This one is good one… Vomiting venom has consequences. Read the Judgment for the ruthless dry-cleaning of you-know-who…
Category: Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification
CBI Vs Mukesh Pravinchandra Shroff and Ors on 25 November 2005
Here is the one of the shortest decisions from Supreme Court
From Para 2,
2. By the impugned order, the Special Court has discharged the accused Raghunath Lekhraj Wadhwa, Jitendra Ratilal Shroff and Mukesh Pravinchandra Shroff from Special Case No. 4 of 1997. From a bare perusal of the impugned order, it would appear that the Special Court has virtually passed an order of acquittal in the garb of an order of discharge. It is well settled that at the stage of framing of the charge, what is required to be seen is as to whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused. In our view, the Special Court was not justified in discharging the aforesaid accused persons.
Casemine version:
Supreme Court version (Record of {Proceedings):
Citations: [2009 SCC 16 429], [2010 SCC CRI 3 315]
Other Source links:
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/58117eb32713e179478af2d0#
Parkash Singh Badal and Anr Vs State of Punjab and Ors on 6 December 2006
A key element necessary to go for Discharge petition is the following:
That prosecution should refer to existence of any material and not the sufficiency of the materials. If this is missing, you have good chance of winning your Discharge Petition.
With reference to the absence of allegations under Sections 8 and 9 of the Act, it is submitted whether the charge sheet has reference to any particular material referred to in it and the relevance of it is to be considered at the time when the charge is framed. It would not be desirable to analyse minutely the materials as at that stage the Court is primarily concerned with the question as to whether charge is to be framed in respect of any offence and whether there prima facie appears existence of any material and not the sufficiency of the materials. Therefore, the appellants’ stand that the charge sheet does not refer to any particular material cannot be accepted, more particularly, in view of the specific materials referred to by learned counsel for the respondent-State.
Citations: [2007 JT 1 89], [2006 CRIMES SC 4 388], [2007 AIR SC 1276], [2007 AIR SC 1415], [2007 SCC CRI 1 193], [2007 SCC 1 1], [2006 SCR SUPP 10 197], [2006 SUPREME 8 964], [2006 SCALE 13 54], [2007 AIR SC 1274], [2007 AIC SC 51 623]
Other Source links:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1634320/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae36e4b014971141330e
Index of Discharge/Quash case laws here.
Shamnsaheb M. Multtani Vs State of Karnataka on 24 January 2001
Supreme Court held that the burden of proof even in a 304B Dowry death case initially lies on prosecution only and shifts to accused, only after prosecution establishes their case.
Under Section 4 of the Evidence Act whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall presume the fact it shall regard such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved. So the court has no option but to presume that the accused had caused dowry death unless the accused disproves it. It is a statutory compulsion on the court. However it is open to the accused to adduce such evidence for disproving the said compulsory presumption, as the
burden is unmistakably on him to do so. He can discharge such burden either by eliciting answers through cross-examination of the witnesses of the prosecution or by adducing evidence on the defence side or by both.
And then,
But the peculiar situation in respect of an offence under Section 304B IPC, as discernible from the distinction pointed out above in respect of the offence under Section 306 IPC is this: Under the former the court has a statutory compulsion, merely on the establishment of two factual positions enumerated above, to presume that the accused has committed dowry death. If any accused wants to escape from the said catch the burden is on him to disprove it. If he fails to rebut the presumption the court is bound to act on it.
Now take the case of an accused who was called upon to defend only a charge under Section 302 IPC. The burden of proof never shifts on to him. It ever remains on the prosecution which has to prove the charge beyond all reasonable doubt. The said traditional legal concept remains unchanged even now. In such a case the accused can wait till the prosecution evidence is over and then to show that the prosecution has failed to make out the said offence against him. No compulsory presumption would go to the assistance of the prosecution in such a situation. If that be so, when an accused has no notice of the offence under Section 304B IPC, as he was defending a charge under Section 302 IPC alone, would it not lead to a grave miscarriage of justice when he is alternatively convicted under Section 304B IPC and sentenced to the serious punishment prescribed thereunder, which mandates a minimum sentence of imprisonment for seven years.
