Kannan Vs Selvamuthukani on 30 Jan 2012

Posted on April 13, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that, it has to be clearly established that the family members of Accused-husband knew that his divorce with his first wife was set aside before participating in the second marriage.

9. The prosecution has clearly established that A1 was married to the complainant on 16.6.1980. It is also a fact that A1 obtained a decree of divorce on 20.2.1991 which was set aside on 10.2.1992 in the appeal carried by the complainant against the said decree of divorce. Evidence of the complainant establishes beyond doubt that A1 married A4 on 8.3.1992. The question is whether the fact that the decree of divorce was set aside and the marriage between A1 and the complainant was revived was known to A3, A4 and A5. Merely because A3 is the sister of A1, it cannot be presumed that she knew that the decree of divorce was set aside. If A1 wanted to marry A4, it is possible that he would keep back these facts from his sister as also from A4 and A5 i.e. his second wife and her father respectively.
10. In our opinion, the evidence of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 does not conclusively establish that the fact that the decree of divorce was set aside on 10.2.1992 was known to A3, A4 and A5 and, therefore, benefit of doubt must be given to A3, A4 and A5. In the circumstances, in our opinion, the impugned judgment and order dated 24.9.2008 so far as it convicts and sentences A3, A4 and A5 needs to be set aside.

Citations : [2012 SCC CRI 3 234], [2012 SUPREME 1 714], [2012 AIR SC 1278], [2012 ANJ SC 1 204], [2012 CRIMES SC 1 225], [2012 RCR CRIMINAL SC 4 331], [2012 JT 1 554], [2012 DMC SC 1 327], [2012 AIOL 2007], [2012 AIR SC 1217], [2012 SLT 1 626], [2012 RCR CIVIL SC 4 356], [2012 SCC 5 570], [2012 BOMCR CRI SC 2 428], [2012 SCC ONLINE SC 92], [2012 AIC 111 270], [2012 UC 1 506], [2012 NCC 1 686], [2012 ALD CRI 2 155], [2012 CALLT SC 3 21], [2012 SCALE 2 9], [2012 AIR SCW 1278], [2012 CRI LJ 1576]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/180112594/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af1de4b0149711415a65

https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/Browse/Case?CaseId=002102170000&Title=KANNAN-Vs.-SELVAMUTHUKANI

https://www.legalauthority.in/judgement/kannan-vs-selvamuthukani-7495

K Neelaveni Vs State Rep By Inspector of Police and Ors on 22 Mar 2010

Posted on April 13, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that there are, prima facie, specific allegations in the FIR to attract IPC 406 and 494.

From Paras 8 and 9,

8. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced and we are inclined to accept the submission of Mr. Guru Krishna Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant. From a perusal of the allegations made in the First Information Report, it is evident that the appellant has clearly alleged that her husband had married another lady namely Bharathi and the said marriage had taken place in the presence and with the support of other accused persons. She had also stated that from the second marriage with Bharathi a girl child was born. In the First Information Report, it had clearly been alleged that besides gold ornaments other household articles were given in marriage and further she was subjected to cruelty and driven out from the matrimonial home by the accused persons. In our opinion, the allegations made in the First Information Report, at this stage, have to be accepted as true, and allegations so made prima facie, constitute offences under Sections 406 and 494 of the Indian Penal Code. It has to be borne in mind that while considering the application for quashing of the charge sheet, the allegations made in the First Information Report and the materials collected during the course of the investigation are required to be considered. Truthfulness or otherwise of the allegation is not fit to be gone into at this stage as it is always a matter of trial. Essential ceremonies of the Marriage were gone into or not is a matter of trial.
9. From what we have said above, we are of the opinion that the High Court erred in holding that the charge sheet does not reveal the ingredients constituting the offences under Sections 494 and 406 of the Indian Penal Code.

