Priya Bala Ghosh Vs Suresh Chandra Ghosh on 4 Mar 1971

Posted on April 12, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division Bench of Apex Court held that, the second marriage has to be proved by establishing the ceremonies constituting the same have been gone through for an offence of Bigamy to be made out.

As pointed out earlier, this Court in Kanwal Ram’s case has laid down that an admission is not evidence of the fact that the second marriage has taken place after the ceremonies constituting the same have been gone through.

Towards the end of Judgment:

Further as pointed out by this Court in Kawal Ram’s case, the admission in Ex. 2 cannot in law be treated as evidence of the second marriage having taken place in an adultery or bigamy case: and that in such cases it must be proved by the prosecution that the second marriage as a fact has taken place after the performance of the essential ceremonies. Mr. Majumdar relied on the decision of this Court in Bharat Singh and another vs. Bhagirathi(1) to the effect that the admissions made by a party are substantive evidence by themselves in view of ss. 17 and 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, and that if those admissions have been duly proved they can be relied on irrespective of the fact whether the party making them appear in the witness box or not or irrespective of the fact whether such a party had or had not been confronted with those admissions. We do not think that the said decision in any way supports the appellant with regard to prosecution for bigamy under s. 494 I.P.C. To conclude, we have already referred to the fact that both the learned Sessions Judge and the High Court have categorically found that the Homo and Saptapadi are the essential rites-for a marriage according to the law governing the parties and that there is no evidence that these two essential ceremonies have been performed when the respondent is stated to have married Sandhya Rani. No reliance can be placed on the admissions stated to be contained in Ex. 2.

Priya Bala Ghosh Vs Suresh Chandra Ghosh on 4 Mar 1971

Citations : [1972 CRI LJ 275], [1971 SCC 1 864], [1971 SCC CRI 362], [1971 SCR 3 961], [1971 AIR SC 1153], [1971 CRLJ SC 939]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/80924/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ab75e4b014971140c8aa

https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/browse/Case?CaseId=001791071000&Title=PRIYA-BALA-GHOSH-Vs.-SURESH-CHANDRA-GHOSH

Jagdish Shrivastava Vs State of Maharashtra on 11 Mar 2022

Posted on March 21, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court deprecated such practice of the Police Officer in taking the petitioners into custody without compliance of Section 41(A) Cr.P.C.

Counsel for the petitioners submits that no notice under Section 41(A) Cr.P.C was ever served and after this fact came to the notice of the Investigating officer that SLPs have been preferred by the petitioners for seeking pre-arrest bail, he approached them and took the petitioners into custody on 8th March, 2022.
Since the petitioners have now been in custody, it may not be appropriate for this Court to pass further orders but at the same time, we grant them liberty to file regular bail application.
If such an application is filed, it is expected from the Trial Court to take note of non-compliance of Section 41(A) Cr.P.C and dispose of the application for post-arrest bail, if any, filed by the petitioners within a reasonable time as expeditiously as possible.
We deprecate such practice of the Police Officer in overstepping after the matter being instituted in this Court and taking the petitioners into custody without compliance of Section 41(A) Cr.P.C. and keeping in view the judgment of this Court in Arnesh Kumar vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2014) 8 SCC 273.

Jagdish Shrivastava Vs State of Maharashtra on 11 Mar 2022

Suresh Chand Jain Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr on 10 Jan 2001

Posted on March 21, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held that, there is no authority for the magistrate to examine the complainant in a 156(3) CrPC proceeding since this is a pre-cognizance stage.

From Para 7,

7. In our opinion, the aforesaid direction given by the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Suresh Kumar v. State of Haryana is contrary to law and cannot be approved. Chapter XII of the Code contains provisions relating to “information to the police and their powers to investigate”, whereas Chapter XV, which contains Section 202, deals with provisions relating to the steps which a Magistrate has to adopt while and after taking cognizance of any offence on a complaint. Provisions of the above two chapters deal with two different facets altogether, though there could be a common factor i.e complaint filed by a person. Section 156, falling within Chapter XII, deals with powers of the police officers to investigate cognizable offences. True, Section 202 which falls under Chapter XV, also refers to the power of a Magistrate to “direct an investigation by a police officer”. But the investigation envisaged in Section 202 is different from the investigation contemplated in section 156 of the code.

