Supreme Court sensed that, there is a need to ensure that the power under section 41A is not used to intimidate, threaten and harass. Thereafter, granted an ad-interim stay on High Court order compelling the petitioner to appear before Police u/s 41A CrPC.
Category: Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification
Shailaja Patil Vs Khobbanna Patil on 18 Jan 2017
In this Order, Supreme Court held as follows,
That apart, we find that the High Court has proceeded on the basis that the appellant No.1 was capable of earning and that is one of the reasons for reducing the maintenance granted to her by the Family Court. Whether the appellant No.1 is capable of earning or whether she is actually earning are two different requirements. Merely because the appellant No.1 is capable of earning is not, in our opinion, sufficient reason to reduce the maintenance awarded by the Family Court.
This means, due to the mistake of High Court in assuming that being capable means earning, Supreme Court clarified that it is NOT so. This principle should apply to men as much as it was applied to women.
And, it is not clear why no Court is asking this question: Why are your needs/expenses out of sync with your income? Just because of the termination of financial assistance from husband?
Citations : [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 2692017 AIR SC 11742017 AKR 2 3142017 ALLMR CRI 31072017 CRILJ 23062017 KCCR 3 18092017 OLR 1 9212017 RLW SC 3 24902017 RCR CIVIL 2 7012017 RCR CRIMINAL 2 4972017 SCC ONLINE SC 2692017 AIR SC 1174]
Other Sources :
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5a65cbb44a93263320779de5
Here is the High Court Order.
Note: The mistake is this… All Assumptions are highlighted…
Petitioner is said to be working as a Lecturer and in a matrimonial dispute between him and the 1st respondent wife, the Family Court has ordered to pay maintenance of Rs.15,000/- to the wife and Rs.10,000/- per month to the son. According to the petitioner’s counsel, the 1st respondent is also working as a Teacher and is earning.
However, according to the counsel representing the 1st respondent, there is no proof of income being produced and she has no permanent source of income. Accordingly, he has sought for rejection of the application filed by the petitioner and to enhance the maintenance awarded.
Having regard to the fact that the wife is also capable of earning, she could be awarded Rs.6,000/- per month and the son could be awarded Rs.6,000/- per month. Ordered accordingly. Amount in deposit be adjusted towards arrears and also for future payment. Amount in deposit be released in favour of the respondent wife and child, as per the modified award.
Indian Olympic Association Vs Kerala Olympic Association and Ors on 06 Nov 2020
Single-judge bench held that, if a if a court has no jurisdiction to try a lis, it is good for the party raising the issue of jurisdiction to seek the dismissal/return of the proceedings, rather than seeking a transfer.
From Para 14,
14. Suffice it to say that if a court has no jurisdiction to try a lis, it is good for the party raising the issue of jurisdiction to seek the dismissal/return of the proceedings, rather than seeking a transfer. I fail to understand the anxiety of the petitioner, to make an irregular proceeding initiated by the first respondent, regular. The decision in Arvee Industries (supra) is no answer to this contention, since this Court did not say in that case that an invalid proceeding, may be validated, at the instance of the opposite party by transferring the same to a court having jurisdiction.
Citations :
Other Sources :
State Of Goa Vs Jose Maria Albert Vales @ Robert Vales on 18 Aug 2017
2-Judge bench held that without prima facie opinion in a complaint made otherwise than a police complaint, invoking of perjury u/s 340 CrPC or 341 CrPC is indefensible.
From Para 58,
58. We are thus of the firm opinion that a Trial Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint under Section 340 and/or Section 341 of the Code, if there is a preliminary inquiry and adequate materials in support of the considerations impelling action under the above provisions are available, would be required to treat such complaint to constitute a case, as if instituted on police report and proceed in accordance with law. However, in absence of any preliminary inquiry or adequate materials, it would be open for the Trial Magistrate, if he genuinely feels it necessary, in the interest of justice and to avoid unmerited prosecution to embark on a summary inquiry to collect further materials and then decide the future course of action as per law. In both the eventualities, the Trial Magistrate has to be cautious, circumspect, rational, objective and further informed with the overwhelming caveat that the offence alleged is one affecting the administration of justice, requiring a responsible, uncompromising and committed approach to the issue referred to him for inquiry and trial, as the case may be. In no case, however, in the teeth of Section 343(1), the procedure prescribed for cases instituted otherwise than on police report would either be relevant or applicable qua the complaints under Section 340 and/or 341 of the Cr.P.C.