K Neelaveni Vs State Rep By Inspector of Police and Ors on 22 Mar 2010

Citations : [2010 SCJ 3 654], [2010 AIR SC 3191], [2010 SCC 11 607], [2011 KLJ NOC 2 10], [2010 SCALE 3 261], [2010 DMC 1 560], [2010 SLT 2 604], [2010 CUTLT SUPPL 947], [2010 AIOL 153], [2010 CRIMES SC 2 90], [2010 RCR CRIMINAL SC 2 547], [2011 SCC CRI 1 219], [2010 SUPREME 2 543], [2010 ECRN 2 541], [2010 AIR SC 2760], [2010 AIC 88 58], [2010 MLJ CRL 3 352], [2010 CRLJ SC 2819], [2010 JT SC 3 156], [2010 AIR SCW 2760]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1440610/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aeece4b01497114152ae

https://www.legalauthority.in/judgement/k-neelaveni-vs-state-rep-by-insp-of-police-9855

https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/Browse/Case?CaseId=000102622000

https://advocatespedia.com/Case_Study:_K_Neelaveni_Vs_State_Rep_By_Inspector_of_Police_%26_Ors_Case

Santi Deb Berma Vs Kanchan Prava Devi on 10 Oct 1990

Posted on April 13, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held as follows…

From Paras 6 and 7,

6. Mr. Dutta, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant herein assailed the impugned judgment contending that in the absence of acceptable proof that the marriage of the appellant with Namita Ghosh was celebrated or performed with proper ceremonies and in due form, it cannot be said that the marriage had been solemnised within the ambit of the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) and that the finding of the High Court based on the three letters and the oral evidence to the effect that the appellant and Namita Ghosh were living together as husband and wife cannot in any way serve as proof of a valid marriage as per the Act, especially when there is no plea that the marriage was solemnised in accordance with the customary rites and usage which do not include Saptapadi. In other words, it is not the case of the respondent that the marriage was celebrated in accordance with the customs, dispensing with the ceremony of Saptapadi and usage applicable to the parties. In fact, the courts have proceeded on the footing that according to the parties the ceremony of Saptapadi is one of the essential requirements for constituting a valid marriage.
7. The High Court in the instant case has drawn an inference that all the ceremonies essential for a valid marriage had been performed on the strength of the three letters and the oral evidence as aforementioned. We, after going through the judgment of the High Court very carefully are of the opinion that the High Court is not at all justified in drawing such an inference in the absence of any reliable and acceptable evidence, in regard to the performance of Saptapadi. The result will be that the alleged marriage between the appellant and Namita Ghosh, celebrated in defiance of the law applicable to the parties is held to be a marriage not valid in law. Hence the judgment of the High Court is not sustainable and consequently we allow the appeal by setting aside the conviction and sentence awarded by the High Court and acquit the appellant.

Santi Deb Berma Vs Kanchan Prava Devi on 10 Oct 1990 (CM Ver)

Citations :[1991 AIR SC 8161991 CRI LJ 6601991 SUPP SCC 2 6161992 SCC CRI 651992 JT 1 5401991 CRLJ 0 6601992 MWN CRI 1 841991 CRILJ 6601991 SCC 6161992 MADWN CRI 1 841991 CRLJ SC 660]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/937017/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac4ce4b014971140e8d7

https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/Browse/Case?CaseId=000991475000&CaseId=000991475000

https://courtverdict.com/supreme-court-of-india/santi-deb-berma-vs-smt-kanchan-prava-devi

Priya Bala Ghosh Vs Suresh Chandra Ghosh on 4 Mar 1971

Posted on April 12, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division Bench of Apex Court held that, the second marriage has to be proved by establishing the ceremonies constituting the same have been gone through for an offence of Bigamy to be made out.

As pointed out earlier, this Court in Kanwal Ram’s case has laid down that an admission is not evidence of the fact that the second marriage has taken place after the ceremonies constituting the same have been gone through.

