Bhagirath Vs Delhi Administration on 16 April, 1985

Posted on December 20, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A highly technical issue is resolved in affirmative, by the 5-judge Constitutional Bench by interpreting a term, ‘TERM‘.

Whether persons sentenced to imprisonment for life entitled to set-off their under trial period of detention against their sentence?

The Bench said,

Life is uncertain. In more ways than one. Who knows what good may come tomorrow and how many good tomorrows there are still to go ? But , philosophical digressions apart , especially optimistic , the fact that the term of life is of an uncertain duration does not justify the conclusion that the sentence of imprisonment for life is not for a term. The relevant question and , the only one , to ask under section 428 is: Has this person been sentenced to imprisonment for a term ? For the sake of convenience , the question may be split into two parts. One, has this person been sentenced to imprisonment ? And, two, is the imprisonment to which he has been sentenced an imprisonment for a term ? There can possibly be no dispute that a person sentenced to life imprisonment is sentenced to imprisonment. Then , what is the term to which he is sentenced ? The obvious answer to that question is that term to which he has been sentenced is the term of his life. Therefore , a person who is sentenced to life imprisonment is sentenced to imprisonment for term.

In conclusion,

We have considered with great care the reasoning upon which the decision in Kartar Singh proceeds. With respect, we are unable to agree with the decision. We have already discussed why ’imprisonment for life is imprisonment for a term , within the meaning of section 428. We would like to
add that we find it difficult to agree that the expressions ’imprisonment for life’ and imprisonment for a term’ are used either in the Penal Code or in the Criminal Procedure Code in contra-distinction with each other. Sections 304 , 305 , 307 and 391 of the penal Code undoubtedly provide that persons quilty of the respective offences shall be punished with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment for a term not exceeding a certain number of years. But , that is the only manner in which the Legislature could have expressed its intention that persons who are guilty of those offences shall be punished with either of the sentences mentioned in the respective sections. The circumstance on which the learned judges have placed reliance in Kartar Singh , do not afford any evidence , intrinsic or otherwise’ of the use of the two expressions in contra-distinction with each other. Two or more expressions are often used in the same section in order to exhaust the alternatives which are available to the Legislature. That does not mean that there is , necessarily , an antithesis between those expressions.
The reasoning in Kartar Singh that an order of remission does not interfere with the sentence recorded by the court but merely affects the execution of the sentence, stands answered by the interpretation which we have put upon the language of section 428 that persons sentenced to imprisonment for life are sentenced to imprisonment for a term. It is not because of remission that a sentence of life imprisonment becomes an imprisonment for a term.
We have also already answered the last of the reasons given in Kartar Singh that the question is not whether the beneficent provision contained in section 428 should be extended to life convicts on equitable considerations. We enter a most respectful caveat. Equity sustains law and the twain must meet. They cannot run in parallel streams. Equitable considerations must have an important place in the construction of beneficent provisions, particularly in the field of criminal law. To exclude such considerations is to denude law’s benevolence Or its true and lasting content. Lastly , the view expressed by the Joint Committee in its Report does not yield to the inference that the “mischief sought to be remedied has no relevance where gravity of offence requires the imposition of imprisonment for life”. As we have indicated earlier , graver the crime , longer the sentence and , longer the
sentence , greater the need for set-offs and remissions. Punishments are no longer retributory. They are reformative.
The order passed by this Court in Sukhlal Hansda related to the cases of 24 prisoners who were sentenced to life imprisonment. Most of those prisoners had undergone imprisonment for a period which , after taking account the remissions earned by them , exceeded fourteen years. It was
held by this Court that , for the purpose of considering whether the cases of those prisoners should be examined for premature release under the relevant provisions of the West Bengal Jail Manual , there was no reason why the period of imprisonment undergone by them as undertrial prisoners
should not be taken into account. The Court directed that the cases of the prisoners should be considered by the State Government , both for the purpose of setting off the period of detention undergone by them as undertrial prisoners and for taking into account the remissions earned by them. The order passed by the Court does not discuss the point which arises before us though , the observations made therein are consistent more with the view which we have taken than with the view taken in Kartar Singh.

