Luckose Zachariah Vs Joseph Joseph on 18 Feb 2022

Posted on March 3, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division bench of the Supreme Court held that the reports filed by police under 173(2) (Original Charge sheet) and 173(8) (Supplementary Charge sheet) are to be considered by the Magistrate to come to an opinion if the accused committed an offence.

From Para 16,

16 In view of the clear position of law which has been enunciated in the judgments of this Court, both in Vinay Tyagi (supra) and Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya (supra), it is necessary for the Magistrate, to have due regard to both the reports, the initial report which was submitted under Section 173(2) as well as the supplementary report which was submitted after further investigation in terms of Section 173(8). It is thereafter that the Magistrate would have to take a considered view in accordance with law as to whether there is ground for presuming that the persons named as accused have committed an offence. While the High Court has relied upon the decision in Vinay Tyagi (supra), it becomes necessary for this Court to set the matter beyond any controversy having due regard to the fact that the Sessions Judge in the present case had while remitting the proceedings back to the Magistrate relied on the judgment of the Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in Joseph (supra) which is contrary to the position set out in Vinay Tyagi. Hence, the JFCM – I Alappuzha shall reexamine both the reports in terms of the decisions of this Court in Vinay Tyagi vs Irshad Ali alias Deepak and Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya vs State of Gujarat as noted above and in terms of the observations contained in the present judgment. The Magistrate shall take a considered decision expeditiously within a period of one month from the date of the present order.

Luckose Zachariah Vs Joseph Joseph on 18 Feb 2022

Citations :

Other Sources :

M.S Jayaraj Vs Commissioner of Excise Kerala and Ors on 29 Sep 2000

Posted on March 3, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A simple but crucial observation by the Apex Court.

From Para 18,

18. We have difficulty to accept the said contention for more than one reason. If the rule-making authority had intended it to be so they would have effortlessly used the words “outside local limits specified in the licence” in the proviso because the same words have been used in sub- rule (1). As the proviso gives powers to the Excise Commissioner to order removal of a shop to a place “outside the limits specified in this sub- rule” it can only refer to the limits specified in that sub-rule and not elsewhere. It must be noted in this context that sub-rule (2) specifies certain limits such as “within 400 metres” (for toddy shops) and “within 200 metres” (for FL 1 shops) from certain institutions mentioned therein. It is with reference to those limits which are specified in sub-rule (2) that the proviso confers power on the Excise Commissioner to pass order for removal.

M.S Jayaraj Vs Commissioner of Excise Kerala and Ors on 29 Sep 2000

Casemine Version:

M.S Jayaraj Vs Commissioner of Excise Kerala and Ors on 29 Sep 2000 (CM)

Citations : [2000 AIR SC 3674], [2000 SCC 7 552], [2000 SUPREME 7 105], [2000 JT SUPP 1 487], [2000 AIRSC 3266], [2000 SCALE 6 674], [2000 ECC 72 7], [2000 KLT SC 3 820], [2000 SUPP SCR 3 616], [2000 AIR SCW 3674], [2000 SUPPSCR 3 616]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1919476/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad6fe4b014971141169c

Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam Vs State of Bihar on 08 Feb 2022

Posted on February 18, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Apex Court quashed the FIR against relatives, which was riddled with vague allegations.

From Para 12,
12. Before we delve into greater detail on the nature and content of allegations made, it becomes pertinent to mention that incorporation of section 498A of IPC was aimed at preventing cruelty committed upon a woman by her husband and her in-laws, by facilitating rapid state intervention. However, it is equally true, that in recent times, matrimoniallitigation in the country has also increased significantly and there is a greater disaffection and friction surrounding the institution of marriage,now, more than ever. This has resulted in an increased tendency to employ provisions such as 498A IPC as instruments to settle personalscores against the husband and his relatives.

From Para 18,

18. The above-mentioned decisions clearly demonstrate that this court has at numerous instances expressed concern over the misuse of section 498A IPC and the increased tendency of implicating relatives of thehusband in matrimonial disputes, without analysing the long term ramifications of a trial on the complainant as well as the accused. It is further manifest from the said judgments that false implication by way of general omnibus allegations made in the course of matrimonial dispute, ifleft unchecked would result in misuse of the process of law. Therefore, this court by way of its judgments has warned the courts from proceedingagainst the relatives and in-laws of the husband when no prima facie case is made out against them.

