MS Supreme Bhiwandi Wada Manor Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs State of Maharashtra on 26 Jul 2021

Posted on March 21, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division bench of the Apex Court held that, there is no scope for examining the complainant (or any witnesses) u/s 200 CrPC, in a 156(3) CrPC proceeding, since that stage is pre-cognizance of any cognizable offence.

From Paras 16 and 17,

16 The primary basis on which the High Court has allowed the applications under Section 438 is that the complaint filed by the first informant was supported by an affidavit dated 6 February 2016. However, the High Court held that the mandate of Section 200 of the CrPC of examining the complainant on oath has not been fulfilled by the Magistrate. On this basis, the High Court held that this raises a serious doubt about the validity of the order which has been passed under Section 156(3).
17 There is a serious error in the view of the Single Judge. First and foremost, the Magistrate’s order under Section 156(3) was not under challenge before the High Court and has attained finality. The High Court was in error in raising a doubt about the correctness of the order under section 156(3) passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate on 11 May 2016 in the course of considering the complaint filed by the complainant. Secondly, the position in law as set out in the order of the Single Judge does not accord with the principles which have been consistently enunciated in the decisions of this Court specifically in the context of Chapter XV of the CrPC. Sections 200 and 202

From Para 20,

20 In Anju Chaudhary v. State of Uttar Pradesh6, Justice Swatanter Kumar for the Bench noted that Section 156 primarily deals with the powers of the police officer to investigate cognizable cases. While passing an order under Section 156(3), the Magistrate does not take cognizance. The order of the Magistrate is in the nature of ―a pre-emptory reminder or intimation to the police‖ to exercise their primary duty and power of investigation. The court held that the power of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) is not affected by the provisions of Section 202

MS Supreme Bhiwandi Wada Manor Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs State of Maharashtra on 26 Jul 2021

Citations : [AIR 2021 SC 3580], [2021 All.M.R. (Cri.) 3062], [2021 (5) BLJ 114], [2021 CriLJ 3747], [JT 2021 (7) SC 238], [2021 (3) MLJ (Cri) 438], [2021 (3) RCR (Criminal) 691], [2021 (8) SCALE 534], [(2021) 8 SCC 753]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/77704402/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6101a65137988476911e2ec4

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/m-s-supreme-bhiwandi-wada-manor-infrastructure-pvt-ltd-versus-the-state-of-maharashtra-anr

S.Vanitha Vs Deputy Commissioner on 15 Dec 2020

Posted on March 15, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Full bench of the Apex Court, in an attempt to balance the rights of parties, purportedly in exercise of the power under Article 142 of the Constitution, allowed a party to stay in a residence owner by the Parents-in-law.

S.Vanitha Vs Deputy Commissioner on 15 Dec 2020

Citations : [2020 SCC ONLINE SC 1023]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71453821/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5fe97792814df3882b7c2a16

Sarbati Devi and Anr Vs Usha Devi on 06 Dec 1983

Posted on March 15, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that in a case of insurance policy holder dying intestate with some nomination, then the nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them

From Para 4,

4. At the outset it should be mentioned that except the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kesari Devi v. Dharma Devi AIR 1962 All 355 on which reliance was placed by the High Court in dismissing the appeal before it and the two decisions of the Delhi High Court in S. Fauza Singh v. Kuldip SinghAIR 1978 Del 276 and Uma Sehgal v. Dwarka Dass Sehgal AIR 1982 Del 36 in all other decisions cited before us the view taken is that the nominee under Section 39 of the Act is nothing more than an agent to receive the money due under a life insurance policy in the circumstances similar to those in the present case and that the money remains the property of the assured during his lifetime and on his death forms part of his estate subject to the law of succession applicable to him. The cases which have taken the above view are Ramballav Dhandhania v. Gangadhar NathmallAIR 1956 Cal 275; Life Insurance Corporation of India v. United Bank of India Ltd AIR 1970 Cal 513; D. Mohanavelu Mudaliar v. Indian Insurance and Banking Corporation Ltd., Salem6; Sarojini Amma v. Neelakanta Pillai AIR 1961 Ker 126; Atmaram Mohanlal Panchal v. Gunvantiben AIR 1977 Guj 134; Malli Dei v. Kanchan Prava Dei AIR 1973 Ori 83 and Lakshmi Amma v. Saguna BhagathILR 1973 Kant 827. Since there is a conflict of judicial opinion on the question involved in this case it is necessary to examine the above cases at some length.