Bhagirath Vs Delhi Administration on 16 April, 1985

Citations : [1985 SCC CRI 280], [1985 SCALE 1 719], [1985 AIR SC 1050], [1985 SCC 2 580], [1985 CRIMES SC 1 832], [1985 SCR 3 743], [1985 CRILJ 1179], [1985 AWC 11 510], [1985 BOMLR 85 400], [1985 ACR 340]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/733492/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac19e4b014971140e060

State of Andhra Pradesh Vs Reddi Govinda Rao

Posted on December 18, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court passed a stay order until further orders on this AP HC Order here.

2020-12-18 State of Andhra Pradesh Vs Reddi Govinda Rao

Paramvir Singh Saini Vs Baljit Singh and Ors on 02 Dec 2020

Posted on December 16, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court passed this Order in furtherance to earlier Orders as follows:

From Paras 2 and 3,

2. This Court, vide Order dated 03.04.2018 in SLP (Crl) No. 2302 of 2017, reported as Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2018) 5 SCC 311, directed that a Central Oversight Body (hereinafter referred to as the “COB”) be set up by the Ministry of Home Affairs to implement the plan of action with respect to the use of videography in the crime scene during the investigation. This Court, while considering the directions issued in D.K. Basu Vs. State of West Bengal & Others (2015) 8 SCC 744, held that there was a need for further directions that in every State an oversight mechanism be created whereby an independent committee can study the CCTV camera footages and periodically publish a report of its observations thereon. The COB was further directed to issue appropriate instructions in this regard at the earliest.

From Paras 5, 6 and 7,

5. This Court, vide Order dated 16.07.2020, issued notice in the instant Special Leave Petition to the Ministry of Home Affairs on the question of audio-video recordings of Section 161 CrPC statements as is provided by Section 161 (3) proviso, as well as the larger question as to installation of CCTV cameras in police stations generally. While issuing notice this Court also took note of the directions in Shafhi Mohammad (supra).
6. This Court, vide Order dated 16.09.2020, impleaded all the States and Union Territories to find out the exact position of CCTV cameras qua each Police Station as well as the constitution of Oversight Committees in accordance with the Order dated 03.04.2018 of this Court in Shafhi Mohammad (supra).
7. Pursuant to the said directions of this Court, Compliance Affidavits and Action Taken Reports were filed by 14 States (till 24.11.2020), namely, West Bengal, Chhattisgarh, Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Nagaland, Karnataka, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, Assam, Sikkim, Mizoram, Madhya Pradesh, Meghalaya, Manipur; and 2 Union Territories, namely, Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry.

Duties of SLOC and DLOC are as follows:

12. It shall be the duty of the SLOC to see that the directions passed by this Court are carried out. Amongst others, the duties shall consist of:
a) Purchase, distribution and installation of CCTVs and its equipment; b) Obtaining the budgetary allocation for the same;
c) Continuous monitoring of maintenance and upkeep of CCTVs and its equipment;
d) Carrying out inspections and addressing the grievances received from the DLOC; and
e) To call for monthly reports from the DLOC and immediately address any concerns like faulty equipment.
Likewise, the DLOC shall have the following obligations:
a) Supervision, maintenance and upkeep of CCTVs and its equipment;
b) Continuous monitoring of maintenance and upkeep of CCTVs and its equipment;
c) To interact with the Station House Officer (hereinafter referred to as the “SHO”) as to the functioning and maintenance of CCTVs and its equipment; and
d) To send monthly reports to the SLOC about the functioning of CCTVs and allied equipment.
e) To review footage stored from CCTVs in the various Police Stations to check for any human rights violation that may have occurred but are not reported.
13. It is obvious that none of this can be done without allocation of adequate funds for the same, which must be done by the States’/Union Territories’ Finance Departments at the very earliest.

