State of Himachal Pradesh Vs Tara Dutt and Anr on 19 Nov 1999

Posted on July 9, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A 3-judge full bench of Apex Court held that the limitation available under section 468 CrPC deals only with taking of the initial cognizance of an offence by a Court.

Indiankanoon version:

State of Himachal Pradesh Vs Tara Dutt and Anr on 19 November, 1999

Casemine version:

State of H.P Vs Tara Dutt and Anr on 19 Nov 1999

Citations : [1999 ACR SC 3 2841], [2000 AIR SC 297], [2000 ALD CRI 2 278], [1999 JT SC 9 215], [2000 LW CRL 1 379], [2000 OLR 1 153], [2000 RCR CRIMINAL 1 41], [1999 SCALE 7 183], [2000 SCC 1 230], [1999 SUPP SCR 4 514], [2000 SCC CRI 125], [2000 AIR SC 207], [1999 SUPREME 9 421], [1999 AIR SC 4413], [2000 CRIMES SC 1 15], [1999 CCR 4 280], [1999 SLT 9 612], [2000 SRJ 1 79], [2000 JCC 1 121], [2000 UJ SC 1 498], [2000 CRLJ SC 485], [1999 AIR SCW 4413]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1807975/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad5ae4b0149711411286

S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs Jagannath on 27 Oct 1993

Posted on July 4, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Landmark judgment by a division bench of the Supreme Court of India around perjury/fraud committed upon the Courts. Just read the below line to understand how far the frauds take the Courts for a ride.

This Civil Appeal was numbered 994 of 1972, but got decided on October 27, 1993!
Twenty One (21) years lost at Supreme Court itself!!!

From Para 5,

5. The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. The High Court, however, went haywire and made observations which are wholly perverse. We do not agree with the High Court that “there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence”. The principle of “finality of litigation” cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court-process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who’s case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.

From Para 6,

6. The facts of the present case leave no manner of doubt that Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another’s loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. Jagannath was working as a clerk with Chunilal Sowcar. He purchased the property in the court auction on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. He had, on his own volition, executed the registered release deed (Ex. B-15) in favour of Chunilal Sowcar regarding the property in dispute. He knew that the appellants had paid the total decretal amount to his master Chunilal Sowcar. Without disclosing all these facts, he filed the suit for the partition of the property on the ground that he had purchased the property on his own behalf and not on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. Non-production and even non-mentioning of the release deed at the trial is tantamount to playing fraud on the court. We do not agree with the observations of the High Court that the appellants- defendants could have easily produced the certified registered copy of Ex. B-15 and non-suited the plaintiff. A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party.

S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs Jagannath on 27 Oct 1993 (Original)

Citations : [1994 AIR SC 853], [1993 SCALE 4 277], [1994 UJ SC 1 1], [1993 BC SC 2 546], [1994 BLJR 1 216], [1994 OLR SC 1 201], [1995 PLR 109 293], [1993 SUPP SCR 3 422], [1994 SCC 1 1], [1994 PLJR 1 39], [1994 APLJ SC 1 66], [1994 LW 1 21], [1994 GLH 1 81], [1993 JT SC 6 331]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1151521/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac8fe4b014971140f23f

Index of Perjury related judgments is here.

Asar Mohammad and Ors Vs State of UP on 24 Oct 2018

Posted on July 2, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Replying on a catena of landmark judgments, a division bench of the Apex Court that the Appellant No.1 is guilty of committing the murder and the Appellant No.2 and 3 are liable to punishment u/s 201 IPC.

Asar Mohammad and Ors Vs State of UP on 24 Oct 2018

Citations : [2018 SCC ONLINE SC 2179], [2019 SCC 12 253], [2019 SCC CRI 4 321], [2018 AIR SC 5264], [2018 CRIMES 4 387], [2019 ALL LJ 1 382], [2018 AIC 192 50], [2019 ECRN 1 148]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/28788694/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5bd343729eff430a1b47f1d9

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/asar-mohammad-and-ors-versus-the-state-of-u-p

https://crlreview.in/asar-mohammad-v-state-of-up/

Rahul S Shah Vs Jinendra Kumar Gandhi on 22 Apr 2021

Posted on July 1, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court passed these mandatory guidelines which “All Courts dealing with suits and execution proceedings shall follow”.