The operative portion of the Judgment:

12. Moreover there is one other strong circumstance in this case which dissuades us from taking a view contrary to the decisions of all other High Courts and accepting the view expressed by the Delhi High Court in the two recent judgments delivered in the year 1978 and in the year 1982. The Act has been in force from the year 1938 and all along almost all the High Courts in India have taken the view that a mere nomination effected under Section 39 does not deprive the heirs of their rights in the amount payable under a life insurance policy. Yet Parliament has not chosen to make any amendment to the Act. In such a situation unless there are strong and compelling reasons to hold that all these decisions are wholly erroneous, the Court should be slow to take a different view. The reasons given by the Delhi High Court are unconvincing. We, therefore, hold that the judgments of the Delhi High Court in Fauza Singh case and in Uma Sehgal case do not lay down the law correctly. They are, therefore, overruled. We approve the views expressed by the other High Courts on the meaning of Section 39 of the Act and hold that a mere nomination made under Section 39 of the Act does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy on the death of the assured. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them.

Sarbati Devi and Anr Vs Usha Devi on 06 Dec 1983

Citations : [1983 SCALE 2 869], [1984 AIR SC 346], [1984 SCC 1 424], [1984 SCR 1 992], [1984 SCC TAX 59], [1984 ALR 10 268], [1984 ALJ 194], [1984 BLJR 21], [1984 ACC 2 377], [1984 ACJ 138], [1984 BLJR 32 210], [1984 COMPLJ SC 1 1], [1984 GLH 490], [1984 COMPCAS SC 55 214], [1984 UJ SC 866]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1308094/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac0ce4b014971140de2b

M.A Khaliq and Ors Vs Ashok Kumar and Anr on 15 Sep 2021

Posted on March 5, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A three-judge full bench of Apex Court held as follows.

The report of the Metropolitan Sessions Judge, after due inquiry into the matter sets out the factual details of the matter. The report indicates that the contempt petitioner was not only summoned to Akividu Police Station in the name of counseling but was also detained. In the circumstances, there was clear violation of the directions issued by this Court not only in Arnesh Kumar but also in the case in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal.
The mere fact that no crime was registered, could not be a defence, nor would it be an escape from the rigour of the decisions rendered by this Court. As a matter of fact, summoning the person without there being any crime registered against him and detaining him would itself be violative of basic principles.
In the circumstances, the Division Bench was not right and justified in setting aside the view taken by the Single Judge of the High Court. We, therefore, allow this appeal. While setting aside the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court, we restore the decision of the Single Judge.
However, considering the facts and circumstances on record, the substantive sentence of three months as recorded in paragraph 32 of the decision of the Single Judge is modified to 15 days leaving rest of the incidents of sentence completely intact.
The contemnor shall surrender himself before the Registrar of the High Court within two weeks from today.

M.A Khaliq and Ors Vs Ashok Kumar and Anr on 15 Sep 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/136109957/

https://www.legitquest.com/case/ma-khaliq-ors-v-ashok-kumar-anr/1FCF45

https://legiteye.com/detaining-any-person-without-there-being-any-crime-registered-against-him-is-violation-of-basic-principles-supreme-court/

Division Bench decision is here.

Ashok Kumar Vs M.A.Khaliq on 18 Jul 2019

Single Judge decision is here.

M.A Khaliq and 2 Ors Vs Bhaskar Bhushan and Anr on 20 Nov 2018

Final Forum:

Review petition was filed but withdrawn by the contemnor himself.

Ashok Kumar Vs M.A.Khaliq on 30 Mar 2022

Luckose Zachariah Vs Joseph Joseph on 18 Feb 2022

Posted on March 3, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division bench of the Supreme Court held that the reports filed by police under 173(2) (Original Charge sheet) and 173(8) (Supplementary Charge sheet) are to be considered by the Magistrate to come to an opinion if the accused committed an offence.