One of the most important aspect is settled here… Awesome…

14. The duty and responsibility for the working, maintenance and recording of CCTVs shall be that of the SHO of the police station concerned. It shall be the duty and obligation of the SHO to immediately report to the DLOC any fault with the equipment or malfunctioning of CCTVs. If the CCTVs are not functioning in a particular police station, the concerned SHO shall inform the DLOC of the arrest / interrogations carried out in that police station during the said period and forward the said record to the DLOC. If the concerned SHO has reported malfunctioning or non-functioning of CCTVs of a particular Police Station, the DLOC shall immediately request the SLOC for repair and purchase of the equipment, which shall be done immediately.
15. The Director General/Inspector General of Police of each State and Union Territory should issue directions to the person in charge of a Police Station to entrust the SHO of the concerned Police Station with the responsibility of assessing the working condition of the CCTV cameras installed in the police station and also to take corrective action to restore the functioning of all non-functional CCTV cameras. The SHO should also be made responsible for CCTV data maintenance, backup of data, fault rectification etc.

Regarding placement of CCTV cameras:

16. The State and Union Territory Governments should ensure that CCTV cameras are installed in each and every Police Station functioning in the respective State and/or Union Territory. Further, in order to ensure that no part of a Police Station is left uncovered, it is imperative to ensure that CCTV cameras are installed at all entry and exit points; main gate of the police station; all lock-ups; all corridors; lobby/the reception area; all verandas/outhouses, Inspector’s room; Sub-Inspector’s room; areas outside the lock-up room; station hall; in front of the police station compound; outside (not inside) washrooms/toilets; Duty Officer’s room; back part of the police station etc.
17. CCTV systems that have to be installed must be equipped with night vision and must necessarily consist of audio as well as video footage. In areas in which there is either no electricity and/or internet, it shall be the duty of the States/Union Territories to provide the same as expeditiously as possible using any mode of providing electricity, including solar/wind power. The internet systems that are provided must also be systems which provide clear image resolutions and audio. Most important of all is the storage of CCTV camera footage which can be done in digital video recorders and/or network video recorders. CCTV cameras must then be installed with such recording systems so that the data that is stored thereon shall be preserved for a period of 18 months. If the recording equipment, available in the market today, does not have the capacity to keep the recording for 18 months but for a lesser period of time, it shall be mandatory for all States, Union Territories and the Central Government to purchase one which allows storage for the maximum period possible, and, in any case, not below 1 year. It is also made clear that this will be reviewed by all the States so as to purchase equipment which is able to store the data for 18 months as soon as it is commercially available in the market. The affidavit of compliance to be filed by all States and Union Territories and Central Government shall clearly indicate that the best equipment available as of date has been purchased.
18. Whenever there is information of force being used at police stations resulting in serious injury and/or custodial deaths, it is necessary that persons be free to complain for a redressal of the same. Such complaints may not only be made to the State Human Rights Commission, which is then to utilise its powers, more particularly under Sections 17 and 18 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, for redressal of such complaints, but also to Human Rights Courts, which must then be set up in each District of every State/Union Territory under Section 30 of the aforesaid Act. The Commission/Court can then immediately summon CCTV camera footage in relation to the incident for its safe keeping, which may then be made available to an investigation agency in order to further process the complaint made to it.

And, finally explicitly publicising that the said premises is under CCTV monitoring in vernacular and English languages.

20. The SLOC and the COB (where applicable) shall give directions to all Police Stations, investigative/enforcement agencies to prominently display at the entrance and inside the police stations/offices of investigative/enforcement agencies about the coverage of the concerned premises by CCTV. This shall be done by large posters in English, Hindi and vernacular language. In addition to the above, it shall be clearly mentioned therein that a person has a right to complain about human rights violations to the National/State Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Court or the Superintendent of Police or any other authority empowered to take cognizance of an offence. It shall further mention that CCTV footage is preserved for a certain minimum time period, which shall not be less than six months, and the victim has a right to have the same secured in the event of violation of his human rights.

