Fakhrey Alam Vs State of Uttar Pradesh on 15 Mar 2021

Posted on March 18, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division bench of Supreme Court in this Order held as follows in regards to Default bail u/s 167 CrPC,

On the second aspect we cannot lose sight of the fact that what was envisaged by the Legislature was that the investigation should be completed in 24 hours but practically that was never found feasible. It is in these circumstances that Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. provided for time period within which the investigation should be completed, depending upon the nature of offences. Since, liberty is a Constitutional right, time periods were specified in the default of which the accused will have a right to default bail, a valuable right.
If we look at the scenario in the present case in that conspectus, the charge sheet under the provisions of law as originally filed on 04.09.2017 were required to be filed within 90 days but was actually filed within 180 days. This was on the premise of the charge under Section 18 of the UAPA Act. However, no charge sheet was filed even within 180 days under the UAPA Act, but post filing of the application for default bail, it was filed after 211 days. Thus, undoubtedly the period of 180 days to file the charge sheet qua UAPA Act had elapsed. We do not think that the State can take advantage of the fact that in one case there is one charge sheet and supplementary charge sheets are used to extend the time period in this manner by seeking to file the supplementary charge sheet qua the offences under the UAPA Act even beyond the period specified under Section 167 of the Cr.P.C beyond which default bail will be admissible, i.e, the period of 180 days. That period having expired and the charge sheet not having been filed qua those offences (albeit a supplementary charge sheet), we are of the view the appellant would be entitled to default bail in the aforesaid facts and circumstances.
We need only emphasize what is already observed in Bikramjit Singh case (supra) that default bail under first proviso of Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. is a fundamental right and not merely a statutory right as it is, a procedure established by law under Article 21 of the Constitution. Thus a fundamental right is granted to an accused person to be released on bail once the conditions of the first proviso to Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. are fulfilled.
In fact in the majority judgment of this Court it has been held that an oral application for grant of default bail would suffice [See. Rakesh Kumar Paul vs. State of Assam]3. The consequences of the UAPA Act are drastic in punishment and in that context, it has been held not to be a mere statutory right but part of the procedure established by law under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Citations :

Other Sources :

State of Goa Vs Fouziya Shaikh on 12 Mar 2021

Posted on March 17, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court said, State Election Commissioner cannot be a Government functionary as this Constitutional body is supposed to be independent body.

From Para 52,

52. Given the fact that the scheme contained in Part XV is bodily lifted into the provisions contained in Part IX-A, the powers exercised by the SEC under Article 243ZA(1) are the same as those vested in the Election Commission of India under Article 324 of the Constitution of India. As has been pointed out in Mohinder Singh Gill (supra) and the aforesaid decisions, the entire supervision and conduct of elections to municipalities is vested in a constitutional authority that is the SEC which is to supervise and conduct elections by giving orders and directions to the State Government as well as authorities that are set up under State statutes for the purpose of supervision and conduct of elections. The power thus conferred by the Constitution is a power given to the SEC not only to carry out the constitutional mandate but also to fill in gaps where there is no law or rule governing a particular
situation during the conduct of an election. The SEC, being anindependent constitutional functionary, is not only to be obeyed by the State Government and the other authorities under local State statutes,but can also approach the writ court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to either enforce directions or orders issued by itor to ask for appropriate orders from High Courts in that behalf.

From Para 63 (Final observations)