From Para 42,

42. All Courts dealing with suits and execution proceedings shall mandatorily follow the below-mentioned directions:
1. In suits relating to delivery of possession, the court must examine the parties to the suit under Order X in relation to third party interest and further exercise the power under Order XI Rule 14 asking parties to disclose and produce documents, upon oath, which are in possession of the parties including declaration pertaining to third party interest in such properties.
2. In appropriate cases, where the possession is not in dispute and not a question of fact for adjudication before the Court, the Court may appoint Commissioner to assess the accurate description and status of the property.
3. After examination of parties under Order X or production of documents under Order XI or receipt of commission report, the Court must add all necessary or proper parties to the suit, so as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and also make such joinder of cause of action in the same suit.
4. Under Order XL Rule 1 of CPC, a Court Receiver can be appointed to monitor the status of the property in question as custodia legis for proper adjudication of the matter.
5. The Court must, before passing the decree, pertaining to delivery of possession of a property ensure that the decree is unambiguous so as to not only contain clear description of the property but also having regard to the status of the property.
6. In a money suit, the Court must invariably resort to Order XXI Rule 11, ensuring immediate execution of decree for payment of money on oral application.
7. In a suit for payment of money, before settlement of issues, the defendant may be required to disclose his assets on oath, to the extent that he is being made liable in a suit. The Court may further, at any stage, in appropriate cases during the pendency of suit, using powers under Section 151 CPC, demand security to ensure satisfaction of any decree.
8. The Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 47 or under Order XXI of CPC, must not issue notice on an application of third-party claiming rights in a mechanical manner. Further, the Court should refrain from entertaining any such application(s) that has already been considered by the Court while adjudicating the suit or which raises any such issue which otherwise could have been raised and determined during adjudication of suit if due diligence was exercised by the applicant.
9. The Court should allow taking of evidence during the execution proceedings only in exceptional and rare cases where the question of fact could not be decided by resorting to any other expeditious method like appointment of Commissioner or calling for electronic materials including photographs or video with affidavits.
10. The Court must in appropriate cases where it finds the objection or resistance or claim to be frivolous or mala fide, resort to Sub-rule (2) of Rule 98 of Order XXI as well as grant compensatory costs in accordance with Section 35A.
11. Under section 60 of CPC the term “…in name of the judgment- debtor or by another person in trust for him or on his behalf” should be read liberally to incorporate any other person from whom he may have the ability to derive share, profit or property.
12. The Executing Court must dispose of the Execution Proceedings within six months from the date of filing, which may be extended only by recording reasons in writing for such delay.
13. The Executing Court may on satisfaction of the fact that it is not possible to execute the decree without police assistance, direct the concerned Police Station to provide police assistance to such officials who are working towards execution of the decree. Further, in case an offence against the public servant while discharging his duties is brought to the knowledge of the Court, the same must be dealt stringently in accordance with law.
14. The Judicial Academies must prepare manuals and ensure continuous training through appropriate mediums to the Court personnel/staff executing the warrants, carrying out attachment and sale and any other official duties for executing orders issued by the Executing Courts

Rahul S Shah Vs Jinendra Kumar Gandhi on 22 Apr 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/93073896/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6085af43c07b9e7eacd85ef8

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/rahul-s-shah-versus-jinendra-kumar-gandhi-ors

Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya and Ors Vs State of Gujarat and Anr on 16 Oct 2019

Posted on June 28, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A landmark judgment by a Full Bench of Supreme Court of India around the question,

From Para 9,

whether, after a charge-sheet is filed by the police, the Magistrate has the power to order further investigation, and if so, up to what stage of a criminal proceeding.

