AP High Court has issued Status Quo on the Petition by Rajadhani Rythu Parirakshnana Samithi here. Promptly, State of AP filed SLP at Supreme Court.
On 2020-08-17:
CJI Bobde recused himself from hearing. Not before me.
On 2020-08-19:
Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman recused himself from hearing. Not before me.
On 2020-08-26:
SLP dismissed. Om Shanti…
Gazette from President of India regd Formation of High Court of Andhra Pradesh here.
In this Suo Moto Criminal Writ Petition, Supreme Court took up the cause upon itself and issue directions, one of which is constitution of Special Court to prosecute cases under POCSO Act.
Action taken by Andhra Pradesh Government:
The Recent Order is from March… after which no update (Not brought before a bench even though the Order clearly says so.
Daughter-in-law launched a pressure tactic (supreme court’s words) against her in-laws and husband but had to eat dirt in the end. Since the complaint was filed after more than limitation period of 3 years, the 498A case was quashed.
Trivia: No launching of criminal proceedings for filing a false case.
Citations :
Other Sources :
Supreme Court laid the law down with respect to Contracts signed by Vendor alone are valid or not.
From Para 7,
7) We find that neither of the two decisions have addressed the real issue and cannot be said to be laying down the correct law. The observation in Md. Mohar Ali (supra) stating that an agreement of sale is an unilateral contract is not correct. An unilateral contract refers to a gratuitous promise where only party makes a promise without a return promise. Unilateral contract is explained thus by John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo in The Law of Contracts (4th Edition Para 2-10(a) at pages 64-65):
“If A says to B, ‘If you walk across the Brooklyn Bridge I will pay you $ 100,’ A has made a promise but has not asked B for a return promise. A has asked B to perform, not a commitment to perform. A has thus made an offer looking to a unilateral contract. B cannot accept this offer by promising to walk the bridge. B must accept, if at all, by performing the act. Because no return promise is requested, at no point is B bound to perform. If B does perform, a contract involving two parties is created, but the contract is classified as unilateral because only one party is ever under an obligation.”
All agreements of sale are bilateral contracts as promises are made by both – the vendor agreeing to sell and the purchaser agreeing to purchase. On the other hand, the observation in S.M. Gopal Chetty (supra) that unless agreement is signed both by the vendor and purchaser, it is not a valid contract is also not sound. An agreement of sale comes into existence when the vendor agrees to sell and the purchaser agrees to purchase, for an agreed consideration on agreed terms. It can be oral. It can be by exchange of communications which may or may not be signed. It may be by a single document signed by both parties. It can also be by a document in two parts, each party signing one copy and then exchanging the signed copy as a consequence of which the purchaser has the copy signed by the vendor and a vendor has a copy signed by the purchaser. Or it can be by the vendor executing the document and delivering it to the purchaser who accepts it. Section 10 of the Act provides all agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent by the parties competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are not expressly declared to be void under the provisions of the Contract Act. The proviso to section 10 of the Act makes it clear that the section will not apply to contracts which are required to be made in writing or in the presence of witnesses or any law relating to registration of documents. Our attention has not been drawn to any law applicable in Bihar at the relevant time, which requires an agreement of sale to be made in writing or in the presence of witnesses or to be registered. Therefore, even an oral agreement to sell is valid. If so, a written agreement signed by one of the parties, if it evidences such an oral agreement will also be valid. In any agreement of sale, the terms are always negotiated and thereafter reduced in the form of an agreement of sale and signed by both parties or the vendor alone (unless it is by a series of offers and counter-offers by letters or other modes of recognized communication). In India, an agreement of sale signed by the vendor alone and delivered to the purchaser, and accepted by the purchaser, has always been considered to be a valid contract. In the event of breach by the vendor, it can be specifically enforced by the purchaser. There is, however, no practice of purchaser alone signing an agreement of sale.
An earlier order whereby Aloka Bose (LR of Kanika Bose) was brought on record of case:
Vested interests tried to grab the money donated into PM CARES Fund but fell flat on them.. ahem…
Supreme Court laid down the following practice guidelines to be followed by all Trial Courts, while conducting a criminal trial.
From Para 12,
12. The following practice guidelines should be followed by trial courts in the conduct of a criminal trial, as far as possible:
i. a detailed case-calendar must be prepared at the commencement of the trial after framing of charges;
ii. the case-calendar must specify the dates on which the examination-in-chief and cross-examination (if required) of witnesses is to be conducted;
iii. the case-calendar must keep in view the proposed order of production of witnesses by parties, expected time required for examination of witnesses, availability of witnesses at the relevant time, and convenience of both the prosecution as well as the defence, as far as possible;
iv. testimony of witnesses deposing on the same subject-matter must be proximately scheduled;
v. the request for deferral under Section 231(2) of the Cr.P.C. must be preferably made before the preparation of the case-calendar;
vi. the grant for request of deferral must be premised on sufficient reasons justifying the deferral of cross-examination of each witness, or set of witnesses;
vii. while granting a request for deferral of cross-examination of any witness, the trial courts must specify a proximate date for the cross-examination of that witness, after the examination-in-chief of such witness(es) as has been prayed for;
viii. the case-calendar, prepared in accordance with the above guidelines, must be followed strictly, unless departure from the same becomes absolutely necessary;
ix. in cases where trial courts have granted a request for deferral, necessary steps must be taken to safeguard witnesses from being subjected to undue influence, harassment or intimidation.
Citations: [2018 SCC ONLINE SC 2251], [2019 SCC 13 297], [2019 SCC CRI 4 552], [2019 AIR SC 721], [2018 KLT 4 783], [2018 CRIMES 4 288], [2018 AIC 192 212], [2019 CRI LJ 1516], [2019 KLJ 2 398], [2019 ECRN 1 46], [2018 INSC 1021]
Other sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/187514485/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5bdfde204a93267eadff9b10
Supreme Court initiate a Suomoto WP here to assess the effectiveness of the Guidelines issue above.
