This is so cute judgment where in to get Anticipatory Bail, husband has to pay maintenance to knife in Divorce matter husband filed. Aaa baile mujhe maat…
Here is the jewel of the Order given at Patna High Court.
This is precisely why I advocate quick disposal of civil matters… A helpful compilation is here.
This is a while-color crime from Kadapa, AP from 2017, wherein the accused went to Supreme Court for Anticipatory bail.
Here is the AB dismissal order from AP High Court:
Some news about these people:
https://www.newindianexpress.com/cities/vijayawada/2017/jul/11/couple-held-for-duping-people-with-easy-loans-1626616.html
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/vijayawada/man-woman-aide-held-for-gypping-loan-seekers/articleshow/59518402.cms
Supreme Court answered this short question in this reportable case of a regular/default bail issue where Trial court and High Court imposed Rs.8,00,000/- as a deposit.
whether while releasing the appellant-accused on default bail/statutory bail under Section 167(2), Cr.P.C., any condition of deposit of amount as imposed by the High Court, could have been imposed?
From Para 9,
9. Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and considering the scheme and the object and purpose of default bail/statutory bail, we are of the opinion that the High Court has committed a grave error in imposing condition that the appellant shall deposit a sum of Rs.8,00,000/- while releasing the appellant on default bail/statutory bail. It appears that the High Court has imposed such a condition taking into consideration the fact that earlier at the time of hearing of the regular bail application, before the learned Magistrate, the wife of the appellant filed an affidavit agreeing to deposit Rs.7,00,000/.
Supreme Court has overruled SR Batra landmark case law here on the aspect of ‘Shared Household‘ and held as following:
From Para 64,
64. In paragraph 29 of the judgment, this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) held that wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household and a shared household would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The definition of shared household as noticed in Section 2(s) does not indicate that a shared household shall be one which belongs to or taken on rent by the husband. We have noticed the definition of “respondent” under the Act. The respondent in a proceeding under Domestic Violence Act can be any relative of the husband. In event, the shared household belongs to any relative of the husband with whom in a domestic relationship the woman has lived, the conditions mentioned in Section 2(s) are satisfied and the said house will become a shared household. We are of the view that this court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) although noticed the definition of shared household as given in Section 2(s) but did not advert to different parts of the definition which makes it clear that for a shared household there is no such requirement that the house may be owned singly or jointly by the husband or taken on rent by the husband. The observation of this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) that definition of shared household in Section 2(s) is not very happily worded and it has to be interpreted, which is sensible and does not lead to chaos in the society also does not commend us. The definition of shared household is clear and exhaustive definition as observed by us. The object and purpose of the Act was to grant a right to aggrieved person, a woman of residence in shared household. The interpretation which is put by this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) if accepted shall clearly frustrate the object and purpose of the Act. We, thus, are of the opinion that the interpretation of definition of shared household as put by this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) is not correct interpretation and the said judgment does not lay down the correct law.
And from para 106,
106. The right is to be implemented by an order under Section 19, on an application filed under sub-section (1) of Section 12. Sub-section (2) of Section 17, however, contains an exception in the right granted by sub-section (2), i.e., “save in accordance with the procedure established by law”. Sub-section (2) of Section 17, thus, contemplates that aggrieved person can be evicted or excluded from the shared household in accordance with the procedure established by law. What is the meaning and extent of expression “save in accordance with the procedure established by law” is a question which has come up for consideration in this appeal. Whether the suit filed by the plaintiff for mandatory and permanent injunction against the defendant in the Civil Court is covered by the expression “save in accordance with the procedure established by law”. We may further notice that the learned Magistrate while passing the interim order on 26.11.2016 in favour of the defendant on her application filed under Section 12 has directed that “the respondent shall not alienate the alleged shared household nor would they dispossess the complainant or their children from the same without orders of a Competent Court”. The Magistrate, thus, has provided that without the orders of Competent Court the applicant (respondent herein) should not be dispossessed. In the present case, interim order specifically contemplates that it is only by the order of the Competent Court respondent shall be dispossessed.
Note: Even though this may seem Topsy-turvy case law (Since it held SR Batra not correct law), not much is lost. Just arrange for alternate accommodation and make use of reliefs made available at reliefs from judiciary page and get the case closed in 2-3 months.