63. A conspectus of the aforesaid judgments in the context of municipal elections would yield the following results.
I. Under Article 243 ZG(b), no election to any municipality can be called in question except by an election petition presented to a Tribunal as is provided by or under any law made by the Legislature of a State. This would mean that from the date of notification of the election till the date of the declaration of result a judicial hands-off is mandated by the non-obstante clause contained in Article 243ZG debarring the writ court under Articles
226 and 227 from interfering once the election process has begun until it is over. The constitutional bar operates only during this period. It is therefore a matter of discretion exercisable by a writ court as to whether an interference is called for when the electoral process is “imminent” i.e, the notification for elections is yet to be announced.
II. If, however, the assistance of a writ court is required in subserving the progress of the election and facilitating its completion, the writ court may issue orders provided that the election process, once begun, cannot be postponed or protracted in any manner.
III. The non-obstante clause contained in Article 243ZG does not operate as a bar after the election tribunal decides an election dispute before it. Thus, the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 and that of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is not affected as the non-obstante clause in Article 243ZG operates only during the process of election.
IV. Under Article 243ZA(1), the SEC is in overall charge of the superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls, and the conduct of all municipal elections. If there is a constitutional or statutory infraction by any authority including the State Government either before or during the election process, the SEC by virtue of its power under Article 243ZA(1) can set right such infraction. For this purpose, it can direct the State
Government or other authority to follow the Constitution or legislative enactment or direct such authority to correct an order which infracts the constitutional or statutory mandate. For this purpose, it can also approach a writ court to issue necessary directions in this behalf. It is entirely upto the SEC to set the election process in motion or, in cases where a constitutional or statutory provision is not followed or infracted, to postpone the
election process until such illegal action is remedied. This the SEC will do taking into account the constitutional mandate of holding elections before the term of a municipality or municipal council is over. In extraordinary cases, the SEC may conduct elections after such term is over, only for good reason.
V. Judicial review of a State Election Commission’s order is available on grounds of review of administrative orders. Here again, the writ court must adopt a hands-off policy while the election process is on and interfere either before the process commences or after such process is completed unless interfering with such order subserves and facilitates the progress of the election.
VI. Article 243ZA(2) makes it clear that the law made by the legislature of a State, making provision with respect to matters relating to or in connection with elections to municipalities, is subject to the provisions of the Constitution, and in particular Article 243T, which deals with reservation of seats.
VII. The bar contained in Article 243ZG(a) mandates that there be a judicial hands-off of the writ court or any court in questioning the validity of any law relating to delimitation of constituency or allotment of seats to such constituency made or purporting to be made under Article 243ZA. This is by virtue of the non-obstante clause contained in Article 243ZG. The statutory provisions dealing with delimitation and allotment of seats cannot therefore be questioned in any court. However, orders made under such statutory provisions can be questioned in courts provided the concerned statute does not give such orders the status of a statutory provision.
VIII. Any challenge to orders relating to delimitation or allotment of seats including preparation of electoral rolls, not being part of the election process as delineated above, can also be challenged in the manner provided by the statutory provisions dealing with delimitation of constituencies and allotment of seats to such constituencies.
IX. The constitutional bar of Article 243ZG(a) applies only to courts and not the State Election Commission, which is to supervise, direct and control preparation of electoral rolls and conduct elections to municipalities.
X. The result of this position is that it is the duty of the SEC to countermand illegal orders made by any authority including the State Government which delimit constituencies or allot seats to such constituencies, as is provided in proposition (IV) above. This may be done by the SEC either before or during the electoral process, bearing in mind its constitutional duty as delineated in the said proposition.

From Para 68,

68. The most disturbing feature of these cases is the subversion of the constitutional mandate contained in Article 243K of the Constitution of India. The State Election Commissioner has to be a person who is independent of the State Government as he is an important constitutional functionary who is to oversee the entire election process in the state qua panchayats and municipalities. The importance given to the independence of a State Election Commissioner is explicit from the provision for removal from his office made in the proviso to clause (2) of Article 243K. Insofar as the manner and the ground for his removal from the office is concerned, he has been equated with a Judge of a High Court. Giving an additional charge of such an
important and independent constitutional office to an officer who is directly under the control of the State Government is, in our view, a mockery of the constitutional mandate. We therefore declare that the additional charge given to a Law Secretary to the government of the state flouts the constitutional mandate of Article 243K. The State Government is directed to remedy this position by appointing an
independent person to be the State Election Commissioner at the earliest. Such person cannot be a person who holds any office or post in the Central or any State Government. It is also made clear that henceforth, all State Election Commissioners appointed under Article 243K in the length and breadth of India have to be independent persons who cannot be persons who are occupying a post or office under the Central or any State Government. If there are any such persons holding the post of State Election Commissioner in any other state, such persons must be asked forthwith to step down from such office and the State Government concerned be bound to fulfil the constitutional mandate of Article 243K by appointing only independent persons to this high constitutional office. The directions contained in this paragraph are issued under Article 142 of the Constitution of India so as to ensure that the constitutional mandate of an independent
State Election Commission which is to conduct elections under Part IX and IXA of the Constitution be strictly followed in the future.