From Paras 8 and 9,

8. The investigation referred to therein is the same investigation, the various steps to be adopted for it have been elaborated in Chapter XII of the Code. Such investigation would start with making the entry in a book to be kept by the officer in charge of a police station, of the substance of the information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence. The investigation started thereafter can end up only with the report filed by the police as indicated in Section 173 of the Code. The investigation contemplated in that chapter can be commenced by the police even without the order of a Magistrate. But that does not mean that when a Magistrate orders an investigation under Section 156(3) it would be a different kind of investigation. Such investigation must also end up only with the report contemplated in Section 173 of the Code. But the significant point to be noticed is, when a Magistrate orders investigation under Chapter XII he does so before he takes cognizance of the offence.3
9. But a Magistrate need not order any such investigation if he proposes to take cognizance of the offence. Once he takes cognizance of the offence he has to follow the procedure envisaged in Chapter XV of the Code. A reading of Section 202(1) of the Code would convince that the investigation referred to therein is of a limited nature. The Magistrate can direct such an investigation to be made either by a police officer or by any other person. Such investigation is only for helping the Magistrate to decide whether or not there is sufficient ground for him to proceed further. This can be discerned from the culminating words in Section 202(1). This is because he has already taken cognizance of the offence disclosed in the complaint, and the domain of the case would thereafter vest with him.

And finally from Para 10,

10. The position is thus clear. Any Judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After all registration of an FIR involves only the process of entering the substance of the information relating to the commission of the cognizable offence in a book kept by the officer in charge of the police station as indicated in section 154 of the code. Even if a Magistrate does not say in so many words while directing investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code that an FIR should be registered, it is the duty of the officer in charge of the police station to register the FIR regarding the cognizable offence disclosed by the complaint because that police officer could take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Code only thereafter.

Suresh Chand Jain Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr on 10 Jan 2001

Citations : [2001 ACR SC 1 586], [2001 AIR SC 571], [2001 ALD CRI 1 367], [2001 ALT CRI 1 284], [2001 CGLJ 1 451], [2001 GLH 1 594], [2001 JLJ SC 1 395], [2001 JT SC 2 81], [2001 KLT SC 1 623], [2001 OLR 1 470], [2001 RCR CRIMINAL 1 335], [2001 RLW SC 2 317], [2001 SCALE 1 93], [2001 SCC 2 628], [2001 SCR 1 257], [2001 UC 1 202], [2001 SCC CRI 377], [2001 CCR 1 54], , [2001 AIR SC 189], [2001 CRIMES SC 1 171], [2001 SUPREME 1 129], [2001 CLJ 3 78], [2001 SLT 1 364], [2001 SCJ 1 605], [2001 SRJ 2 100], [2001 JCC 1 78], [2001 CTC 1 500], [2001 AD SC 1 109], [2001 CRLJ SC 954], [2001 AIR SCW 189], [2001 ALLMR CRI SC 775], [2001 UJ SC 1 420]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1373794/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ada0e4b0149711411e8a

MS Supreme Bhiwandi Wada Manor Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs State of Maharashtra on 26 Jul 2021

Posted on March 21, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division bench of the Apex Court held that, there is no scope for examining the complainant (or any witnesses) u/s 200 CrPC, in a 156(3) CrPC proceeding, since that stage is pre-cognizance of any cognizable offence.

From Paras 16 and 17,

16 The primary basis on which the High Court has allowed the applications under Section 438 is that the complaint filed by the first informant was supported by an affidavit dated 6 February 2016. However, the High Court held that the mandate of Section 200 of the CrPC of examining the complainant on oath has not been fulfilled by the Magistrate. On this basis, the High Court held that this raises a serious doubt about the validity of the order which has been passed under Section 156(3).
17 There is a serious error in the view of the Single Judge. First and foremost, the Magistrate’s order under Section 156(3) was not under challenge before the High Court and has attained finality. The High Court was in error in raising a doubt about the correctness of the order under section 156(3) passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate on 11 May 2016 in the course of considering the complaint filed by the complainant. Secondly, the position in law as set out in the order of the Single Judge does not accord with the principles which have been consistently enunciated in the decisions of this Court specifically in the context of Chapter XV of the CrPC. Sections 200 and 202