Citations : [2020 AIR SC 5397], [2020 SCALE 11 576], [2021 SCC CIV 1 325], [2020 KLT 6 208], [2020 SCC ONLINE SC 841], [2020 GUJ LH 4 416], [2021 SCC 1 414], [2021 SCC CRI 1 667], [2020 ALD 6 94]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/62368827/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5f89406b9868c3226a8e7b51
The index page is here.
Supreme Court came to the protection of the Gentleman Elephants in the Elephant corridor in Nilgiris District.
The following is the Common Judgment passed by Madras High Court in 2011.
A District-Judge aspirant lost that opportunity due to a false 498A IPC case from which he got acquitted, after the selection for the post completed.
Earlier High Court Judgment dismissing the Writ petition
~~~
Other Source: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/103138593/
Justice P.N. Bhagawati held as follows…
It is the fundamental right of every one in this Country, assured under the interpretation given to Article 21 by this Court in Francis Mullen’s case, to live with human dignity, free from exploitation. This right to live with human dignity, enshrined in Article 21 derives its life breath from the Directive Principles of State Policy and particularly clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39 and Article 41 and 42 and at the least, therefore, it must include protection of the health and strength of workers men and women, and of the tender age of children against abuse, opportunities and facilities for children to develop in healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity, educational facilities, just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief. These are the minimum requirements which must exist in order to enable a person to live with human dignity and no State neither the Central Government nor any State Government-has the right to take any action which will deprive a person of the enjoyment of these basic essentials. Since the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39, Article 41 and 42 are not enforceable in a court of law, it may not be possible to compel the State through the judicial process to make provision by statutory enactment or executive fiat for ensuring these basic essentials which go to make up a life of human dignity but where legislation is already enacted by the State providing these basic requirements to the workmen and thus investing their right to live with basic human dignity, with concrete reality and content, the State can certainly be obligated to ensure observance of such legislation for inaction on the part of the State in securing implementation of such legislation would amount to denial of the right to live with human dignity enshrined in Article 21, more so in the context of Article 256 which provides that, the executive power of every State shall be so exercised as to ensure compliance with the laws made by Parliament and any existing laws which apply in that State.
Citations : [1984 AIR SC 802], [1984 SCC 3 161], [1984 SCR 2 67], [1983 SCALE 2 1151], [1984 SCC L&S 389], [1984 LABIC 560], [1984 LLN 2 60], [1984 UJ 16 29], [1984 AIR 802], [1984 LAB IC 560]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/595099/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac0fe4b014971140dea7
List of other case laws around Article 21 are here.
After giving some inputs to Law commission and Bar Council of India in this para,
16. The interest of justice may suffer if the counsel conducting the trial is physically or mentally unfit on account of any disability. The interest of the society is paramount and instead of trials being conducted again on account of unfitness of the counsel, reform may appear to be necessary so that such a situation does not arise. Perhaps time has come to review the Advocates Act and the relevant Rules to examine the continued fitness of an advocate to conduct a criminal trial on account of advanced age or other mental or physical infirmity, to avoid grievance that an Advocate who conducted trial was unfit or incompetent. This is an aspect which needs to be looked into by the concerned authorities including the Law Commission and the Bar Council of India.
Supreme Court passed these reasons for not recalling a witness
29. We may now sum up our reasons for disapproving the view of the High Court in the present case:
(i) The trial court and the High Court held that the accused had appointed counsel of his choice. He was facing trial in other cases also. The earlier counsel were given due opportunity and had duly conducted cross-examination. They were under no handicap;
(ii) No finding could be recorded that the counsel appointed by the accused were incompetent particularly at back of such counsel;
(iiii) Expeditious trial in a heinous offence as is alleged in the present case is in the interests of justice;
(iv) The trial Court as well as the High Court rejected the reasons for recall of the witnesses;
(v) The Court has to keep in mind not only the need for giving fair opportunity to the accused but also the need for ensuring that the victim of the crime is not unduly harassed;
(vi) Mere fact that the accused was in custody and that he will suffer by the delay could be no consideration for allowing recall of witnesses, particularly at the fag end of the trial;
(vii) Mere change of counsel cannot be ground to recall the witnesses;
(viii) There is no basis for holding that any prejudice will be caused to the accused unless the witnesses are recalled;
(ix) The High Court has not rejected the reasons given by the trial court nor given any justification for permitting recall of the witnesses except for making general observations that recall was necessary for ensuring fair trial. This observation is contrary to the reasoning of the High Court in dealing with the grounds for recall, i.e., denial of fair opportunity on account of incompetence of earlier counsel or on account of expeditious proceedings;
(x) There is neither any patent error in the approach adopted by the trial court rejecting the prayer for recall nor any clear injustice if such prayer is not granted.