The serious consequence which may ensue to the accused in such a situation can be limned through an illustration:-
If a bride was murdered within seven years of her marriage and there was evidence to show that either on the previous day or a couple of days earlier she was subjected to harassment by her husband with demand for dowry, such husband would be guilty of the offence on the language of Section 304-B IPC read with Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. But if the murder of his wife was actually committed either by a decoit or by a militant in a terrorist act the husband can lead evidence to show that he had no hand in her death at all. If he succeeds in discharging the burden of proof he is not liable to be convicted under Section 304B, IPC. But if the husband is charged only under Section 302 IPC he has no burden to prove that his wife was murdered like that as he can have his traditional defence that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge of murder against him and claim an order of acquittal. The above illustration would amplify the gravity of the consequence befalling an accused if he was only asked to defend a charge under Section 302 IPC and was alternatively convicted under Section 304B IPC without any notice to him, because he is deprived of the opportunity to disprove the burden cast on him by law.
In such a situation, if the trial court finds that the prosecution has failed to make out the case under Section 302 IPC, but the offence under Section 304-B IPC has been made out, the court has to call upon the accused to enter on his defence in respect of the said offence. Without affording such an opportunity to the accused, a conviction under Section 304-B IPC would lead to real and serious miscarriage of justice. Even if no such count was included in the charge, when the court affords him an opportunity to discharge his burden by putting him to notice regarding the prima facie view of the court that he is liable to be convicted under Section 304B IPC, unless he succeeds in disproving the presumption, it is possible for the court to enter upon a conviction of the said offence in the event of his failure to disprove the presumption.
Citations: [
Other Source links:
All Dowry related case laws are in this Index here.
Vipin Jaiswal Vs State of A.P. on 13 March 2013
This is overruled by Rajinder Singh here.
Citations: [2013 AIR SC 1567], [2013 ALT CRI 2 457], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 225], [2013 OLR 2 130], [2013 JT 4 188], [2013 AIR SC 1746], [2013 AIOL 160], [2013 GLR 3 2510], [2013 CRILJ 2095], [2013 AKR 2 339], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL 2 342], [2013 CLT 116 563], [2013 ALD CRI 1 967], [2013 SCALE 3 525], [2013 SUPREME 2 485], [2013 AIC 125 194], [2013 CUTLT 116 563], [2013 PLJR 3 91], [2013 SCC 3 684], [2013 JCC 2 1330], [2013 DMC 1 700], [2013 SLT 2 767], [2013 BLJ 3 531], [2013 SCC CRI 2 15], [2013 SCR 3 449], [2013 ALLCC 82 61], [2013 AD SC 4 275], [2013 CRIMES SC 3 229], [2013 GUJLR 3 2510], [2013 CRLJ SC 2095]
Other Source links:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/167568223/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af30e4b0149711415c1b
All Dowry related case laws are in this Index here.
Surinder Singh Vs State of Haryana on 13 November 2013
Supreme Court in this case, held that the demand for dowry in connection with marriage was available so, Dowry Demand allegation is made out.
From Para 16,
This Court held that demand made for purchasing a computer, six months after the marriage, was not a demand in connection with marriage and was not a dowry demand within the meaning of Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Vipin Jaiswal is not applicable to the present case. Explanation to Section 304B of the IPC states that for the purpose of this sub-section, dowry shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, so far as it is material to this case, states that dowry means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage at or before or at any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said party. Thus, the emphasis is on property or valuable security given ‘at or before’ or ‘at any time after’ the marriage in connection with marriage. The amount or things demanded must, therefore, have a nexus with the marriage. In this case both the brothers i.e. PW-6 Satish Kumar and PW-7 Ashok Kumar, brothers of the deceased, have clearly stated that the accused were unhappy by the quality and quantity of the dowry and the deceased was being taunted and beaten-up for that. The words ‘insufficient and inferior quality of dowry’ are important. They indicate that the transaction of giving dowry was not complete. Sufficient quantity of dowry was not given and that transaction was sought to be completed by asking for Rs.60,000/- after the marriage for the business of the appellant. This demand has a connection with the marriage. Therefore, in our opinion Vipin Jaiswal is not applicable to the present case.