State of Goa Vs Fouziya Shaikh on 12 Mar 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/68534005/

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/state-of-goa-anr-versus-fouziya-imtiaz-shaikh-anr

Sartaj Singh Vs State of Haryana on 15 Mar 2021

Posted on March 16, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that, even after getting discharged, an accused can be made to face trail u/s 319 CrPC, if new facts/evidence emerge during trial, even at chief-examination of prosecution witnesses.

From Para 6,

6.2 Considering the law laid down by this Court in Hardeep Singh (supra) and the observations and findings referred to and reproduced hereinabove, it emerges that
(i) the Court can exercise the power under Section 319 CrPC even on the basis of the statement made in the examination-in-chief
of the witness concerned and the Court need not wait till the cross-examination of such a witness and the Court need not wait for the evidence against the accused proposed to be summoned to be tested by cross-examination; and
(ii) a person not named in the FIR or a person though named in the FIR but has not been charge-sheeted or a person who has been discharged can be summoned under Section 319 CrPC, provided from the evidence (may be on the basis of the evidence collected in the form of statement made in the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned), it appears that such person can be tried along with the accused already facing trial.
6.4 In the case of Rajesh v. State of Haryana (2019) 6 SCC 368, after considering the observations made by this Court in Hardeep Singh (supra) referred to hereinabove, this Court has further observed and held that even in a case where the stage of giving opportunity to the complainant to file a protest petition urging upon the trial court to summon other persons as well who were named in FIR but not implicated in the chargesheet has gone, in that case also, the Court is still not powerless by virtue of Section 319 CrPC and even those persons named in FIR but not implicated in chargesheet can be summoned to face the trial provided during the trial some evidence surfaces against the proposed accused.

Sartaj Singh Vs State of Haryana on 15 Mar 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/sartaj-singh-versus-state-of-haryana-anr-etc

Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay Vs Union of India (Election Reforms: Right to Reject)

Posted on March 15, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Adv Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay filed a PIL with regards to Election Reforms in India, i.e., Right to Reject all candidates in an election.

On 2021-03-15

Supreme Court issued notice to Union of India and Election Commission of India.

Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay Vs Union of India on 15 Mar 2021

On 2021-04-30

Computed generated date.

Dr. Rajesh Pratap Giri Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 05 Mar 2021

Posted on March 15, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A bench of three-judges categorically held that, once an Anticipatory Bail is granted it protected the grantee/accused until the end of trial and there is no need to obtain Regular Bail, after Charge sheet is filed by Police into the Court. This cites the 5-judge constitution bench decision in Sushila Aggarwal here.

From Para 2,

2. The present Criminal Appeals by way of Special Leave arise out of the impugned orders dated 11.12.2019 and 20.12.2019 passed by the Allahabad High Court. By order dated 11.12.2019, the High Court, on an application made by the complainant/respondent no. 2, indicated that the anticipatory bail granted to the appellant/accused by the Trial Court vide order dated 21.10.2019 had come to an end with the filing of a chargesheet, and directed him to surrender and apply for regular bail. The appellant subsequently filed an application for recall/modification of the order dated 11.12.2019 passed by the High Court, which was dismissed by the second impugned order dated 20.12.2019.

From Para 8,

8. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the High Court wrongly held that the anticipatory bail granted to the appellant by the Trial Court vide order dated 21.10.2019 had come to an end with the filing of the chargesheet. We therefore set aside the impugned orders passed by the High Court and restore the anticipatory bail granted to the appellant by the Trial Court vide order dated 21.10.2019.

Dr. Rajesh Pratap Giri Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 05 Mar 2021

Citations : [2021 LawSuit(SC) 166], [MANU/SC/0305/2021]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/161262593/

https://lawsuitcasefinder.com/casedetail?id=U2FsdGVkX1plo2tUxa2cMAz7KRvWCQqG8B12T11THz0P2wMgs5

Index of all Anticipatory Bail Matters is here

Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga Vs Rameshwari Rameshchandra Daga on 13 Dec 2004

Posted on March 14, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held that, Alimony and maintenance can be given even if a marriage is held to be null and void.