From Para 16,

16 In view of the clear position of law which has been enunciated in the judgments of this Court, both in Vinay Tyagi (supra) and Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya (supra), it is necessary for the Magistrate, to have due regard to both the reports, the initial report which was submitted under Section 173(2) as well as the supplementary report which was submitted after further investigation in terms of Section 173(8). It is thereafter that the Magistrate would have to take a considered view in accordance with law as to whether there is ground for presuming that the persons named as accused have committed an offence. While the High Court has relied upon the decision in Vinay Tyagi (supra), it becomes necessary for this Court to set the matter beyond any controversy having due regard to the fact that the Sessions Judge in the present case had while remitting the proceedings back to the Magistrate relied on the judgment of the Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in Joseph (supra) which is contrary to the position set out in Vinay Tyagi. Hence, the JFCM – I Alappuzha shall reexamine both the reports in terms of the decisions of this Court in Vinay Tyagi vs Irshad Ali alias Deepak and Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya vs State of Gujarat as noted above and in terms of the observations contained in the present judgment. The Magistrate shall take a considered decision expeditiously within a period of one month from the date of the present order.

Luckose Zachariah Vs Joseph Joseph on 18 Feb 2022

Citations :

Other Sources :

M.S Jayaraj Vs Commissioner of Excise Kerala and Ors on 29 Sep 2000

Posted on March 3, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A simple but crucial observation by the Apex Court.

From Para 18,

18. We have difficulty to accept the said contention for more than one reason. If the rule-making authority had intended it to be so they would have effortlessly used the words “outside local limits specified in the licence” in the proviso because the same words have been used in sub- rule (1). As the proviso gives powers to the Excise Commissioner to order removal of a shop to a place “outside the limits specified in this sub- rule” it can only refer to the limits specified in that sub-rule and not elsewhere. It must be noted in this context that sub-rule (2) specifies certain limits such as “within 400 metres” (for toddy shops) and “within 200 metres” (for FL 1 shops) from certain institutions mentioned therein. It is with reference to those limits which are specified in sub-rule (2) that the proviso confers power on the Excise Commissioner to pass order for removal.

M.S Jayaraj Vs Commissioner of Excise Kerala and Ors on 29 Sep 2000

Casemine Version:

M.S Jayaraj Vs Commissioner of Excise Kerala and Ors on 29 Sep 2000 (CM)

Citations : [2000 AIR SC 3674], [2000 SCC 7 552], [2000 SUPREME 7 105], [2000 JT SUPP 1 487], [2000 AIRSC 3266], [2000 SCALE 6 674], [2000 ECC 72 7], [2000 KLT SC 3 820], [2000 SUPP SCR 3 616], [2000 AIR SCW 3674], [2000 SUPPSCR 3 616]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1919476/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad6fe4b014971141169c

Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam Vs State of Bihar on 08 Feb 2022

Posted on February 18, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Apex Court quashed the FIR against relatives, which was riddled with vague allegations.

From Para 12,
12. Before we delve into greater detail on the nature and content of allegations made, it becomes pertinent to mention that incorporation of section 498A of IPC was aimed at preventing cruelty committed upon a woman by her husband and her in-laws, by facilitating rapid state intervention. However, it is equally true, that in recent times, matrimoniallitigation in the country has also increased significantly and there is a greater disaffection and friction surrounding the institution of marriage,now, more than ever. This has resulted in an increased tendency to employ provisions such as 498A IPC as instruments to settle personalscores against the husband and his relatives.

From Para 18,

18. The above-mentioned decisions clearly demonstrate that this court has at numerous instances expressed concern over the misuse of section 498A IPC and the increased tendency of implicating relatives of thehusband in matrimonial disputes, without analysing the long term ramifications of a trial on the complainant as well as the accused. It is further manifest from the said judgments that false implication by way of general omnibus allegations made in the course of matrimonial dispute, ifleft unchecked would result in misuse of the process of law. Therefore, this court by way of its judgments has warned the courts from proceedingagainst the relatives and in-laws of the husband when no prima facie case is made out against them.

From Para 21 and 22,

21. Here it must be borne in mind that although the two FIRs may constitute two independent instances, based on separate transactions, the present complaint fails to establish specific allegations against the in-laws of the Respondent wife. Allowing prosecution in the absence of clear allegations against the in-laws Appellants would simply result in an abuse of the process of law.
22. Therefore, upon consideration of the relevant circumstances and in the absence of any specific role attributed to the accused appellants, it would be unjust if the Appellants are forced to go through the tribulations of a trial, i.e., general and omnibus allegations cannot manifest in a situation where the relatives of the complainant’s husband are forced to undergo trial. It has been highlighted by this court in varied instances, that a criminal trial leading to an eventual acquittal also inflicts severe scars upon the accused, and such an exercise must therefore be discouraged.

Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam Vs State of Bihar on 08 Feb 2022

Citations :

Other Sources :

Rajendra Bhagat Vs State of Jharkhand on 03 Jan 2022

Posted on February 18, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Apex Court held that when there is a genuine settlement between the parties and they are living happily together, such settlement has to be upheld by High Court and quash the 498A IPC case. This cites B.S. Joshi & Ors Vs State Of Haryana & Anr on 13 March, 2003

From Para 5, (The bozos who file false matrimonial cases do NOT realize what they are unleashing; in this case Armyman lost his job!)

5. The appeal preferred by the appellant, being Criminal Appeal No. 10 of 2019, was dismissed by Sessions Judge, Gumla on 30.05.2019. Thereafter, the appellant preferred a revision petition before the High Court, being Criminal Revision No. 910 of 2019. While the said revision petition was pending, two significant events took place. The firsthad been sanction of competent authority for dismissal of the appellant from his military service w.e.f. 14.07.2020for having been convicted of the offence under Section 498-A IPC. In the second relevant event, on 24.11.2020, the appellant and the respondent No. 2 submitted a jointapplication before the High Court, inter alia, stating that with the intervention and advice of family members, common relatives and friends, they had entered intosettlement and resolved all their disputes. It was submitted that upon the appellant approaching his wife forsettlement with assurance to keep her with full honour and dignity, the proposal was accepted by the wife (respondent No. 2) with some conditions, while also undertaking todischarge her matrimonial duties. It was submitted that the parties were residing together with love and affectionand with no dispute between them. It was, therefore jointly prayed that since the dispute was a family dispute that arose due to miscommunication and misunderstanding, now the revision petition may be disposed of in view of the changed circumstances and the family status of the parties. This application was registered as I.A. No. 6052 of 2020.

From Para 7,

7. Having examined the matter in its totality, it appears that the High Court, while disposing of the revision petition with the application moved by the parties, did not pause to consider that maintaining of conviction of the appellant of the offence under Section 498-A IPC would not be securing the ends of justice and with such conviction being maintained and the appellant losing his job, the family would again land itself in financial distress which may ultimately operate adverse to the harmony and happy conjugal life of the parties. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the respondent No. 2 both have reiterated their stand that they have resolved their disputes and are living together while leading a happy conjugal life.

From Para 10,

10. In the aforesaid view of the matter, and taking note of the terms of settlement as stated in the application moved before the High Court which include the undertaking of the appellant that he would be nominating the respondent No. 2 as the nominee in his service record; and where the parties are said to be leading a happy conjugal life, we are clearly of the view that the High Court should have accepted the settlement and quashed all the proceedings with annulment of the orders against the appellant. The High Court having not done so, we are inclined to adopt this course so as to secure the ends of justice.

Rajendra Bhagat Vs State of Jharkhand on 03 Jan 2022

Citations :

Other Sources :

Deepak Sharma Vs State of Haryana on 12 Jan 2022

Posted on January 15, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Another false case victim was stopped from traveling abroad for his employment, but Supreme Court cut the tail of the false complainant and allowed his to travel to US of A.