And from Final Para,
60. In view of the determination as above, the approach of the High Court is wholly indefensible, as in the face of Section 343(1) of the Cr.P.C., the procedure prescribed for cases instituted otherwise than on police report is not attracted qua a complaint under Section 340 and/or Section 341 of the Code. Even assuming that the Trial Magistrate had examined few witnesses in support of the complaint, it was in the form of a summary inquiry, to be satisfied as to whether the materials on record would justify the framing of charge against the respondent or not and nothing further. Any other view would fly in the face of the ordainment of Section 343(1) of the Cr.P.C. and thus cannot receive judicial imprimatur. The impugned judgment of the High Court in quashing the charge framed by the Trial Magistrate and remanding the case to him to follow the procedure outlined for cases, instituted otherwise than on police report, under Chapter XIX-B is on the face of it unsustainable in law and on facts. It is thus set aside. The appeals are allowed. The Trial Magistrate would proceed from the stage of framing of charge, strictly in compliance of the letter and spirit of the precept contained in Section 343(1) of the Code. We make it clear that we have not offered any observation on the merits of the charge and the Trial Court would further the proceedings in accordance with law.
Citations : [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 1021], [2017 ALLCC 101 330], [2017 CCR SC 4 28], [2017 JCC 4 2245], [2017 RCR CRIMINAL 3 981], [2017 SCALE 9 527], [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 1021]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/194410529/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5a65cbaf4a93263320778706
Index of Perjury Case laws is here.
Bikramjit Singh Vs State of Punjab on 12 Oct 2020
Supreme Court held that, the default bail that is available to an accused person u/s 167(2)(a) of CrPC, is part of the fundamental rights available to him/her under Article 21 of Constitution of India.
From Para 28,
A conspectus of the aforesaid decisions would show that so long as an application for grant of default bail is made on expiry of the period of 90 days (which application need not even be in writing) before a charge sheet is filed, the right to default bail becomes complete. It is of no moment that the Criminal Court in question either does not dispose of such application before the charge sheet is filed or disposes of such application wrongly before such charge sheet is filed. So long as an application has been made for default bail on expiry of the stated period before time is further extended to the maximum period of 180 days, default bail, being an indefeasible right of the accused under the first proviso to Section 167(2), kicks in and must be granted.
But then from Para 29,
…
We must not forget that we are dealing with the personal liberty of an accused under a statute which imposes drastic punishments. The right to default bail, as has been correctly held by the judgments of this Court, are not mere statutory rights under the first proviso to Section 167(2) of the Code, but is part of the procedure established by law under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which is, therefore, a fundamental right granted to an accused person to be released on bail once the conditions of the first proviso to Section 167(2) are fulfilled.
…
Citations : [(2020) SCC Online SC 824]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/10807134/
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/bikramjit-singh-versus-the-state-of-punjab
United India Insurance Co Ltd Vs Satwinder Kaur and Ors on 30 June 2020
3 judge bench granted compensation to the surviving members of a fatal-accident victim, while revisting a catena of a landmark SC judgments.
Citations :
Other Sources :
Balaji Baliram Mupade Vs State of Maharashtra on 29 Oct 2020
Supreme Court, again, highlighted the need of delivering judgments at the earliest, as the “problem is compounded where the result is known but not the reasons.”
From Para 3,
3. Further, much later but still almost two decades ago, this Court in Anil Rai v. State of Bihar – 2001 (7) SCC 318 deemed it appropriate to provide some guidelines regarding the pronouncement of judgments, expecting them to be followed by all concerned under the mandate of this Court. It is not necessary to reproduce the directions except to state that normally the judgment is expected within two months of the conclusion of the arguments, and on expiry of three months any of the parties can file an application in the High Court with prayer for early judgment. If, for any reason, no judgment is pronounced for six months, any of the parties is entitled to move an application before the then Chief Justice of the High Court with a prayer to re-assign the case before another Bench for fresh arguments.
From Para 10,
10. We must note with regret that the counsel extended through various judicial pronouncements including the one referred to aforesaid appear to have been ignored, more importantly where oral orders are pronounced. In case of such orders, it is expected that they are either dictated in the Court or at least must follow immediately thereafter, to facilitate any aggrieved party to seek redressal from the higher Court. The delay in delivery of judgments has been observed to be a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in Anil Rai’s case (supra) and as stated aforesaid, the problem gets aggravated when the operative portion is made available early and the reasons follow much later.
Citations :
Other Sources :
Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal Vs State of Gujarat on 9 Sep 2013
Division bench of Supreme Court held that,
From Para 306,
26. Section 306 refers to abetment of suicide. It says that if any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine. The action for committing suicide is also on account of mental disturbance caused by mental and physical cruelty. To constitute an offence under Section 306, the prosecution has to establish that a person has committed suicide and the suicide was abetted by the accused. Prosecution has to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased committed suicide and the accused abetted the commission of suicide. But for the alleged extra marital relationship, which if proved, could be illegal and immoral, nothing has been brought out by the prosecution to show that the accused had provoked, incited or induced the wife to commit suicide.
