27. Section 24 confers a power on a matrimonial Court to grant interim maintenance in pending proceedings seeking a decree contemplated under the 1955 Act. The power is to be exercised pending the proceedings for a grant of a decree under Sections 9 to 13 of the 1955 Act. The conditions for applicability of Section 24 are:
(i) There must be a proceeding under the 1955 Act pending and
(ii) the court must come to a conclusion that either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, has no independent income sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding.
26. Even if, prima facie, the matrimonial court finds the marriage between the parties is void or voidable, the court is not precluded from granting maintenance pendente lite provided the conditions mentioned above are satisfied. The grant of relief under Section 24 is discretionary as the Section uses the word ‘may’. While deciding the prayer for interim relief under Section 24, the Court will always consider the conduct of the party seeking the relief. It provides for issuing a direction to pay a reasonable amount.

Final conclusions:

29. Accordingly, we answer the questions as follows:
a. A spouse whose marriage has been declared void under Section 11 of the 1955 Act is entitled to seek permanent alimony or maintenance from the other spouse by invoking Section 25 of the 1955 Act. Whether such a relief of permanent alimony can be granted or not always depends on the facts of each case and the conduct of the parties. The grant of relief under Section 25 is always discretionary; and
b. Even if a court comes to a prima facie conclusion that the marriage between the parties is void or voidable, pending the final disposal of the proceeding under the 1955 Act, the court is not precluded from granting maintenance pendente lite provided the conditions mentioned in Section 24 are satisfied. While deciding the prayer for interim relief under Section 24, the Court will always take into consideration the conduct of the party seeking the relief, as the grant of relief under Section 24 is always discretionary.

Sukhdev Singh Vs Sukhbir Kaur on 12 Feb 2025

Citations: [2025 INSC 197]

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/permanent-alimony-interim-maintenance-can-be-granted-even-when-marriage-is-void-under-hindu-marriage-act-supreme-court-283751

https://www.barandbench.com/news/litigation/spouse-of-void-marriage-under-hindu-marriage-act-entitled-to-permanent-alimonymaintenance-supreme-court

https://www.advocatekhoj.com/library/judgments/announcement.php?WID=18508

https://lawtrend.in/hindu-marriage-act-alimony-and-maintenance-granted-even-if-marriage-is-void-supreme-court/

Index of Maintenance Judgements under HMA here.

Roopa Soni Vs Kamal Narayan Soni on 06 Sep 2023

Posted on February 7, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held as follows, while relying on landmark judgments like

From Para 10,

10. On the question of burden in a petition for divorce, burden of proof lies on the petitioner. However, the degree of probability is not one beyond reasonable doubt, but of preponderance.

From Para 17,

17. For a decade and half, the parties have been living separately. As fairly stated at the Bar, the marriage does not survive any longer, and the relationship was terminated otherwise except by a formal decree of divorce. The status quo continues, awaiting an approval from this Court.

From Para 19,

19. The Trial Court and the High Court adopted a hyper-technical and pedantic approach in declining the decree of divorce. It is not as if the respondent-Husband is willing to live with the appellant–Wife. The allegations made by him against her are as serious as the allegations made by her against him. Both the parties have moved away and settled in their respective lives. There is no need to continue the agony of a mere status without them living together.

Roopa Soni Vs Kamal Narayan Soni on 06 Sep 2023

Index of Divorce judgments is here.

Ivan Rathinam Vs Milan Joseph on 28 Jan 2025

Posted on January 30, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that,

From Para 45,

45. Despite concurrent findings of three courts as to the legitimacy of the Respondent, he and his mother maintain and proclaim to the world that the Appellant is his biological father. It must be underscored that theAppellant has maintained a consistent stance across all fora that he never had sexual relations with the Respondent’s mother. In fact, the dispute was assumed to have been put to rest in 2011, providing some relief to the Appellant, only to be reopened in 2015, once again making him face the brunt of the allegations. This constant pendulum-like state of affairs and unsubstantiated allegations must have, undoubtedly, had an adverse effect on the Appellant’s quality of life. In this backdrop, an order necessitating a DNA test based on mere allegations of adultery, would ultimately violate the Appellant’s right to dignity and privacy.

From Paras 69 and 70,

69. This convoluted case, spanning over two decades, has no doubt taken its toll on the parties involved and other relevant stakeholders. Given these
extenuating circumstances, at this stage, it must be closed for all intents and purposes.
70. Accordingly, we deem it appropriate to allow this appeal and set aside the Impugned Judgment of the High Court dated 21.05.2018 and of the
Family Court dated 09.11.2015, with the following directions and conclusions:
i. Legitimacy determines paternity under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, until the presumption is successfully rebutted by proving ‘non-access’;
ii. The Munsiff Court and the Sub-Judge Court possessed jurisdiction to entertain the Original Suit, which dealt with the question of the legitimacy of the Respondent;
iii. The Family Court, Alappuzha erred in reopening the Maintenance Petition when the self-imposed condition was not satisfied;
iv. The impugned proceedings, initiated by the Respondent, are barred by the principle of res judicata;
v. The proceedings in MC No. No. 224/2007 before the Family Court, Alappuzha stand quashed;
vi. Any claim by the Respondent based upon the perceived relationship of paternity qua the Appellant, stands negated; and
vii. The Respondent is presumed to be the legitimate son of Mr. Raju Kurian.

Ivan Rathinam Vs Milan Joseph on 28 Jan 2025

Impugned Judgment:

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5e977c0b4653d048ca2bb2dc

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Category: Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification

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