From Para 20,

20 In Anju Chaudhary v. State of Uttar Pradesh6, Justice Swatanter Kumar for the Bench noted that Section 156 primarily deals with the powers of the police officer to investigate cognizable cases. While passing an order under Section 156(3), the Magistrate does not take cognizance. The order of the Magistrate is in the nature of ―a pre-emptory reminder or intimation to the police‖ to exercise their primary duty and power of investigation. The court held that the power of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) is not affected by the provisions of Section 202

MS Supreme Bhiwandi Wada Manor Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs State of Maharashtra on 26 Jul 2021

Citations : [AIR 2021 SC 3580], [2021 All.M.R. (Cri.) 3062], [2021 (5) BLJ 114], [2021 CriLJ 3747], [JT 2021 (7) SC 238], [2021 (3) MLJ (Cri) 438], [2021 (3) RCR (Criminal) 691], [2021 (8) SCALE 534], [(2021) 8 SCC 753]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/77704402/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6101a65137988476911e2ec4

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/m-s-supreme-bhiwandi-wada-manor-infrastructure-pvt-ltd-versus-the-state-of-maharashtra-anr

S.Vanitha Vs Deputy Commissioner on 15 Dec 2020

Posted on March 15, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Full bench of the Apex Court, in an attempt to balance the rights of parties, purportedly in exercise of the power under Article 142 of the Constitution, allowed a party to stay in a residence owner by the Parents-in-law.

S.Vanitha Vs Deputy Commissioner on 15 Dec 2020

Citations : [2020 SCC ONLINE SC 1023]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71453821/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5fe97792814df3882b7c2a16

Sarbati Devi and Anr Vs Usha Devi on 06 Dec 1983

Posted on March 15, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that in a case of insurance policy holder dying intestate with some nomination, then the nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them

From Para 4,

4. At the outset it should be mentioned that except the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kesari Devi v. Dharma Devi AIR 1962 All 355 on which reliance was placed by the High Court in dismissing the appeal before it and the two decisions of the Delhi High Court in S. Fauza Singh v. Kuldip SinghAIR 1978 Del 276 and Uma Sehgal v. Dwarka Dass Sehgal AIR 1982 Del 36 in all other decisions cited before us the view taken is that the nominee under Section 39 of the Act is nothing more than an agent to receive the money due under a life insurance policy in the circumstances similar to those in the present case and that the money remains the property of the assured during his lifetime and on his death forms part of his estate subject to the law of succession applicable to him. The cases which have taken the above view are Ramballav Dhandhania v. Gangadhar NathmallAIR 1956 Cal 275; Life Insurance Corporation of India v. United Bank of India Ltd AIR 1970 Cal 513; D. Mohanavelu Mudaliar v. Indian Insurance and Banking Corporation Ltd., Salem6; Sarojini Amma v. Neelakanta Pillai AIR 1961 Ker 126; Atmaram Mohanlal Panchal v. Gunvantiben AIR 1977 Guj 134; Malli Dei v. Kanchan Prava Dei AIR 1973 Ori 83 and Lakshmi Amma v. Saguna BhagathILR 1973 Kant 827. Since there is a conflict of judicial opinion on the question involved in this case it is necessary to examine the above cases at some length.

The operative portion of the Judgment:

12. Moreover there is one other strong circumstance in this case which dissuades us from taking a view contrary to the decisions of all other High Courts and accepting the view expressed by the Delhi High Court in the two recent judgments delivered in the year 1978 and in the year 1982. The Act has been in force from the year 1938 and all along almost all the High Courts in India have taken the view that a mere nomination effected under Section 39 does not deprive the heirs of their rights in the amount payable under a life insurance policy. Yet Parliament has not chosen to make any amendment to the Act. In such a situation unless there are strong and compelling reasons to hold that all these decisions are wholly erroneous, the Court should be slow to take a different view. The reasons given by the Delhi High Court are unconvincing. We, therefore, hold that the judgments of the Delhi High Court in Fauza Singh case and in Uma Sehgal case do not lay down the law correctly. They are, therefore, overruled. We approve the views expressed by the other High Courts on the meaning of Section 39 of the Act and hold that a mere nomination made under Section 39 of the Act does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy on the death of the assured. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them.