The allegations in the complaint against the Appellant prima facie do not disclose, against the Appellant, any offence under Section 498A of the IPC, which contemplates cruelty, that is willful conduct of such a nature, as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to the life, limb or health (whether physical or mental) of the woman.
It is interesting to note that in the complaint, the complainant has given the address of her husband in U.S.A. in addition to his permanent address at Faridabad. The complainant has, for reasons known to herself, not made any reference in her complaint to the fact that the Appellant is a resident of Texas, where he is working. The complaint gives the impression that the Appellant is a resident of Faridabad.
From the complaint itself, it is patently clear that the Appellant does not reside in the same premises as his brother, being the husband of the complainant. The averments in the pleadings in the Courts below read with the complaint show that they do not even live in the same place. The Appellant works in Texas, U.S.A., whereas his brother lives and works in North Carolina.
The complainant has not given any particulars of the jewellery that had allegedly been taken by her mother-in-law and brother-in-law. There is not a whisper of whether any jewellery is lying with the Appellant. It is not even alleged that the Appellant forcibly took away or misappropriated the complainant’s jewellery or refused to return the same in spite of request. Taking custody of jewellery for safety cannot constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section 498A of the IPC.
There is not even any allegation against the Appellant of any demand or threat or torture for dowry or property. Failure to control an adult brother, living independently, or giving advice to the complainant to adjust to avoid vindictive retaliation from the Accused No. 1 cannot constitute cruelty on the part of the Appellant within the meaning of Section 498A of the IPC.
There are no specific allegations against the Appellant of misrepresentation or concealment. There is not a whisper of the Appellant’s role in the marriage negotiations that took place in India. As observed above, the Appellant who is the elder brother-in-law of the complainant, resides in U.S.A. There is only a general omnibus allegation that all the accused ruined the life of the complainant by misrepresentation, concealment, etc. On the face of the averments in the complaint, the complainant’s husband made certain misrepresentations to her. The Appellant is not liable for the acts of cruelty, or any other wrongful and/or criminal acts on the part of his parents or brother.
There is nothing specific against the Appellant except the vague allegation that the Appellant and his mother, that is the complainant’s mother-in-law kept her jewellery. The only other allegation is that the Appellant had not done anything, when the complainant had spoken to the Appellant about his brother’s conduct and behaviour, he had told the complainant to remain quiet as Nitin could be a very bad enemy. In any event a deed of compromise has now been executed between the complainant and her husband being the Accused No. 1. A copy of the compromise settlement has been enclosed. The Appellant is not party to the settlement.
Having regard to the nature of the allegations, it is not understood how and why the Appellant should have been detained in India. In our considered opinion, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kurukshetra, erred in directing this Appellant not to leave the country without prior permission of the Court.

The apprehension that the husband of the complainant (Accused No.1) who had been working in the U.S.A. might leave the country cannot be ground to deny the Appellant’s prayer to go back to the U.S.A. to resume his duties in a Company in which he has been working for about 9/10 years. The High Court has also not considered the allegations against the Appellant. There is not even any prima facie finding with regard to liability, if any, of the Appellant to the complainant. There are no specific allegations against the Appellant.

Final nail in the coffin…

The instant application was strongly opposed by the State. This Court finds no merit in the contentions of the State. Ex facie, the allegations in the FIR do not disclose any offence under the provisions of the IPC referred to in the FIR. Ms. Monika Gusain stated that charge-sheet has been filed. She has not been able to point out what is the offence so far as this Appellant being the brother of Nitin Sharma, living in the USA is concerned. The repetitive allegations in the complaint are directed against the husband of the complainant, Nitin Sharma (Accused No.1) and his parents, particularly, his mother being the Accused No.2.

Deepak Sharma Vs State of Haryana on 12 Jan 2022

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/personal-liberty-supreme-court-allows-brother-in-law-accused-in-section-498a-ipc-case-to-travel-abroad-189551

https://www.barandbench.com/news/litigation/giving-advice-avoid-vindictive-retaliation-husband-not-cruelty-498a-ipc-supreme-court

https://lawtrend.in/498-a-ipc-advising-woman-to-adjust-with-husband-taking-jewellery-for-safe-custody-is-not-cruelty-rules-sc/

Dinesh Mahajan Vs Vishal Mahajan on 26 Oct 2021

Posted on November 10, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

In this short order, the single-judge bench of Justice JK Maheswari held as follows:

In Ground ‘D’ of the Transfer Petition, an apprehension of threat of life merely on receiving notice on the above-mentioned complaint, has been shown. No complaint has been lodged by the petitioner to the authorities concerned or before any Court. Mere apprehension of threat of life is not a sufficient ground to transfer a case, without lodging a complaint or substantiating the said ground.

Dinesh Mahajan Vs Vishal Mahajan on 26 Oct 2021

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Category: Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification

MS Supreme Bhiwandi Wada Manor Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs State of Maharashtra on 26 Jul 2021

S.Vanitha Vs Deputy Commissioner on 15 Dec 2020

Sarbati Devi and Anr Vs Usha Devi on 06 Dec 1983

M.A Khaliq and Ors Vs Ashok Kumar and Anr on 15 Sep 2021

Luckose Zachariah Vs Joseph Joseph on 18 Feb 2022

M.S Jayaraj Vs Commissioner of Excise Kerala and Ors on 29 Sep 2000

Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam Vs State of Bihar on 08 Feb 2022

Rajendra Bhagat Vs State of Jharkhand on 03 Jan 2022

Deepak Sharma Vs State of Haryana on 12 Jan 2022

Dinesh Mahajan Vs Vishal Mahajan on 26 Oct 2021