Since the prosecution wasted years in bringing in the prosecution witnesses to Court for examination, Trial Court denied to provide any adjournments. High Court held it correct.
Citations : [1981 AIR SC 1239], [1981 SUPP SCC 1 64], [1982 SCC CRI 139], [1980 CAR 343], [1980 CRLR 470], [1980 UJ SC 832], [1981 CRLJ SC 745]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1828992/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609abece4b014971140da6a#
This is a 498A/304B IPC Case. Parents of husband were discharged on application. Husband was denied suspension of Sentence while the Appeal at High Court was pending disposal. Supreme Court granted Bail to Husband.
The impugned judgment from Telangana High Court is below
Here is the Sessions Court Judgment
Justice Dipak Misra decried the practice of Trial/Session Court judges in giving adjournments on mere asking by the parties, in spite of the presence of the witnesses willing to be examined fully.
From Para 41,
41. Before parting with the case we are constrained to reiterate what we have said in the beginning. We have expressed our agony and anguish the manner in which trials in respect of serious offences relating to corruption are being conducted by the trial courts. Adjournments are sought on the drop of a hat by the counsel, even though the witness is present in court, contrary to all principles of holding a trial. That apart, after the examination-in-chief of a witness is over, adjournment is sought for cross-examination and the disquieting feature is that the trial courts grant time. The law requires special reasons to be recorded for grant of time but the same is not taken note of. As has been noticed earlier, in the instant case the cross-examination has taken place after a year and 8 months allowing ample time to pressurize the witness and to gain over him by adopting all kinds of tactics. There is no cavil over the proposition that there has to be a fair and proper trial but the duty of the court while conducting the trial to be guided by the mandate of the law, the conceptual fairness and above all bearing in mind its sacrosanct duty to arrive at the truth on the basis of the material brought on record. If an accused for his benefit takes the trial on the path of total mockery, it cannot be countenanced. The Court has a sacred duty to see that the trial is conducted as per law. If adjournments are granted in this manner it would tantamount to violation of rule of law and eventually turn such trials to a farce. It is legally impermissible and jurisprudentially abominable. The trial courts are expected in law to follow the command of the procedure relating to trial and not yield to the request of the counsel to grant adjournment for non-acceptable reasons. In fact, it is not all appreciable to call a witness for cross-examination after such a long span of time. It is imperative if the examination-in-chief is over, the cross-examination should be completed on the same day. If the examination of a witness continues till late hours the trial can be adjourned to the next day for cross-examination. It is inconceivable in law that the cross-examination should be deferred for such a long time. It is anathema to the concept of proper and fair trial. The duty of the court is to see that not only the interest of the accused as per law is protected but also the societal and collective interest is safe-guarded. It is distressing to note that despite series of judgments of this Court, the habit of granting adjournment, really an ailment, continues. How long shall we say, “Awake! Arise!”. There is a constant discomfort. Therefore, we think it appropriate that the copies of the judgment be sent to the learned Chief Justices of all the High Courts for circulating the same among the learned trial Judges with a command to follow the principles relating to trial in a requisite manner and not to defer the cross-examination of a witness at their pleasure or at the leisure of the defence counsel, for it eventually makes the trial an apology for trial and compels the whole society to suffer chicanery. Let it be remembered that law cannot allowed to be lonely; a destitute.
Citations: [2015 SCC 3 220], [2015 SCC ONLINE SC 53]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/188951670/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/581180e72713e179479dda10
This was followed in this decision here.
This is regarding adoption criteria under section 10() of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956, which reads as follows,
10. Persons who may be adopted.―No person shall be capable of being taken in adoption unless the following conditions are fulfilled, namely:―
(i) he or she is a Hindu;
(ii) he or she has not already been adopted;
(iii) he or she has not been married, unless there is a custom or usage applicable to the parties which permits persons who are married being taken in adoption;
(iv) he or she has not completed the age of fifteen years, unless there is a custom or usage applicable to the parties which permits persons who have completed the age of fifteen years being taken in adoption.