Sarbati Devi and Anr Vs Usha Devi on 06 Dec 1983

Citations : [1983 SCALE 2 869], [1984 AIR SC 346], [1984 SCC 1 424], [1984 SCR 1 992], [1984 SCC TAX 59], [1984 ALR 10 268], [1984 ALJ 194], [1984 BLJR 21], [1984 ACC 2 377], [1984 ACJ 138], [1984 BLJR 32 210], [1984 COMPLJ SC 1 1], [1984 GLH 490], [1984 COMPCAS SC 55 214], [1984 UJ SC 866]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1308094/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac0ce4b014971140de2b

M.A Khaliq and Ors Vs Ashok Kumar and Anr on 15 Sep 2021

Posted on March 5, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A three-judge full bench of Apex Court held as follows.

The report of the Metropolitan Sessions Judge, after due inquiry into the matter sets out the factual details of the matter. The report indicates that the contempt petitioner was not only summoned to Akividu Police Station in the name of counseling but was also detained. In the circumstances, there was clear violation of the directions issued by this Court not only in Arnesh Kumar but also in the case in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal.
The mere fact that no crime was registered, could not be a defence, nor would it be an escape from the rigour of the decisions rendered by this Court. As a matter of fact, summoning the person without there being any crime registered against him and detaining him would itself be violative of basic principles.
In the circumstances, the Division Bench was not right and justified in setting aside the view taken by the Single Judge of the High Court. We, therefore, allow this appeal. While setting aside the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court, we restore the decision of the Single Judge.
However, considering the facts and circumstances on record, the substantive sentence of three months as recorded in paragraph 32 of the decision of the Single Judge is modified to 15 days leaving rest of the incidents of sentence completely intact.
The contemnor shall surrender himself before the Registrar of the High Court within two weeks from today.

M.A Khaliq and Ors Vs Ashok Kumar and Anr on 15 Sep 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/136109957/

https://www.legitquest.com/case/ma-khaliq-ors-v-ashok-kumar-anr/1FCF45

https://legiteye.com/detaining-any-person-without-there-being-any-crime-registered-against-him-is-violation-of-basic-principles-supreme-court/

Division Bench decision is here.

Ashok Kumar Vs M.A.Khaliq on 18 Jul 2019

Single Judge decision is here.

M.A Khaliq and 2 Ors Vs Bhaskar Bhushan and Anr on 20 Nov 2018

Final Forum:

Review petition was filed but withdrawn by the contemnor himself.

Ashok Kumar Vs M.A.Khaliq on 30 Mar 2022

Luckose Zachariah Vs Joseph Joseph on 18 Feb 2022

Posted on March 3, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division bench of the Supreme Court held that the reports filed by police under 173(2) (Original Charge sheet) and 173(8) (Supplementary Charge sheet) are to be considered by the Magistrate to come to an opinion if the accused committed an offence.

From Para 16,

16 In view of the clear position of law which has been enunciated in the judgments of this Court, both in Vinay Tyagi (supra) and Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya (supra), it is necessary for the Magistrate, to have due regard to both the reports, the initial report which was submitted under Section 173(2) as well as the supplementary report which was submitted after further investigation in terms of Section 173(8). It is thereafter that the Magistrate would have to take a considered view in accordance with law as to whether there is ground for presuming that the persons named as accused have committed an offence. While the High Court has relied upon the decision in Vinay Tyagi (supra), it becomes necessary for this Court to set the matter beyond any controversy having due regard to the fact that the Sessions Judge in the present case had while remitting the proceedings back to the Magistrate relied on the judgment of the Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in Joseph (supra) which is contrary to the position set out in Vinay Tyagi. Hence, the JFCM – I Alappuzha shall reexamine both the reports in terms of the decisions of this Court in Vinay Tyagi vs Irshad Ali alias Deepak and Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya vs State of Gujarat as noted above and in terms of the observations contained in the present judgment. The Magistrate shall take a considered decision expeditiously within a period of one month from the date of the present order.

Luckose Zachariah Vs Joseph Joseph on 18 Feb 2022

Citations :

Other Sources :

M.S Jayaraj Vs Commissioner of Excise Kerala and Ors on 29 Sep 2000

Posted on March 3, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A simple but crucial observation by the Apex Court.