Towards the end of Judgment:

Further as pointed out by this Court in Kawal Ram’s case, the admission in Ex. 2 cannot in law be treated as evidence of the second marriage having taken place in an adultery or bigamy case: and that in such cases it must be proved by the prosecution that the second marriage as a fact has taken place after the performance of the essential ceremonies. Mr. Majumdar relied on the decision of this Court in Bharat Singh and another vs. Bhagirathi(1) to the effect that the admissions made by a party are substantive evidence by themselves in view of ss. 17 and 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, and that if those admissions have been duly proved they can be relied on irrespective of the fact whether the party making them appear in the witness box or not or irrespective of the fact whether such a party had or had not been confronted with those admissions. We do not think that the said decision in any way supports the appellant with regard to prosecution for bigamy under s. 494 I.P.C. To conclude, we have already referred to the fact that both the learned Sessions Judge and the High Court have categorically found that the Homo and Saptapadi are the essential rites-for a marriage according to the law governing the parties and that there is no evidence that these two essential ceremonies have been performed when the respondent is stated to have married Sandhya Rani. No reliance can be placed on the admissions stated to be contained in Ex. 2.

Priya Bala Ghosh Vs Suresh Chandra Ghosh on 4 Mar 1971

Citations : [1972 CRI LJ 275], [1971 SCC 1 864], [1971 SCC CRI 362], [1971 SCR 3 961], [1971 AIR SC 1153], [1971 CRLJ SC 939]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/80924/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ab75e4b014971140c8aa

https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/browse/Case?CaseId=001791071000&Title=PRIYA-BALA-GHOSH-Vs.-SURESH-CHANDRA-GHOSH

Jagdish Shrivastava Vs State of Maharashtra on 11 Mar 2022

Posted on March 21, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court deprecated such practice of the Police Officer in taking the petitioners into custody without compliance of Section 41(A) Cr.P.C.

Counsel for the petitioners submits that no notice under Section 41(A) Cr.P.C was ever served and after this fact came to the notice of the Investigating officer that SLPs have been preferred by the petitioners for seeking pre-arrest bail, he approached them and took the petitioners into custody on 8th March, 2022.
Since the petitioners have now been in custody, it may not be appropriate for this Court to pass further orders but at the same time, we grant them liberty to file regular bail application.
If such an application is filed, it is expected from the Trial Court to take note of non-compliance of Section 41(A) Cr.P.C and dispose of the application for post-arrest bail, if any, filed by the petitioners within a reasonable time as expeditiously as possible.
We deprecate such practice of the Police Officer in overstepping after the matter being instituted in this Court and taking the petitioners into custody without compliance of Section 41(A) Cr.P.C. and keeping in view the judgment of this Court in Arnesh Kumar vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2014) 8 SCC 273.

Jagdish Shrivastava Vs State of Maharashtra on 11 Mar 2022

Suresh Chand Jain Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr on 10 Jan 2001

Posted on March 21, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held that, there is no authority for the magistrate to examine the complainant in a 156(3) CrPC proceeding since this is a pre-cognizance stage.

From Para 7,

7. In our opinion, the aforesaid direction given by the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Suresh Kumar v. State of Haryana is contrary to law and cannot be approved. Chapter XII of the Code contains provisions relating to “information to the police and their powers to investigate”, whereas Chapter XV, which contains Section 202, deals with provisions relating to the steps which a Magistrate has to adopt while and after taking cognizance of any offence on a complaint. Provisions of the above two chapters deal with two different facets altogether, though there could be a common factor i.e complaint filed by a person. Section 156, falling within Chapter XII, deals with powers of the police officers to investigate cognizable offences. True, Section 202 which falls under Chapter XV, also refers to the power of a Magistrate to “direct an investigation by a police officer”. But the investigation envisaged in Section 202 is different from the investigation contemplated in section 156 of the code.