This one is good one… Vomiting venom has consequences. Read the Judgment for the ruthless dry-cleaning of you-know-who…
Here is the one of the shortest decisions from Supreme Court
From Para 2,
2. By the impugned order, the Special Court has discharged the accused Raghunath Lekhraj Wadhwa, Jitendra Ratilal Shroff and Mukesh Pravinchandra Shroff from Special Case No. 4 of 1997. From a bare perusal of the impugned order, it would appear that the Special Court has virtually passed an order of acquittal in the garb of an order of discharge. It is well settled that at the stage of framing of the charge, what is required to be seen is as to whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused. In our view, the Special Court was not justified in discharging the aforesaid accused persons.
Casemine version:
Supreme Court version (Record of {Proceedings):
Citations: [2009 SCC 16 429], [2010 SCC CRI 3 315]
Other Source links:
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/58117eb32713e179478af2d0#
A key element necessary to go for Discharge petition is the following:
That prosecution should refer to existence of any material and not the sufficiency of the materials. If this is missing, you have good chance of winning your Discharge Petition.
With reference to the absence of allegations under Sections 8 and 9 of the Act, it is submitted whether the charge sheet has reference to any particular material referred to in it and the relevance of it is to be considered at the time when the charge is framed. It would not be desirable to analyse minutely the materials as at that stage the Court is primarily concerned with the question as to whether charge is to be framed in respect of any offence and whether there prima facie appears existence of any material and not the sufficiency of the materials. Therefore, the appellants’ stand that the charge sheet does not refer to any particular material cannot be accepted, more particularly, in view of the specific materials referred to by learned counsel for the respondent-State.
Citations: [2007 JT 1 89], [2006 CRIMES SC 4 388], [2007 AIR SC 1276], [2007 AIR SC 1415], [2007 SCC CRI 1 193], [2007 SCC 1 1], [2006 SCR SUPP 10 197], [2006 SUPREME 8 964], [2006 SCALE 13 54], [2007 AIR SC 1274], [2007 AIC SC 51 623]
Other Source links:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1634320/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae36e4b014971141330e
Index of Discharge/Quash case laws here.
Supreme Court held that the burden of proof even in a 304B Dowry death case initially lies on prosecution only and shifts to accused, only after prosecution establishes their case.
Under Section 4 of the Evidence Act whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall presume the fact it shall regard such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved. So the court has no option but to presume that the accused had caused dowry death unless the accused disproves it. It is a statutory compulsion on the court. However it is open to the accused to adduce such evidence for disproving the said compulsory presumption, as the
burden is unmistakably on him to do so. He can discharge such burden either by eliciting answers through cross-examination of the witnesses of the prosecution or by adducing evidence on the defence side or by both.
And then,
But the peculiar situation in respect of an offence under Section 304B IPC, as discernible from the distinction pointed out above in respect of the offence under Section 306 IPC is this: Under the former the court has a statutory compulsion, merely on the establishment of two factual positions enumerated above, to presume that the accused has committed dowry death. If any accused wants to escape from the said catch the burden is on him to disprove it. If he fails to rebut the presumption the court is bound to act on it.
Now take the case of an accused who was called upon to defend only a charge under Section 302 IPC. The burden of proof never shifts on to him. It ever remains on the prosecution which has to prove the charge beyond all reasonable doubt. The said traditional legal concept remains unchanged even now. In such a case the accused can wait till the prosecution evidence is over and then to show that the prosecution has failed to make out the said offence against him. No compulsory presumption would go to the assistance of the prosecution in such a situation. If that be so, when an accused has no notice of the offence under Section 304B IPC, as he was defending a charge under Section 302 IPC alone, would it not lead to a grave miscarriage of justice when he is alternatively convicted under Section 304B IPC and sentenced to the serious punishment prescribed thereunder, which mandates a minimum sentence of imprisonment for seven years.
The serious consequence which may ensue to the accused in such a situation can be limned through an illustration:-
If a bride was murdered within seven years of her marriage and there was evidence to show that either on the previous day or a couple of days earlier she was subjected to harassment by her husband with demand for dowry, such husband would be guilty of the offence on the language of Section 304-B IPC read with Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. But if the murder of his wife was actually committed either by a decoit or by a militant in a terrorist act the husband can lead evidence to show that he had no hand in her death at all. If he succeeds in discharging the burden of proof he is not liable to be convicted under Section 304B, IPC. But if the husband is charged only under Section 302 IPC he has no burden to prove that his wife was murdered like that as he can have his traditional defence that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge of murder against him and claim an order of acquittal. The above illustration would amplify the gravity of the consequence befalling an accused if he was only asked to defend a charge under Section 302 IPC and was alternatively convicted under Section 304B IPC without any notice to him, because he is deprived of the opportunity to disprove the burden cast on him by law.
In such a situation, if the trial court finds that the prosecution has failed to make out the case under Section 302 IPC, but the offence under Section 304-B IPC has been made out, the court has to call upon the accused to enter on his defence in respect of the said offence. Without affording such an opportunity to the accused, a conviction under Section 304-B IPC would lead to real and serious miscarriage of justice. Even if no such count was included in the charge, when the court affords him an opportunity to discharge his burden by putting him to notice regarding the prima facie view of the court that he is liable to be convicted under Section 304B IPC, unless he succeeds in disproving the presumption, it is possible for the court to enter upon a conviction of the said offence in the event of his failure to disprove the presumption.
Citations: [
Other Source links:
All Dowry related case laws are in this Index here.
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