From Para 18,

18. In the present case, on the husband’s petition, a decree declaring the second marriage as null and void has been granted. The learned counsel has argued that where the marriage is found to be null and void — meaning non-existent in the eye of the law or non est, the present respondent cannot lay a claim as wife for grant of permanent alimony or maintenance. We have critically examined the provisions of section 25 in the light of conflicting decisions of the High Court cited before us. In our considered opinion, as has been held by this Court in Chand Dhawan case, the expression used in the opening part of Section 25 enabling the “court exercising jurisdiction under the Act” “at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto” to grant alimony or maintenance cannot be restricted only to, as contended, decree of judicial separation under Section 10 or divorce under Section 13. When the legislature has used such wide expression as “at the time of passing of any decree”, it encompasses within the expression all kinds of decrees such as restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9, judicial separation under Section 10, declaring marriage as null and void under Section 11, annulment of marriage as voidable under Section 12 and divorce under Section 13.
19. Learned counsel for the husband has argued that extending the benefit of Section 25 to even marriages which have been found null and void under Section 11 would be against the very object and purpose of the Act to ban and discourage bigamous marriages.
20. It is a well-known and recognised legal position that customary Hindu law like Mohammedan law permitted bigamous marriages which were prevalent in all Hindu families and more so in royal Hindu families. It is only after the Hindu law was codified by enactments including the present Act that bar against bigamous marriages was created by Section 5(i) of the Act. Keeping in consideration the present state of the statutory Hindu law, a bigamous marriage may be declared illegal being in contravention of the provisions of the Act but it cannot be said to be immoral so as to deny even the right of alimony or maintenance to a spouse financially weak and economically dependent. It is with the purpose of not rendering a financially dependent spouse destitute that Section 25 enables the court to award maintenance at the time of passing any type of decree resulting in breach in a marriage relationship.
21. Section 25 is an enabling provision. It empowers the court in a matrimonial case to consider facts and circumstances of the spouse applying and decide whether or not to grant permanent alimony or maintenance.
22. The facts of the present case fully justify grant of maintenance both to the wife and the daughter. The evidence of the wife has been believed by the courts below and according to us rightly so. From the circumstances preceding and attending the marriage, it can safely be inferred that the present husband must have made reasonable enquiries about the previous marriage of the present wife. The wife’s version is natural and inspires belief that the document of chhor chithhi was shown and given to the husband. It is proved from the photocopy of the foil of registration, placed on record. According to the wife, the husband did receive the document of chhor chithhi but has not produced it before the Family Court. It is argued that it is open to the wife, if the document was registered, to get a copy from the registration office. Even if that was possible, we find no ground to disbelieve her version that the fact of her previous marriage was not concealed from the present husband. The husband is an advocate. His falsehood went to the extent of denying his second marriage and calling his wife only to be a governess of his children from the first wife. He unsuccessfully denied even the parentage of daughter Puja, born through him. He failed to lead any evidence on the illegitimacy of the child. After the second marriage the parties lived as husband and wife and they had a considerably long married life of about nine years from 1981 to 1990. In such a situation, the Family Court and the High Court were fully justified in holding that the wife deserves to be granted maintenance under Section 25 of the Act.

Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga Vs Rameshwari Rameshchandra Daga on 13 Dec 2004

Citations : [2005 ALD SC 2 62], [2005 BOMCR 3 834], [2005 CTC 1 66], [2005 DMC SC 1 1], [2005 GLH 1 288], [2005 GLR 2 939], [2005 JCR SC 2 306], [2004 JT SC 10 366], [2005 KLT SC 1 188], [2005 LW 4 11], [2005 MLJ SC 2 49], [2004 SCALE 10 391], [2005 SCC 2 33], [2005 AIR SC 422], [2005 GUJLR 2 939], [2005 GUJ LR 2 939]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/938507/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adffe4b0149711412a91

Index of Maintenance Judgements under HMA is here.