From Paras 8 and 9,

8. The investigation referred to therein is the same investigation, the various steps to be adopted for it have been elaborated in Chapter XII of the Code. Such investigation would start with making the entry in a book to be kept by the officer in charge of a police station, of the substance of the information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence. The investigation started thereafter can end up only with the report filed by the police as indicated in Section 173 of the Code. The investigation contemplated in that chapter can be commenced by the police even without the order of a Magistrate. But that does not mean that when a Magistrate orders an investigation under Section 156(3) it would be a different kind of investigation. Such investigation must also end up only with the report contemplated in Section 173 of the Code. But the significant point to be noticed is, when a Magistrate orders investigation under Chapter XII he does so before he takes cognizance of the offence.3
9. But a Magistrate need not order any such investigation if he proposes to take cognizance of the offence. Once he takes cognizance of the offence he has to follow the procedure envisaged in Chapter XV of the Code. A reading of Section 202(1) of the Code would convince that the investigation referred to therein is of a limited nature. The Magistrate can direct such an investigation to be made either by a police officer or by any other person. Such investigation is only for helping the Magistrate to decide whether or not there is sufficient ground for him to proceed further. This can be discerned from the culminating words in Section 202(1). This is because he has already taken cognizance of the offence disclosed in the complaint, and the domain of the case would thereafter vest with him.

And finally from Para 10,

10. The position is thus clear. Any Judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After all registration of an FIR involves only the process of entering the substance of the information relating to the commission of the cognizable offence in a book kept by the officer in charge of the police station as indicated in section 154 of the code. Even if a Magistrate does not say in so many words while directing investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code that an FIR should be registered, it is the duty of the officer in charge of the police station to register the FIR regarding the cognizable offence disclosed by the complaint because that police officer could take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Code only thereafter.

Suresh Chand Jain Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr on 10 Jan 2001

Citations : [2001 ACR SC 1 586], [2001 AIR SC 571], [2001 ALD CRI 1 367], [2001 ALT CRI 1 284], [2001 CGLJ 1 451], [2001 GLH 1 594], [2001 JLJ SC 1 395], [2001 JT SC 2 81], [2001 KLT SC 1 623], [2001 OLR 1 470], [2001 RCR CRIMINAL 1 335], [2001 RLW SC 2 317], [2001 SCALE 1 93], [2001 SCC 2 628], [2001 SCR 1 257], [2001 UC 1 202], [2001 SCC CRI 377], [2001 CCR 1 54], , [2001 AIR SC 189], [2001 CRIMES SC 1 171], [2001 SUPREME 1 129], [2001 CLJ 3 78], [2001 SLT 1 364], [2001 SCJ 1 605], [2001 SRJ 2 100], [2001 JCC 1 78], [2001 CTC 1 500], [2001 AD SC 1 109], [2001 CRLJ SC 954], [2001 AIR SCW 189], [2001 ALLMR CRI SC 775], [2001 UJ SC 1 420]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1373794/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ada0e4b0149711411e8a

MS Supreme Bhiwandi Wada Manor Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs State of Maharashtra on 26 Jul 2021

Posted on March 21, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division bench of the Apex Court held that, there is no scope for examining the complainant (or any witnesses) u/s 200 CrPC, in a 156(3) CrPC proceeding, since that stage is pre-cognizance of any cognizable offence.

From Paras 16 and 17,

16 The primary basis on which the High Court has allowed the applications under Section 438 is that the complaint filed by the first informant was supported by an affidavit dated 6 February 2016. However, the High Court held that the mandate of Section 200 of the CrPC of examining the complainant on oath has not been fulfilled by the Magistrate. On this basis, the High Court held that this raises a serious doubt about the validity of the order which has been passed under Section 156(3).
17 There is a serious error in the view of the Single Judge. First and foremost, the Magistrate’s order under Section 156(3) was not under challenge before the High Court and has attained finality. The High Court was in error in raising a doubt about the correctness of the order under section 156(3) passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate on 11 May 2016 in the course of considering the complaint filed by the complainant. Secondly, the position in law as set out in the order of the Single Judge does not accord with the principles which have been consistently enunciated in the decisions of this Court specifically in the context of Chapter XV of the CrPC. Sections 200 and 202