From Para 25,

25. Whereas it is true that Section 156(3) remains unchanged even after the 1973 Code has been brought into force, yet the 1973 Code has one very important addition, namely, Section 173(8), which did not exist under the 1898 Code. As we have noticed earlier in this judgment, Section 2(h) of the 1973 Criminal Procedure Code defines “investigation” in the same terms as the earlier definition contained in Section 2(l) of the 1898 Criminal Procedure Code with this difference – that “investigation” after the 1973 Code has come into force will now include all the proceedings under the CrPC for collection of evidence conducted by a police officer. “All” would clearly include proceedings under Section 173(8) as well. Thus, when Section 156(3) states that a Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order “such an investigation”, such Magistrate may also order further investigation under Section 173(8), regard being had to the definition of “investigation” contained in Section 2(h).

From Para 36,

36. Despite the aforesaid judgments, some discordant notes were sounded in three recent judgments. In Amrutbhai Shambubhai Patel v. Sumanbhai Kantibai Patel (2017) 4 SCC 177, on the facts in that case, the Appellant/Informant therein sought a direction under Section 173(8) from the Trial Court for further investigation by the police long after charges were framed against the Respondents at the culminating stages of the trial. The Court in its ultimate conclusion was correct, in that, once the trial begins with the framing of charges, the stage of investigation or inquiry into the offence is over, as a result of which no further investigation into the offence should be ordered. But instead of resting its judgment on this simple fact, this Court from paragraphs 29 to 34 resuscitated some of the earlier judgments of this Court, in which a view was taken that no further investigation could be ordered by the Magistrate in cases where, after cognizance is taken, the accused had appeared in pursuance of process being issued. In particular, Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy (supra) was strongly relied upon by the Court. We have already seen how this judgment was rendered without adverting to the definition of “investigation” in Section 2(h) of the CrPC, and cannot therefore be relied upon as laying down the law on this aspect correctly.

From Para 38,

38. There is no good reason given by the Court in these decisions as to why a Magistrate’s powers to order further investigation would suddenly cease upon process being issued, and an accused appearing before the Magistrate, while concomitantly, the power of the police to further investigate the offence continues right till the stage the trial commences. Such a view would not accord with the earlier judgments of this Court, in particular, Sakiri (supra), Samaj Parivartan Samudaya (supra), Vinay Tyagi (supra), and Hardeep Singh (supra); Hardeep Singh (supra) having clearly held that a criminal trial does not begin after cognizance is taken, but only after charges are framed. What is not given any importance at all in the recent judgments of this Court is Article 21 of the Constitution and the fact that the Article demands no less than a fair and just investigation. To say that a fair and just investigation would lead to the conclusion that the police retain the power, subject, of course, to the Magistrate’s nod under Section 173(8) to further investigate an offence till charges are framed, but that the supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate suddenly ceases mid-way through the pre-trial proceedings, would amount to a travesty of justice, as certain cases may cry out for further investigation so that an innocent person is not wrongly arraigned as an accused or that a prima facie guilty person is not so left out. There is no warrant for such a narrow and restrictive view of the powers of the Magistrate, particularly when such powers are traceable to Section 156(3) read with Section 156(1), Section 2(h), and Section 173(8) of the CrPC, as has been noticed hereinabove, and would be available at all stages of the progress of a criminal case before the trial actually commences. It would also be in the interest of justice that this power be exercised suo motu by the Magistrate himself, depending on the facts of each case. Whether further investigation should or should not be ordered is within the discretion of the learned Magistrate who will exercise such discretion on the facts of each case and in accordance with law. If, for example, fresh facts come to light which would lead to inculpating or exculpating certain persons, arriving at the truth and doing substantial justice in a criminal case are more important than avoiding further delay being caused in concluding the criminal proceeding, as was held in Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi (supra). Therefore, to the extent that the judgments in Amrutbhai Shambubhai Patel (supra), Athul Rao (supra) and Bikash Ranjan Rout (supra) have held to the contrary, they stand overruled. Needless to add, Randhir Singh Rana v. State (Delhi Administration) (1997) 1 SCC 361 and Reeta Nag v. State of West Bengal and Ors. (2009) 9 SCC 129 also stand overruled.