From Para 21 and 22,

21. Here it must be borne in mind that although the two FIRs may constitute two independent instances, based on separate transactions, the present complaint fails to establish specific allegations against the in-laws of the Respondent wife. Allowing prosecution in the absence of clear allegations against the in-laws Appellants would simply result in an abuse of the process of law.
22. Therefore, upon consideration of the relevant circumstances and in the absence of any specific role attributed to the accused appellants, it would be unjust if the Appellants are forced to go through the tribulations of a trial, i.e., general and omnibus allegations cannot manifest in a situation where the relatives of the complainant’s husband are forced to undergo trial. It has been highlighted by this court in varied instances, that a criminal trial leading to an eventual acquittal also inflicts severe scars upon the accused, and such an exercise must therefore be discouraged.

Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam Vs State of Bihar on 08 Feb 2022

Citations :

Other Sources :

Rajendra Bhagat Vs State of Jharkhand on 03 Jan 2022

Posted on February 18, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Apex Court held that when there is a genuine settlement between the parties and they are living happily together, such settlement has to be upheld by High Court and quash the 498A IPC case. This cites B.S. Joshi & Ors Vs State Of Haryana & Anr on 13 March, 2003

From Para 5, (The bozos who file false matrimonial cases do NOT realize what they are unleashing; in this case Armyman lost his job!)

5. The appeal preferred by the appellant, being Criminal Appeal No. 10 of 2019, was dismissed by Sessions Judge, Gumla on 30.05.2019. Thereafter, the appellant preferred a revision petition before the High Court, being Criminal Revision No. 910 of 2019. While the said revision petition was pending, two significant events took place. The firsthad been sanction of competent authority for dismissal of the appellant from his military service w.e.f. 14.07.2020for having been convicted of the offence under Section 498-A IPC. In the second relevant event, on 24.11.2020, the appellant and the respondent No. 2 submitted a jointapplication before the High Court, inter alia, stating that with the intervention and advice of family members, common relatives and friends, they had entered intosettlement and resolved all their disputes. It was submitted that upon the appellant approaching his wife forsettlement with assurance to keep her with full honour and dignity, the proposal was accepted by the wife (respondent No. 2) with some conditions, while also undertaking todischarge her matrimonial duties. It was submitted that the parties were residing together with love and affectionand with no dispute between them. It was, therefore jointly prayed that since the dispute was a family dispute that arose due to miscommunication and misunderstanding, now the revision petition may be disposed of in view of the changed circumstances and the family status of the parties. This application was registered as I.A. No. 6052 of 2020.

From Para 7,

7. Having examined the matter in its totality, it appears that the High Court, while disposing of the revision petition with the application moved by the parties, did not pause to consider that maintaining of conviction of the appellant of the offence under Section 498-A IPC would not be securing the ends of justice and with such conviction being maintained and the appellant losing his job, the family would again land itself in financial distress which may ultimately operate adverse to the harmony and happy conjugal life of the parties. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the respondent No. 2 both have reiterated their stand that they have resolved their disputes and are living together while leading a happy conjugal life.

From Para 10,

10. In the aforesaid view of the matter, and taking note of the terms of settlement as stated in the application moved before the High Court which include the undertaking of the appellant that he would be nominating the respondent No. 2 as the nominee in his service record; and where the parties are said to be leading a happy conjugal life, we are clearly of the view that the High Court should have accepted the settlement and quashed all the proceedings with annulment of the orders against the appellant. The High Court having not done so, we are inclined to adopt this course so as to secure the ends of justice.

Rajendra Bhagat Vs State of Jharkhand on 03 Jan 2022

Citations :

Other Sources :

Deepak Sharma Vs State of Haryana on 12 Jan 2022

Posted on January 15, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Another false case victim was stopped from traveling abroad for his employment, but Supreme Court cut the tail of the false complainant and allowed his to travel to US of A.