From Para 20,

20 In Anju Chaudhary v. State of Uttar Pradesh6, Justice Swatanter Kumar for the Bench noted that Section 156 primarily deals with the powers of the police officer to investigate cognizable cases. While passing an order under Section 156(3), the Magistrate does not take cognizance. The order of the Magistrate is in the nature of ―a pre-emptory reminder or intimation to the police‖ to exercise their primary duty and power of investigation. The court held that the power of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) is not affected by the provisions of Section 202

MS Supreme Bhiwandi Wada Manor Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs State of Maharashtra on 26 Jul 2021

Citations : [AIR 2021 SC 3580], [2021 All.M.R. (Cri.) 3062], [2021 (5) BLJ 114], [2021 CriLJ 3747], [JT 2021 (7) SC 238], [2021 (3) MLJ (Cri) 438], [2021 (3) RCR (Criminal) 691], [2021 (8) SCALE 534], [(2021) 8 SCC 753]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/77704402/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6101a65137988476911e2ec4

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/m-s-supreme-bhiwandi-wada-manor-infrastructure-pvt-ltd-versus-the-state-of-maharashtra-anr

S.Vanitha Vs Deputy Commissioner on 15 Dec 2020

Posted on March 15, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Full bench of the Apex Court, in an attempt to balance the rights of parties, purportedly in exercise of the power under Article 142 of the Constitution, allowed a party to stay in a residence owner by the Parents-in-law.

S.Vanitha Vs Deputy Commissioner on 15 Dec 2020

Citations : [2020 SCC ONLINE SC 1023]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71453821/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5fe97792814df3882b7c2a16

Sarbati Devi and Anr Vs Usha Devi on 06 Dec 1983

Posted on March 15, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that in a case of insurance policy holder dying intestate with some nomination, then the nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them

From Para 4,

4. At the outset it should be mentioned that except the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kesari Devi v. Dharma Devi AIR 1962 All 355 on which reliance was placed by the High Court in dismissing the appeal before it and the two decisions of the Delhi High Court in S. Fauza Singh v. Kuldip SinghAIR 1978 Del 276 and Uma Sehgal v. Dwarka Dass Sehgal AIR 1982 Del 36 in all other decisions cited before us the view taken is that the nominee under Section 39 of the Act is nothing more than an agent to receive the money due under a life insurance policy in the circumstances similar to those in the present case and that the money remains the property of the assured during his lifetime and on his death forms part of his estate subject to the law of succession applicable to him. The cases which have taken the above view are Ramballav Dhandhania v. Gangadhar NathmallAIR 1956 Cal 275; Life Insurance Corporation of India v. United Bank of India Ltd AIR 1970 Cal 513; D. Mohanavelu Mudaliar v. Indian Insurance and Banking Corporation Ltd., Salem6; Sarojini Amma v. Neelakanta Pillai AIR 1961 Ker 126; Atmaram Mohanlal Panchal v. Gunvantiben AIR 1977 Guj 134; Malli Dei v. Kanchan Prava Dei AIR 1973 Ori 83 and Lakshmi Amma v. Saguna BhagathILR 1973 Kant 827. Since there is a conflict of judicial opinion on the question involved in this case it is necessary to examine the above cases at some length.