From Para 43,

43. We, therefore, set aside the impugned High Court judgment insofar as it states that post-cognizance the Magistrate is denuded of power to order further investigation.

Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya and Ors Vs State of Gujarat and Anr on 16 Oct 2019

Citations : [2019 SCC ONLINE SC 1346], [(2019) 17 SCC 1], [AIR 2019 SC 5233], [2020(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 1], [(2019) 14 SCALE 1]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/131202146/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5da99d013321bc410549721e

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/vinubhai-haribhai-malaviya-and-ors-versus-the-state-of-gujarat-and-anr

S.Gopal Reddy Vs State of Andhra Pradesh on 11 Jul 1996

Posted on June 28, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

This a landmark judgment from a Division bench of the Supreme Court around section 2, 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act 1961.

Definition of Dowry and the offence of Demanding Dowry

The definition of the term ’dowry’ under Section 2 of the Act shows that any property or valuable security given or “agreed to be given” either directly or indirectly by one party to the marriage to the other party to the marriage “at or before or after the marriage” as a “consideration for the marriage of the said parties” would become ’dowry’ punishable under the Act. Property or valuable security so as to constitute ’dowry’ within the meaning of the Act must therefore be given or demanded “as consideration for the marriage”.
Section 4 of the Act aims at discouraging the very “demand” of “dowry” as a ’Consideration for the marriage’ between the parties thereto and lays down that if any person after the commencement of the Act, “demands”, directly or indirectly, from the parents or guardians of a ’bride’ or ’bridegroom’, as the case may be, any ’dowry’, he shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to Rs.5,000/- or with both.
Thus, it would be seen that section 4 makes punishable the very demand of property or valuable security as a consideration for marriage, which demand, if satisfied, would constitute the graver offence under section 3 of the Act punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years and with fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value of such dowry whichever is more.
The definition of the expression ’dowry’ contained in Section 2 of the Act cannot be confined merely to the ’demand’ of money, property or valuable security ’made at or after the performance of marriage’ as is urged by Mr. Rao. The legislature has in its wisdom while providing for the definition of ’dowry’ emphasised that any money, property or valuable security given, as a consideration for marriage, ’before, at or after the marriage would be covered by the expression ’dowry’ and this definition as contained in Section 2 has to be read wherever the expression ’dowry’ occurs in the Act. Meaning of the expression ’dowry’ as commonly used and understood is different than the peculiar definition thereof under the Act. Under Section 4 of the Act, mere demand of ’dowry’ is sufficient to bring home the offence to an accused. Thus, any “demand” of money, property or valuable security made from the bride or her parents or other relatives by the bridegroom or his parents or other relatives or vice-versa would fall within the mischief of ’dowry’ under the Act where such demand is not properly referable to any legally recognised claim and is consideration of marriage. Marriage in this context would include a proposed marriage also more particularly where the non-fulfilment of the “demand of dowry” leads to the ugly consequence of the marriage not taking place at all. The expression ’dowry’ under the Act must be interpreted in the sense which the Statute wishes to attribute to it. Mr. P.P.Rao, learned senior counsel referred to various dictionaries for the meaning of ’dowry’, ’bride’ and ’bridegroom’ and on the basis of those meanings submitted that ’dowry’ must be construed only as such property, goods or valuable security which is given to a husband by and on behalf of the wife at marriage and any demand made prior to marriage would not amount to dowry. We cannot agree. Where definition has been given in a statute itself, it is neither proper nor desirable to look to the dictionaries etc. to find out the meaning of the expression. The definition given in the statute is the determinative- factor. The Act is a piece of social legislation which aims to check the growing menace of the social evil of dowry and it makes punishable not only the actual receiving of dowry but also the very demand of dowry made before or at the time or after the marriage where such demand is referable to the consideration of marriage. Dowry as a quid pro for marriage is prohibited and not the giving of traditional presents to the bride or the bride groom by friends and relatives. Thus, voluntary presents given at or before or after the marriage to the bride or the bridegroom, as the case may be, of a traditional nature, which are given not as a consideration for marriage but out of love, affection on regard, would not fall within the mischief of the expression ’dowry’ mare punishable under the Act.