Paramvir Singh Saini Vs Baljit Singh and Ors on 02 Dec 2020

Md. Ali @ Guddu Vs State of U.P. on 10 Mar 2015

Posted on December 15, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice Dipak Misra sitting in a Division Bench of Supreme Court held that, the story of prosecutrix did not inspire confidence so the sole evidence of prosecutrix unsupported by medical evidence led to the acquittal of the appellants.

Md. Ali @ Guddu Vs State of U.P. on 10 Mar 2015

Citations : [2016 NCC 1 99], [2015 ACR SC 1 972], [2015 AD SC 3 181], [2015 ALD CRL SC 2 43], [2015 CCR SC 2 404], [2015 CCR SC 1 543], [2015 CLT SC 120 418], [2015 CRIMES SC 2 84], [2015 JCC SC 2 1327], [2015 OLR SC 1 856], [2015 RCR CRIMINAL 2 206], [2015 SCC 7 272], [2015 SCJ 4 178], [2015 WLN SC 3 18], [2015 SCC ONLINE SC 192], [2015 SCR 3 416], [2015 ALL LJ 3 489], [2015 CRI LJ 1967], [2015 ALT CRL SC 2 432]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/51474008/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5790b240e561097e45a4e228

Supreme Court Judgment – Md. Ali@Guddu vs State of Uttar Pradesh

Ganga Kumar Srivastava Vs The State of Bihar on 20 Jul 2005

Posted on December 15, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

The following are the principles that emerge in regards to the exercise of power of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution:

“(i) The powers of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution are very wide but in criminal appeals this Court does not interfere with the
concurrent findings of fact save in exceptional circumstances.
(ii) It is open to this Court to interfere with the findings of fact given by the High Court, if the High Court has acted perversely or otherwise improperly.
(iii) It is open to this Court to invoke the power under Article 136 only in very exceptional circumstances as and when a question of law of general public importance arises or a decision shocks the conscience of the Court.
(iv) When the evidence adduced by the prosecution fell short of the test of reliability and acceptability and as such it is highly unsafe to act upon it.
(v) Where the appreciation of evidence and finding is vitiated by any error of law of procedure or found contrary to the principles of natural justice, errors of record and misreading of the evidence, or where the conclusions of the High Court are manifestly perverse and unsupportable from the evidence on record.”

Ganga Kumar Srivastava Vs The State of Bihar on 20 Jul 2005

Citations : [2005 SCC 6 211], [2005 JT 6 356], [2005 RCR CRI 3 707], [2005 AIR SC 3123], [2005 CRI 5 95], [2005 SAR CRI 0 640], [2005 SCJ 5 364], [2005 CALCRILR 419], [2005 CRLR 650], [2005 BLJ 1630], [2005 ALD CRI 1 485], [2005 ALD CRI 2 485], [2005 ALL MR CRI 2540], [2005 MAHLR 3 542], [2005 SUPREME 5 123], [2005 SCALE 5 535], [2005 AIR SC 3617], [2005 CCR 3 35], [2005 JCRIC 2 1182], [2005 SRJ 7 47], [2005 SLT 5 393], [2005 SCC CRI 1424], [2005 CRLJ SC 3454], [2005 MADLJ CRI 1 864], [2005 AIR SCW 3617]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1238385/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae1ce4b0149711412fe4

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/ganga-kumar-srivastava-versus-the-state-of-bihar

Veera Sarin vs UOI

Posted on December 14, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A wonderful case indeed, one intending to overturn the atrocity of National Emergency imposed on Indians by Congress Government.