Doling out gyan in Para 25,
25. Before closing, the most commonplace argument must be dealt with. In all cases of bride burning it is submitted that independent witnesses have not been examined. When harassment and cruelty is meted out to a woman within the four walls of the matrimonial home, it is difficult to get independent witnesses to depose about it. Only the inmates of the house and the relatives of the husband, who cause the cruelty, witness it. Their servants, being under their obligation, would never depose against them. Proverbially, neighbours are slippery witnesses. Moreover, witnesses have a tendency to stay away from courts. This is more so with neighbours. In bride burning cases who else will, therefore, depose about the misery of the deceased bride except her parents or her relatives? It is time we accept this reality. We, therefore, reject this submission.
Citations: [2014 SUPREME 2 553], [2013 JT SC 15 9], [2014 ECRN 1 875], [2014 AIR SC 817], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 1009], [2014 SLT 3 24], [2013 AIOL 748], [2014 SCJ 1 701], [2014 CRIMES SC 1 355], [2014 CUTLT SUPPL 438], [2014 SCC CRI 4 769], [2014 SCC 4 129], [2013 SCC 10 691], [2014 CRI LJ 561], [2014 DMC SC 1 722], [2014 ALD CRL SC 1 687], [2013 SCALE 13 691], [2014 CCR SC 1 671], [2014 ALT CRI 2 261], [2014 RCR CRIMINAL 1 535], [2014 AIC 133 174], [2014 AIR BOM R CRI 1 208], [2014 ALLCC 84 371], [2014 ALD CRI 1 687], [2013 AIR SC 6741]
Other Source links:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/10522469/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af2ee4b0149711415bdb
All Dowry related case laws are in this Index here.
Sanapareddy Maheedhar and Anr Vs State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr on 13 December 2007
Supreme Court has held that when proceeding against parents were quashed on the ground that Magistrate had taken cognizance after three years, husband also gets same benefit.
Although, the learned Single Judge of High Court dealt with various points raised by the appellants and negatived the same by recording the detailed order, his attention does not appear to have been drawn to the order dated 24.10.2006 passed by the co-ordinate bench in Criminal Petition No.1302/2003 whereby the proceedings of CC No.240/2002 were quashed qua the parents of the appellants on the ground that the learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance after three years. Respondent No.2 is not shown to have challenged the order passed in Criminal Petition No.1302/2003. Therefore, that order will be deemed to have become final. We are sure that if attention of the learned Single Judge, who decided Criminal Petition No.4152/2006 had been drawn to the order passed by another learned Single Judge in Criminal Petition No.1302/2003, he may have, by taking note of the fact that the learned Magistrate did not pass an order for condonation of delay or extension of the period of limitation in terms of Section 473 Cr.P.C., quashed the proceedings of CC No.240/2002.
Citations: [2007 AIOL 1286], [2007 SCALE 14 321], [2007 SCC 13 165], [2008 CRLJ SC 1375], [2007 SCR 13 478], [2009 SCC CRI 1 170], [2008 AIR SC 787], [2008 AIC SC 61 102], [2008 CRILJ 1375]
Other Source links:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1494950/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae45e4b01497114135cd
Earlier judgment of AP High Court is available here.
Anvar P.V Vs P.K.Basheer and Ors on 18 September 2014
A 3-judge bench laid down the law to be followed in respect of electronic evidence as a secondary evidence.
Sec 65B of Evidence Act is a complete code in itself.
19. Proof of electronic record is a special provision introduced by the IT Act amending various provisions under the Evidence Act. The very caption of Section 65A of the Evidence Act, read with Sections 59 and 65B is sufficient to hold that the special provisions on evidence relating to electronic record
shall be governed by the procedure prescribed under Section 65B of the Evidence Act. That is a complete code in itself. Being a special law, the general law under Sections 63 and 65 has to yield.