On the point of Interpretation of Statutes

It is a well known rule of interpretation of statutes that the text and the context of the entire Act must be looked into while interpreting any of the expressions used in a statute. The courts must look to the object which the statute seeks to achieve while interpreting any of the provisions of the Act. A purposive approach for interpreting the Act is necessary. We are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with Mr. Rao that it is only the property or valuable security given at the time of marriage which would bring the same within the definition of ’dowry’ punishable under the Act, as such an interpretation would be defeating the very object for which the Act was enacted. Keeping in view the object of the Act, “demand of dowry” as a consideration for a proposed marriage would also come within the meaning of the expression dowry under the Act. If we were to agree with Mr. Rao that it is only the demand made at or after marriage which is punishable under Section 4 of the Act, Some serious consequences, which the legislature wanted to avoid, are bound to follow. Take for example a case where the bridegroom or his parents or other relatives make a ’demand’ of dowry during marriage negotiations and later on after bringing the bridal party to the bride’s house find that the bride or her parents or relative have not met the earlier ’demand’ and call off the marriage and leave the bride house should they escape the punishment under the Act. The answer has to be an emphatic ’no’. It would be adding insult to injury if we were to countenance that their action would not attract the provisions of Section 4 of the Act. Such an interpretation would frustrate the very object of the Act and would also run contrary to the accepted principles relating to the interpretation of statutes.

S.Gopal Reddy Vs State of Andhra Pradesh on 11 Jul 1996

Citations : [1996 AD SC 5 229], [1996 AIR SC 2184], [1996 ALD CRI 2 926], [1996 ALT CRI 2 418], [1996 BLJR 2 1329], [1996 CRILJ 3237], [1996 CRIMES SC 3 35], [1997 DMC SC 2 100], [1996 JT SC 6 268], [1996 RCR CRIMINAL 3 153], [1996 SCALE 5 78], [1996 SCC 4 596], [1996 SUPP SCR 3 439], [1996 SCC CRI 792], [1996 OLR SC 2 229]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1213429/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ace1e4b014971140fef2

Gurmeet Singh Vs State of Punjab on 28 May 2021

Posted on June 18, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Based on Satbir Singh case here, a 3-judge bench comprising the CJI N.V. Ramana, the appellant was held liable for the offence of 304B IPC>

Gurmeet Singh Vs State of Punjab on 28 May 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

Satbir Singh and Anr Vs State of Haryana on 28 May 2021

Posted on June 18, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division bench of the Apex Court passed these guidelines to the Judges trying the 304 IPC cases.