From Para 18,

18. We have difficulty to accept the said contention for more than one reason. If the rule-making authority had intended it to be so they would have effortlessly used the words “outside local limits specified in the licence” in the proviso because the same words have been used in sub- rule (1). As the proviso gives powers to the Excise Commissioner to order removal of a shop to a place “outside the limits specified in this sub- rule” it can only refer to the limits specified in that sub-rule and not elsewhere. It must be noted in this context that sub-rule (2) specifies certain limits such as “within 400 metres” (for toddy shops) and “within 200 metres” (for FL 1 shops) from certain institutions mentioned therein. It is with reference to those limits which are specified in sub-rule (2) that the proviso confers power on the Excise Commissioner to pass order for removal.

M.S Jayaraj Vs Commissioner of Excise Kerala and Ors on 29 Sep 2000

Casemine Version:

M.S Jayaraj Vs Commissioner of Excise Kerala and Ors on 29 Sep 2000 (CM)

Citations : [2000 AIR SC 3674], [2000 SCC 7 552], [2000 SUPREME 7 105], [2000 JT SUPP 1 487], [2000 AIRSC 3266], [2000 SCALE 6 674], [2000 ECC 72 7], [2000 KLT SC 3 820], [2000 SUPP SCR 3 616], [2000 AIR SCW 3674], [2000 SUPPSCR 3 616]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1919476/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad6fe4b014971141169c

Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam Vs State of Bihar on 08 Feb 2022

Posted on February 18, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Apex Court quashed the FIR against relatives, which was riddled with vague allegations.

From Para 12,
12. Before we delve into greater detail on the nature and content of allegations made, it becomes pertinent to mention that incorporation of section 498A of IPC was aimed at preventing cruelty committed upon a woman by her husband and her in-laws, by facilitating rapid state intervention. However, it is equally true, that in recent times, matrimoniallitigation in the country has also increased significantly and there is a greater disaffection and friction surrounding the institution of marriage,now, more than ever. This has resulted in an increased tendency to employ provisions such as 498A IPC as instruments to settle personalscores against the husband and his relatives.

From Para 18,

18. The above-mentioned decisions clearly demonstrate that this court has at numerous instances expressed concern over the misuse of section 498A IPC and the increased tendency of implicating relatives of thehusband in matrimonial disputes, without analysing the long term ramifications of a trial on the complainant as well as the accused. It is further manifest from the said judgments that false implication by way of general omnibus allegations made in the course of matrimonial dispute, ifleft unchecked would result in misuse of the process of law. Therefore, this court by way of its judgments has warned the courts from proceedingagainst the relatives and in-laws of the husband when no prima facie case is made out against them.

From Para 21 and 22,

21. Here it must be borne in mind that although the two FIRs may constitute two independent instances, based on separate transactions, the present complaint fails to establish specific allegations against the in-laws of the Respondent wife. Allowing prosecution in the absence of clear allegations against the in-laws Appellants would simply result in an abuse of the process of law.
22. Therefore, upon consideration of the relevant circumstances and in the absence of any specific role attributed to the accused appellants, it would be unjust if the Appellants are forced to go through the tribulations of a trial, i.e., general and omnibus allegations cannot manifest in a situation where the relatives of the complainant’s husband are forced to undergo trial. It has been highlighted by this court in varied instances, that a criminal trial leading to an eventual acquittal also inflicts severe scars upon the accused, and such an exercise must therefore be discouraged.

Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam Vs State of Bihar on 08 Feb 2022

Citations :

Other Sources :

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Category: Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification

Priya Bala Ghosh Vs Suresh Chandra Ghosh on 4 Mar 1971

Jagdish Shrivastava Vs State of Maharashtra on 11 Mar 2022

Suresh Chand Jain Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr on 10 Jan 2001

MS Supreme Bhiwandi Wada Manor Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs State of Maharashtra on 26 Jul 2021

S.Vanitha Vs Deputy Commissioner on 15 Dec 2020

Sarbati Devi and Anr Vs Usha Devi on 06 Dec 1983

M.A Khaliq and Ors Vs Ashok Kumar and Anr on 15 Sep 2021

Luckose Zachariah Vs Joseph Joseph on 18 Feb 2022

M.S Jayaraj Vs Commissioner of Excise Kerala and Ors on 29 Sep 2000

Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam Vs State of Bihar on 08 Feb 2022