The allegations in the complaint against the Appellant prima facie do not disclose, against the Appellant, any offence under Section 498A of the IPC, which contemplates cruelty, that is willful conduct of such a nature, as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to the life, limb or health (whether physical or mental) of the woman.
It is interesting to note that in the complaint, the complainant has given the address of her husband in U.S.A. in addition to his permanent address at Faridabad. The complainant has, for reasons known to herself, not made any reference in her complaint to the fact that the Appellant is a resident of Texas, where he is working. The complaint gives the impression that the Appellant is a resident of Faridabad.
From the complaint itself, it is patently clear that the Appellant does not reside in the same premises as his brother, being the husband of the complainant. The averments in the pleadings in the Courts below read with the complaint show that they do not even live in the same place. The Appellant works in Texas, U.S.A., whereas his brother lives and works in North Carolina.
The complainant has not given any particulars of the jewellery that had allegedly been taken by her mother-in-law and brother-in-law. There is not a whisper of whether any jewellery is lying with the Appellant. It is not even alleged that the Appellant forcibly took away or misappropriated the complainant’s jewellery or refused to return the same in spite of request. Taking custody of jewellery for safety cannot constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section 498A of the IPC.
There is not even any allegation against the Appellant of any demand or threat or torture for dowry or property. Failure to control an adult brother, living independently, or giving advice to the complainant to adjust to avoid vindictive retaliation from the Accused No. 1 cannot constitute cruelty on the part of the Appellant within the meaning of Section 498A of the IPC.
There are no specific allegations against the Appellant of misrepresentation or concealment. There is not a whisper of the Appellant’s role in the marriage negotiations that took place in India. As observed above, the Appellant who is the elder brother-in-law of the complainant, resides in U.S.A. There is only a general omnibus allegation that all the accused ruined the life of the complainant by misrepresentation, concealment, etc. On the face of the averments in the complaint, the complainant’s husband made certain misrepresentations to her. The Appellant is not liable for the acts of cruelty, or any other wrongful and/or criminal acts on the part of his parents or brother.
There is nothing specific against the Appellant except the vague allegation that the Appellant and his mother, that is the complainant’s mother-in-law kept her jewellery. The only other allegation is that the Appellant had not done anything, when the complainant had spoken to the Appellant about his brother’s conduct and behaviour, he had told the complainant to remain quiet as Nitin could be a very bad enemy. In any event a deed of compromise has now been executed between the complainant and her husband being the Accused No. 1. A copy of the compromise settlement has been enclosed. The Appellant is not party to the settlement.
Having regard to the nature of the allegations, it is not understood how and why the Appellant should have been detained in India. In our considered opinion, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kurukshetra, erred in directing this Appellant not to leave the country without prior permission of the Court.

The apprehension that the husband of the complainant (Accused No.1) who had been working in the U.S.A. might leave the country cannot be ground to deny the Appellant’s prayer to go back to the U.S.A. to resume his duties in a Company in which he has been working for about 9/10 years. The High Court has also not considered the allegations against the Appellant. There is not even any prima facie finding with regard to liability, if any, of the Appellant to the complainant. There are no specific allegations against the Appellant.

Final nail in the coffin…

The instant application was strongly opposed by the State. This Court finds no merit in the contentions of the State. Ex facie, the allegations in the FIR do not disclose any offence under the provisions of the IPC referred to in the FIR. Ms. Monika Gusain stated that charge-sheet has been filed. She has not been able to point out what is the offence so far as this Appellant being the brother of Nitin Sharma, living in the USA is concerned. The repetitive allegations in the complaint are directed against the husband of the complainant, Nitin Sharma (Accused No.1) and his parents, particularly, his mother being the Accused No.2.

Deepak Sharma Vs State of Haryana on 12 Jan 2022

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/personal-liberty-supreme-court-allows-brother-in-law-accused-in-section-498a-ipc-case-to-travel-abroad-189551

https://www.barandbench.com/news/litigation/giving-advice-avoid-vindictive-retaliation-husband-not-cruelty-498a-ipc-supreme-court

https://lawtrend.in/498-a-ipc-advising-woman-to-adjust-with-husband-taking-jewellery-for-safe-custody-is-not-cruelty-rules-sc/

Dinesh Mahajan Vs Vishal Mahajan on 26 Oct 2021

Posted on November 10, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

In this short order, the single-judge bench of Justice JK Maheswari held as follows:

In Ground ‘D’ of the Transfer Petition, an apprehension of threat of life merely on receiving notice on the above-mentioned complaint, has been shown. No complaint has been lodged by the petitioner to the authorities concerned or before any Court. Mere apprehension of threat of life is not a sufficient ground to transfer a case, without lodging a complaint or substantiating the said ground.

Dinesh Mahajan Vs Vishal Mahajan on 26 Oct 2021

Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 13 Apr 2021

Posted on November 10, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

This is a landmark judgment from the 3-judge full-bench of Supreme Court of India.

From Para 23,

23. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be adopted”, during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during the investigation or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under:
i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence;
ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences;
iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on;
iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty).
v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;
vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;
vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule;
viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere;
ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping;
x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;
xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice;
xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;
xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court;
xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint;
xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR;
xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order.
xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.

Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 13 Apr 2021

Citations : [2021 SCC ONLINE SC 315]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/199473647/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/607d22efba0bb01cbed0c0a7

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/m-s-neeharika-infrastructure-pvt-ltd-versus-state-of-maharashtra-and-others

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Amish Devgan Vs Union of India and Ors on 07 Dec 2020

Posted on October 27, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 84,

84. Lastly, we would also like to clarify that Section 179 of the Criminal Code permits prosecution of cases in the court within whose local jurisdiction the offence has been committed or consequences have ensued. Section 186 of the Criminal Code relates to cases where two separate charge-sheets have been filed on the basis of separate FIRs and postulates that the prosecution would proceed where the first charge-sheet has been filed on the basis of the FIR that is first in point of time. Principle underlying section 186 can be applied at the pre-charge-sheet stage, that is, post registration of
FIR but before charge-sheet is submitted to the Magistrate. In such cases ordinarily the first FIR, that is, the FIR registered first in point of time, should be treated as the main FIR and others as statements under Section 162 of the Criminal Code. However, in exceptional cases and for good reasons, it will be open to the High Court or this Court, as the case may be, to treat the subsequently registered FIR as the principal FIR. However, this should not cause any prejudice, inconvenience or harassment to either the victims, witnesses or the person who is accused. We have clarified the aforesaid position to avoid any doubt or debate on the said aspect.

Amish Devgan Vs Union of India and Ors on 07 Dec 2020

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/179868451/

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/amish-devgan-versus-union-of-india-and-others

Kusum Bhatia Vs Sagar Sethi on 16 Sep 2019

Posted on October 23, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

In a short order, the Apex Court said this,

Having heard learned counsel for both the sides on merits, we do not find any ground to interfere in the impugned order. In our considered opinion, the interest of justice would be met if the child, Kumari Preksha (aged about 16 years as of now) is awarded maintenance. Since, the petitioner is a working lady with sufficient salary, we decline to award any maintenance in her favour.

Kusum Bhatia Vs Sagar Sethi on 16 Sep 2019

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/89241961/

Here is the Lower High Court Order:

Kusum Bhatia Vs Sagar Sethi on 27 May 2016

Japani Sahoo Vs Chandra Sekhar Mohanty on 27 Jul 2007

Posted on October 16, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court declared that, Limitation u/s 468 starts from the date of making the complaint and not on the date the cognizance was taken.

Reasoning

52. The matter can be looked at from different angle also. Once it is accepted (and there is no dispute about it) that it is not within the domain of the complainant or prosecuting agency to take cognizance of an offence or to issue process and the only thing the former can do is to file a complaint or initiate proceedings in accordance with law. If that action of initiation of proceedings has been taken within the period of limitation, the complainant is not responsible for any delay on the part of the Court or Magistrate in issuing process or taking cognizance of an offence. Now, if he is sought to be penalized because of the omission, default or inaction on the part of the Court or Magistrate, the provision of law may have to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. It can possibly be urged that such a provision is totally arbitrary, irrational and unreasonable. It is settled law that a Court of Law would interpret a provision which would help sustaining the validity of law by applying the doctrine of reasonable construction rather than making it vulnerable and unconstitutional by adopting rule of ‘litera legis’. Connecting the provision of limitation in Section 468 of the Code with issuing of process or taking of cognizance by the Court may make it unsustainable and ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution.

Conclusion

53. In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, the relevant date must be considered as the date of filing of complaint or initiating criminal proceedings and not the date of taking cognizance by a Magistrate or issuance of process by a Court. We, therefore, overrule all decisions in which it has been held that the crucial date for computing the period of limitation is taking of cognizance by the Magistrate/Court and not of filing of complaint or initiation of criminal proceedings.

Japani Sahoo Vs Chandra Sekhar Mohanty on 27 Jul 2007

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1432851/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae4ae4b0149711413706

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Category: Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification

Luckose Zachariah Vs Joseph Joseph on 18 Feb 2022

M.S Jayaraj Vs Commissioner of Excise Kerala and Ors on 29 Sep 2000

Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam Vs State of Bihar on 08 Feb 2022

Rajendra Bhagat Vs State of Jharkhand on 03 Jan 2022

Deepak Sharma Vs State of Haryana on 12 Jan 2022

Dinesh Mahajan Vs Vishal Mahajan on 26 Oct 2021

Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 13 Apr 2021

Amish Devgan Vs Union of India and Ors on 07 Dec 2020

Kusum Bhatia Vs Sagar Sethi on 16 Sep 2019

Japani Sahoo Vs Chandra Sekhar Mohanty on 27 Jul 2007