From Para 16,
16. The aforesaid decision is squarely applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The Andhra Pradesh High Court has recognized such a custom among the “Kamma” community of Andhra Pradesh of taking in adoption of a person even above the age of 15 years of age and has held the same to be legal and valid.
Citations: 2010 JT 12 4412011 AIR SC 5452010 CTC 6 5552010 SCJ 8 5992011 MLJ 1 7422011 ALT 1 312010 CLT 4 4612010 SLT 8 3982011 CUTLT SUPPL 8222010 AIOL 7842010 ALLMR SC 6 9792011 RCR CIVIL SC 2 972010 SCALE 12 1572010 SCC 14 4662010 SUPREME 7 8682012 SCC CIV 1 6442010 ALR 83 8812010 AIC 96 92011 CHN 1 217
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/663319/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aedae4b0149711414e5d
Shri Dalveer Bhandari J has held so with regards to civil cases such as DVC, HMA24 etc…
42. In civil cases, adherence to Section 30 CPC would alsohelp in ascertaining the truth. It seems that this provision which ought to be frequently used is rarely pressed in serviceby our judicial officers and judges. Section 30 CPC reads as under:-
30. Power to order discovery and the like. –
Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, the Court may, at any time either of its own motion or on the application of any party, –
(a) make such orders as may be necessary or reasonable in all matters relating to the delivery and answering of interrogatories, the admission of documents and facts, and the discovery, inspection, production, impounding and return of documents or other material objects producible as evidence;
(b) issue summons to persons whose attendance is required either to give evidence or to produce documents or such other objects as aforesaid;
(c) order any fact to be proved by affidavit
Regarding punishing perjurers:
82. This Court in a recent judgment in Ramrameshwari Devi aptly observed at p. 266, para 43 that unless wrongdoers are denied profit from frivolous litigation, it would be difficult to prevent it. In order to curb uncalled for and frivolous litigation, the courts have to ensure that there is no incentive or motive for uncalled for litigation. It is a matter of common experience that the court’s otherwise scarce time is consumed or more appropriately, wasted in a large number of uncalled for cases. In this very judgment, the Court provided that this problem can be solved or at least can be minimised if exemplary costs is imposed for instituting frivolous litigation. The Court observed at pp. 267-68, para 58 that imposition of actual, realistic or proper costs and/or ordering prosecution in appropriate cases would go a long way in controlling the tendency of introducing false pleadings and forged and fabricated documents by the litigants. Imposition of heavy costs would also control unnecessary adjournments by the parties. In appropriate cases, the courts may consider ordering prosecution otherwise it may not be possible to maintain purity and sanctity of judicial proceedings.
Citations: [2012 SCC CIV 3 126], [2012 AIR SC 1727], [2012 AIR SC 2162], [2012 RCR CIVIL SC 2 441], [2012 SCALE 3 550], [2012 AIR BOMR 3 857], [2012 AIOL 139], [2012 SLT 2 753], [2012 JT 3 451], [2012 BOMCR SC 4 75], [2012 CCC SC 2 344], [2012 SUPREME 2 602], [2012 SCC 5 370], [2012 SCC ONLINE SC 281], [2012 ALR 92 251], [2012 LW 3 111], [2012 AIC 113 212], [2012 ALD 4 1], [2012 ALT SC 3 518], [2012 AWC SC 4 3645], [2012 CUT LT 114 437], [2012 SCSUPPL CHN 3 1]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/100486606/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af13e4b014971141585f
Another landmark judgment which emphasizes that Right to Speedy Trial is integral to Article 21 of Constitution.
Citations: [2001 ACR SC 1 719], [2001 AIR SC 1246], [2001 ALD CRI 1 559], [2001 ALLMR CRI SC 582], [2001 JT SC 2 558], [2001 RCR CRIMINAL 1 838], [2001 RLW SC 2 297], [2001 SCALE 2 8], [2001 SCC 4 525], [2001 SCR 1 990], [2001 UC 1 652], [2001 AIR SC 0 795], [2001 BCR 5 323], [2001 AIR SC 1248], [2001 BOMCR CRI SC 323], [2001 CRIMES SC 1 248], [2001 CRLJ SC 1242], [2001 SUPREME 1 661], [2001 SLT 2 68], [2001 SRJ 3 341], [2001 CCR 1 197], [2001 JCC 1 185], [2001 AD SC 2 202], [2001 BLR 2 978], [2001 SCC CR 787], [2001 UJ SC 1 593], [2001 RECENTCR 1 838], [2001 AIR SCW 0 795], [2001 MLJ CRL 1 476]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/220491/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad90e4b0149711411b60
In this landmark judgment, SC reiterated that Right to Speedy trail as established in Hussainara Khatoon and Ors Vs Home Secretary State Of Bihar.