The operative portion of the Judgment:

12. Moreover there is one other strong circumstance in this case which dissuades us from taking a view contrary to the decisions of all other High Courts and accepting the view expressed by the Delhi High Court in the two recent judgments delivered in the year 1978 and in the year 1982. The Act has been in force from the year 1938 and all along almost all the High Courts in India have taken the view that a mere nomination effected under Section 39 does not deprive the heirs of their rights in the amount payable under a life insurance policy. Yet Parliament has not chosen to make any amendment to the Act. In such a situation unless there are strong and compelling reasons to hold that all these decisions are wholly erroneous, the Court should be slow to take a different view. The reasons given by the Delhi High Court are unconvincing. We, therefore, hold that the judgments of the Delhi High Court in Fauza Singh case and in Uma Sehgal case do not lay down the law correctly. They are, therefore, overruled. We approve the views expressed by the other High Courts on the meaning of Section 39 of the Act and hold that a mere nomination made under Section 39 of the Act does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy on the death of the assured. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them.

Sarbati Devi and Anr Vs Usha Devi on 06 Dec 1983

Citations : [1983 SCALE 2 869], [1984 AIR SC 346], [1984 SCC 1 424], [1984 SCR 1 992], [1984 SCC TAX 59], [1984 ALR 10 268], [1984 ALJ 194], [1984 BLJR 21], [1984 ACC 2 377], [1984 ACJ 138], [1984 BLJR 32 210], [1984 COMPLJ SC 1 1], [1984 GLH 490], [1984 COMPCAS SC 55 214], [1984 UJ SC 866]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1308094/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac0ce4b014971140de2b

M.A Khaliq and Ors Vs Ashok Kumar and Anr on 15 Sep 2021

Posted on March 5, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A three-judge full bench of Apex Court held as follows.

The report of the Metropolitan Sessions Judge, after due inquiry into the matter sets out the factual details of the matter. The report indicates that the contempt petitioner was not only summoned to Akividu Police Station in the name of counseling but was also detained. In the circumstances, there was clear violation of the directions issued by this Court not only in Arnesh Kumar but also in the case in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal.
The mere fact that no crime was registered, could not be a defence, nor would it be an escape from the rigour of the decisions rendered by this Court. As a matter of fact, summoning the person without there being any crime registered against him and detaining him would itself be violative of basic principles.
In the circumstances, the Division Bench was not right and justified in setting aside the view taken by the Single Judge of the High Court. We, therefore, allow this appeal. While setting aside the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court, we restore the decision of the Single Judge.
However, considering the facts and circumstances on record, the substantive sentence of three months as recorded in paragraph 32 of the decision of the Single Judge is modified to 15 days leaving rest of the incidents of sentence completely intact.
The contemnor shall surrender himself before the Registrar of the High Court within two weeks from today.

M.A Khaliq and Ors Vs Ashok Kumar and Anr on 15 Sep 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/136109957/

https://www.legitquest.com/case/ma-khaliq-ors-v-ashok-kumar-anr/1FCF45

https://legiteye.com/detaining-any-person-without-there-being-any-crime-registered-against-him-is-violation-of-basic-principles-supreme-court/

Division Bench decision is here.

Ashok Kumar Vs M.A.Khaliq on 18 Jul 2019

Single Judge decision is here.

M.A Khaliq and 2 Ors Vs Bhaskar Bhushan and Anr on 20 Nov 2018

Final Forum:

Review petition was filed but withdrawn by the contemnor himself.

Ashok Kumar Vs M.A.Khaliq on 30 Mar 2022

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Category: Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification

Kannan Vs Selvamuthukani on 30 Jan 2012

K Neelaveni Vs State Rep By Inspector of Police and Ors on 22 Mar 2010

Santi Deb Berma Vs Kanchan Prava Devi on 10 Oct 1990

Priya Bala Ghosh Vs Suresh Chandra Ghosh on 4 Mar 1971

Jagdish Shrivastava Vs State of Maharashtra on 11 Mar 2022

Suresh Chand Jain Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr on 10 Jan 2001

MS Supreme Bhiwandi Wada Manor Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs State of Maharashtra on 26 Jul 2021

S.Vanitha Vs Deputy Commissioner on 15 Dec 2020

Sarbati Devi and Anr Vs Usha Devi on 06 Dec 1983

M.A Khaliq and Ors Vs Ashok Kumar and Anr on 15 Sep 2021