From Para 28, exoneration of husband,
28. Suicide note completely exonerates A-1, which states that he was not responsible for death of the deceased. On the other hand, the deceased described herself as extremely selfish, egoist and, therefore, not a match for A-1. She entertained the belief that her husband A-1 was in love with A-2 and wanted to marry A-2. Note states it was for their happiness she had decided to end her life. She also wanted to have the marriage of A-1 and A-2 solemnized with pomp and gaiety. On reading the suicide note, one can infer that the deceased was so possessive of her husband, and was always under an emotional stress that she might lose her husband. Too much of possessiveness could also lead to serious emotional stress, over and above the fact that she had one abortion and her daughter died after few days of birth. No evidence is forthcoming in this case to show that A-2 ever evinced any interest to marry A-1. On the other hand, during the subsistence of the alleged relationship, A-2 herself got married.
Citations : [2013 CRLJ SC 44482013 AIOL 5932013 CRIMES SC 4 2952013 CRIMES SC 4 1102013 SCC 10 482013 AIR SC 52192013 RCR CRIMINAL SC 4 2712013 SLT 7 7062014 AIR SC 3312013 SCALE 11 1982013 JT 12 3572013 SUPREME 6 3662014 JLJR SC 1 3902013 SCC CRI 3 8012013 SCC CIV 4 6162013 SCC ONLINE SC 8142013 AIC 130 292013 CRILJ 44482014 PLJR 1 5112013 BOMCR CRI 4 5222013 UC 3 19352013 DMC 3 2452014 ALT CRL AP 1 2582013 ALD CRI 2 7552013 MLJ CRI 3 7002013 OLR 2 8672013 KHC 3 8102013 AD SC 10 452013 ABR 6 1792014 SCJ 1 5262013 RCR CRIMINAL 4 2712014 JLJR 1 3902013 CRI LJ 44482013 MLJ CRL 3 7002013 AIR SCW 5219
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/170814796/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af2de4b0149711415bb9
https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2015/02/25/husband-s-extra-marital-relationship-does-not-amount-to-cruelty/
K.V Prakash Babu Vs State of Karnataka on 22 Nov 2016
Supreme Court held that the necessary ingredients to make out a IPC 306 offence are missing in the case.
From Para 15, Mental Cruelty,
15. The concept of mental cruelty depends upon the milieu and the strata from which the persons come from and definitely has an individualistic perception regard being had to one’s endurance and sensitivity. It is difficult to generalise but certainly it can be appreciated in a set of established facts. Extra-marital relationship, per se, or as such would not come within the ambit of Section 498-A IPC. It would be an illegal or immoral act, but other ingredients are to be brought home so that it would constitute a criminal offence. There is no denial of the fact that the cruelty need not be physical but a mental torture or abnormal behaviour that amounts to cruelty or harassment in a given case. It will depend upon the facts of the said case. To explicate, solely because the husband is involved in an extra-marital relationship and there is some suspicion in the mind of wife, that cannot be regarded as mental cruelty which would attract mental cruelty for satisfying the ingredients of Section 306 IPC.
From Para 17, Final nail in the coffin,
17. In the instant case, as the evidence would limpidly show, the wife developed a sense of suspicion that her husband was going to the house of Ashwathamma in Village Chelur where he got involved with Deepa, daughter of Ashwathamma. It has come on record through various witnesses that the people talked in the locality with regard to the involvement of the appellant with Deepa. It needs to be noted that Anjanamma, being not able to digest the humiliation, committed suicide. The mother and the brother of Anjanamma paved the same path. In such a situation, it is extremely difficult to hold that the prosecution has established the charge under Section 498-A IPC and the fact that the said cruelty induced the wife to commit suicide. It is manifest that the wife was guided by the rumour that aggravated her suspicion which has no boundary. The seed of suspicion planted in mind brought the eventual tragedy. But such an event will not constitute the offence or establish the guilt of the appellant-accused under Section 306 IPC.
Citations : [2017 SCC 11 176], [2017 SCC CRI 4 242], [2016 SCC ONLINE SC 1363], [2016 AIR SC 5430], [2016 SCR 11 509], [2016 CRIMES 4 184], [2017 CRI LJ 264], [2017 AIC 169 211], [2017 KLT 1 125], [2017 KCCR 1 673], [2017 ECRN 1 1]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/33506004/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5837160c53bee74f64c25ebc