Citations: [1991 SCALE 2 1273], [1991 SCR SUPP 3 325], [1992 AIR SC 1701], [1992 CRLJ SC 2717], [1992 SCC 1 225], [1991 JT 6 431], [1992 SCC CRI 93], [1992 CRIMES SC 1 193], [1992 BLJR 2 1319], [1991 JT SC 6 431]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1200243/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac60e4b014971140eafc
Supreme Court requested AP High Court to expedite the case which was stayed by AP High Court here.
Supreme Court explained the Section 6 of Evidence Act.
Section 6 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule whereunder the hearsay evidence becomes admissible. But for bringing such hearsay evidence within the provisions of Section 6, what is required to be established is that it must be almost contemporaneous with the acts and there should not be an interval which would allow fabrication. The statements sought to be admitted, therefore, as forming part of res gestae, must have been made contemporaneously with the acts or immediately thereafter. The aforesaid rule as it is stated in Wigmores Evidence Act reads thus: Under the present Exception [to hearsay] an utterance is by hypothesis, offered as an assertion to evidence the fact asserted (for example that a car-brake was set or not set), and the only condition is that it shall have been made spontaneously, i.e. as the natural effusion of a state of excitement. Now this state of excitement may well continue to exist after the exciting fact has ended. The declaration, therefore, may be admissible even though subsequent to the occurrence, provided it is near enough in time to allow the assumption that the exciting influence continued.
… and…
Sarkar on Evidence (Fifteenth Edition) summarises the law relating to applicability of Section 6 of the Evidence Act thus:
1. The declarations (oral or written must relate to the act which is in issue or relevant thereto; they are not admissible merely because they accompany an act. Moreover the declarations must relate to and explain the fact they accompany, and not independent facts previous or subsequent thereto unless such facts are part of a transaction which is continuous.
2. The declarations must be substantially contemporaneous with the fact and not merely the narrative of a past.
3. The declaration and the act may be by the same person, or they may be by different persons, e.g., the declarations of the victim, assailant and bystanders. In conspiracy, riot &c.the declarations of all concerned in the common object are admissible.
4. Though admissible to explain or corroborate, or to understand the significance of the act, declarations are not evidence of the truth of the matters stated.
This case emphasizes the importance of examination of material witnesses in proving the allegations of Demand for Dowry, the lack of which results in Acquittal of accused persons.
Citations: [2012 ACR 3002], [2012 AIR SC 2297], [2012 ALD CRI 2 340], [2012 JLJR 4 97], [2012 NCC 2 308], [2012 RCR CRIMINAL 5 799], [2012 RLW SC 4 3745], [2012 SCALE 5 578], [2012 SCC 6 589], [2012 UC 2 1310], [2012 SCC CRI 3 287], [2012 SCC ONLINE SC 457], [2012 AIC 115 87], [2012 GUJLR 3 2199], [2012 CUTLT 114 1107], [2013 SCJ 4 636], [2012 SLT 7 1], [2012 AIOL 239], [2012 AIR SC 3318], [2012 CRIMES SC 2 324], [2012 CRLJ SC 3189], [2012 JT 5 451], [2012 SUPREME 4 88], [2012 KCCR SN 4 228], [2012 DMC 3 323], [2012 DLT CRI 3 6], [2012 MAHLJ CRI 4 97], [2012 CUT LT 114 1107], [2012 GUJ LR 3 2199], [2012 AIR SCW 3318], [2012 RCR CRIMINAL SC 4 539]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/146360566/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af20e4b0149711415aff
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