Krishnaveni Rai Vs Pankaj Rai and Anr on 19 Feb 2020

Posted on March 14, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

The division bench of Apex Court held as follows,

From Paras 26, 27 and 28

26. It is well settled that a marriage which is null and void is no marriage in the eye of law. Where the marriage is a nullity application for maintenance is liable to be set aside on that ground alone. Under Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, a marriage may validly be solemnized between any two Hindus, subject to the following conditions:-
(i) Neither party has a spouse living at the time of marriage [(Section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act];
(ii) Neither party was incapable of giving valid consent of the marriage in circumstances specified in Section 5(ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act;
(iii) The parties to the marriage are of requisite age, that is, the bridegroom should have completed 21 years of age and the bride 18 years of age, at the time of marriage [Section 5(iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act];
(iv) The parties should not be within the degree of prohibited relationship unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits such marriage
[(Section 5(iv) of the Hindu Marriage Act];
(v) Parties are not sapindas of each other unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits between two. [(Section 5 (v) of the Hindu Marriage Act];
27. Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act provides that any marriage solemnized after the commencement of this Act shall be null and void and may on a petition presented by either party thereto, against the other party, be so declared by a decree of nullity, if it contravenes any of the conditions in Clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of the Section 5.
28. A careful reading of Sections 5, 11 and 15 makes it amply clear that while Section 5 specifies the conditions on which a marriage may be solemnized between two Hindus, only contravention of some of those conditions render a marriage void.

And from Para 38,

38. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant has also argued that maintenance cannot be refused on the ground of nullity of marriage, until there is a declaration of nullity of marriage by a competent Court, in appropriate proceedings under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act. We need not go into this question in view of our finding that a marriage contracted during the pendency of an appeal from a decree is not ab initio void, and certainly not when such an appeal is filed after expiry of the period of limitation.

Krishnaveni Rai Vs Pankaj Rai and Anr on 19 Feb 2020

Citations : [2020 SCC ONLINE SC 225]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/81931264/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5e52c0a93321bc1e173f86fe

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/krishnaveni-rai-versus-pankaj-rai-anr

Krishna Prasad Verma (D) Thr. Lrs. Vs State of Bihar on 26 Sep 2019

Posted on March 13, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

The division bench of the Apex Court held as follows:

From Para 16,

16. We would, however, like to make it clear that we are in no manner indicating that if a judicial officer passes a wrong order, then no action is to be taken. In case a judicial officer passes orders which are against settled legal norms but there is no allegation of any extraneous influences leading to the passing of such orders then the appropriate action which the High Court should take is to record such material on the administrative side and place it on the service record of the judicial officer concerned. These matters can be taken into consideration while considering career progression of the concerned judicial officer. Once note of the wrong order is taken and they form part of the service record these can be taken into consideration to deny selection grade, promotion etc., and in case there is a continuous flow of wrong or illegal orders then the proper action would be to compulsorily retire the judicial officer, in accordance with the Rules. We again reiterate that unless there are clear-cut allegations of misconduct, extraneous influences, gratification of any kind etc., disciplinary proceedings should not be initiated merely on the basis that a wrong order has been passed by the judicial officer or merely on the ground that the judicial order is incorrect.

Krishna Prasad Verma (D) Thr. Lrs. Vs State of Bihar on 26 Sep 2019

Citations : [2019 SCC ONLINE SC 1330], [2019 SCC 10 640], [2020 SCC CRI 1 78], [2019 AIR SC 4852]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/23604802/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5dc567dd46571b38af731d48

Upkar Singh Vs Ved Prakash and Ors on 10 Sep 2004

Posted on March 11, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A landmark judgment from a 3-judge bench of Supreme Court, categorically declares as follows:

From Para 17,

17. It is clear from the words emphasised hereinabove in the above quotation, this Court in the case of T.T Antony v. State of Kerala has not excluded the registration of a complaint in the nature of a counter-case from the purview of the Code. In our opinion, this Court in that case only held that any further complaint by the same complainant or others against the same accused, subsequent to the registration of a case, is prohibited under the Code because an investigation in this regard would have already started and further complaint against the same accused will amount to an improvement on the facts mentioned in the original complaint, hence will be prohibited under section 162 of the code. This prohibition noticed by this Court, in our opinion, does not apply to counter-complaint by the accused in the first complaint or on his behalf alleging a different version of the said incident.