From Para 36,

36. At the cost of repetition, the law under Section 304B, IPC read with Section 113B, Evidence Act can be summarized below:
i. Section 304B, IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and dowry demand.
ii. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section 304B, IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable presumption of causality, provided under Section 113B, Evidence Act operates against the accused.
iii. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304B, IPC cannot be construed to mean ‘immediately before’. The prosecution must establish existence of “proximate and live link” between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives.
iv. Section 304B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.
v. Due to the precarious nature of Section 304B, IPC read with 113B, Evidence Act, Judges, prosecution and defence should be careful during conduction of trial.
vi. It is a matter of grave concern that, often, Trial Courts record the statement under Section 313, CrPC in a very casual and cursory manner, without specifically questioning the accused as to his defense. It ought to be noted that the examination of an accused under Section 313, CrPC cannot be treated as a mere procedural formality, as it based on the fundamental principle of fairness. This aforesaid provision incorporates the valuable principle of natural justice “audi alteram partem” as it enables the accused to offer an explanation for the incriminatory material appearing against him. Therefore, it imposes an obligation on the court to question the accused fairly, with care and caution.
vii. The Court must put incriminating circumstances before the accused and seek his response. A duty is also cast on the counsel of the accused to prepare his defense since the inception of the Trial with due caution, keeping in consideration the peculiarities of Section 304B, IPC read with
Section 113B, Evidence Act.
viii. Section 232, CrPC provides that, “If, after taking the evidence for the prosecution, examining the accused and hearing the prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence, the Judge shall record an order of acquittal”. Such discretion must be utilized by the Trial Courts as an obligation of best efforts.
ix. Once the Trial Court decides that the accused is not eligible to be acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232, CrPC, it must move on and fix hearings specifically for ‘defence evidence’, calling upon the accused to present his defense as per the procedure provided under Section 233, CrPC, which is also an invaluable right provided to the accused.
x. In the same breath, Trial Courts need to balance other important considerations such as the right to a speedy trial. In this regard, we may caution that the above provisions should not be allowed to be misused as delay tactics.
xi. Apart from the above, the presiding Judge should follow the guidelines laid down by this Court while sentencing and imposing appropriate punishment.
xii. Undoubtedly, as discussed above, the menace of dowry death is increasing day by day. However, it is also observed that sometimes family members of the husband are roped in, even though they have no active role in commission of the offence and are residing at distant places. In these cases, the Court need to be cautious in its approach.

Satbir Singh and Anr Vs State of Haryana on 28 May 2021

Citations :

Other Sources:

Dwarika Prasad Satpathy Vs Bidyut Prava Dixit and Anr on 14 Oct 1999

Posted on May 13, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division bench of the Supreme Court held as follows,

“6………………In our view, validity of the marriage for the purpose of summary proceeding under Section 125 Cr.P.C. is to be determined on the basis of the evidence brought on record by the parties. The standard of proof of marriage in such proceeding is not as strict as is required in a trial of offence under section 494 of the I.P.C. If the claimant in proceedings under Section 125 of the Code succeeds in showing that she and the respondent have lived together as husband and wife, the Court can presume that they are legally wedded spouses, and in such a situation, the party who denies the marital status can rebut the presumption………………”

Dwarika Prasad Satpathy Vs Bidyut Prava Dixit and Anr on 14 Oct 1999

Citations : [1999 ACR SC 3 2547], [1999 AIR SC 3348], [1999 ALD CRI 2 955], [1999 ALR 37 733], [2000 ALT CRI 1 29], [1999 CALLT SC 3 61], [2000 CLT SC 89 167], [1999 GLH 2 1037], [1999 JT SC 8 329], [2000 LW CRL 1 218], [2000 PLJR 1 61], [2000 RLW SC 1 23], [1999 SCALE 6 579], [1999 SCC 7 675], [1999 SUPP SCR 3 684], [1999 SCC CRI 1345], [1999 SUPREME 8 602], [2000 CRLJ 0 1], [1999 RCR CRIMINAL 4 577], [2000 CRI LJ 0 1], [2000 OCR SC 18 348], [1999 AIR SC 3844], [2000 BOMCR CRI SC 731], [1999 CRIMES SC 3 206], [2000 LW CRL 1 217], [2000 CRLJ SC 1], [1999 AIR SCW 3844]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/305700/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad5ee4b0149711411339

Bhagwat Singh Vs Commissioner of Police and Anr on 25 Apr 1985

Posted on May 11, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Wonderful judgment clearly states how law takes care of scenarios where the Police do not investigate a complaint/FIR.

Rule-1

If, notwithstanding the First Information Report, the officer-in-charge of a police station decides not to investigate the case on the view that there is no sufficient ground for entering on an investigation, he is required under sub-section (2) of Section 157 to notify to the informant the fact that he is not going to investigate the case because it to be investigated.