The matter was posted to be listed on 14 Dec 2020

2020-12-07 Veera Sarin vs UOI - Listed on 14 Dec 2020

2020-09-22 Here is the Petition

2020-09-22 Veera Sarin vs UOI - Petition

Girish Kumar Suneja Vs CBI on 13 Jul 2017

Posted on December 13, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that all those Order of a Trial Court which terminate the proceedings are not interlocutory Order but are intermediate orders in nature so such Orders are not prohibited in Revision at Session or High Courts.

From Para 16, 17 and 18,

16. While the text of sub-section (1) of Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. appears to confer very wide powers on the court in the exercise of its revision jurisdiction, this power is equally severely curtailed by sub-section (2) thereof. There is a complete prohibition in a court exercising its revision jurisdiction in respect of interlocutory orders. Therefore, what is the nature of orders in respect of which a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction?
17. There are three categories of orders that a court can pass – final, intermediate and interlocutory. There is no doubt that in respect of a final order, a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction – that is in respect of a final order of acquittal or conviction. There is equally no doubt that in respect of an interlocutory order, the court cannot exercise its revision jurisdiction. As far as an intermediate order is concerned, the court can exercise its revision jurisdiction since it is not an interlocutory order.
18. The concept of an intermediate order first found mention in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana7 in which case the interpretation and impact of Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. came up for consideration. This decision is important for two reasons. Firstly it gives the historical reason for the enactment of Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. and secondly considering that historical background, it gives a justification for a restrictive meaning to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

From Para 21,

21. The concept of an intermediate order was further elucidated in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra8 by contradistinguishing a final order and an interlocutory order. This decision lays down the principle that an intermediate order is one which is interlocutory in nature but when reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in a final order. Two such intermediate orders immediately come to mind – an order taking cognizance of an offence and summoning an accused and an order for framing charges. Prima facie these orders are interlocutory in nature, but when an order taking cognizance and summoning an accused is reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings against that person resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Similarly, an order for framing of charges if reversed has the effect of discharging the accused person and resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Therefore, an intermediate order is one which if passed in a certain way, the proceedings would terminate but if passed in another way, the proceedings would continue.

From Paras 23 and 24,

23. We may note that in different cases, different expressions are used for the same category of orders – sometimes it is called an intermediate order, sometimes a quasi-final order and sometimes it is called an order that is a matter of moment. Our preference is for the expression ‘intermediate order’ since that brings out the nature of the order more explicitly.
24. The second reason why Amar Nath is important is that it invokes the principle, in the context of criminal law, that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Therefore, when Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. prohibits interference in respect of interlocutory orders, Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be availed of to achieve the same objective. In other words, since Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. prohibits interference with interlocutory orders, it would not be permissible to resort to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to set aside an interlocutory order.

Finally,

27. Our conclusion on this subject is that while the appellants might have an entitlement (not a right) to file a revision petition in the High Court but that entitlement can be taken away and in any event, the High Court is under no obligation to entertain a revision petition – such a petition can be rejected at the threshold. If the High Court is inclined to accept the revision petition it can do so only against a final order or an intermediate order, namely, an order which if set aside would result in the culmination of the proceedings. As we see it, there appear to be only two such eventualities of a revisable order and in any case only one such eventuality is before us. Consequently the result of paragraph 10 of the order passed by this Court is that the entitlement of the appellants to file a revision petition in the High Court is taken away and thereby the High Court is deprived of exercising its extraordinary discretionary power available under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C.
28. However, this does not mean that the appellants have no remedy available to them – paragraph 10 of the order does not prohibit the appellants from approaching this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Therefore all that has happened is that the forum for ventilating the grievance of the appellants has shifted from the High Court to this Court. It was submitted by one of the learned counsel that this is not good enough for the appellants since this Court is not obliged to give reasons while dismissing such a petition unlike the High Court which would necessarily have to give reasons if it rejected a revision petition. In our opinion, the mere fact that this Court could dismiss the petition filed by the appellants under Article 136 of the Constitution without giving reasons does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that reasons will not be given or that some equitable order will not be passed. The submission of learned counsel has no basis and is only a presumption of what this Court might do. We cannot accept a submission that has its foundation on a hypothesis.