From Para 23,

23. Be that as it may, if the law laid down by this Court in T.T Antony case is to be accepted as holding that a second complaint in regard to the same incident filed as a counter-complaint is prohibited under the Code then, in our opinion, such conclusion would lead to serious consequences. This will be clear from the hypothetical example given hereinbelow i.e if in regard to a crime committed by the real accused he takes the first opportunity to lodge a false complaint and the same is registered by the jurisdictional police then the aggrieved victim of such crime will be precluded from lodging a complaint giving his version of the incident in question, consequently he will be deprived of his legitimated right to bring the real accused to book. This cannot be the purport of the Code.

Upkar Singh Vs Ved Prakash and Ors on 10 Sep 2004

Citations : [2004 AIR SC 4320], [2004 ALD CRI 2 906], [2004 CRI LJ 4219], [2004 JCR SC 4 158], [2004 JT SC 7 488], [2004 KLT SC 3 444], [2005 OLR SC 1 43], [2004 PLJR 4 157], [2004 SCALE 7 563], [2004 CRLJ 0 4219], [2004 SCC 13 2922004 ACR 3 2450], [2005 SCC CR 0 211], [2004 SCC 1 292], [2004 JT 7 4881], [2005 JIC 1 1092005 ACC 51 673], [2004 AIR SC 3240], [2004 AIR SC 0 4320], [2004 RCR CRIMINAL 4 294], [2004 SCC 22 292], [2004 SCC 6 528], [2004 AIR SC 5017], [2005 BOMCR CRI SC 1 199], [2004 CRIMES SC 4 20], [2005 SCC CRI 211], [2004 SUPREME 6 528], [2004 ALLLJ 3436], [2004 CRLJ SC 4219], [2004 RCR CRL 4 2942004 ALL LJ 3436], [2004 CRILJ 42192004 JT 7 488], [2004 AIR SCW 5017], [2004 AIR SCW 0 4320]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1054183/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adefe4b0149711412948

Krishna Lal Chawla and Ors Vs State of UP and Anr on 08 Mar 2021

Posted on March 11, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that a second complaint/FIR against same accused person by same complaint is impermissible in law and is also violative of Article 21 of Constitution.

It is the aforementioned part of the holding in Upkar Singh that bears directly and strongly upon the present case. This Court in Upkar Singh has clearly stated that any further complaint by the same complainant against the same accused, after the case has already been registered, will be deemed to be an improvement from the original complaint. Though Upkar Singh was rendered in the context of a case involving cognizable offences, the same principle would also apply where a person gives information of a non-cognizable offence and subsequently lodges a private complaint with respect to the same offence against the same accused person. Even in a non-cognizable case, the police officer after the order of the Magistrate, is empowered to investigate the offence in the same manner as a cognizable case, except the power to arrest without a warrant. Therefore, the complainant cannot subject the accused to a double whammy of investigation by the police and inquiry before the Magistrate.

Krishna Lal Chawla and Ors Vs State of UP and Anr on 08 Mar 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Category: Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification

Fakhrey Alam Vs State of Uttar Pradesh on 15 Mar 2021

State of Goa Vs Fouziya Shaikh on 12 Mar 2021

Sartaj Singh Vs State of Haryana on 15 Mar 2021

Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay Vs Union of India (Election Reforms: Right to Reject)

Dr. Rajesh Pratap Giri Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 05 Mar 2021

Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga Vs Rameshwari Rameshchandra Daga on 13 Dec 2004

Krishnaveni Rai Vs Pankaj Rai and Anr on 19 Feb 2020

Krishna Prasad Verma (D) Thr. Lrs. Vs State of Bihar on 26 Sep 2019

Upkar Singh Vs Ved Prakash and Ors on 10 Sep 2004

Krishna Lal Chawla and Ors Vs State of UP and Anr on 08 Mar 2021