Citations : [2016 ACR SC 1 142], [2016 ALT CRL AP 1 167], [2016 MPJR 1 1], [2016 NCC 1 393], [2016 SCC 2 402], [2016 SCJ 1 93], [2015 AIR SC 3501], [2015 AD SC 10 165], [2015 ALLCC 91 640], [2015 BOMCR CRI 4 366], [2015 CCR SC 3 468], [2015 CRILJ 4640], [2015 CRIMES SC 4 1], [2015 JLJR 4 97], [2015 PLJR 4 258], [2015 RCR CRIMINAL 4 312], [2015 RLW SC 4 3271], [2015 SCALE 9 649], [2015 UC 3 1794], [2016 SCC CRI 1 510], [2015 SCC ONLINE SC 799], [2015 AIC 155 68], [2015 CRI LJ 4640]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/33982557/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5790b391e561097e45a4e3ea
Guidelines around fixed timelines given by earlier SC judgments were deleted in this 5-Judge judgment in respect of u/s 468 CrPC
Concurring opinion from Justice Doraiswamy Raju.
Citations : 2002 MHLJ SC 3 1452002 SUPREME 3 2602002 SCC 4 5782002 SCALE 3 4972002 MPLJ SC 3 32002 CRLJ SC 25472002 AIR SC 18412002 BOMCR CRI SC 8592002 AIR SC 18562002 SCR 3 602012 SCC 9 4302002 PLJR 3 2292002 KLT SC 2 1892002 WLN 4 7512002 CRIMES SC 2 2002002 JCR SC 2 2732002 RCR CRIMINAL 2 5532002 OLR 1 6972002 SCR 3 682002 UC 2 2072002 JT SC 4 922002 ALD CRI 1 7922002 GLH 2 5182002 ACR SC 2 13822002 CRILJ 25472002 GLR 2 15492002 SCC CRI 8302002 MHLJ 3 1452002 AIR SCW 18412002 MPLJ SC 3
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/516669/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adb4e4b014971141208d
Supreme Court held as follows when Cross-examination of a Prosecution witness was adjourned/deferred to over 1 year.
It is also to be pointed out that PW4 Vikram Singh (informant) who had lodged FIR immediately was under constant threat and was compelled not to speak the truth despite the fact that he was the brother of deceased. Other witnesses also turned hostile including PW6 Prem Singh son of Pratap Singh and PW8 Rattan Lal, which indicates, as observed by the High Court, that accused party was stronger in terms of money power and muscle power. At this stage, we would observe that the Sessions Judge ought to have followed the mandate of Section 309 Cr.P.C. of completing the trial by examining the witnesses from day to day and not giving a chance to accused to threaten or win over the witnesses so that they may not support the prosecution. It appears from the record that examination-in-chief of PW4 Vikram Singh was over on 06.2.1984. The counsel representing Ambika Prasad requested the court that because of his uncles demise, he would not be in a position to cross-examine the witness and, therefore, recording of further cross-examination might be adjourned. Thereafter, the witness was cross-examined in the month of July, 1985. In our view, this is highly improper. Even if the request for adjournment of the learned counsel for the accused was accepted, the cross-examination ought not to have been deferred beyond two or three days.
Citations : [2000 ACR SC 1 282], [2000 AIR SC 718], [2000 ALD CRI 1 460], [2000 CRI LJ 810], [2000 JT SC 1 273], [2000 RCR CRIMINAL 1 64], [2000 SCALE 1 219], [2000 SCC 2 646], [2000 SCR 1 342], [2000 SCC CRI 522], [2000 DLT 83 476], [2000 AIR SC 719], [2000 SCC 2 464], [2000 ACC 40 462], [2000 SCO 2 646], [2000 AIR SC 253], [2000 CRIMES SC 2 63], [2000 SUPREME 2 633], [2000 CRLJ 106 810], [2000 CCR 1 130], [2000 RCR CRIMINAL 1 643], [2000 SCJ 2 472], [2000 SLT 1 442], [2000 SRJ 2 235], [2000 JCC SC 1 197], [2000 SCC SC 1 197], [2000 CRIMES 2 63], [2000 CRLJ SC 810], [2000 RECENTCR 1 643], [2000 AIR SCW 253]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/151141/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad6ee4b014971141165e
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