Girish Kumar Suneja Vs CBI on 13 Jul 2017

Citations : [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 766], [2017 AIR SC 3620], [2017 CRIMES SC 3 96], [2017 CCR SC 3 409], [2017 MLJ CRL 3 616], [2017 RCR CRIMINAL 3 665], [2017 SCALE 7 661], [2017 SCC 14 809], [2018 SCC CRI 1 202], [2017 CRI LJ 4980], [2017 AIC 180 100]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/174336697/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/59786fa94a9326202d8a7817

State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr Vs Varla Ramaiah and Ors

Posted on December 11, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

After facing another slipper shot at AP HC here, State Government filed SLP(C) at Supreme Court.

On 05 Nov 2020,

Notice was issued to Respondents

State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr Vs Varla Ramaiah and Ors on 05 Nov 2020

Just for this, the following payments (total: Rs.20,16,667/) are made to 3 advocates.

Dushyant A.Dave 11,00,000
Shekhar Naphade 5,50,000
Mahfooz Ahsan Nazki 3,66,667

2020-12-11 2020GAD_RT1948 Payment of an amount of Rs.20,16,667 towards advocate fee - Sanction – Accorded

Kaushal Verma and Ors Vs State of Chhattisgarh on 08 Dec 2020

Posted on December 11, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court in this Order approved of Convenience Note submitted by Advocate Sumeer Sodhi to be a helpful aid that other Standing Counsels of States can follow as a Standard format.

In the end, we must observe that the presentation made by Mr. Sumeer Sodhi in the Note extracted above is an illustration how a case can be presented on behalf of the State. We may suggest that said Note may be taken as the Standard Format by all the learned counsel appearing for various State Governments in this Court. The Registry may circulate copies of this Order to all the learned Standing Counsel for the States.

Kaushal Verma and Ors Vs State of Chhattisgarh on 08 Dec 2020

State of Andhra Pradesh Vs A.B. Venkateswara Rao IPS on 26 Nov 2020

Posted on December 9, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court stayed the operation of AP HC Order of reinstatement of Sri A.B. Venkateswara Rao IPS and issued notices to him, DGP and UOI returnable in 4 weeks.

State of Andhra Pradesh Vs A.B. Venkateswara Rao IPS on 26 Nov 2020

Here are the GOs issued by State Government of AP sanctioning Legal fee and expenses for the attending this case for the the arguing Senior Counsel and the AoR.

Senior Advocate was paid Rs.3,00,000/- (For this appearance)

2020-12-08 2020GAD_RT1920 Payment of Rs. 3,00,000 to Sri Chander Uday Singh, Senior Advocate, SC of AP at Supreme Court towards legal fee and expenses in connection with SLP (C) No. 8024 of 2020

=============

Advocate on Record was paid Rs.1,00,000/- (For this appearance)

2020-12-08 2020GAD_RT1921 Payment of Rs. 1,00,000 to Sri Mahfooz Ahsan Nazki, AoR, SC of AP at Supreme Court towards legal fee and expenses in connection with SLP (C) No. 8024 of 2020

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Category: Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification

Bhagirath Vs Delhi Administration on 16 April, 1985

State of Andhra Pradesh Vs Reddi Govinda Rao

Paramvir Singh Saini Vs Baljit Singh and Ors on 02 Dec 2020

Md. Ali @ Guddu Vs State of U.P. on 10 Mar 2015

Ganga Kumar Srivastava Vs The State of Bihar on 20 Jul 2005

Veera Sarin vs UOI

Girish Kumar Suneja Vs CBI on 13 Jul 2017

State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr Vs Varla Ramaiah and Ors

Kaushal Verma and Ors Vs State of Chhattisgarh on 08 Dec 2020

State of Andhra Pradesh Vs A.B. Venkateswara Rao IPS on 26 Nov 2020