Rule-2

Then again, the officer in charge of a police station is obligated under sub-section(2)(ii) of Section 173 to communicate the action taken by him to the informant and the report forwarded by him to the magistrate under subsection (2)(i) has therefore to be supplied by him to the informant.

Rule-3

Now, when the report forwarded by the officer-in charge of a police station to the Magistrate under sub-section (2)(i) of Section 173 comes up for consideration by the Magistrate, one of two different situations may arise. The report may conclude that an offence appears to have been committed by a particular person or persons and in such a case, the Magistrate may do one of three things:
(1) he may accept the report and take cognizance of the offence and issue process or
(2) he may disagree with the report and drop the proceeding or
(3) he may direct further investigation under sub-section (3) of Section 156 and require the police to make a further report.

Rule-4

The report may on the other hand state that, in the opinion of the police, no offence apppears to have been committed and where such a report has been made, the Magistrate again has an option to adopt one of three courses:
(1) he may accept the report and drop the proceeding or
(2) he may disagree with the report and taking the view that there is sufficient ground for proceeding further, take cognizance of the offence and issue process or
(3) he may direct further investigation to be made by the police under sub-section (3) of Section 156.

Opportunity of filing Protest Petition

We are accordingly of the view that in a case where the magistrate to whom a report is forwarded under sub-section (2)(i) of Section 173 decides not to take cognizance of the offence and to drop the proceeding or takes the view that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against some of the persons mentioned in the First Information Report, the magistrate must give notice to the informant and provide him an opportunity to be heard at the time of consideration of the report.

And finally,

It was urged before us on behalf of the respondents that if in such a case notice is required to be given to the informant, it might result in unnecessary delay on account of the difficulty of effecting service of the notice on the informant. But we do not think this can be regarded as a valid objection against the view we are taking, because in any case the action taken by the police on the First Information Report has to be communicated to the informant and a copy of the report has to be supplied to him under sub-section (2) (i) of Section 173 if that be so, we do not see any reason why it should be difficult to serve notice of the consideration of the report on the informant. Moreover, in any event, the difficulty of service of notice on the informant cannot possibly provide any justification for depriving the informant of the opportunity of being heard at the time when the report is considered by the Magistrate.

Bhagwat Singh Vs Commissioner of Police and Anr on 25 Apr 1985

Citation : [1985 AIR SC 1285], [1985 SCALE 1 1194], [1985 SCC CRI 267], [1985 SCC 2 537], [1985 CRLJ SC 1179], [1985 CRIMES SC 1 994], [1985 SCR 3 942], [1986 ACR SC 10 26], [1986 AWC SC 26], [1985 BOMLR 87 421], [1985 PLJR 53], [1985 SHIMLC 260], [1985 UJ 17 820], [1985 CRI LJ 1521], [1985 UJ SC 820]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/118375/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac18e4b014971140e050

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Category: Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification

State of Himachal Pradesh Vs Tara Dutt and Anr on 19 Nov 1999

S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs Jagannath on 27 Oct 1993

This Civil Appeal was numbered 994 of 1972, but got decided on October 27, 1993!

Twenty One (21) years lost at Supreme Court itself!!!

Asar Mohammad and Ors Vs State of UP on 24 Oct 2018

Rahul S Shah Vs Jinendra Kumar Gandhi on 22 Apr 2021

Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya and Ors Vs State of Gujarat and Anr on 16 Oct 2019

S.Gopal Reddy Vs State of Andhra Pradesh on 11 Jul 1996

Gurmeet Singh Vs State of Punjab on 28 May 2021

Satbir Singh and Anr Vs State of Haryana on 28 May 2021

Dwarika Prasad Satpathy Vs Bidyut Prava Dixit and Anr on 14 Oct 1999

Bhagwat Singh Vs Commissioner of Police and Anr on 25 Apr 1985