Special Law Prevails over General Law
22. The evidence relating to electronic record, as noted herein before, being a special provision, the general law on secondary evidence under Section 63 read with Section 65 of the Evidence Act shall yield to the same. Generalia specialibus non derogant, special law will always prevail over the general law. It appears, the court omitted to take note of Sections 59 and 65A dealing with the admissibility of electronic record. Sections 63 and 65 have no application in the case of secondary evidence by way of electronic record; the same is wholly governed by Sections 65A and 65B. To that extent, the statement of law on admissibility of secondary evidence pertaining to electronic record, as stated by this court in Navjot Sandhu case (supra), does not lay down the correct legal position. It requires to be overruled and we do so. An electronic record by way of secondary evidence shall not be admitted in evidence unless the requirements under Section 65B are satisfied. Thus, in the case of CD, VCD, chip, etc., the same shall be accompanied by the certificate in terms of Section 65B obtained at the time of taking the document, without which, the secondary evidence pertaining to that electronic record, is inadmissible.
Key Paragraph
24. The situation would have been different had the appellant adduced primary evidence, by making available in evidence, the CDs used for announcement and songs. Had those CDs used for objectionable songs or announcements been duly got seized through the police or Election Commission and had the same been used as primary evidence, the High Court could have played the same in court to see whether the allegations were true. That is not the situation in this case. The speeches, songs and announcements were recorded using other instruments and by feeding them into a computer, CDs were made therefrom which were produced in court, without due certification. Those CDs cannot be admitted in evidence since the mandatory requirements of Section 65B of the Evidence Act are not satisfied. It is clarified that notwithstanding what we have stated herein in the preceding paragraphs on the secondary evidence on electronic record with reference to Section 59, 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act, if an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act, the same is admissible in evidence, without compliance of the conditions in Section 65B of the Evidence Act.
Citations: [2015 MHLJ SC 2 135], [2015 RD 129 112], [2014 GUJ LH 3 305], [2014 KERLT 4 104], [2015 SUPREME 3 453], [2015 AIR SC 180], [2014 JT 10 459], [2015 SCC L&S 1 108], [2015 AWC SC 1 156], [2015 SCC CRI 1 24], [2015 ALR 111 811], [2014 SCC 10 473], [2015 JCC SC 1 214], [2014 SCC ONLINE SC 732], [2014 AIOL 574], [2014 SLT 8 223], [2015 MPLJ SC 1 507], [2015 SCC CIV 1 27], [2015 KARLJ 1 547], [2014 SCALE 10 660], [2015 ALT CRI 3 161]
Other Source links:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/187283766/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af58e4b01497114161f4
LG Polymers India Private Limited Vs Andhra Pradesh Pollution Control Board
Supreme Court had passed an interim order on 15-06-2020, staying the NGT Order to appropriate the 50 Crores deposited by LG Polymers for 10 Days.
In this Order dated 26-06-2020, Supreme Court extended the stay for 2 more weeks.
A complete indexed and mess-wise segregated collection of reprimands received by this incumbent State Government of YSRC Party are here.
L. Krishna Reddy Vs State on 24 October 2013
Citations: [2013 BOMCR CRI SC 4 608], [2014 JLJR SC 1 75], [2013 AIR SC 6202], [2014 SCC 14 401], [2013 SUPREME 7 765], [2014 RCR CRIMINAL SC 1 140], [2013 SCALE 13 259], [2013 AIOL 708], [2015 SCC CRI 1 376], [2013 CRIMES SC 4 485], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 957], [2013 AIC 132 33], [2014 CUTLT 117 975], [2013 AIR SC SUPP 423], [2013 ALLCC 83 947], [2014 NCC 1 280], [2014 CCR SC 1 9], [2014 SCJ 3 735], [2014 DMC 1 107], [2013 JT SC 14 543], [2014 OLR 1 323], [2014 CLT 117 975], [2014 UC 1 59], [2013 MLJ CRI 4 535]
Other Source links:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/47377728/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af3de4b0149711415e9f
Index of Discharge Judgments u/s 227 are here.
